Abstract
Regional integration scholars have long stressed the role and importance of bilateral and other minilateral relations between states for multilateral politics in a regional organisation. However, the literature on bilateralism and multilateralism mostly evolves separately from one another, both conceptually and empirically. To bridge this divide, this article develops a tripartite differentiation of competing, coexisting and complecting relations or, correspondingly, of bilateralism or, and, as well as in multilateralism. It then scrutinises the bilateral link between France and Germany as a particularly developed case of minilateral relations mingling with the multilateral politics of the European Union. Analysing three pivotal episodes which span 50 years of European integration and different policy domains, we document why and how France and Germany repeatedly came together bilaterally to promote multilateral European polity stabilisation and development. The article contributes to an emerging but so far dispersed scholarship on bilateralism within multilateralism in Europe and beyond.
Introduction
Are we experiencing the decline, a return, or new forms of multilateralism in regional order and global politics? The rise of geopolitical rivalry, notably between the United States and China, as well as Russia’s war against Ukraine, prompts regional organisations like the European Union (EU) to (re)define its interests. If the EU wants to keep and strengthen its own distinct profile, for instance with respect to international security, industrial policy or green energy, it must speak with one voice (Driedger and Krotz, 2024; Matthijs and Meunier, 2023). This objective usually presupposes difficult internal bargaining and consolidation processes, as individual member states’ positions often greatly differ.
Such basic challenges are, of course, nothing new for the EU with its various predecessor organisations, most prominently the European Community (EC). At the same time, multilateral politics involving cooperation and conflict resolution, is not unconditional (Martin, 1992). The lack of (ongoing) political support, unilateralism or outright withdrawal, especially on the part of the most powerful member states, risk undermining multilateral institutions and make cooperation difficult (Lake et al., 2021; Morse and Keohane, 2015). Multilateralism, therefore, needs member states that are able and willing to maintain and promote the system.
Mini- or bilateralism, that is, the coordination in a (very) small group of member states and its intertwining with multilateral policymaking and regional order at large, are ways to do so. This is because in a multilateral system, with its multitude of different capacities, coordination and agreement among all actors might not always be possible. At the same time, a single member state permanently taking the lead and unilaterally trying to impose policy solutions on others, would face strong legitimacy concerns and political resistance. France-Germany in European integration and EU politics is a case in which bilateralism and multilateralism ‘meet’. While neither a particularism of these two countries nor of Europe, Franco-German relations are a particularly prominent, lasting and consequential instance of bilateralism in multilateralism (see, for example, Cole, 2001; Pedersen, 1998; Webber, 1999).
The two scholars who arguably have offered the intellectually deepest sets of writings on multilateralism and bilateralism, respectively, John G. Ruggie (1992, 1993) and Albert O. Hirschman, (1980[1945]), had good reasons exclusively to focus only on just one. However, as distinct but dynamic types of interstate relations, regionally or globally, bilateralism (or other forms of minilateralism) and multilateralism (including multilateral forms of regional integration) may relate to each other in three basic ways. Bi- and multilateralism can compete with one another (bilateralism or or versus multilateralism); they can coexist next to each other (bilateralism and multilateralism); or they can complect, that is, intertwine or mingle (bilateralism in multilateralism). A range of largely empirical studies, together making up a small but growing body of literature, and which we will explore in greater detail in the next section, illustrate and reflect this tripartite conceptual differentiation.
Franco-German bilateralism is located at a time and region that has experienced and still displays a deeply anchored multilateralism that is wedded to the ‘European project’ ever since the Second World War and to the politics within the EU/EC, of which it is a key part. Franco-German bilateralism is an at once particularly unlikely and plausible form of tenacious bilateralism and deep multilateralism: inter-linked and inter-twined, we argue that in key episodes of European integration and EU/EC politics Franco-German bilateralism has proven decisive in shaping political processes and outcomes. Disregarding the bilateral-multilateral link would mean missing major aspects at ‘critical junctures’ of European politics (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007).
We show that the role and impact of Franco-German bilateralism within multilateral European crisis management and polity development is rooted in several factors. One is that as the two largest EU member states, both in terms of demography and the economy, France and Germany have a ‘critical mass’ for decision-making in this regional organisation (Gruber, 2000). Others concern the strong institutional and normative underpinnings of Franco-German relations, leading policymakers and civil servants from the two countries to evoke a special responsibility for regional stability and development (Simonian, 1985). Finally, with the two countries often holding initially different but compatible preferences on European policy and polity, this large bilateral spectrum of preferences opens ways for broader multilateral EU-level compromises (Webber, 1999).
The next section locates the Franco-German node within a large universe of instances of minilateralims in regional and global multilateralism. The subsequent section theorises Franco-German bilateralism within the context of multilateral European politics and contrasts our approach with prominent integration theories. We then explain the rationale for our case selection, as well as the data used and the methodology applied for this study. The following empirical sections scrutinise three pivotal episodes of European polity development – disputes and uncertainties concerning budgetary politics (1979–1984), the end of the Cold War (1989–1991) and implications of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020–2022) – covering different policy domains, actor constellations and phases of the European integration process. The conclusions summarise our main findings and suggest avenues for further research.
Bilateralism or/and/in multilateralism
Bilateralism and multilateralism each constitute prominent concepts in the international relations and regional integration literatures. They have been applied empirically in different contexts, both over time and across space. A key shortcoming, we hold, is that bilateralism and multilateralism are usually treated separately from one another. Consider, for instance, the works of John G. Ruggie (1992, 1993) and Albert O. Hirschman (1980[1945]). Both represent groundbreaking studies documenting multilateralism and bilateralism as the forms of decisively shaping, defining, dominating or marginalising sets of relations among or between state actors. However, they focused on just one dimension, multilateralism or bilateralism, respectively.
John Gerard Ruggie, in multiple single-authored publications or along with collaborators, uncovers the nature, origins and implications of multilateralism as basic forms of relating to others both in the areas of international political economy, including trade and the international financial system (Abdelal and Ruggie, 2009; Ruggie, 1982), as well as with respect to arrangements in international security, notably NATO and the United Nations system (Ruggie, 1994, 1996). Writing from an institutionalist and modernist-constructivist perspective, Ruggie presents multilateralism as a consequential ordering principle fundamentally shaping regional order and global politics. The main powers underwriting multilateral orders, he contends, are oriented towards ‘principled multilateralism’, that is, committed to solve collective action problems cooperatively (Ruggie, 1992, 1993).
Albert Otto Hirschman (1980[1945]), in turn, investigates the inherent political dimensions of international trade, especially if organised bilaterally. Writing from a theoretical stance informed by classical realism, he focuses on the asymmetries of mutual benefits and (inter)dependence, and the potentially deeply uneven opportunity costs of breaking up bilateral relationships. The uneven costs, damage or pain of interrupting or reducing bilateral exchange – ‘the power to interrupt’ (p. 16 et passim) – emerges as core. Hirschman exposes bilateral trade relations as a form of leverage, influence and domination, and documents external trade as a policy tool to expand and exert coercion and national power. Scrutinising the ‘influence effect of foreign trade’ (p. 15 et passim), he shows how trade may ‘become a direct source of power’ (p. 14).
Both Ruggie and Hirschman were thus less interested in the links of multilateralism or bilateralism, respectively, to other forms of relating to one another, and in the potentially intertwining dynamics between bilateralism and multilateralism. On one hand, Ruggie paid little attention to bilateralism or other forms of minilateralism even within the dense system of ‘Western’ multilateralisms broadly defined. On the other hand, Hirschman did not consider other types of bilateral relations, outside or beyond trade, or bilateral nodes with potentially different or additional dynamics including multilateral ones.
Against this background, we hold that bilateralism, as a form of minilateralism, represents a privileged connection or partnership between a selective dyadic subgroup of states. To be sure, bilateralism is one manifestation of, hence not the same as and not necessarily equivalent to minilateralism. While the conceptual boundaries are not always clear (cf. Dee, 2024), we perceive of minilateral relations as often rather flexible, little institutionalised and ad hoc phenomena. With the number of participants increasing in a subgroup of states, coordination becomes more difficult (Kahler, 1992). By contrast, bilateral relations are by definition more exclusive. Especially in the case of Franco-German bilateral relations, they also represent more robust and lasting links and thus a particularly developed form of minilateralism.
Bilateralism features between multilateralism, including many or all member states of a regional or global organisation, and unilateralism, involving individual assertions. Gomart (2002) holds that bilateral relations are the ‘basic form of the diplomatic game’ and, as such, the fundamental element of international politics. Pannier (2020) shows that many multilateral international negotiations are based on a multiplicity of bilateral relations. Other scholars point to an increasing need to coordinate policies on bilateral or multilateral levels. Mattelaer (2019), for instance, suggests that in view of the global decline of multilateralism and the scope of Europeanisation involving ever more actors, there is a greater need for bilateral diplomacy.
Bilateral relations range from ‘friendships’ to ‘special relationships’, to dyads with lasting tensions and disagreements with recurrently conflictual relations. Regarding the latter, Greece-Turkey within NATO or China-Japan in the Asian Pacific come to mind. While some bilateral relations get worse over time, others change for the better, and yet others remain largely unaffected by evolving or transforming domestic, regional or global contexts. The bases of all such cooperation or interaction include formal treaties, informal arrangements, international institutions, or varying patterns of practices and interchange. Arguably, however, certain bilateral relations ‘count’ more than others (Pannier, 2020) due to their exceptional density, tenacity or adaptability to change, and/or their larger impact on regional policymaking.
As we will document in greater detail below, Franco-German relations are a particularly lasting and consequential kind of bilateralism within a deep and robust regional multilateralism. The two countries are closely tied to the European integration project and European Union politics. Yet, the co-presence of bilateral connections and multilateral forms is not a phenomenon exclusive to Europe or the EU, nor is it a Franco-German particularism. Rather, simultaneous forms of bilateralism or minilateralism, on one hand, and multilateralism, on the other, form an integral part of regional orders and global politics.
A panoptic view of bilateralism and minilateralism next to and along with multilateral contexts reveals that both forms can, at any given time and place, regionally or globally, relate to one another in three basic ways. First, bilateralism and multilateralism might compete with each other as institutional forms of relating to one another in a given policy domain or generally. This may imply that one form dominates or overpowers the other. Thereby, one may marginalise or fully crowd out the political relevance of the other. If so, the dominance or particular relevance of one form may warrant an exclusive analytic focus on just one without considering the other. This constellation thus broadly follows the research focus of Ruggie’s and Hirschman’s landmark studies on one of the two forms, multilateralism and bilateralism, respectively. In any case, politically and analytically, we call this constellation ‘bilateralism or multilateralism’ or ‘bilateralism versus multilateralism’.
Nathan (2018), for example, shows that bilateral relations between Malaysia and Singapore defy multilateral types of conflict resolution within ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and instead prefer bilateral mechanisms towards economic integration and security affairs in that region. Vazquez (2021) documents a similar phenomenon for the second decade since the foundation of the BRICS (including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), noting the transition from a multilateral alignment to several separate and partly competing bilateral arrangements among the five members. This ‘bilateralisation’ of intra-BRICS relations comprises political issues such as the India-China border conflict and broader matters of competition within the Indo-Pacific.
Both China and Russia, with their bilateral coordination, pursue the clear longer-term goal of contesting, undermining and perhaps ultimately replacing parts of the multilateral US-made international governance structures – thus displaying a fair dose of bilateralism versus the prevalent pre-existing multilateralism. As Börzel and Zürn (2021) note, the (verbal) attacks on ‘Western’ multilateral international organisations by rising and resurgent powers like China and Russia seek to undermine the ‘liberal international order’.
Second, bilateralism and multilateralism can coexist in considerable or full separation, dissociation or isolation from one another in terms of organisation and impact. Each may apply to different political subject matters or policy domains. Or each may apply to complementing aspects or dimensions in certain policy domains. That is, they may be complementary while remaining largely distinct, dissociated, and without interfering with one another. This constellation we denote ‘bilateralism and multilateralism’.
Kutchesfahani (2016) reports an interesting case of bilateralism within multilateral international non-proliferation politics in the domains of weapons of mass destruction. Writing from the theoretical perspective of epistemic communities, she investigates the creation of a mutual nuclear inspection safeguards regime between Argentina and Brazil as part of the evolution of nuclear policies in the two countries. This bilateral regime complementarily operates within, yet remains separate from, the multilateral non-proliferation regime.
Similarly, Thompson and Verdier (2014) research the choice of either bilateral or multilateral regimes, and how the two may complement each other. Approaching the subject matter from a cost-benefit analysis in the areas of foreign direct investment (bilateral), human rights (multilateral), trade (mixed) and climate (mixed), they find that transaction costs favour multilateralism, whereas compliance costs and externalities promote bilateralism.
Third, bilateralism and multilateralism can complect, that is intertwine or mingle in jointly shaping policy processes and outcomes. In their political effects and implications for policymaking, political decision-making processes, policies, and political trajectories, bilateralism and multilateralism operate together and in combination, regionally or globally. Bilateralism may constitute the inner link of multilateral cooperation or integration. Prior bilateral agreements may also pave the way for subsequent agreements on a larger scale. Such constellations, we term ‘bilateralism in multilateralism’. Thus, in the second form referred to above bi- and multilateralism might be complementary but they remain distinct from and do not interfere in one another. In this third form, however, it is difficult to imagine bilateralism and multilateralism separately from each other because they operate in combination.
Huang (2009) shows how preceding and parallel negotiations between Taiwan and the United States lubricated Taiwan’s trade liberalisations within the multilateral General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) frameworks. Mestres (2015) reports a little noted case of ‘bilateralism in multilateralism’ from EU-Europe, showing that during all its four rotating presidencies of the Council of the EU by then, Spain promoted intensified bilateral relationships particularly with the largest member states (France, Germany, Italy) to shape the EU’s foreign policy at the multilateral Union-level.
In many studies, however, it often remains vague and unclear which of the three constellations between bilateralism and multilateralism applies. The small yet persisting literature on special relationships in international affairs, for example, frequently involves aspects of ‘and’ as well as of ‘in’ (for overviews of special relations, see Danchev, 1998; Harnisch et al., 2015; Haugevik, 2018). Most writings in this vein focus on ‘special’ bilateral bonds and links, their historical origins and political logics, or their various dimensions and aspects of particularly ‘special’ bilateral dyads, such as those between the United States and the United Kingdom (Campbell, 2008; Louis and Bull, 1986; Russett, 1963), Germany and Israel (Feldman, 1984; Pallade, 2005), or the United States and Israel (Dumbrell and Schäfer, 2009).
While often anecdotal and implicit, these latter writings occasionally touch upon aspects of multilateralism, such as the United States and the United Kingdom within the Western security order of NATO. We hold that in the second and especially the third constellation – that is, ‘bilateralism and multilateralism’ and ‘bilateralism in multilateralism’ – bilateral (and other minilateral) relations, in many periods and areas, cannot and should not be explored in dissociation from the multilateral political framework in which they operate, and vice versa. This is because the focus on just one form risks losing sight of important or decisive aspects of the other, especially if the two forms mingle and intertwine in shaping important political processes and outcomes. Table 1 summarises the types, interactions and implications of bi- and multilateralism.
Types, interactions and implications of bilateralism and multilateralism.
Franco-German bilateralism in multilateral European politics
As for the politics of the European integration project, what is it that holds together and occasionally deepens the multilateral EU polity? European integration marks the process of nation states working together more closely in economic and political affairs and pooling or delegating competences to the supranational, European level (Haas, 1968; Moravcsik, 1998; Schmitter, 1970). In a Union of (currently) 27 member states with at times different national positions and policy preferences, intergovernmental deadlock over the depth and breadth of cooperation regularly become visible. One might thus expect Europe to be stalled in different opposing camps of member states or even follow the path of a ‘European disintegration’ (Lindberg, 1963; Nye, 1968; Taylor, 1989; Webber, 2018). This risk is particularly present in the event of crises, characterised by high levels of threat and uncertainty, and potentially setting free or further intensifying centrifugal forces (Van Middelaar, 2019: 1–18).
Within the EU’s multilateral setting, there are numerous forms of bilateral or other minilateral cooperation. Cooper and Fabbrini (2022) recently counted 13 such ‘bottom-up regional groups’, next to France-Germany, including formations like the Visegrád Group of the four Central and Eastern EU member states Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia; the EuroMed grouping of nine Southern EU member states neighbouring the Mediterranean Sea; or the New Hanseatic League of eight Northern and self-proclaimed fiscally ‘frugal’ EU member states. What these groups have in common is that their members engage in some sort of cooperation and that this cooperation unfolds outside the EU’s regular institutional framework. Yet, the groups vary in several dimensions including their primary purpose: while some groups cooperate in only a very limited number of policy domains, the primary objective of others is to prevent (further) European integration. Yet others want to actively promote and shape European integration in particular ways or directions (Cooper and Fabbrini, 2022).
Among the numerous bilateral and minilateral configurations inside the EU, most scholars and practitioners agree, the Franco-German node has been the most visible and influential one. However, it often remains theoretically underexplored and empirically vague why this should be the case and how France and Germany exercise decisive influence in concrete instances, such as during European integration crises. To fill this gap and trace a particularly developed and consequential form of minilateralism in regional multilateralism, this section theorises the bilateral relationship between France and Germany in multilateral European politics.
Drawing from rich yet at times dispersed bodies of literature, we argue that the foundations and potential influence of Franco-German bilateralism in and on the multilateralism of European integration and EU politics rests on four factors. First, Franco-German joint material resources stand out, both in absolute and in relative terms. For instance, in the 2025-EU of 27 member states these two countries still represent about 40 percent of the Union’s overall economic output, making Franco-German consent at least a necessary condition for every European-level decision involving large amounts of money (cf. Gruber, 2000). Even in a now larger and more heterogenous EU there is no other bilateral (or small minilateral) combination of member states that would represent similar bargaining clout. Rather, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from EU membership (‘Brexit’) has again increased the relative share of Franco-German material resources (Chopin and Lequesne, 2021; see also Tallberg, 2008). While not decisive for the functioning of the bilateral or minilateral link itself, (joint) material resources can be an important factor for the potential impact of these countries on the multilateral order.
Second, the Franco-German bilateralism is historically rooted and normatively grounded. As founding member states of the earliest European Communities after the Second World War, policymakers from the two countries regularly note a special responsibility that they carry for the stability and development of the European polity. Indeed, the Franco-German link goes beyond intergovernmental relations between governmental elites to also include transnational contacts among other public and societal actors (Krotz and Schild, 2013; Schild, 2010 Interviews 4, 12, 18, 19).
Third, the political and institutional reality of Franco-German relations, which date back to the bilateral 1963 Treaty of Friendship better known as the ‘Elysée Treaty’ – the seat of the French President and locale of its signing – is extraordinary in international relations and European politics (Karagiannis, 2013). With its multiple updates and extensions, the Elysée Treaty ties the executives of the two countries together and stipulates provisions to define joint positions on international matters of common concern. The Franco-German link thus represents a particularly advanced form of institutional consolidation within the universe of bilateral and other minilateral relations.
There is a fourth factor of Franco-German relations that we consider not being part of the foundations of the bilateral relationship itself but that, if present, increases the likelihood for a decisive influence of Franco-German bilateralism on EU-level multilateralism. It is well known that France and Germany often hold different preferences on regional policy and polity, at least at the beginning of a European integration crisis (Webber, 1999). For instance, France’s economic model driven by domestic consumption and high public spending stands in contrast with Germany’s export-oriented model relying on fiscal restraint and sound public finances. Regarding the EU polity, French governments have traditionally favoured the strengthening of intergovernmental European-level actors and procedures, while German governments tend to promote supranational solutions, although usually with strong national ‘safeguards’. France and Germany holding different but compatible preferences and being, at first, on opposite poles of a larger spectrum of national preferences then opens ways for broader multilateral EU-level compromises (Krotz and Schild, 2013: 39–41; Schramm and Krotz, 2024).
Our analysis of critical junctures or basic crisis episodes, together with the focus on Franco-German bilateralism within European integration and EU politics multilateralism, in several respects differs from and complements the leading European integration theories. Most obviously, other than neofunctionalism (Haas, 1968; Niemann, 2006; Schmitter, 1970) and related supranational accounts (for example Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997), our approach theorises and traces the agency of states and governmental actors, notably of the French and German executives. To be sure, we do not dispute the at times influential role played by supranational compound actors like the European Commission; however, in the event of intergovernmental divides and when strong national resources are needed, we consider member states and their executives to be the most important actors. Moreover, unlike neofunctionalism with its emphasis on longer-term dynamics, our approach looks at concrete moments in time. While we argue that the theorised factors and mechanisms of Franco-German bilateralism in European multilateralism apply in general, we expect them to be particularly visible and consequential in concrete crisis episodes.
This article, with its emphasis on interstate bargains and concrete integration outcomes, is therefore closer to the intergovernmental theoretical tradition. However, our approach in several respects also departs from classic or traditional intergovernmentalism in European affairs (Hoffmann, 1966, 2019[1995]), liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). or the more recent new intergovernmentalism (Bickerton et al., 2015). Unlike the two former, we focus on governmental interactions above the national but below the European level. And other than the latter, but in line with our notion of bilateralism in multilateralism, we stress the relevance of a small (actually, dyadic) subgroup of member states rather than deliberation among all national governments within the multilateral setting.
Highlighting the role of the ‘bilateral fabric’, that is, the institutional and political reality of Franco-German relations and their impact on European multilateral bargains, involves aspects of historical institutionalist and other institutionalist thought (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 1996; Rixen et al., 2016) that are largely absent in purely intergovernmentalist perspectives. Franco-German relations, with their intertwined bilateral reality within the multilateral European setting, is comparable to but – for the foundational factors listed above – still distinct from other regional groupings. We also see an important linking point of our approach to ‘differentiated integration’ (Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 2020). In line with this vast and growing literature, we consider Franco-German bilateralism, just like other regional groupings, as a hitherto neglected form of differentiated integration in the EU.
Bringing together the foundations of Franco-German relations and the logic of bilateralism in multilateralism, we expect the two countries to exercise different types of regional political leadership, especially during moments of crisis for the EU/EC. We define such leadership as a group of regional actors being able and willing to apply resources for regional stabilisation and development (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011; Kindleberger, 1987; Mattli, 1999). The leadership types originate from the theorised factors above. For the logic of Franco-German bilateralism in multilateral European politics to be present, and for the two countries to exercise decisive influence on regional stabilisation and development, we expect all four factors to be present in the empirical reality. In principle, they can occur simultaneously although, in practice, they tend to unfold in a sequential manner.
First, agenda setting (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Kreppel and Oztas, 2017) is when France and Germany develop bilateral initiatives to accelerate deliberations with other member states and shape the European crisis response. Their large joint material resources potentially increase the credibility of supply as well as the multilateral demand for such bilateral initiative.
Second, compromise building results from the two countries uploading a common win-set to the European level. Their strong institutional foundation stipulates the search for such bilateral win-set. Two pathways are then conceivable: via an ‘exchange perspective’ (Jones, 2001), France and Germany each give and receive something. By contrast, the ‘compromises by proxy’ logic (Koopmann, 2004) implies that France and Germany agree on a joint goal. In either way, initially different national preferences, followed by the definition of a bilateral win-set, reduce the functional costs for subsequent multilateral consensus-seeking.
And third, France and Germany may succeed in the art of coalition forming (Gruber, 2000; Moravcsik, 1993). Their strong normative underpinnings make it unlikely that either France or Germany permanently sides with other members of the multilateral group. Via ‘entrepreneurial leadership’ (Young, 1991) the two countries rally behind them the support of the largest possible group of EU member states for their favourite crisis response. In the event of an absence of multilateral consensus, bilateral or other minilateral agreements constitute the ‘fallback position’ (Mattelaer, 2019) for structuring the regional system. Table 2 provides an overview of the foundations and types of bilateral leadership in multilateral regional settings.
Foundations and types of bilateral leadership in multilateral regional settings.
Case selection, data sources, and methodological approach
Whereas empirically we focus on France-Germany in Europe, we stress that neither bilateralism-multilateralism matters at large, nor ‘bilateralism in multilateralism’ is a Franco-German or a European particularism. We locate ‘France-Germany in Europe’ within a broader universe of cases involving what we call ‘bilateralism in multilateralism’. Yet, while just one case and far from the only one of bilateralism or minilateralism either within Europe or beyond, France-Germany in Europe is a case of a particularly advanced and consequential bilateralism in multilateralism.
With the focus on France-Germany in Europe, we seek to theorise, trace and document the role of bilateralism in multilateralism and their intertwined nature in concrete episodes of European integration. 1 We consider both France-Germany in Europe and the three chosen crises to represent ‘pathway cases’ (Gerring, 2017: 105–114) for our arguments on bilateralism in multilateralism and on European polity development, respectively. This means that to illustrate how our theorised factors play out in practice, we deliberately chose to focus on ‘positive’ cases in terms of the outcome of interest. 2 At the same time, our case selection makes sure to include different policy domains, constellations of actors, and political challenges, suggesting that the cases are at once unlikely, at least at first sight, and plausible ones for our theorised factors and pathways. This is because in each episode France and Germany started from different initial positions and showed different immediate crisis reactions, making a robust multilateral environment far from certain.
Our three cases thus include disputes over the finances and budgetary system of the EC from 1979 to 1984; the end of the Cold War and the creation of the European Monetary Union from 1989 to 1991; as well as financial and economic matters during the Covid-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2022. Each of our case-episodes concerned and threatened key features and principles of European integration and the emerging European polity, namely the supranational budgetary order, member-state and member state-Union relations, and Europe’s single market. To increase the scope and plausibility of our argument, we cover three empirical cases instead of a single one. We derive our cases from authoritative accounts of the history of European integration which all list them as pivotal episodes for the emerging European polity (e.g. Dinan, 2014; Gilbert, 2020; Patel, 2020). Since we are interested in overall European polity development, our cases affected the entire EU/EC and not just a subgroup of member states in a certain policy regime, such as the Eurozone or the Schengen area.
In terms of source materials and empirical data, we build on a large range of primary sources including archival material, expert interviews and documents like European Council conclusions, minutes from bilateral meetings and the memoirs of leading policymakers. The archival documents that we mobilise for the first and second case studies originate from the library of the German-French Institute in Ludwigsburg, as well as from the online depositories of the Historical Archives of the European Union at the European University Institute in Florence and the Archive of European Integration at the University of Pittsburgh. For Franco-German bilateralism in general and for the third case study, we use data from 20 in-depth expert interviews that we conducted between March 2018 and November 2024 with policymakers, civil servants and former diplomatic advisers from France, Germany, other EU member states, the European Commission, the European Council and the Council of the EU. To obtain relevant information, the interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality. However, to increase the reliability of the material, questions suggesting causal relationships or social desirability were omitted (cf. Rathbun, 2008: 690–691). We triangulate these primary sources with relevant press reports and specialised secondary literature.
Carefully tracing the three episodes from across European politics and integration affairs, we make use of ‘structured, focused comparisons’ (George and Bennett, 2005). This means that we focus on similar analytical aspects in all three crisis episodes under consideration. We also deploy counterfactual arguments and ‘educated guesses’ (Levy, 2015) about what might have happened if Franco-German cooperation had been less resilient and/or if bilateralism had had a weaker or different impact on the multilateral European level.
What are the ‘observable implications’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2019: 195–222) of Franco-German bilateralism for multilateral European politics and integration, especially in times of crisis? The theorisation of bilateral foundations and multilateral leadership types leads us to develop several such implications. First, we expect France and Germany, more than any other member state or group of member states, to move centre stage. Empirically, this should become visible through an intensification of bilateral coordination at the highest administrative levels. Second, we expect France and Germany to take each other’s main concerns into account when forming or altering policy preferences. The two countries might also develop and pursue shared bilateral preferences regarding European polity development. Third, on the condition that both countries recognise a common threat and need for joint action, France and Germany are expected to side with each other, rather than with other supposedly like-minded member states. Importantly, and in line with our selection of ‘pathway’ but nevertheless ‘unlikely’ cases, this should happen despite individual French and/or German preferences actually being closer to those of other national governments at the beginning of the respective crisis episode.
Overall, the case selection, together with the chosen methodological approach and collected data, document the role and importance of bilateralism in multilateralism and the different mechanisms at play. The research design allows us to raise and answer two critical questions: why did France and Germany regularly come together, despite initially holding different or even opposite preferences? We show that both countries developed a shared understanding of the challenge at stake and a joint interest in strengthening the EU polity. And how exactly did France and Germany contribute to European polity stabilisation and development? We demonstrate that starting from opposite preferences, the two countries bridged differences, established joint positions (at least temporarily), and enabled broader European-level agreements.
European budgetary politics and the rebate question (1979–1984)
In the first round of European enlargement, in 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom had joined the European Community of the original six member states, namely, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and (West) Germany. The general expectation had it that a more numerous and heterogeneous membership would complicate European decision-making. This notably concerned concrete policy domains like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the European budget. It also concerned matters of European polity development, such as majority voting and calls for a European political union. On aspects related to agriculture and the budget, German preferences were close to those of the United Kingdom (F.A.Z. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung], 1984). Both states advocated budgetary restraint and tight limits to agricultural expenditure. On constitutional aspects, by contrast, French and British preferences tended to align. Policymakers from both states were sceptical of federal and supranational European features and instead favoured intergovernmental forms of decision-making (Simonian, 1985: 290–295; 327–330).
The key controversy on the European political agenda since the late 1970s was the British budgetary rebate question. UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for the first time had raised the issue at the European Council meeting in Strasbourg in June 1979. Famously demanding ‘our own money back’, Thatcher called for a permanent British compensation (rebate) to its financial contributions, a general restructuring of the Community budget, and the proportion devoted to agriculture to be reduced (Gowland, 2017: 219–225). Unlike other EC member states, having a small agricultural sector the British economy imported much food and goods from third countries. For the United Kingdom, this meant that it had to transfer large shares of agricultural levies and customs duties to the Community budget while receiving little funding from the CAP (Denton, 1984: 120). However, British demands for a fixed and permanent rebate called into question the EC’s existing budgetary system, including the principle of ‘own resources’ and the financing of communitised policies like the CAP (Wallace, 1983).
Following the 1970-Treaty of Luxembourg, the EC budget rested on two sources of revenue: first, national contributions in the form of a harmonised VAT rate were not to exceed one percent of a country’s yearly economic output. Second, member states collected own resources in the form of agricultural levies and customs duties on trade with third countries, which they then transferred to the EC (Laffan, 1999: 41). A central contentious point was that Thatcher considered levies and duties as national contributions while most other member states insisted on the autonomy of Community own resources. To emphasise their demand, the British government threatened to block the EC’s yearly decisions on agricultural price levels (Schramm, 2024a). The price levels were the cornerstone of the CAP system, which agricultural ministers usually adopted on the basis of consensus. This way, the British government sought to establish a linkage between the agreement on CAP prices and concessions to its budgetary claims. Between 1979 and 1984, the United Kingdom several times managed to negotiate a temporary reduction of its budgetary contributions (Schramm, 2024a).
In a momentous move, the French government spoke out in favour of majority decisions on agricultural prices to increase pressure and isolate the United Kingdom in the negotiations. This was a strong deviation from former French positions and a game-changer for European-level decision-making because it was France that in 1966 had established the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ (Golub, 1999). Ever since then, it had insisted that a European vote must not be taken if a member state raised concerns based on vital national interests. However, in accordance with France’s move, and backed by the German government, in May 1982 the Belgian EC Council Presidency called for such an explicit vote (Wallace, 1983: 104–105). Forming a qualified majority, seven member states decided on the annual agricultural prices against the British representative, with also Denmark and Greece voting against. Manifesting agenda setting power, France and Germany had joined forces to apply majority voting, where possible, and rallied behind them a large-enough number of member states. According to Wall (2008: 13), surprised British civil servants reported back to their foreign ministry that France and Germany had sided against the UK because they claimed that ‘our use of the [Luxembourg] Compromise was not appropriate in our case because our motives were procedural rather than substantive and related to issues in a context other than that in which the Council was reaching decisions’
Shortly thereafter, the United Kingdom focused on a second and more credible threat. Rising expenditures mostly related to the CAP and the prospect of Southern enlargement brought the EC to the verge of bankruptcy (see also Moravcsik, 1991: 32; 36). Its founding treaties prohibit the Community from running a deficit. Thatcher sought to link her consent to an increase in the EC’s revenues with demands for a British rebate and a restructuring of the Community budget. Against this background, several member states signalled their willingness to proceed with integration, if necessary, without the United Kingdom (Taylor, 1989: 4–8). France and Germany were particularly determined to drive European integration forward. Starting in 1981, the notion of a ‘multi-speed’ Europe gained traction, implying that a subgroup of member states would realise common policies, including potential changes to the EC’s legal and political basis. This, in turn, triggered concerns on the part of the British government that the United Kingdom could be excluded from the core of European integration (Wall, 2019: 258–288).
As our theoretical framework would expect, during the first half of 1984 Franco-German coordination on the budgetary crisis intensified. More than any other minilateral group of leaders, President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl met multiple times bilaterally and ahead of European Council summits. In his memoirs, France’s Minister for European Affairs, Roland Dumas (2007: 215–217; 385–396), lists several position papers and joint Franco-German initiatives outlining two scenarios: first, if agreement on the budgetary crisis was reached, the Community as a whole could embark on a European ‘relaunch’. Second, if no agreement was reached, the French government would commence discussions on how those member states who were committed to further integration, excluding the United Kingdom, might move ahead. Addressing the European Parliament in May 1984, Mitterrand suggested a multi-speed Europe to overcome the current political deadlock. Around the same time, Kohl signalled that the circumstances now were right to move forward with European integration (Bulletin, 1984a: 133–138).
In a first important concession, at the European Council in Brussels in March 1984 Thatcher had agreed that any British rebate would be based on her country’s contributions in the form of the VAT rate, and not, as hitherto requested, also on agricultural levies and customs duties. Confirming a key principle of the EC’s budgetary system, the British government accepted that levies and customs were own resources that it collected only on behalf of the Community (George, 1998: 155). We thus see how Franco-German bilateral coordination and compromise building had immediate European-level consequences. Little later, at the European Council in Fontainebleau on 25–26 June 1984 the other member states granted the United Kingdom a compensation for its budgetary contributions. The conclusions stipulate that from 1985 on, the United Kingdom ‘will receive two thirds (66%) of what it pays [. . .] and what it receives from the Community budget’ (Bulletin, 1984b: 7). However, calculations made by Le Monde (1984) showed that these compensations were less generous than the ones that had been offered three months earlier in Brussels, and that the quasi-permanent British rebate was smaller than the temporary reductions negotiated during previous years. With France and Germany holding their lines and signalling that they were not willing to alter the fundamental structures of the EC’s budgetary system, the British prime minister realised that she had ‘overplayed her hand’ (George, 1998: 157).
Most remarkably, despite her yearslong opposition, Thatcher at Fontainebleau agreed to raise the EC’s budgetary ceiling. She also accepted concrete provisions for EC institutional reform. Following the Fontainebleau conclusions (Bulletin, 1984b: 9–10), member states set up an ‘ad hoc committee [. . .] to suggest ways of improving European cooperation’. During the next two years, this so-called Dooge Committee would pave the way for the Single European Act and deepened integration including greater applicability of majority voting, more powers for the European Parliament and, eventually, the European Union (see also Moravcsik, 1991: 38–40). Starting with France and Germany’s readiness to outvote intractable national governments, the resolution of the budgetary rebate crisis led to a reinterpretation and eventual disregard of the Luxembourg Compromise.
How did these seemingly unlikely agreements come about? Why did Thatcher compromise on multiple points? The decisive factor was that France and Germany rallied their political and financial resources and developed a joint interest to overcome intergovernmental deadlock (cf. Schramm, 2024a). After all, as the EC’s two biggest economies, Germany and France had to cover the largest part of the United Kingdom’s budgetary rebate. Forming winning coalitions and signalling ‘go-it-alone power’ (Gruber, 2000), they were determined to move forward with European integration, if necessary, without intractable actors like the United Kingdom. Doing so, both states deviated from strictly defined national policy preferences: while Mitterrand accepted greater use of majority voting, Kohl consented to more Community financial resources. Taylor (1989: 7) called this an exemplary instance of France and Germany deciding to join forces and promote European polity development, despite national preferences suggesting otherwise.
The budgetary rebate crisis was a key episode in European integration because it underlined and strengthened important features of the EC’s political and budgetary order. Although the episode brought with it a deviation from the Community’s original financing system due to the introduction of ‘national rebates’, the income ceiling was raised to finance Community projects like the CAP and upcoming Southern enlargement. Most importantly, despite major opposition from the part of the United Kingdom and its formal right to veto any changes to the budget, the principle of own resources, thus the autonomous Community budgetary order, was confirmed. In a counterfactual scenario, a less resilient bilateral basis could have prevented the convergence of national preferences. Strictly defined German preferences would have led the government to insist on EC fiscal restraint and side with the United Kingdom. This, in turn, would have made Franco-German bilateral compromises and the broader EC-level package deal including a fundamental restructuring of the Community budget, the secure financing of the CAP and EC enlargement unlikely. The consequence might have been severe political clashes, EC bankruptcy and the undermining of the Community’s founding principles, such as the own resources.
The end of the Cold War and the spectre of German power in Europe (1989–1991)
Popular upheavals in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s called into question the post-Second World War European political and security order. Eventually, the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 dramatically symbolised the end of the Cold War and heralded the prospect of German unification. This led to concerns about a possible return of disastrous power politics on the European continent and uncertainty about the future orientation of the ‘new’ Germany (e.g. Mearsheimer, 1990). It also had major implications for the internal politics and the future trajectory of the European Community.
Policymakers from other EC member states sought to tie the now larger and economically potentially even more superior Germany into European political structures. Their preferred means was closer European monetary integration. The great 1989–1991 divide directly affected the Franco-German bilateral relationship, as well as multilateral European politics more broadly (Krotz et al., 2012). European integration, after all, rested on fragile political balances and the implicit notion of parity between France and Germany. A unified Germany, however, would be significantly more populous than France (Bozo, 2009).
Monetary cooperation had long had a prominent place in the history of European integration. Already at the Hague summit in December 1969, the heads of State or Government of the EC member states committed to exploring the possibilities for a European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The resulting Werner report, proposing the creation of a single currency by 1980, however, did not find sufficient support for the necessary treaty changes, nor for a starting date (Szász, 1999: 36–75). In the 1970s and 1980s, the European Monetary System (EMS) aimed to ensure monetary stability. The EMS was a system of intergovernmental monetary cooperation and did not provide for supranational structures (Szász, 1999). The European Council of Hanover in June 1988 appointed a committee of monetary experts under the chairmanship of European Commission President Jacques Delors to develop proposals for EMU. Welcoming the Delors report one year later, national leaders agreed on preparing the subsequent stages, but they again did not set a concrete starting date (Gros and Thygesen, 1998: 406). This was because ‘hard currency’ countries like Germany and the Netherlands, as well as more Eurosceptic countries like Denmark and the United Kingdom, regarded EMU as a distant long-term objective (Szász, 1999: 103–106). Basic national preferences on monetary and economic preferences thus differed greatly, letting member states to find themselves in different, at times opposing camps.
Political dynamics changed dramatically with the upheavals and demonstrations during the summer of 1989. Speaking to the European Parliament on 25 October in response to the developments in Eastern Europe, France’s President Mitterrand called for ‘strengthening and accelerating’ the EC’s political structures (Mitterrand, 1989). More than anyone else, the UK Prime Minister Thatcher was determined to prevent German unification. For her, a united Germany would be ‘simply too big and powerful to be just another player within Europe’ (Thatcher, 1995: 791). Several times, Thatcher tried to convince Mitterrand, as well as the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, to form alliances and stop German unification. To do so, she suggested close relations between the other EC member states, primarily the United Kingdom and France, to balance Germany (Thatcher, 1995: 796–799; see also Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 566–567).
French policymakers followed the developments in Germany with great unease, too. From the start, Mitterrand’s political rhetoric and actions proved quite ambivalent (Bozo, 2009: 59–62): on one hand, he saw unification as the legitimate right of German self-determination. On the other hand, he underlined the European and international dimensions of the crisis and argued that unification was not a matter for the German people alone. During a meeting with Mitterrand and his French counterpart Dumas on 30 November 1989, Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher noticed growing impatience on the part of the French government (Genscher, 1995: 390). Chancellor Kohl himself, one week later in Strasbourg, would face a ‘frosty atmosphere’ and one of the most difficult European Council summits of his 16 year chancellorship (as cited in Bitterlich, 1998: 116). Mitterrand warned German unification not to be completed until decisive steps towards EMU had been taken. Determined to launch EMU at the European Council in Strasbourg, scheduled for 8–9 December, he undertook a tour to the capitals of the 10 other EC member states in the run-up to that summit to gain support for his plans (Bozo, 2009: 111–134).
In view of the potentially damaging impact of the way German unification would be realised for both their bilateral relations and multilateral European integration, we would expect the French and German governments to intensify their bilateral consultations starting from November (Krotz et al., 2012). This is indeed what happened. From the fall of the Berlin Wall to the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, three phases proved decisive (cf. Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: chapters 4 and 8) for the management and eventual resolution of this period of fundamental crisis. The phases document how French and German leaders, stressing their normatively and historically grounded responsibility for the unification of the European continent and building on privileged bilateral institutions, formed an inner link within the EC and helped to prevent an emerging crisis from fully escalating (Telschik, 1991: 68–69). In the first phase, four weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall the heads of State or Government agreed on a date for an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to launch EMU. Three days before the Strasbourg summit, the German diplomatic advisor Bitterlich informed the French European advisor, Guigou, that Germany was ready to agree on a concrete date for the IGC, which would discuss the treaty changes necessary to launch EMU (Védrine, 1996: 431).
At the European Council in Strasbourg, member states agreed to convene the IGC before the end of 1990 to discuss and prepare treaty changes ‘with a view to the final stages of EMU’ (Bulletin, 1989: 14). They both recognised that ‘the German people will regain its unity through free self-determination’ and underlined their commitment ‘to achieve closer unity and make the [European] Community the focal point for a changing Europe’ (Bulletin, 1989: 8). Confirming the basic agreement reached by Franco-German agenda setting, the heads of State or Government at Strasbourg thus established an explicit linkage between German unification and deeper European integration, stipulating that both processes would happen in parallel. This linkage reflected key German and French preferences following the ‘exchange perspective’ of bilateral compromise building (see above): while Germany wanted broader global and European developments not to delay or impede the national unification process, France sought to tie the new Germany closer to European structures.
In the second phase, when the process towards German unification further accelerated during spring 1990, national leaders fixed a timetable for the next steps towards EMU. Despite ongoing domestic reservations about giving up the Deutsche Mark, Kohl became a major advocate of monetary union (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 758). Previous bilateral tensions began to relax, mostly thanks to the intensified contact between French and German governmental elites. Mitterrand, after initially giving some support to Thatcher’s opposition to German unification, came to different conclusions on how to cope with the evolving geopolitical shifts (Bozo, 2009: 165–207). Confirming our theoretical expectations, Mitterrand, unlike Thatcher, intensified cooperation with the German government and sought to embed German unification into deeper European integration. Representing an ‘inner negotiation’ within the multilateral European framework (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 758), Franco-German bilateral coordination gave impetus for European-level dynamics and speeded up the creation of EMU. Notably, in a joint letter to the Irish EC Council Presidency on 18 April Kohl and Mitterrand urged to intensify the preparatory work for the IGC on EMU. Dyson and Featherstone (1999: 415) counted no less than six Franco-German meetings, usually taking place over the weekend, between April and November 1990 in which the two governments removed bilateral and broader European differences. In the third phase, with Germany united, national governments at the European Council summit in Maastricht from 9–10 December 1991 formally adopted EMU.
Franco-German bilateralism, embedded within European multilateralism, not only remained politically relevant and functional during this final critical crisis phase. Numerous scholars have pointed out that the design of EMU largely reflected German preferences. Unsurprisingly, however, primarily rationalist accounts of major steps and treaty reforms in European integration as being based on member states’ national economic calculations (cf. Moravcsik, 1998: 379–471), have a difficult time in the present case. While they might plausibly explain the terms of the final agreement, that is, the design of EMU reflecting key German policy preferences, they struggle with respect to both the start of the process and its accelerated pace. Therefore, unlike liberal intergovernmentalism’s emphasis on national economic calculations, the evidence gathered here suggests the important role of bilateral institutional robustness and European ideology – especially on the part of French and German political leaders – together with Mitterrand and Kohl’s shared concerns about European polity stability and development in the context of major geopolitical changes. After some initial irritation and controversies, they used the bilateral framework to clear up points of dispute, prepare bi- and multilateral meetings, and determine the European agenda between 1989 and 1991.
Franco-German embedded bilateralism proved to be key for navigating European integration from the Cold-War era into post-Cold War affairs. Hence, European integration continued to proceed, even while experiencing phases of strain, problems and occasional setbacks. Why was that? As in other instances, France and Germany developed joint postures and positions, despite holding preferences that were actually closer to those of other EC member states, and opted for a form of ‘integrative balancing’ (Link, 2001). Most notably, France and the United Kingdom drew very different conclusions for how to handle the soon-to-be-unified Germany and the spectre of European power politics. Counterfactually speaking, weaker normative underpinnings in their bilateral relationship on the part of French and German elites could have created much uncertainty for multilateral European politics. France siding with the United Kingdom might not have necessarily prevented German unification but would certainly have hampered it. In turn, Germany not taking other member states’ concerns seriously, most notably those of France, could have led to the formation of counter-alliances and a deep crisis in European politics.
Instead, French and German national leaders considered and framed the Maastricht Treaty as the European response to major geopolitical shifts (Bozo, 2009: 330). They had the capacities and political willingness that were necessary to promote major European polity development. During the following years, France-Germany at several moments confirmed their commitment to implement EMU. When facing, in the early 1990s, currency crises in the EMS and a negative referendum in Denmark on the Maastricht Treaty, they realised EMU with a reduced number of member states. This outcome thus reflects our third theorised type of bilateral leadership, namely multilateral coalition forming. With some member states not able or willing to join, France-Germany proceeded with deepening European integration within a subgroup of countries. Next to Denmark, the United Kingdom obtained an ‘opting out’ from the common currency. France and Germany, however, realised EMU as one of the most ambitious and symbolic projects in the history of multilateral European integration.
Economic and financial strains culminating in the Covid-19 pandemic (2020–2022)
Starting in 2010 the EU faced a whole string of severe challenges, many of which concerned economic and financial issues related to Europe’s single market. Due to its sudden and comprehensive character, the Covid-19 pandemic arguably constituted a particularly imminent threat. Different from other recent instances of crises, such as inside the Eurozone or the Schengen area, the Covid-19 pandemic affected all EU member states. Like the two other cases under examination in this study, it thus concerned the functioning and development of the entire EU. Franco-German bilateralism again included both states at important moments deviating from strictly or narrowly defined national preferences to enable bilateral compromises and subsequent multilateral European consensus (Schramm and Krotz, 2024). Our argument also implies that without Franco-German leadership and polity stabilisation and development, the EU would have risked stalling or even disintegration (Ferrera et al., 2021).
On top of all other calamities, the Covid-19 pandemic, which fully unfolded in Europe starting in February 2020, had strong economic and financial dimensions. Sharply rising costs for health and economic support measures, together with already high national debt levels, suggested that some member states would face difficulties financing their ongoing state expenditure (cf. Copelovitch et al., 2016). Moreover, interruptions of economic supply chains and different national fiscal capacities to absorb the economic shock risked undermining fair competition inside Europe’s single market. Of particular concern was Italy, Europe’s first corona ‘hotspot’ and third-largest economy. It was widely assumed that if Italy was to face bankruptcy, unknown economic and political damage for the EU and its single market might follow (Jones, 2020).
Moreover, Europe’s political unity and cohesion were at stake. This is because at the beginning of the crisis, national measures in public health and related areas predominated. For instance, when the Italian government in mid-March requested the sharing of medical face masks, the EU failed to deliver. Instead, several member states including France and Germany restricted the export of medical equipment, even within the EU (Braw, 2020). Such egoistic behaviour reflected the traditional ‘sovereigntist reflex’ (Benoît and Hay, 2022) according to which policymakers tend to focus on the national level and their respective electorates for the most immediate measures. The European dimension of the crisis, by contrast, at this stage remained largely absent. This led policymakers like the Spanish prime minister to warn that the future of the European project was at stake (Sánchez, 2020).
In accordance with that initial reflex, member states throughout March and April mobilised national financial resources to support their citizens and enterprises. Having available most financial resources, France and Germany together endorsed by far the largest domestic fiscal support in absolute numbers (Bruegel, 2020). Notably Germany’s massive stimulus packages raised concerns among other member states and the EU’s supranational institutions about fair competition inside the single market. The German government at this point rejected calls for joint European fiscal efforts. In late March, the finance minister at the time, Olaf Scholz, instead suggested making use of existing instruments like the European Stability Mechanism. It seemed as if Germany was to side with other Northern, occasionally dubbed ‘frugal’, member states in their opposition to common debt (Reuters, 2020). In contrast, France early on had spoken out in favour of common fiscal measures. On 25 March, it joined a group of eight other EU member states calling for the introduction of a European debt instrument, possibly in the form of ‘corona bonds’ (Michalopoulos, 2020).
With intergovernmental negotiations in a deadlock, and France and Germany each representing supposedly opposite camps of member states, the functional potential and political demand for bilateral leadership increased, as suggested in our theoretical framework. Indeed, in late March and early April the rhythm of consultation and coordination between the two countries intensified, both at the administrative and the highest political levels (cf. Krotz and Schramm, 2022). Reports revealed how Chancellor Merkel and President Macron held direct talks several times per week, more than with any other national leader bilaterally and more than any other group of leaders (Seidendorf, 2020). A first result of this increased Franco-German activity became visible on 9 April 2020 when the Eurogroup agreed on a Covid-19 recovery package worth €540 billion comprising loans and guarantees for enterprises, employees and health-related state expenditure (Eurogroup, 2020). According to both insiders and close observers, the French and German Finance Ministers, Le Maire and Scholz, had been essential for bridging differences between member states (Interviews 8, 10).
Following intensified bilateral consultations and setting the agenda, France and Germany on 18 May 2020 presented a joint initiative for an EU recovery plan (France Diplomacy, 2020). This proposal was also a bilateral compromise in which the two countries respected each other’s ‘red lines’ (Interviews 4, 18, 19): Germany accepted the notion of common EU debt on a large scale and direct financial transfers to the member states, hence grants. France, for its part, subscribed to a temporary instrument as part of the EU budget with economic conditions and supranational oversight attached. The form and coming about of the bilateral compromise indicate that France and Germany, once having established a joint objective, namely common economic recovery, were ready to deviate from strictly nationally defined preferences. The compromise was necessary to provide impetus and spin to the ongoing but difficult multilateral EU-level discussions about the adequate pandemic crisis measures (Interview 9).
Indeed, the Franco-German initiative provided the institutional blueprint for the following ‘official’ proposal by the European Commission. On 27 May 2020, the Commission suggested a ‘Next Generation EU’ (NGEU) recovery plan based on the issuance of common debt. To the €500 billion in grants from the Franco-German initiative, it added another €250 billion in loans (European Commission, 2020). In the run-up to the decisive European Council meeting, scheduled for mid-July, France and Germany definitively left their camps of supposedly like-minded member states to promote their proposal. Both Macron and Merkel met for bi- and other minilateral pre-consultations with other national leaders whom they considered indispensable for establishing EU-level consensus. In late June, they also held direct bilateral talks in Berlin to coordinate further action in the first face-to-face meeting after social distancing rules had been lifted (Federal Government, 2020). In their meeting on 17–21 July, the heads of State or Government from all 27 EU member states reached agreement on the recovery plan. Due to the complex multilateral setting, the various components of the package and decision rules often requiring unanimity, some concessions to individual member states were necessary. These notably concerned the ratio between grants and loans and formulations on a new conditionality clause regarding rule of law criteria. However, the size and governance structure of the Commission proposal, backed by France-Germany, remained (European Council, 2020).
At times, Franco-German bilateralism and leadership also included coalition forming and (the threat of) differentiated integration. For instance, when Hungary and Poland in late November 2020 announced to veto the recovery package due to concerns over the planned conditionality clause – namely, that the disbursement of the EU funds would be linked to national governments respecting rule of law criteria – France-Germany suggested realising NGEU, if necessary, on an intergovernmental basis and with 25 member states (Fleming and Khan, 2020). In the end, Hungary and Poland, lacking credible other options and facing the loss of large amounts of money, refrained from putting a national veto. Therefore, the European Council finally endorsed NGEU in mid-December. The Commission started raising the new debt on the financial markets in mid-2021, while the first funds were distributed to most EU member states in 2022.
Franco-German bilateralism during the pandemic crisis enabled EU polity stabilisation and consolidation (Ferrera et al., 2021). It also led to deeper integration in the sense that the European Commission was entrusted to issue common debt and that this debt will have to be paid back together. This marks a decisive step towards a future European fiscal union. In a counterfactual scenario, France and Germany could have refrained from using their national financial resources for an EU-level recovery plan. Both states might also have joined a camp of like-minded actors. For Germany, this would have implied siding with the ‘frugals’. France, in turn, could have explicitly and permanently joined Southern member states advocating for corona bonds. In both scenarios, a bilateral compromise followed by a multilateral EU-level response to the pandemic crisis would have become very unlikely. As in the other cases under examination in this study, regarding crisis resolution and European polity development there was no credible alternative to Franco-German bilateralism.
Table 3 summarises this article’s main empirical findings. Next to France and Germany’s initial policy preferences in the three key episodes, it documents the types of Franco-German leadership exercised. The Table also lists the implications of Franco-German bilateralism for European polity development.
Franco-German policy preferences, leadership types, and European-level impact in three key integration crises.
Conclusions
This article has theorised and documented bilateral (and other minilateral) forms of cooperation within broader multilateral politics of regional integration. The extant literature often considers bilateralism and multilateralism separate from each other, both conceptually and empirically. To overcome this divide, we consider possible combinations of how the two can relate to one another. Next to bilateralism or/versus multilateralism, where one forms dominates the other, and bilateralism and multilateralism, where the two forms coexist largely in separation, we suggest bilateralism in multilateralism. It is in this third combination that the two forms of relating to one another complect, that is, they interlink and mingle in shaping policy processes and outcomes or broader political trajectories.
Franco-German relations in European integration and European Union politics is a particularly advanced form of bilateral cooperation within a multilateral setting. Whereas not restricted to these two countries and to regional integration in Europe, the foundations and mechanisms of ‘bilateralism in multilateralism’ become particularly visible via these actors and in this setting. This is because France and Germany, more than most other two countries in Europe and beyond, display strong bilateral ties characterised by large joint material resources, deep treaty-based institutional links, and normative underpinnings. Moreover, European integration represents the most advanced form of multilateral cooperation and regional integration in the world.
The article has scrutinised the role, importance and eventual impact of Franco-German bilateralism in multilateral European politics via three case studies covering 50 years of the European integration process and different policy domains. All three episodes concerned key features of European integration and were very consequential for the consolidation and development of the European Community and the European Union, respectively (see Table 3). The data and evidence gathered for this study shed new light on two earlier episodes (the budgetary rebate disputes and the end of the Cold War situation) under the theorised notion of bilateralism in multilateralism. In turn, the most recent case study (on the Covid-19 pandemic) demonstrates the relevance and explanatory power of Franco-German bilateralism in multilateral European politics, despite the now larger and at times more heterogenous EU.
Future research may consider ‘negative’ instances where (some of) our four theorised factors do not apply or play out differently than we have it above. Scholars might also want to systematically consider the role of domestic politics for Franco-German bilateralism in Europe beyond our focus on governmental elites. And, future research may probe this article’s bilateralism-in-multilateralism perspective in other regional orders and instances of world politics to work out similarities and differences compared to bilateralism in multilateralism in Europe.
