Abstract
The collapse of communism and the Cold War have precipitated a broad reconsideration of central principles of democracy and societal governance. This paper examines a recent contribution by Paul Hirst—a model of associ ative democracy. Drawing on principles of associationalism and rational choice, Hirst sets out a model of participatory democracy, which focuses on general principles, economic institutions and welfare provisions. Mandatory economic democracy and a bifurcated structure of political governance are proposed. Voluntary associations are presented as primary vehicles of communicative democracy and social life. It is argued that Hirst's formulations of rational choice and the decentralisation of the state are fundamentally untenable: he proposes regulation of economic relations to secure socially responsible outcomes, and the injection of market relations into state administration to maximise individual choice. It is concluded that Hirst's theoretical tools are incompatible with the nature of political governance advocated. Moreover, the fracturing of state power, in search of dubious advantages of decentralised associations, undermines the positive gains of universal state action.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.