Conventional wisdom holds that interest group access to the European Commission is biased in favor of specific interests and against diffuse interests. Yet, patterns of access vary between policy areas. In this article, I map and explain the relative access of specific and diffuse interests to the European Commission’s expert groups. I find that specific interests gain more access in general, but there are considerable variations across issues. I argue that variations in access across expert groups are explained by the relative ability of specific and diffuse interests to contest policies in different policy areas. This argument gains support by statistical analyses using a novel dataset comprising all expert groups with interest group participants. The findings suggest that a political logic helps explain variations in specific and diffuse interest access to the Commission.
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