Michael Lempert’s misleading critique of what I have called ordinary ethics provides a welcome invitation to clarify my perspective. I briefly address what I mean by immanence and point to my argument that the ethical is intrinsic to action and practice rather than discernable only as a discrete object or distinct product of linguistic interaction. Lempert’s invocation of entanglement is fine but, with respect to my argument, beside the point.
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