The presence of cross-institutional partisan links between the Council and the European Parliament is a key feature of bicameral law-making in the European Union. However, assessing the conditions under which national parties can and do influence ‘their’ Members of the European Parliament is complicated by a lack of measurements of the national interest at stake. Analysing the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals regulation, this article shows that national parties represented in the Council only seek to influence ‘their’ Members of the European Parliament when the national interest at stake is sufficiently large and, more importantly, when a legislative deal has been struck. These findings have implications for our understanding of legislative politics in the European Union and the relationship between Members of the European Parliament, European Parliamentary Groups and the Council.
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