The ‘Open Method of Co-Ordination’ as an Instrument for Implementing the Principle of Subsidiarity?

Abstract

In recent years, the notion of ‘subsidiarity’ has gained prominence in European discourse on the sharing of competences among different levels in the multi-level political system of the European Union. This article addresses the question whether the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)’ is a suitable instrument for implementing the principle of subsidiarity and, at the same time, for promoting policy convergence in the European Union. In the first part of the article, the general concept of subsidiarity is reviewed in light of its role in the European context. In the next part, the evolution of the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’, its general characteristics and its application to various policy fields are examined. Based on this analysis, a critical evaluation is undertaken in the final part of the article concerning the potential policy outcomes of the OMC from a longer term perspective. This analysis is carried out from an institutionalist perspective, focussing on the consequences that the OMC is likely to have on the mindsets and behaviour of political actors. This before leads to the conclusion that the OMC can help to create a normative commitment to coordinating national policies with respect to commonly agreed goals while leaving the competences of policy-making mainly with the Member States. In this way, the OMC respects subsidiarity and national diversity, but at the same time contributes to achieving greater convergence of economic and social policies.