Extending emphasis framing in an age of factual relativism and epistemic polarization: The role of divergent factual interpretations in frame packages

Abstract

In a digital communication era where oppositions are often formed around epistemic disputes, we suggest integrating factual interpretations into the conceptualization and measurement of emphasis frames. Beyond proposing this extended conceptualization of emphasis frames and interpretative packages of journalistic content, we rely on an exploratory qualitative content analysis of an international sample of media content and comments on polarized issues surrounded by epistemic disputes. To extend framing literature and research, this paper ends with concrete suggestions for the measurement of factual interpretations across different methods and journalistic and media domains. Together, to better understand the scope and consequences of the epistemic turn in digital communication ecologies and journalism, this paper suggests placing emphasis on how (in)congruent claims on truth are (de)legitimized across sources and platforms.

Emphasis frames have been defined as patterns of interpretation that emphasize a certain problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation in communication texts (e.g., Entman, 1993). In the contemporary context of shifts toward factual relativism (e.g., Van Aelst et al., 2017), epistemic vulnerabilities beyond disinformation (Labarre, 2025) and factual belief polarization (Rekker and Harteveld, 2024), we explore how the legitimization of factual claims and subjective truths across journalistic and non-journalistic domains may be regarded as an important unexplored component of frames that suggest a certain factual interpretation of reality.

By suggesting a certain epistemic interpretation of issues, factual interpretations may set boundaries for the epistemic considerations of audiences. By making media representations revolve around the factual underpinnings of disputes, the interpretation of issues can shift from the ideological to the epistemic dimension – as also central to the concepts of factual belief polarization (Rekker and Harteveld, 2024) and factual relativism (Van Aelst et al., 2017). These concepts suggest that audiences consider the (il)legitimacy of subjective truth claims around contested issues, especially when there are signals in the media environment that point them to the subjective nature of truth claims, such as delegitimizing ‘fake news’ labels (Egelhofer et al., 2022).

In a context where political and societal discussions increasingly revolve around epistemic disputes, we suggest to integrate factual interpretations into the conceptualization and measurement of emphasis frames. In line with the conceptualization of media interpretations as interpretative packages (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989), we regard factual interpretations as indicative of the organization of themes and issues. Factual interpretations refer to the discursive construction of truth, which may be unrelated to the actual objective or verifiable reality of issues. As such, it may correspond to what Stephan Colbert (see Boler and Davis, 2018) referred to as “truthiness” – the subjective perception of what someone feels to be true (also see Cramer and Toff, 2017). Making salient alternative factual interpretations (i.e., quoting expert knowledge versus direct experiences) may influence the public perception of truth, herewith affecting the perceived legitimacy of evidence. What counts as the objective and universal truth is not the central object of factual interpretations: It rather relates to the legitimization of identity-congruent claims on truth to suggest a targeted interpretation of reality among audiences.

To update the emphasis framing approach in an era of factual relativism and subjective evaluations of truth (e.g., Cramer and Toff, 2017), this paper proposes a definition of emphasis frames that includes factual interpretations as frame-element or reasoning device (e.g., Matthes and Kohring, 2008). Beyond introducing epistemic disputes as distinctive frames, this paper explores an extension of emphasis framing that systematically includes the ways in which truth claims are legitimized and disputed across issues. Restricting our approach to distinctive frames would not allow for the systematic investigation of how epistemic elements of emphasis co-construct meaning together with other frame-elements. Moreover, the suggested systematic approach allows epistemic disputes to be studied across various regional contexts, issues, and types of media.

The emphasis on factual interpretations is context-bound: Some communicators may strategically voice certain epistemic disputes to address or cultivate sentiments of a targeted audience – as may be the case for right-wing populist actors emphasizing delegitimizing ‘fake news’ labels across social media to appeal to their followers’ distrust (Egelhofer et al., 2022). In other settings (i.e., in discussions with journalists or politicians in private), the same political actors may not voice these public epistemic disputes. As another example, citizens on social media may discuss epistemic disputes in public to emphasize belonging to groups, or mark differences between their own and other identities in private conversations.

The main purpose of this study is to offer suggestions on how the established theory of framing may be extended and updated with an explicit focus on the framing of epistemic disputes. The case study serves as a limited illustration of how epistemic considerations can be approached in frames, and aims to invite future research to more systematically study the epistemic dimension of framing.

Defining emphasis frames

As part of the proposed conceptualization of factual interpretations, we consider that facts and truths are contingent upon subjective experiences (Boler and Davis, 2018). In their revised understanding of civic competence, Cramer and Toff (2017) propose that political knowledge should take into account how facts are interpreted through personal and subjective experiences. This may especially be relevant in the current information and communication climate in which “common sense” and “direct experiences” are often highlighted as valid experiences of reality (e.g., Hameleers and Yekta, 2025). In light of this, we extend the traditional concept of emphasis framing by taking into account how truth claims are driven by subjective constructions, personal beliefs, and the lens of communicators.

The concept of framing presupposes that journalists or other communicators make salient certain aspects of reality whilst leaving out others, herewith suggesting a framework for interpretation (e.g., De Vreese, 2005; Entman, 1993; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Scheufele, 1999). Entman’s classical (1993) and widely cited definition of emphasis frames suggests that frames have four potential elements that act as organizing ideas or reasoning devices: a problem definition, a causal interpretation, a moral evaluation, and/or a treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993, p.52). Problem definitions highlight how an issue or problem should be perceived, and what is at stake for different actors. Causal interpretations emphasize the responsibility of different actors related to both causing and solving the issue (e.g., Iyengar, 1990). Moral evaluations express evaluations of right or wrong. Treatment recommendations, finally, can suggest how a certain issue should be dealt with, and which responses may be appropriate to alleviate a threat.

The four elements of emphasis frames may be regarded as building blocks or reasoning devices that can cluster together in different meaningful ways to offer a suggested interpretation of different events (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). This also aligns with the approach of Gamson and Modigliani (1989), who see the frame as the organizing idea that is supported by more encompassing interpretative packages, of which the four frame-elements form a pivotal part, alongside the use of certain cultural symbols and styles of communication.

Although we focus on emphasis frames in this paper given their wide applicability to various issues and contexts, it should be argued that scholars have distinguished such frames from other conceptualizations of frames, such as equivalence frames that present an alternative interpretation based on an equivalent presentation of information (i.e., O’Keefe and Jensen, 2009; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) and issue-specific frames tied to specific issues (e.g., Nelson, 2011). We will, therefore, also consider how the conceptualization of factual interpretations in emphasis frames may be transferable to divergent conceptualizations and approaches of framing.

The blind spot in framing: The epistemic dimension of journalism

Although the four elements of emphasis frames can be used to analyze media framing in reliable and valid ways (Matthes and Kohring, 2008; Van Gorp, 2007), we argue that a central epistemic element is missing in existing conceptualizations and operationalizations of frames. Considering Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) understanding of media discourse as composed of meaning-signaling interpretative packages, such as symbols and culturally embedded language, epistemic elements make up an important part of interpretative packages surrounding frames. In this paper, we approach the factual interpretation as an additional element of emphasis frames embedded in a package, as it organizes how truth claims and factual beliefs suggest a reconstructed suggested interpretation of reality.

Specifically, although the element of the problem definition may offer a suggested interpretation and diagnosis of the issue, it does not explicitly forward a suggested factual or epistemic perspective on the issue. We argue that, against the backdrop of increasing concerns about the truth value of news, the perceived prevalence of misinformation, epistemic vulnerabilities in political communication (Labarre, 2025), and the weaponization of delegitimizing ‘fake news’ and disinformation discourses (e.g., Newman et al., 2023; Van Aelst et al., 2017), there is a need to integrate factual interpretations as a central frame-element in the conceptualization and operationalization of emphasis frames.

This context may justify an ‘epistemic turn’ in theories of communication science and beyond. Indeed, epistemic considerations have arguably affected longer-standing political developments such as populism (e.g., Mede and Schäfer, 2020; Saurette and Gunster, 2011) and polarization (Rekker and Harteveld, 2024). For example, science-related populism (Mede and Schäfer, 2020) and epistemic populism (Saurette and Gunster, 2011) both refer to the centrality of the delegitimization of established truth claims in populist discourse, alongside the emphasis on common sense and direct experiences as legitimate knowledge. Factual belief polarization, in turn, posits that deep disagreements central to polarization do not only operate on an affective, moral or ideological level, but increasingly revolve around conflicts about the epistemic nature of the socio-political world (Rekker and Harteveld, 2024).

Hence, beyond traditional notions of affective or ideological polarization that assume that different groups in society increasingly disagree with or dislike each other based on how they think about issues (Iyengar et al., 2019), factual belief polarization relates to deep factual disputes around what empirical facts represent reality (e.g., Van der Goot et al., 2024). As such, different camps in society may have diametrically opposed subjective beliefs about which facts are legitimate interpretations of reality (e.g., Cramer and Toff, 2017). For example, partisans may not only dislike other people with different views on immigration policy, but also legitimize and support incongruent sets of factual beliefs about the mere numbers of immigration. It is relevant to note that the act of framing such disputes in epistemic terms does not make the dispute epistemic per se. Hence, factual interpretations may or may not be emphasized when talking about disputes such as immigration or climate change.

However, factual interpretations do suggest how audiences should think about the epistemic dimensions of issues, and herewith potentially prime or activate epistemic considerations. As an example, quoting alternative experts about immigration whilst delegitimizing epistemic authorities in media coverage may result in audiences questioning the legitimacy of established evidence (e.g., Egelhofer et al., 2022), or perceiving more uncertainty and relativism about factual knowledge. In light of this, framing issues in epistemic terms can be connected to factual belief polarization as the alternative claims on truth emphasized in frames may translate into disputes around the perceived legitimacy of contradictory factual claims.

Defining factual interpretations in emphasis framing

Although the concept of truth may be difficult to capture given its flexible nature, Heidegger (1943, p.1) has referred to it as “correspondence, grounded in correctness, between proposition and thing.” In line with this understanding, propositions gain truth value when they can comprehensively and accurately describe the phenomenon they refer to. In this reading, objectivity can be understood as striving toward the highest level of correspondence possible between reality and its descriptions (Heidegger, 1943). As such, reality becomes observable and palpable through mapping empirical objects in a manner that is free of bias and driven by the goal to maximize correspondence between empirical observations and phenomena.

The issue with truth and objectivity is that, especially in the post-factual context described here, multiple competing propositions are used to describe similar phenomena (Waisbord, 2018). Ideally, and guided by the principles of deliberative democracy, in order to determine which of these alternative claims on truth are most valid, one should collect additional empirical evidence and then determine which alternative hypothesis offers the highest level of correspondence between empirical objects and their descriptions (Heidegger, 1943). This illustrates how objectivity and truth are not necessarily fixed or certain, and thus subject to framing and (media) interpretation.

This relative understanding of truth is crucial for the proposed conceptualization of factual interpretations as part of emphasis frames. Different actors may forward alternative claims on truth that best align with their ideological position or (political) strategy. At the same time, they may delegitimize the truth claims of opposed actors by disclaiming the correspondence between competing truth claims and empirical observations. These (de)legitimizing claims can also result in transferring non-epistemic issues and disputes into the realm of epistemic concerns. Hence, when the emphasis of frames is not about morality, causality, diagnosis or treatments, but rather about the epistemic foundation of issues and the legitimacy of evidence, public perceptions about issues may also be shaped around factual disputes, which connects to the idea of factual belief polarization alongside affective or ideological polarization (Rekker and Harteveld, 2024).

In light of this, the frame-element of factual interpretations can be defined as the legitimization or delegitimization of congruent versus incongruent truth claims through different references to facticity and objectivity. Here, objectivity can be seen as a journalistic performance or discursive construction of making claims that signal credibility to an intended audience (e.g., Boudana, 2011; Tuchman, 1972). Journalists, and other actors that express factual interpretations, can apply different procedures and tactics to signal objectivity to their audiences, for example, by quoting legitimate expert sources or referring to official statistics to legitimize a claim on truth. As such, factual interpretations are subject to a competitive process by which opposed actors that build frames rely on different discursive strategies to legitimize supported truth claims whilst delegitimizing incongruent claims on truth.

Just like emphasis framing has been applied to social media discourse, political discussions, social movements, and other domains (Matthes, 2012), divergent factual interpretations may be emphasized in both journalistic and non-journalistic content. Arguably, the respective domain of information may predict which factual interpretations are more legitimate based on resonance with the source’s profile and intended target audience. For example, hyper-partisan alternative media may focus more on common sense and direct experiences, whereas established news media may rely on statistical evidence and distant experts (e.g., Hameleers and Van der Goot, 2025).

Following the emphasis framing approach, this paper focuses on the relative truth claims and factual interpretations emphasized in the content of information. However, the perceived truthfulness of a given message is also determined by source cues. Indeed, source credibility literature holds that expertise and trustworthiness are central components of the credibility of a source (e.g., Hovland and Weiss, 1951). For example, a claim made by Reuters or the AP may be deemed as more trustworthy compared to the same claim communicated by an ordinary citizen without a status of legitimacy. Arguably, the interaction between factual interpretations in emphasis frames, the legitimacy of source cues, and individual-level beliefs and preferences together determine the credibility of information.

In the next section, we will apply the proposed conceptualization of factual interpretations to a case study on partisan information disseminated in times of armed conflicts salient at the time of data collection (2024): The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Palestine war. Although this case study is not meant to be representative, it serves as an illustration of how opposed partisan perspectives on a given phenomenon can result in alternative factual interpretations of the manner at hand.

Case study: How factual interpretations are embedded in emphasis frames

For our case study, we intentionally sampled ‘most likely’ cases of alternative factual interpretations, which intend to illustrate the breath and construct validity of the concept. For this reason, we sampled information from internationally published English-language news platforms that supported a pro-Russia (Sputnik), a pro-Ukraine (The Kyiv Independent), a pro-Israel (The Jerusalem Post) and pro-Palestine (Al Jazeera) perspective on the issues. The inclusion criteria for these platforms were: (1) their established position as legitimate news sources; (2) the international visibility of these outlets in covering the conflicts for a global digital audience; (3) their support for opposed sides of the two conflicts; (4) the popularity of these outlets in terms of (online) audience sizes and agenda-setting potential in international news coverage. For all outlets, a first random sample of 10 articles published in the period between September 1, 2024 and December 1, 2024 was drawn and analyzed. This period was chosen as it reflects a 3 months period amidst the two different ongoing wars in which no major shifts in discourse or real-life events occurred.

To assess theoretical saturation (e.g., Glaser and Strauss, 1967), five additional articles for each outlet were selected after analyzing the first 10. Reflecting the cyclic-iterative nature of qualitative analyses, and to check for theoretical saturation, we assessed to what extent the analysis of the additional articles revealed additional or contradictory findings on factual interpretations compared to the first sample. This was not the case, so we can assume that theoretical saturation on factual interpretations – at least within the specific scope of this case study – was reached.

Analyses

To analyze the data, a combination of the coding steps of grounded theory (e.g., Charmaz, 2006) and principles of discourse analyses were used (Van Dijk, 1993). Concretely, the stepwise procedures of open, axial, and focused coding of the grounded theory approach were used to derive themes from the data (Charmaz, 2006). The guiding or sensitizing concepts that structured coding were related to the concept of factual interpretations. In the analyses, we aimed to remain open to different alternative ways of constructing truth claims, mapping variety on the ways in which subjective understandings of truth were legitimized by communicators (i.e., journalists or citizens responding to news media). However, references to expert knowledge, empirical evidence, and delegitimizing narratives (Hameleers and Van der Goot, 2025) informed the initial coding of the data.

In line with the principles of discourse analyses (Van Dijk, 1993), we aimed to look beyond mapping the direct meanings of expressions, as we aimed to interpret them as patterns of interpretation that reveal socio-political meanings. This meant that the themes resulting from the grounded theory approach were interpreted into the socio-political context of competing truth claims and the partisan discourse surrounding the narratives around the two wars used as a case study.

Regarding the three subsequent coding steps, the units of analysis (paragraphs or statements in the news stories) were first of all read in depth. After this, relevant segments of data were arced and assigned descriptive labels that summarized the essence in light of the sensitizing concepts guiding the study. Specifically, the coding process aimed to map the variety in the ways in which claims on truth were legitimized, delegitimized, verified or challenged. Atlas.ti was used to support coding. As an example, claims related to expert knowledge confirming partisan claims on the conflicts were coded as a specific form of legitimizing factual interpretations. After this step, we applied axial coding to explore the connection and relationship between open codes. This, for example, entailed the combination of different routines to claim the credibility of congruent truth claims (i.e., pairing official statistics with expert references). This also entailed the contrasting of competing truth claims by emphasizing the validity of congruent truth claims and delegitimizing the credibility of opposed or counter-factual claims on truth (i.e., the out-group spreads fake news, which is confirmed by official statistics that legitimize the truth claims of the in-group).

During focused coding, similar themes were merged (i.e., labels of fake news with labels of disinformation), whereas highly context-bound themes were re-labelled using more analytical and abstract terms (i.e., delegitimizing claims that challenge the honesty and veracity of opposed statements). This step further entailed the grouping of similar codes into more overarching dimensions. Concretely, during the focused coding step, the variety in the data was structured in a more meaningful way by grouping codes that represented different levels of variety on similar underlying dimensions. For example, different codes relating to disinformation accusations (i.e., using the fake news term, calling the opposed camp liars) were all grouped as different ‘disinformation accusations.’

Coding was done in English, which is the same language as the journalistic materials and comments. Although it restricts the richness of the data and the contextual meanings of factual interpretation across languages, it does allow for the direct comparability of meanings and interpretation across sources. The main limitation to be reflexive of is that English is not the native language in the countries under study, and herewith may detach the context from cultural specific meanings and phrases. As such, the English language may signal a reach of communication to the international audience at the cost of being meaningful and inclusive for the domestic audience. Although the framing of disputes on an international level is highly relevant in the scope of global armed conflicts, it should be noted that the frames under study are not necessarily targeted at a domestic audience.

Results

Divergent factual interpretations on the Russia-Ukraine war

First, the findings resulting from the comparison between the pro-Russia outlet Sputnik and the pro-Ukraine outlet Kyiv Independent are discussed. Although not exclusively related to factual interpretations, the most salient contrast reflects divergent labels used to define wars and conflict. The Pro-Russia outlet consistently referred to the war as a mission that is intended to “liberate” regions, herewith labelling Russia as protagonist in the context of an alleged “geopolitical crisis of Ukraine.” The pro-Ukraine outlet defined the same situation as a “full scale war” or an “invasion” initiated by Russian forces that undermine the independence and status of Ukraine.

It can be argued that the use of different labels to refer to the same event also relates to established dimensions of emphasis frames, such as moral evaluations and causal interpretations. At the same time, however, the selection of alternative politically charged labels to define issues promotes (biased) descriptions of events that can be supported and legitimized by congruent factual interpretations and empirical observations. As an example, referring to the war as a “special operation” suggests the broader subjective truth claim that Ukraine threatens and attacks Russia, for which various supportive claims on truth are legitimized (i.e., claims on alleged “proven” acts of violence and undermining behavior by Ukraine that justify an invasion).

Another relevant pattern in factual interpretations concerns the delegitimization of the truth claims of the other camp. The Pro-Ukraine outlet Sputnik often emphasized the dishonesty of the Russian camp in the number of casualties reported. Delegitimizing and challenging the numbers, statistics, and other evidence communicated by the opposed partisan camp was a central theme in the factual interpretations of opposed sources, corresponding to a central delegitimization strategy emphasizing blaming the other for spreading mis- and disinformation cultivating an unfair image of the partisan in-group. This shows how different frame-elements are integrated: Causal interpretations emphasized how the opposed partisan camp was responsible for misrepresenting reality. Factual interpretations shaped this attribution, as they denied the factual claims of the opposed camp (i.e., by delegitimizing statistics and blaming the other for lying) whilst presenting alternative truth claims that offered a favorable image of the (morally superior) in-group.

Another clearly epistemically driven contrast is the ways in which evidence for congruent truth claims was legitimized by warring sides. Sputnik did not emphasize uncertainty or the lack of the confirmation of alleged facts by independent sources for truth claims that resonated with the ideological profile of the outlet. Specifically, factual references were made by simply referring to “investigators” or “The Russian Investigative Committee” as an expert source, without reflecting on potential biases or uncertainty. The following quote illustrates this: “The investigators added that at least 20 people were injured after the August 11 attack on the Bolshoe Soldatskoe village when the Ukrainian brigade used 155 mm cluster munitions containing prohibited asphyxiating poisonous substances.”

In the Kyiv Independent, there were two different ways in which factual claims on the number of fatalities or the impact of attacks were reported. First, factual interpretations explicated that claims were not yet verified or confirmed by Ukrainian sources: “Moscow alleged that 65 Ukrainian POWs were on board the plane during the fatal crash. Ukraine has not confirmed this claim and called for an international investigation, a proposal that Russia refused.” Using the terms “alleged” in the context of truth claims of the out-group and “confirmed” for truth claims of the in-group marks an important element of factual interpretations: Uncertainty in truthfulness is highlighted when claims are incongruent, whereas confirmation of in-group truths points to more certainty and trustworthiness.

A second pattern in the Pro-Ukraine outlet’s factual interpretations is the very specific references to source’s credentials and the context in which something was said. For example, when making partisan claims that legitimized the losses faced by the Russian camp, the outlet explicated the origins of the claims, referring to the source, their credentials, and the event where the claim was made. As such, truthiness was constructed by pointing to the validity and legitimacy of the factual interpretation that was verified and established by expert knowledge embedded in a specific context. These factual interpretations also clearly differentiated between the interpretation of the analyses of experts and authoritative sources versus the direct quotation of the speeches and statements made by independent sources and experts. The distinction between the direct claims made by experts or sources and the interpretation of such statements was absent in the Pro-Russia outlet Sputnik.

Divergent factual interpretations on the Israel-Palestine war

The Pro-Palestine outlet Al-Jazeera used different terms to refer to the armed conflict. Although the news outlet used the more neutral term “Israel-Palestine conflict” to categorize news on the war, individual articles referred to “Israel’s war on Gaza”, “ethnic cleansing” or “war crimes committed by Israel.” The war was consistently interpreted as a genocide initiated by Israel: “The past 14 months of genocide in Gaza have brought alienation but also a sense of new belonging.” This was repeated several times, and the outlet even made the explicit call to the world to apply the correct factual interpretation to describe the war: “It is time the world starts using the correct terminology for Israel’s actions in Gaza: genocide.”

This stands in stark contrast to the interpretations emphasized in the Jerusalem Post. Crucially, and in response to the references to genocide explicated in Al Jazeera, the Pro-Israel outlet explicitly attacked the references to genocide and ethnic cleansing, emphasizing how this was a dangerous form of antisemitism and deception through the distortion of truth claims and the misrepresentation of reality: “An Israeli minister has revealed that accusations of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, made by a former defense minister, caused significant damage internationally, sparking widespread backlash and being amplified by global media outlets.”

In the Pro-Israel outlet, the war was further not referred to as a conflict between two nations, Israel and Palestine, but framed as the war of Israel against the terrorist organization Hamas, which also deemed the actions of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as legitimate acts of defense. The outlet often avoided the term war, and referred to acts of defending borders against foreign attacks, mostly referred to as the individual actions of Hamas or Hezbollah to legitimize truth claims on the position of the in-group.

The partisan outlets representing the two warring sides thus did not share a similar definition of the same situation. The Jerusalem Post avoided references to war and military actions of Israel in Gaza. It legitimized Israel’s position by emphasizing the threats of Hezbollah and Hamas, and emphasized expert knowledge and evidence on the scope of the threat posed by these organizations, for which the observations of the IDF were legitimized as claims on factual reality: “10 weeks into the invasion of Lebanon and about 3 weeks into the ceasefire, the IDF said on Sunday that it confiscated over 10,000 Hezbollah weapons in a large number of different districts of southern Lebanon.” Further, instead of reporting on civilian casualties resulting from Israeli attacks (as dominant in the reporting of Al Jazeera), the outlet emphasized how civilian casualties resulted from the acts of Hamas (the 7 October attack) or Hezbollah: “Hezbollah rockets harm civilians despite IDF operations.” At the same time, the outlet legitimized the claim that the IDF itself avoided making civilian casualties at all cost: “Hezbollah rockets harm civilians despite IDF operations.” Al-Jazeera, in contrast, emphasized how the targeting of civilian targets by the IDF resulted in numerous civilian targets, including children. They therefore foregrounded a diametrically opposed factual interpretation of the scope of the conflict, including the casualties of war and the targets that were affected.

The most dominant reporting on the war by Al-Jazeera reported on specific attacks by the Israeli army, emphasizing the suffering of civilians or the explicit number of civilian deaths resulting from the attacks of Israel. Claims on numbers of casualties were backed up by referring to “the authorities”, “the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza”, “medics” or “medical authorities.” Explicit names of individual experts and their affiliation were, however, not used often. When claims of the Israeli camp were referred to, Al-Jazeera often emphasized the uncertainty or unreliability surrounding these factual claims: “Israeli army claims that the six captives found in Khan Younis in August could have been killed by Hamas but refused to rule out that an Israeli air strike killed them.” Whereas congruent truth claims were stated as hard facts, opposed claims on truth were referred to as “claims” or “statements” that were explicitly referred to as unreliable or inaccurate.

The Jerusalem Post often referred to the IDF as a source for its factual claims. Moreover, the partisan “Alma Center” was referred to as a legitimate source to back up claims on the number of incidents and threats caused by alleged terrorist organizations: “The Alma Center focuses on Israel’s security challenges along the Israel-Lebanon border. Our data indicates that at least 2,291 rockets and missiles crossed into Israeli territory in October 2024, the researchers wrote.” Importantly, although congruent truth claims that supported the Israeli cause were presented as hard facts that could be confirmed with certainty, incongruent claims were explicitly presented as “claims” “allegations” or “suggestions” from other sources.

Factual interpretations in comment sections

It should be noted that this case study focused on journalistic media with a clear ideological profile in the context of the two conflicts under study. To explore the transferability of these findings, an additional content analysis of social media comment sections on the X-platforms of the four different news outlets was conducted. From a random selection of five articles per outlet, 10 comments were selected (N = 200 comments). Following the same analytical strategy as for the articles, the results point to some noteworthy differences in the emphasis of factual interpretations.

Most importantly, the comment sections allowed for factual claims opposing the official narratives of the partisan outlets. For example, when the Kyiv Independent reported on Russia’s losses with statistics, some commenters countered this factual interpretations by referring to them as “propaganda.” Others expressed the need for verification and more sources as evidence. Yet, the majority of commenters reinforced factual interpretations by emphasizing additional evidence that resulted in the same conclusion about losses of the opposed camp.

In the case of Israel-Palestine, we also see a similar counter-factual discourse in comment sections. In the comment sections of the Jerusalem Post, for example, commenters disclaimed the outlet’s legitimization of war crimes by referring to negative interpretations of Palestinians by the outlet as deceptive forms of “warmongering” or “fake Zionist propaganda.” As another example, the comment sections countered factual interpretations about victims and casualties that were legitimized by the pro-Israeli outlet. When the outlet claimed that “Hamas opposes LGBTQ rights”, a commenter replied by suggesting that “You Zionists have murdered far more LGBTQ + people than Hamas did.”

Conclusion case study

In the context of both wars, it can first of all be observed that outlets with a different partisan standing do not share the same epistemic understanding of the events. For example, whereas the outlets associated with a Pro-Ukraine or Pro-Palestine perspective referred to the conflict as a “full scale war” “invasion” or “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide”, the other side avoided the definition war, whilst emphasizing and legitimizing a reality that emphasized “defense and liberation.” As such, the accommodating factual interpretation of the events was congruent with the partisan standing of the different outlets. Although this interpretation resonates with other frame-elements, the different labels and definitions of the situation legitimized by opposed camps suggest different epistemic lenses through which reality and “truthiness” are molded into a subjective observation of empirical facts.

Beyond differing in their definition of the situation, different patterns of interpretation were used to legitimize evidence supporting the partisan standing of the different outlets. In all cases, it can be noted that congruent sources were interpreted as legitimate evidence to justify truth claims about in-group suffering or the legitimization of violence. Uncertainty was avoided, whilst claims on the number of civilian casualties resulting from out-group aggression and the weakening of the military strength of the enemy were presented as hard facts that are not subject to validity or reliability issues. At the same time, unfavorable claims on truth incongruent with the partisan standing of the favored side were debunked, referred to as uncertain or unverified claims, or avoided.

Another relevant conclusion that can be drawn from the case study is the extent to which epistemic claims suggest a fixed and singular definition, as is the case when using labels such as “genocide”, versus more relative understandings of truth as a process of verifying and gathering evidence, which was found in the context of emphasizing uncertainty. We can interpret this as a component of epistemic flexibility: The extent to which factual interpretations allow for a relative construction of reality by being open to alternative interpretations versus a singular construction of truth that suggests only one reality.

Proposed measurement of factual interpretations and hypotheses on effects

Following Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) general recommendation to validly and reliably measure emphasis frames as the clustering and co-occurrence of different frame-elements as building blocks of frames, the following main indicators or dimensions of factual interpretations in communication are proposed: (1) the (non) reliance on expert references to substantiate factual claims; (2) the interpretation of sources of evidence as claims on truth, which includes visuals, common sense, witness accounts, and official statistics; (3) the invalidation of opposed truth claims through the use of delegitimizing accusations; (4) the emphasis on the reliability of congruent truth claims and the uncertainty of opposed truth claims and (5) the level of epistemic flexibility or rigidness.

These dimensions can be measured using various indicators across different research methods in the social sciences. In the context of content analyses, for example, the dimension of reliance on expert references can be operationalized through more discrete indicators applied in codebooks, such as: (1) is there a reference to scientific expertise that is congruent with the claims made on issue X?; (2) are expert quotes used as evidence for claims on reality on issue X?; (3) are truth claims debunked or delegitimized by referring to them as disinformation or fake news?

In the context of automated approaches to content analyses, we suggest that the central dimensions of factual interpretations are used more qualitatively to interpret the meaning of topic clusters or outputs of other inductive approaches. Hence, automated content analyses often result in clusters based on the co-occurrence of certain terms and their embeddings. Crucially, this output is not readily interpretable as frames, and requires researchers to analytically interpret outputs and embed them in certain contexts. We propose that, alongside other elements of emphasis frames, the different proposed dimensions of factual interpretations can be used to interpret topic clusters qualitatively.

The concept of epistemic openness is also crucial to consider empirically. Hence, although factual interpretations that highlight a congruent definition of issues by consistently referring to labels as fixed truths may not allow for relative constructions of truth claims, emphasizing uncertainty or the lack of existing evidence opens up the opportunity for truth claims to be challenged and revised. The extent to which truth is constructed as fixed versus relative may be an important factor to measure in framing research, as it also resonates with the concept of the (perceived) relativism of truth and facts (Van Aelst et al., 2017).

Together, factual interpretations may be measured through different indicators that relate to the legitimization of truths (i.e., the presence of expert references, the reference to common sense/gut feelings/experiences or witness accounts, the presence of cues of uncertainty/references to fixed truths, the contextualization of factual references) versus the delegitimization of truths (i.e., by calling information fake or deceptive, by questioning the authority of sources and statistics, by questioning the credentials of experts, by attacking epistemic authorities, by emphasizing the unreliability of evidence). In the context of our case study, these variables can validly be used to map the presence of different elements of factual interpretations that extend beyond other frame-elements.

Beyond content analyses, our conceptualization aims to be useful for effect studies and survey research. Especially in a context of heightened uncertainty about factual reality (e.g., Van Aelst et al., 2017), distrust in established information (Newman et al., 2023) and the weaponization of ‘fake news’ among citizens (e.g., Schulz et al., 2020; Tong et al., 2020), it is crucial to explore how citizens perceive the epistemic underpinnings of a wide variety of issues, such as climate change, vaccination, and immigration. Concretely, similar questions as proposed in the context of content analyses may be asked to citizens in survey research asking about the perceived truth claims legitimizing or delegitimizing a certain position in the context of a polarized debate. Experimental studies can also test to what extent alternative epistemologies (i.e., emphasizing common sense vs hard empirical facts) and delegitimizing narratives (i.e., disinformation accusations vs questioning expert credentials) affect different groups of society differently.

Discussion

In the contemporary context of increased relativism toward facts, epistemic polarization, disinformation, and discourses attacking the veracity of incongruent claims on truth (e.g., Van Aelst et al., 2017; Waisbord, 2018), the concept of emphasis frames may need to be updated. Concretely, we suggest to extend the conceptualization and operationalization of emphasis frames with factual interpretations as a central frame-element or reasoning device. Yet, it is important to note that this study is intended as a first exploration of how epistemic disputes can be integrated into a framing approach. Based on the rather limited and non-generalizable case study, we aimed to offer an example of how empirical sensitivity to epistemic disputes in framing may result in novel findings that are relevant in the context of increasing concerns about the subjectivity and legitimacy of authoritative sources of knowledge and counter-knowledge (e.g., Van Aelst et al., 2017).

Beyond our approach of factual interpretations as separate frame-elements, alternative approaches may consider epistemic disputes as a generic frame that can attach itself to different issues. This frame, for example, would be indicated by the presence of delegitimizing accusations, the mentioning of alternative sources of evidence, or the relativization of epistemic authorities. Yet, as we believe that the emphasis on factual interpretations co-occurs with other elements of emphasis and patterns of interpretation, we believe that treating factual interpretations as part of a wider set of frame elements or reasoning devices is relevant.

Inspired by the tentative findings of our case study, we suggest to particularly operationalize factual interpretation through the (de)legitimization discourses surrounding the formulation of (opposed) truth claims. For example, in line with research that has conceptualized disinformation as a label or discursive issue (e.g., Egelhofer et al., 2022), it is crucial to explore how (online) sources of information delegitimize, attack, or invalidate the truth claims of opposed sources, and how evidence and sources of the opposed camp are referred to as inaccurate, uncertain, or unreliable. At the same time, we suggest to explore how congruent perspectives on truth and factual reality are legitimized across sources, for example, by analyzing how experts and empirical evidence are quoted and discursively connected to claims on reality (Hameleers and Van der Goot, 2025).

Extending emphasis frames with a focus on factual interpretation is also relevant for media effect studies. Although extant research has established that varying problem definitions or causal interpretations may affect policy responses or political beliefs related to different political issues (Iyengar, 1990), we know markedly little about how the use of alternative factual claims and the (de)legitimization of (in)congruent facts influence responses to media content. As such, the proposed conceptualization of factual interpretations is intended to spark a new line of media effect studies focusing on the consequences of emphasizing different epistemic aspects of reality.

Despite aiming to propose a revised understanding of emphasis framing, there are various limitations that can be taken into account in future approaches. First, we conceptually explored the role of factual interpretations in emphasis frames, as this represents the most widely used approach to a wide range of media interpretations. Yet, alternative factual interpretations and epistemic reasonings may also be central to issue-specific frames, or equivalence frames (e.g., Nelson, 2011). The case study was also limited to journalistic content and comments in the context of a very specific and polarizing issue, and herewith offers an illustration rather than a representative test of the theory of factual interpretations in framing. The empirical scope can be expanded by applying the approach to audience frames, frames in political communication (i.e., contested factual interpretations on polarizing issues), and framing across genres of information (i.e., how alternative news vs legacy news use evidence and expert references). On a related note, the analysis focused on content in the English language, which was not native to the countries under study. As such, we mainly looked at communication targeting international audiences amidst global conflicts. As frames have a strong resonance with socio-cultural contexts, where native language can play an important role in signifying meaning to the domestic audiences, we urge more extensive future research to apply the conceptualization of factual interpretations to domestic languages.

Another potential limitation or consideration is our approach to framing as consisting of separate elements or reasoning devices (also see Matthes and Kohring, 2018). Alternative approaches may see media content as being represented and re-constructed through wider interpretative packages, of which the frame is the organizing idea (e.g., Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). This would mean that factual interpretations are part of an epistemic pattern within the wider interpretative package. Alternatively, epistemic elements could present a counter-factual reality (i.e., a conspiracy theory) to stress that the targeted actor is involved in a hidden scheme against the ordinary people and their common sense, aligning with epistemic populism (e.g., Saurette and Gunster, 2011). As a final limitation, our case study is very time-sensitive and restricted in scope and cultural sensitivity. We used it to illustrate the merits and discriminant validity of factual interpretations, but future research should apply factual interpretations across framing approaches issues and national contexts to extend its ideas and premise.

Although our conceptualization is preliminary and based on a case study limited in scope, we hope that the updated approach to framing embedded in the context of growing epistemic concerns and disputes inspires future research across different contexts and issues. Hence, we suggest future research to extend the categories proposed in this paper, and apply revised instruments across various national contexts (i.e., Global North vs Global South) and corpora (i.e., established or legacy news vs alternative media).