`[C]onstitutions are unlikely to work as intended unless they employ the engines of Bentham, i.e., punishments and rewards.' (Sartori, 1994: ix)
`The transition to democracy consists of the design and manipulation of institutions... that render certain actions and the pursuit of certain outcomes in people's self-interest.' (Ordeshook, 1997: 111)
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