Abstract
Shaping solidarity, guaranteeing basic subsistence, maintaining income and employment activation can be seen as basic values underlying social security law in many European welfare states. This article argues that the meaning of these values or concepts is determined by legitimating discourses within which they are interpreted. While so far Rawls's theory of justice and related egalitarian liberal philosophies have had a great impact on these discourses, the ecological crisis has given rise to new discourses which are inspired by neo-republican theory and green republicanism. Instead of legitimising a capitalist economy based on economic growth, these discourses promote a post-productive society that seeks to realise human flourishing and meaningful lives. The aim of this article is to contribute to the emerging debate on social security reform by explaining how neo-republican theory and green republicanism can fill social security law's basic values or concepts with meaning that is more in line with current ecological concerns. In contrast to previous contributions that have sought to rethink labour and social security law (‘social law’) in a way that is more compatible with our ecological and climate crisis, this article builds on Poststructuralist Discourse Theory to develop its argument.
Keywords
Introduction
Shaping solidarity, guaranteeing basic subsistence, maintaining income and employment activation can be seen as basic values underlying social security law in many European welfare states (Pieters, 2006). This article aims to show how these values can be re-interpreted in a way that is more compatible with our current ecological sustainability concerns. As such, it contributes to the emerging literature that seeks to rethink social security law (and labour law) in the light of climate change and ecological crisis (e.g. Dermine, 2023; Dermine and Dumont, 2022, 2024; Ter Haar, 2022; Tomassetti, 2018; Zbyszewska, 2018). Contrary to previous contributions, this article explicitly builds its analysis on Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (PDT), which means that the world is seen as constituted by words (language), with discourses only temporarily stopping their instability of meaning (Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Departing from PDT, three general points are made. First, political philosophical theories should not be seen as external truths, but rather as coherent sets of arguments. Second, being part of dominant social security discourses, political philosophies give meaning to central concepts or values underlying social security law, which in European welfare states have predominantly been interpreted within the framework of Rawls's theory of justice and related egalitarian liberal philosophies. Third, the ecological and climate crisis constitute a ‘dislocationary event’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), giving rise to a re-imagination of our current situation, and as such, provide an opportunity for re-interpreting social security law's core values. It is argued - to my knowledge for the first time - that green republicanism (e.g. Barry, 2012) is an important candidate to provide the language for new legitimising discourses within which to interpret these values in a way that is more aligned with the idea of a sustainable society. 1
Given the (green) republican emphasis on human interdependence and vulnerability, it is argued among other things that within these legitimising discourses, ‘basic subsistence’ would be interpreted as people's essential needs in relation to limited natural resources; ‘solidarity’ as to also include intergenerational solidarity, solidarity between less - and more - polluting people and solidarity with care-givers; and ‘activation’ as to also include activation to non-paid work. As such, social security law would instead of serving the capitalist market economy, seek to realise human flourishing and meaningful lives. Yet, as this article concludes, agonistic democratic processes will be essential for radically reforming social security law along the lines discussed here.
Social security law's basic values and legitimising discourses
We can delineate three main concepts or basic values underlying social security law in many European welfare states: 1) shaping solidarity by 2) providing basic needs (through means-tested benefits or universal schemes) and maintaining income (through social insurance schemes), and by 3) employment activation (e.g. Eichenhofer, 2015; Pieters, 2006). Within these main concepts or basic values, ‘solidarity’ can be seen as the overarching concept or value, and one that manifests itself in various ways. These include solidarity as reflected, for example, in the principle of collective financing, which requires an appropriate sharing of responsibility between rich and poor individuals; solidarity between individuals, employers and the state for covering risks such as unemployment, sickness or old age; and the solidarity necessary for maintaining income or providing basic needs after a risk has materialised.
Two main streams are usually distinguished regarding the design and the redistributive character of social insurance in European welfare states: Bismarckian and Beveridgean systems. 2 While in the former systems, the value of maintaining income through social insurance systems (usually financed by employers and employees) will be particularly important, in the latter, more emphasis is put on the universal provision of basic needs through flat-rate benefits (Cremer and Pestieau, 2003: 182; Hay and Wincott, 2012: 33–34; Pieters, 2006: 7–8). Nonetheless, in both systems, solidarity is a key value. In order to ensure solidarity between people dependent on social benefits and those who can sustain themselves in other ways (Van der Veen et al., 2012), employment activation has become a third central value underlying social security law in these systems in recent decades (Dermine and Dumont, 2014; Eichenhofer, 2015; Eleveld, 2014).
Political philosophies are usually seen as ‘external frameworks’ that can be used to evaluate law's basic values, or its ‘internal framework’: they provide a yardstick for evaluating the law and thus enable us to formulate recommendations for improving it (Taekema, 2018; Zekic, 2019). This article argues, instead, that political philosophies should rather be seen as important sources for legitimising discourses that give meaning to social security law's basic concepts or values, such as ‘solidarity’, basic needs’ and ‘activation’ (‘internal framework’), and that these concepts or values cannot be separated from the legitimising discourses (‘external frameworks’) wherein which they become meaningful.
This argument is based on post-foundational thought (Marchart, 2007) of which Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, the founders of the Essex School of Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (PDT), are important representatives. Central to post-foundationalist thought is the rejection of an ultimate ground for our society or politics, without, however, assuming the absence of any ground as with anti-foundationalism. That is, post-foundationalists assume a plurality of contingent foundations (Marchart, 2007). For them, what counts as legitimate or just, and what counts as illegitimate or unjust, is a consequence of ‘the political’, or the moment at which new hegemonic forces institute society (Mouffe, 2005). Nonetheless, post-foundationalists’ denial that political philosophy provides ultimate answers to questions such as ‘What is just?’ and ‘What is unjust?’ does not make political philosophies irrelevant. Political philosophies can, for example, feed political discourses on a just distribution of goods and, as such, legitimise certain policy goals. They may also comprise coherent and consistent - and therefore convincing - arguments legitimising the law (Eleveld, 2019). Yet, post-foundationalists will argue that these ‘legitimations’ are contingent and dependent upon existing power constellations and should therefore be seen as ‘dominant discourses’ which give meaning to its core concepts.
To understand how this works, I will briefly explain the basics of PDT. According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), discourses temporarily stop the instability in the meaning of concepts or words such as ‘solidarity’ or ‘activation’, without definitively fixing their meaning. Owing to this non-fixed status, these words are also referred to as ‘floating signifiers’, or words with multiple potential meanings. A discourse seeks to reduce the ambiguity of these words by partially fixing their meaning around certain master signifiers (e.g. ‘justice’) and can be hegemonic for a long period of time. However, this can change because of a crisis (a ‘dislocation’). During such a crisis subjects (individuals) may become aware of the inherent instability of dominant discourses, or the fissures and gaps in current discursive structures, as a result of which the meaning of certain words, or master signifiers, becomes unstable. For example, concepts or words such as ‘solidarity’ or ‘activation’, whose meaning was perhaps previously established in dominant ‘economic growth discourses’ (Ferguson, 2018), may turn into floating signifiers whose meaning is subsequently newly established in relation to a (new) master signifier (e.g. ‘sustainable justice’) in new discourses (e.g. green republican discourses) (Eleveld, 2016; Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Hence, for PDT, crises are important events that may change hegemonic legitimising discourses and, as such, the meaning of these discourses’ signifiers (or basic concepts).
In what follows, I will argue that the ecological crisis can be seen as a dislocationary event, giving rise to new reflections on or a re-imagination of our current situation and resulting in some of us starting to identify with new discourses (e.g. sustainable justice discourses), giving rise to new interpretations of social security law's key values, such as solidarity, providing basic needs, maintaining income and employment activation. Yet, as I will argue throughout this article, the answer to the questions of ‘What is just?’ and ‘What is unjust?’ will ultimately be determined in a pluralistic, agonistic democracy that acknowledges the ‘impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion’ (Mouffe, 2005: 105). The aim, then, of this article is to fuel this agonistic democratic debate by arguing for (green) republican discourses to inform social security law's ‘external framework’.
Rawlsian philosophy legitimising modern social security law as an economic growth framework?
This section examines how northern and western European welfare state discourses were inspired by Rawls's theory of justice and related liberal egalitarian theories, and how these discourses not only legitimised national social security law, but also economic growth policies.
Rawls's theory of justice is sometimes seen as the ‘philosophical foundation’ of social security law in modern welfare states, which provided important arguments for social security law's legitimating discourses. From a historical perspective, this is of course not entirely correct, as Rawls's A Theory of Justice was published in 1971, by which time social security law in many northern and western European welfare states had already peaked. Indeed, after World War II, many northern and western welfare states were profoundly shaped by social-democratic discourses. Nonetheless, Rawls's philosophy, especially the ‘difference principle’, was central to these welfare states’ legitimising social security discourses as it provided, for the first time, a modern and precise definition of distributive justice - one that helped settle disputes about what was meant by ‘from each according to his abilities’ or ‘from each according to his needs’ (Fleischacker, 2004: 114).
So, what is Rawls's theory of justice about? In his seminal work, Rawls asks what principles of justice people would agree on in a hypothetical situation in which they lack knowledge about who they themselves or others are. He concludes that, behind this veil of ignorance, they would decide on two basic principles, the first principle being that every individual should have an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties, and the second that social and economic inequalities should be arranged in such a way that they are attached to positions and offices open to all. This second principle also incorporates the difference principle, whereby all social primary goods, such as freedom, opportunities, income, well-being and the social bases of self-respect, should be divided equally, unless an unequal division of these goods would benefit the least advantaged. Those with more talents should thus be encouraged to increase their income, providing this contributes to the income of the least advantaged. Rawls's second principle of justice also conveys his view that differences in income and prosperity resulting from differences in peoples’ efforts cannot be considered exclusively to be ‘earned’ differences because effort can also be affected by factors that are irrelevant from a moral perspective, such as differences in natural ability or the social class into which one is born.
If we consider Rawls's conception of justice as a master signifier in legitimising discourses, it could be argued that it clearly fills the overarching concept or value of solidarity with meaning. The difference principle, then, requires everyone who is part of a specific society to be entitled to a minimum share of the total social product. As such, it formulates an obligation of the more advantaged (or rich people) towards the least advantaged (or poor people). The difference principle also expresses the value of ‘providing basic needs’. While, for Rawls, the extent of this minimal provision is not predetermined, it will at least exceed the essential needs for leading a decent life, given that the difference principle specifically endeavours to maximise the prosperity of the least advantaged (Rawls, 2001: 129–130).
Rawls's justice conception is less clear, however, regarding the value of employment activation (Eleveld, 2012, chapter 3). Based on Rawls's work, it could even be argued that he would have rejected employment activation programmes as they have been implemented in diverse European welfare states (Eleveld et al., 2020). This aspect of Rawls's theory of justice, however, has been firmly criticised by those known as ‘luck egalitarians’, who have argued that the consequences of voluntary choices should not burden the community; in the end, individuals are responsible for their own success in life. As such, luck egalitarians would also endorse stringent sanction-backed work activation programmes (Dworkin, 2000: 320–350). This luck liberal egalitarian twist to Rawls’ s theory of justice eventually reinforced the New Right's agenda and started to dominate welfare states’ social security discourses in the 1980s. In an amalgam with a communitarian (paternalistic) perspective on welfare recipients (Etzioni, 1997), luck egalitarianism also legitimised the Third Way ‘no rights without obligations’ discourses (Giddens, 1998), which spread across many northern and western European countries in the 1990s. As such, ‘activation to employment’ has increasingly been interpreted to mean a duty to work being imposed on all able-bodied recipients of social security benefits (Eleveld, 2014).
Importantly, Rawls's theory of justice (in concert with Dworkin's luck egalitarianism) has not only become hegemonic in many European welfare states since the 1970s (Mouffe, 1987), but the Rawlsian interpretation has also become strongly linked to ‘welfare-state capitalism’ (Kymlica, 2002: 88), which aims at creating efficient labour markets sustaining a system of unlimited economic growth. Rawls’s argument for economic growth stems from certain passages in A Theory of Justice where he argues that the free-market economy is essential for realising these principles of justice as it not only protects individual freedoms, such as the liberty to freely choose one's occupation, but also fosters economic efficiency (1971 & 1999: para. 42). According to Rawls, then, within the market system ‘the greater expectations allowed to entrepreneurs encourages them to do things which raise the prospects of labouring class. Their better prospects act as incentives so that the economic process is more efficient, innovation proceeds at a faster pace, and so on’ (Rawls, 1971 & 1999: 68).
The relation between social security law and economic growth policies
This section briefly considers the historical association between social security law and the capitalist-based system. This association can, first of all, be illustrated by the example of a particular business sector switching to more efficient production methods, a development inherent in the capitalist system. Workers who have become redundant because of these innovations, and who do not immediately find a new job, will usually be entitled to unemployment or social assistance benefits. At the same time, as benefit recipients, they will likely to be required to remain available for the labour market, and obliged to accept suitable work or job training which prepares them for re-entering the labour market as soon as possible (Lødemel and Moreira, 2014) or for being forced to behave as enterprising individuals, ready to work in the capitalist economy (Whitworth, 2016). This example shows that social security embodies the ‘double movement’ coined by Polanyi (2001), meaning that the market economy cannot be self-regulating, but that governmental action (i.e. national regulation of social security law) is needed to secure the supply of sufficient labour and to ensure a well-functioning market economy. Indeed, as Deakin argued some time ago, social security law not only has a market-correcting function, but also constitutes the market economy and contributes to economic growth (Deakin, 2011: 166, 174, also see Fritz and Lee, 2023). It could therefore be argued that social security law (and labour law) has created a legal framework that regulates and legitimises wage labour (as a commodity) and, as such, serves the capitalist market economy (Dermine and Dumont, 2022; see also Dukelow and Murphy, 2022).
Social security law has also impacted the relation between production and reproduction in European welfare states. While in the first decades after World War II social security law served to establish a balance between production and social reproduction, after the 1980s, social security provisions became less and less generous, tipping the balance more toward production. The introduction of new provisions aimed at the reconciliation of work and private life, to facilitate and stimulate female labour market participation, has further re-enforced this process. These reforms, together with general employment activation measures, essentially responded to the capitalist economy's demand for flexible workers and contributed to the establishment of a dual labour market where female workers generally earn less and enjoy less social security protection compared to male workers (Pfau-Effinger, 2012). Indeed, with low-earning families struggling to get by, and high-earning families increasingly relying on workers from the global south to perform domestic work and care work, it is difficult to maintain that social security law in European welfare states still seeks to establish a balance between production and social reproduction (Winders and Smith, 2019). On the contrary, being strongly linked with a capitalist economy that aims to produce as efficiently as possible, social security law is increasingly supporting a system that aims for production growth (Dukelow, 2022; Jackson, 2021).
As stated before, a crisis or dislocationary event gives rises to new reflections, and key concepts or words may attain alternative meanings in new dominant discourses. The global economic crisis in the late 1970s, for example, promoted a more ambition-sensitive egalitarian notion of justice (as a master signifier), which legitimised sanctioning irresponsible and idle welfare recipients through a new interpretation of the word ‘activation’. Currently, we can observe how the ecological crisis has contributed to the emergence of ‘green republicanism’, a new strand based on the neo-republican theory of non-domination which, instead of promoting efficient labour markets, encourages meaningful work and lives. While values underlying social security law in many European welfare states are still mainly interpreted by liberal egalitarian and communitarian discourses, it is my contention that we urgently need alternative discourses that enable us to interpret social security law's basic concepts in a way that is compatible with a post-productive or post-growth society. In the next section, I take the opportunity, as an academic scholar, to contribute to this discursive struggle over justice by arguing for the neo-republican theory of non-domination and green republicanism as alternative philosophies to feed social security law's legitimising discourses.
Alternative legitimating discourses: the republican theory of non-domination and green republicanism
Green republicanism is based on the neo-republican theory of non-domination developed by Pettit (1997, 2012) and Lovett (2010). In this section I first contrast Pettit and Lovett's take on the neo- republican theory of non-domination with Rawls's theory of justice. Subsequently, I consider how green republican theory applies a relational approach to justice and how social security law's basic values would be interpreted in legitimising discourses inspired by the neo-republican theory of non-domination and green republicanism.
Comparing Rawls’s theory of justice with the neo-republican theory of non-domination
An important difference between Rawls's theory of justice and the neo-republican theory of non-domination is that while the former constitutes an ideal theory, the latter is a non-ideal theory that does not require abstractions of reality such as Rawls's veil of ignorance. This difference has important consequences for their conceptions of freedom. While Rawls presupposes an ideal (Kantian) rational autonomous subject, the republican theory of non-domination departs from the real world, as a result of which people's multifaceted interdependencies come to the fore.
Central to the neo-republican theory of non-domination, as developed by Pettit (1997, 2012) and Lovett (2010), is the need to minimise arbitrary or uncontrolled power. This means that it is not enough for a powerful agent (e.g. an employer) to abstain from interfering with other people's lives as, in the case of uncontrolled power, lack of (practical) interference may also result from people seeking to avoid harm and adapting their behaviour to the powerful agent's expectations.
For Pettit (2012), freedom as non-domination requires, in the first place, democratic republican citizenship and democratic control which goes beyond the formal procedures proposed by Rawls. It demands a high level of civil engagement with people exercising civic vigilance on the basis of their particular concerns and passions. As Pettit puts it, what is required is ‘the activity of the radical social movements that offer an account of common concerns, articulate a suite of popular demands, and challenge government for its failures to recognize or reflect those demands in its polices’ (2012: 227).
Pettit furthermore holds that freedom as non-domination requires the implementation of three types of social policy programmes: infrastructural programmes, public insurance and public insulation of people against danger from others. These programmes share their consideration of existing interdependencies, both with regard to the environment and to other people (e.g. employers). Infrastructural programmes, for instance, instruct the government to take care of a sustainable natural environment so as to ensure people's enjoyment of basic liberties (Pettit, 2012: 112–113), as any environmental damage would limit our range of undominated choice (Pettit, 1997). Meanwhile, public insurance and public insulation programmes specifically consider people's relations to others by preventing needy citizens from becoming dependent on voluntary forms of philanthropy and, as such, on the goodwill of others or the arbitrary power of employers (Pettit, 2012: 113–115).
For Lovett, the other main contributor to the neo-republican theory of non-domination, the centrality of non-domination in neo-republican theory means that republican social policies should aim for ‘human flourishing’ rather than focusing on efficient labour markets and production growth (Lovett, 2010: 162). He furthermore argues that the duty of fairness found in Rawls's theory of justice, which imposes obligations on people as part of a community to collectively share certain risks and burdens based on solidarity, runs into problems when it comes to intergenerational (and global) justice. He proposes, instead, the idea of social justice as ‘minimization of domination’ that takes account of the ability of the next generation to achieve a similar level of non-domination to that of the present generation, implying, for example, that the current generation should minimise its consumption of non-renewable resources that are indefinitely sustainable in order to leave sufficient non-renewable resources for the next generation (Lovett, 2010: 183–184). 3
In sum, an important difference between a Rawlsian and a neo-republican justification of social security law is that while the former is rooted in the idea of distributive justice and the ‘autonomous subject’, the latter is grounded in the idea of freedom of non-domination and the ‘interdependent subject’ and, as such, adopts a more ‘relational approach to justice’ (Pinto, 2020).
Interdependency and vulnerability in green republicanism
The republican focus on people's interdependencies has been an important source of inspiration for political theorists who link green political thought to republican theory, with Barry's publications on ‘green republicanism’ (e.g. Barry, 2012, 2021, 2022) being the most influential so far (Dodsworth and Honohan, 2021). For Barry, dependence and vulnerability are ‘fundamentally constitutive of what it means to be human’ (2012: 46). Building on the ethics of care, a moral theory developed in feminist literature (e.g. Fineman, 2004; Tronto, 1993), he maintains that being vulnerable (and dependent) motivates ‘care and compassion’, not only for other humans but also ‘nonhuman others’ (2012: 75). In general, for green republicans, a shared recognition of our vulnerability and interdependency is an important basis for democratic self-government that values non-domination and human flourishing over economic growth, with economic growth only being permitted within the limits of the planetary boundaries (Barry, 2012; Cannavò, 2021).
Green republican ideas about democratic government diverge from liberal ideas about government, which assume a neutral and non-interfering state. That is, unlike these liberal concepts of freedom, green republican democratic self-government would allow people's freedom to be Constrained in some ways. In the first place, a green republican democratic self-government would put restrictions on unlimited consumption, as this encourages maximising production and endless economic growth (Barry, 2012; Frémaux, 2019). According to green republican theory, this should be prevented as endless economic growth increases existing inequalities, leading to people being more dependent on others and, as such, greater chances of being subject to arbitrary power (Barry, 2021).
The imperative of economic efficiency, inherent in economic growth policies, also puts workers at risk of being subject to arbitrary power on the workfloor. 4 Barry recalls in this context abusive practices in (global) workplaces, such as Amazon fulfilment centres (Barry, 2021: 734–735; 2022: 175–180), where workers’ democracy as a countervailing power - that to some extent prevents workers from being subject to arbitrary power - is often minimised because of company expectations that workers’ democracy would reduce company productivity (also see Anderson, 2017). As Barry concludes, ‘[t]he productivity imperative within non-democratic workplaces results in macro-economic ecological unsustainability as well as illiberty-producing and unfreedom reinforcing practices at the micro-economic level (2022: 179)’.
From a green republican perspective, a restriction on people's consumption patterns would, furthermore, be allowed, because it fits with a green republican concept of freedom as non-domination that actively promotes the common good of sustainability (Barry, 2012; Cannavò, 2021). As Fremaux (2019) puts it, the republican concept of freedom as non-domination requires from citizens to accept restrictions on freedoms that directly jeopardise the ecological environment. Democratically chosen bodies could, for example, be mandated to control modes of production and consumption that are harmful to the environment (e.g. through taxation of commodities).
In conclusion, because of their emphasis on interdependency and vulnerability, green republicans tend to allow for more interferences with people's freedom compared to other republicans. And, as will be further discussed in the last part of this section, this approach to (restricted) freedom probably also affects their interpretation of ‘activation to employment’, one of the three central values underlying social security law.
Towards a republican interpretation of social security law's basic values
So far, green republicans have not considered the implications of green republican theory for social security law. The last part of this section reconsiders social security law's main concepts or values, shaping solidarity, guaranteeing basic subsistence, maintaining income and employment activation, and considers how they might be re-interpreted in legitimating discourses informed by the republican theory of non-domination and green republicanism.
First of all, it could be argued that, from a republican viewpoint, the right to maintain income and basic subsistence is essential in order to prevent people to becoming subject to arbitrary domination resulting from their dependence on the goodwill of their employer or the benevolence of others. People should also be provided with basic subsistence in order to enable them to practice republican citizenship, which is central to realising freedom as non-domination. Yet, from a green republican point of view, people's entitlement to a minimum means of subsistence should not harm the environment, leaving insufficient means for future generations. This means that ‘basic subsistence’ should be interpreted as people's essential needs (e.g. water, food, shelter, energy, secure forms of employment, education, healthcare, childhood security, social relations, physical and economic security and a safe environment) in relation to limited natural resources (see also Coote, 2022).
Providing people with the basics or, in the case of employees, with a right to maintain their income also implies that social security law should be based on the value of solidarity. For republicans, solidarity implies, in the first place, solidarity between rich and poor. Indeed, for Pettit, the need to prevent people from being subject to uncontrolled or arbitrary power justifies redistributive taxation and the introduction of collective insurance schemes. Hence, republican freedom as non-domination trumps property rights and redistributive taxation will be applauded, particularly in green republican discourses, as this will have a dampening effect on exorbitant consumption patterns. Republicans also challenge the privatisation of collective goods, such as education and healthcare, because privatising these goods will inevitably increase the domination of the rich and powerful over other people (Kohn, 2022). Based on this understanding of solidarity, the regulation of these collective goods would fall under the scope of social security law. In addition, from the viewpoint of intergenerational solidarity, a scarce environmental good such as energy will most likely be interpreted as a collective good that ought to be publicly guarded and distributed in a way leaving sufficient resources for future generations (Lovett, 2010). 5
Furthermore, given that for green republicans solidarity amounts to collectively ‘managing our relationship to the environment’ (Barry, 2021: 731), care for the environment will also imply solidarity with the least polluting groups, with financial compensation if necessary. Indeed, since people suffering from ‘energy poverty’ are usually poor (Bridgen, 2023), and the least polluting (Fritz and Eversberg, 2023), green republican discourses will justify a solidarity-based right to energy (Eleveld and Hermans, 2024).
Another issue concerns solidarity with care givers. It can be assumed that within (green) republican social security discourses the meaning of solidarity will be extended to include solidarity with unpaid caregivers, whose work not only exemplifies people's vulnerability and their interdependency, but who are also themselves highly vulnerable to domination if they are not sufficiently financially compensated for their care activities.
Lastly, while solidarity is usually confined to the local level, or state level, in a green republican interpretation solidarity also extends to the global level. That is, the high polluting countries or populations owe a debt of justice to those who have done so little to cause the climate crisis, and yet suffer the most. The green republican argument thus urges us to adopt a more global approach to solidarity, which in fact amounts to the introduction of a global redistributive system, in accordance with a green republican interpretation of the values of basic subsistence and solidarity. This interpretation of solidarity as ‘global solidarity’ would obviously require a tremendous, if not utopian, reform of current national social security laws.
Regarding the third value underlying social security law, employment activation, it is clear from the outset that republicans disagree with the (luck) egalitarian interpretation. For example, Lovett (2010) opposes the idea of employment activation in the context of social security rights because of its contrary effects on freedom as non-domination (also see Eleveld, 2020, 2023). He notes, in this respect, that benefit recipients who are obliged to comply with activation obligations are very vulnerable to being subject to arbitrary power exercised by frontline officers. Therefore, he argues for the introduction of a basic income instead of means-tested social assistance benefits, or at least for relieving people of a requirement to integrate (or re-integrate) into the workplace (see also Dumont, 2022). Hence, within republican discourses, ‘activation’ is not necessarily interpreted as sanction-backed obligations to move to paid employment. And, more generally, for republicans, democratising work is superior to employment activation measures, up to and including democratic ownership (Anderson, 2017; Barry, 2022).
Furthermore, concerning the (green) republican focus on people's interdependency and vulnerability, the focus is put on the broader term ‘work’ instead of ‘employment’, including unpaid forms of work such as unpaid care work, which contribute to the common good (Birnbaum, 2020). Being a consumer acting in specified ways might also be seen as a form of work in green republican discourses (Yeoman, 2022). For example, taking your waste to a place where you can separate it in an ecologically responsible way could be interpreted as ‘work’. Furthermore, facilitating meaningful free time is to be preferred over paid work 1) where economic activities increase ecological damage; 2) where welfare recipients moving to the precarious paid labour market are at great risk of being subject to arbitrary power; or 3) where they have too little control over their time (e.g. due to unpredictable working hours and/or long work weeks).
Neo-republicans and green republicans do not seem to agree, however, over the extent to which welfare recipients can be obliged to accept certain work activities. For example, while for Barry (2012: 234, 238), ‘sustainability citizenship’ may, in accordance with the republican idea of active citizenship, entail implementing forms of compulsory service for sustainable goals, Lovett (2010: 197) holds that welfare conditionality will often lead to welfare recipients being subjected to arbitrary power. Agreeing with Lovett, Birnbaum (2020) argues that the republican duty to contribute to the common good cannot be interpreted independently from republican virtuous citizenship that aims to counter situations of deep dependency (such as in the relations between welfare recipients and welfare officers). In his view, to prevent the poor from being subject to arbitrary power, they should have a right to a basic income, which will help to ‘improve the prospects for sustainable non-domination worldwide by enabling resistance to domination while supporting the contributions and virtues of active citizenship (…) The basic income allows citizens to legitimately say no to (“exit”) unattractive jobs without thereby losing access to basic income security and may thus open up new opportunities to identify and challenge domination at work’ (Birnbaum, 2020: 293).
Hence, we can observe two possible points of disagreement among green republicans and other republicans. First, they seem to disagree about the compulsory nature of the activities carried out by welfare recipients. Second, they seem to disagree about the interpretation of a right to a basic subsistence. While green republicans argue for compulsory service for sustainable goals and - within the limits of the planetary boundaries - a right to basic subsistence that only covers basic needs, other republicans argue against general welfare conditionality, including the duty to perform specific work activities, and for a more extensive right to a basic income to prevent welfare recipients and workers from being subject to domination. According to this view, a right to a job guarantee as a substitute for a basic income will only be acceptable if it entails a right to work, instead of a duty to work (Eleveld, 2020). Even so, although republican discourses do not interpret social security law's basic values such as ‘activation (to employment)’ and ‘basic subsistence’ in an unequivocal way, their interpretation is radically different to that of current Rawlsian and luck egalitarian interpretations.
Finally, irrespective of whether republican thinkers endorse the neo-republican theory of non-domination, as developed by Pettit and Lovett, or adhere to green republican strands, they in any case re-think the ways in which recipients of social security benefits can actively participate in decision-making on activation programmes. These collaborative decisions would need to be controlled by democratic bodies and other forms of civic vigilance aimed at protecting the common good, such as our ecological environment. And, as recent research conducted in Sweden reveals, when people are required to discuss utopian ways of satisfying basic needs, considering the social and ecological sustainability, they tend to agree on a number of green republican proposals, such as broadening the concept of work in order to include other societal important forms of work (Lee and Koch, 2023). This suggests that republican style collaborative decision-making on social security law's future, may lead to a more environmentally-friendly social security law.
Discussion and conclusion
In this article I have argued that political philosophies should be seen as important sources for legitimising discourses that give meaning to social security law's basic concepts or values, which cannot be separated from the legitimising discourses wherein which they become meaningful. Whether and how social security law's basic values will be re-interpreted in republican discourses will depend on the outcome of agonistic democratic processes in each country. This also means that restrictions on freedoms for ecological purposes - for example, the duty imposed on welfare recipients to participate in a specific environmentally-friendly work programme as proposed by green republicans, but not necessarily by other republicans - are allowed only insofar as they are based on (agnostic) democratic decisions. In this respect, I concur with Mouffe (2005) that we ‘need to leave the conversation on justice for ever open’ (2005, 76). Only in this way will voices, alarmed by the ecological crisis, be heard in the political arena; and only in this way will floating signifiers, such as solidarity, guaranteeing basic subsistence, maintaining income and employment activation, be able to establish themselves and be filled with new meaning in neo-republican or green republican social security discourses. In line with social lawyers, such as Beryl ter Haar (2022), Elise Dermine and Daniel Dumont (Dermine, 2023; Dermine and Dumont, 2024), it is my contention that we, as social lawyers, have a responsibility to participate in and fuel this discourse.
It should also be noted that the alternative interpretation of social security law's underlying values proposed here aligns perfectly with the fundamental right to social security enshrined in Article 9 ICESCR. For example, the importance of the relationship between people and the environment is clearly reflected in states parties’ obligation to respect the fundamental right to social security. General Comment No. 19 of the ICESCR monitoring body, the CESCR, specifies this obligation as the first of three, with the other two obligations being the duty to protect and the duty to fulfil this right. In my opinion, the legal literature wrongly assumes that, unlike the other two obligations, the duty to respect the right to social security imposes only a negative obligation on a government to refrain from interfering in the lives of its citizens (e.g. with regard to how the social security system is organised). This body of literature ignores Shue's classic Basic Rights (Shue, 1980), which inspired the formulation of the three duties referred to in General Comment No. 19 (i.e. to respect, protect and fulfil the right to social security) (Birchall, 2022). According to Shue (1980), the duty to respect imposes a positive obligation on governments to take care of the natural environment for the welfare of future generations. In other words, the relationship between people and the environment forms the inevitable backdrop against which social security law should be fleshed out.
Finally, an issue not discussed in this article relates to a possible reconsideration of the range of risks covered under social security law in times of ecological crisis. While this article has argued that the lists of traditional social risks covered under social security law (e.g. unemployment, sickness and old age) should also include the risk of energy poverty, recently, it has been argued that social security coverage should be further extended to include risks related to climate change, such as the risk of not being able to continue providing for oneself due to natural disasters (Becker, 2022). As will be clear by now, the coverage of these ‘new’ social risks also aligns perfectly with green republican thought.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author wants to thank Daniel Dumont, Paolo Tomassetti and Luigi Corrias for their useful comments to earlier versions of this article. The author furthermore wants to thank the two reviewers whose comments have considerably improved it. All remaining errors and shortcomings are my own.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article
