Abstract
The book ‘Human Dignity and Democracy in Europe. Synergies, Tensions and Crises’ deals competently with a socially relevant and topical subject. The target group are scholars, students, but also all persons interested in the future of Europe.
Erin Daly makes a strong case for an extended understanding of the principle of human dignity, ensuring that human dignity is respected, strengthens democratic participation and protects judges from the charge of activism. Catherine Dupré, writing about human dignity and democracy in Europe, points out how much the very construction of ‘Europe’, in the form of the European institutions, is closely linked to democracy as a type of political system. Today, the revitalised discussion on populism has shown the fragility of our democracy.
Human dignity has admittedly not been codified. The authors point out that, despite its importance, human dignity seems almost ‘invisible’ in the current discussion on human rights and fundamental rights and the foundations of democracy. This thesis is based on a review of mainly English-language literature: when, for example, writing about the situation in Poland, the author ignores the extensive Polish literature on this concept.
Free and fair elections are part of the European model. However, there is a move away from focusing on secret ballots as the only measure of democracy and respect for human dignity. The social dimension of human dignity is presented here in a particularly interesting way. The conclusion is that, while the European human rights framework gives a clear definition of human dignity, this definition still lacks procedural guarantees. We can close this gap by formulating a right of access to independent judicial review and incorporating it into the construction of human dignity.
Stephen Riley, writing on subsidiarity and human dignity, describes the practice of subsidiarity. Noteworthy is the conclusion that subsidiarity alone is incapable of resolving the structural, core tensions in politics. It is an expression of our need to balance diversity, autonomy and rational governance. The ideas of human dignity seen through the prism of subsidiarity allow for a stronger respect for the individual, to identify and remove barriers, in a ‘dignitarian’ view of subsidiarity. Przemysław Tacik's article draws a similar conclusion: that although the principle of human dignity constitutes an important element of the constitutional order, it is being eroded and can no longer form an independent basis for the protection of such dignity. Describing the situation in Hungary, too, the destruction of the basic democratic institutions is presented in a reliable manner, with an emphasis on the principle of human dignity and solidarity with the weakest. The principle of dignity remains the cornerstone of the constitutional axiology, but without a proper legal framework, dignity loses its meaning.
Daniel Bedford's article on democratic transition in the UK in the context of human dignity shows increasing signs that the constitutional landscape of the UK is changing. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty can be better seen in the context of the rule of law and fundamental rights. This implies a gradually changing vision of democracy. The author points out that certain limitations on the supremacy of the legislature are fundamental to the protection of democracy.
The principle of human dignity was for too long assumed to be self-evident, and little attention was paid to the legal consequences of this principle. Now, the declared contradiction between the identity and protection of the national community and the protection of human dignity has been heightened. Human dignity as the foundation of other human rights has recently triggered attacks on alleged judicial activism, intensified during the migration crisis in Europe. At the same time, the treatment of numerous asylum seekers has become a true test of the acceptance of the principle of human dignity. Cesare Pinelli describes how individual governments have ‘escaped’ responsibility, while also, however, highlighting the weaknesses of the Dublin system. The distinction between two versions of national identity and community can provide a theoretical underpinning: identity as sameness implies a different approach from identity as selfhood. Selfhood is more open, inclusive, whereas populist discourse is fixated on national identity as sameness, portraying migrants as strangers. This allows populists to incite fear and hostility towards these migrants, and becomes a political tool.
Stéphanie Henette-Vauchez points out that the ‘success story’ of the principle of human dignity in Europe required a series of unique preconditions to be met, and that its gradual consolidation was also linked to the absence for many years of serious challenges. According to the author, the concept of human dignity was originally a kind of extension of the concept of honour, originally reserved for the aristocracy; this is quite a debatable thesis, since from the beginning we have had two concepts of human dignity, including one in which it is not derived from any merit or status, but from an inherent human characteristic.
Maria Disacola's analysis of the issue of the right to citizenship in the context of human dignity is similarly realistic. She focuses on a comparison of regulations and case law in the United Kingdom and the United States. and shows – freely and openly – the weakness of existing citizenship law, in which the assumptions related to human dignity have often been relativised.
This work is an excellent but rather pessimistic diagnosis; what we could now do with, in my view, are more ‘proposed therapies’. In addition to the insightful analyses of the threats to human dignity and democracy in Europe, we need, in the conclusion, more de lege ferenda remarks, pointing to potential solutions.
