We propose an informational model of lobbying to understand macro-characteristics of lobbying systems. We are particularly interested in the number of lobbyists in a system, and the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists. Empirically, we seek to explain the post-Maastricht lobbying boom in the European Union and the concomitant establishment of European Commission forums for interest representation. Using a simple model of informational lobbying with many lobbyists, we show that there is a relationship between lobbying costs, the number of lobbyists, and the informational content of lobbying messages. In conclusion, we propose three different categories of lobbying systems.
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