‘It’s All Personal’: State-led mobilisation of diaspora individuals

Abstract

State-led engagement with diaspora communities abroad has been an increasingly salient feature in international politics. In addition to governments’ attempts to mobilise diaspora collectives, existing research highlights the importance governments attach to key diasporic individuals (diasporans). How do governments decide which diasporans to harness? This article argues that states use tailored and personalised strategies to mobilise diasporans. Building on recent works on diasporic agency and the personal dimensions in diplomacy, the article illustrates the importance of interpersonal relations as an underlying element that shapes decisions regarding who to mobilise and to what goals. We illustrate this argument with archival evidence that details Israel’s targeted engagement with three influential Jewish diasporans in the United States, showing how interpersonal ties facilitate knowledge about the diasporans and trust in their activities.

Introduction

The role of diaspora communities in security and foreign policies has been increasingly recognised by International Relations (IR) scholarship. For instance, existing research points to the role of diasporas in conflict dynamics and post-conflict reconstruction (Adamson, 2013; Baser, 2017; Brinkerhoff, 2008; Koinova, 2011; Piazza, 2018). Other works examine governments’ policies to engage ‘their’ diasporas for security and foreign policy goals (as ethnic lobby groups or economic agents) but also to repress diasporas framed as security threats (Abramson, 2024; Adamson and Han, 2024; Gamlen, 2019; Moss and Furstenberg, 2024; Varadarajan, 2010).

While much of the literature on state-led diaspora engagement focuses on the mobilisation of collectivities – organising public protests, leveraging the community’s financial resources, building lobby groups, or campaigning for diaspora votes (Agunias and Newland, 2012; Gamlen, 2019; Lafleur, 2013) – other works highlight the significance of diasporic individuals (diasporans). Examining diaspora mobilisation, several studies emphasise the agency of animators, activists, or entrepreneurs in mobilising others, allocating resources, or bridging distant transnational sites (Banki, 2024; Betts and Jones, 2016; Brinkerhoff, 2016; Koinova, 2021). Those who study state-diaspora policies note that states sometimes target specific individuals. For instance, the Republic of Cyprus confers VIP status to prominent members of the Greek-Cypriot diaspora (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007: 507), the Chinese government bestows honorary titles upon elite diasporans (Liu, 2022: 1271), and the Armenian government leverages the social influence of diaspora celebrity Kim Kardashian (Koinova, 2017b: 122).

How do governments decide which diasporans to harness? Why do governments approach one diasporan but not another? This article seeks to answer these questions by investigating tailored and personalised state strategies to mobilise diasporic individuals for security and foreign policy purposes. Joining the burgeoning literature on the importance of interpersonal relations in diplomatic affairs (e.g. Heimann and Kampf, 2021; Holmes and Wheeler, 2020; Wheeler, 2018; Wong, 2021), we illustrate the significance of interpersonal elements in the strategic use of diasporas. We do so by employing a ‘theory-laden’ descriptive approach that aims to uncover the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘when’, and ‘how’ of the tailored and personalised mobilisation of diasporans (Gerring, 2012: 722; Holmes et al., 2024: 51; Shapiro, 2002).

We argue that, first, government elites hold perceptions regarding what the diasporic individual can do: who exists in their network, and to which audiences they have access. Second, government elites hold perceptions regarding what the diasporan is willing to do: which values, ideologies, and causes they would likely support. These considerations, which involve aspects related to the diasporan’s network, character, and values, are shaped by the interpersonal relations between the diasporic individual and government elites. Personal acquaintance and previous interactions facilitate knowledge about the relevant diasporans, their networks, and their values. Furthermore, they cultivate interpersonal trust, which is critical for harnessing a diasporan’s capabilities.

We present this argument empirically by analysing Israel’s mobilisation of influential Jewish individuals in the United States from the 1960s to the early 1980s. The Israel–US dyad is a particularly useful context for studying state-led diaspora diplomacy because Israel-diaspora relations can be seen as an ‘extreme’ case of diaspora diplomacy: ¹ Israel – and the Zionist movement that preceded statehood – have a rich and extensive history of engaging Jewish communities, and their mobilisation of the latter is often considered an ‘archetype’ of diaspora engagement (Betts and Jones, 2016: 8, 27; Gamlen, 2019). We illustrate the logic of tailored mobilisation using archival evidence that details Israel’s engagement with three different individual diasporans: Abraham Feinberg, Jacob Javits, and Julius Klein. All three diasporans maintained close personal relationships with central figures among US and Israeli political elites and were mobilised on key issues of national security and foreign policy, such as approving the sale of F-4 warplanes to Israel, restricting the supply of Maverick Missiles to Saudi Arabia, and forging closer diplomatic relations between Israel and West Germany.

Our findings carry implications for the literature on ethnic lobbies (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Kurien, 2025; Rubenzer and Redd, 2010), especially the so-called ‘Israel lobby’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). We show that lobbying activities are more transnational than they seem (see Adamson and Demetriou, 2007: 508). Not only did Israel seek to harness the personal connections and clout of key individual diasporans, but the US administration also used these diasporans to deliver messages to Israel. Furthermore, these individuals facilitated the communication between Israel and foreign governments with the conviction that they served both countries’ interests, not prioritising one over the other. In addition, turning attention to the tailored and personalised logic of state-diaspora mobilisation can shed light on similar processes of individualised policy, such as the recruitment of intelligence assets (Fabre, 2022) or foreign lobbyists (You, 2023) by states.

The article continues as follows. First, we review the literature on diaspora diplomacy to highlight the importance of individual agency. Second, we outline the logic of the tailored mobilisation of diasporans, explaining why and how ‘homeland’ governments target specific diasporans and not others. ² Third, we reflect on the research design and provide details regarding our data and archival sources. Fourth, we illustrate the tailored mobilisation of diasporans through three cases of US Jewish individuals harnessed by the State of Israel. In the concluding section, we discuss our findings’ broader implications and their relevance to studying the recruitment of non-diasporic individuals.

Diaspora diplomacy: From collective mobilisation to interpersonal relations

Governments reach out to diasporas – defined as overseas populations that the state recognises, to some extent, as members of its political community (Burgess, 2020: 17) – for various reasons: economic, electoral, foreign policy, and security goals. As Adamson and Han (2024) specify, one goal of diaspora engagement is promoting states’ ‘soft power’, advancing political projects centred around a discourse of ‘civilizations’, or nation-branding. Moreover, governments utilise diasporas as diplomatic conduits, participating in ethnic lobbying, protests, and public diplomacy campaigns to promote messages favourable to the homeland government.

One central theme that runs through the broad literature on diaspora diplomacy and soft power is the examination of diasporas as collectivities. For instance, those who study diaspora as an already mobilised group tend to analyse their activities in different contexts, such as conflict, peace, or foreign policy (Ahrari, 1987; Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Shain, 1994, 2002; Paul and Paul, 2009; Sheffer, 2003). Specifically in the context of diaspora diplomacy, scholars highlight diaspora networks, associations, and communities and focus on how diasporas operate as a collectivity or how governments target them as such (Arkilic, 2022: 2; Arkilic and To, 2024; Manor and Adiku, 2021; Stone and Douglas, 2018). Governments use diaspora collectivities to enhance their image, influence the perceptions of foreign publics, and facilitate material and cultural exchanges (Brinkerhoff, 2019; Cull, 2022; Liu, 2022; Stone and Douglas, 2018). India and China, for example, have engaged diaspora organisations through cultural performances and festivals to improve their image abroad and convince the public in countries of residence of the benefits of closer bilateral cooperation (Ho and McConnell, 2019: 243). In such works, diaspora diplomacy, to quote Ho and McConnell (2019: 249), is ‘about the collective rather than the individual’.

In contrast to collective and public activities, the literature on ‘unofficial diplomacy’, ‘citizen diplomacy’, and ‘private diplomacy’ provides some insight into the unique advantages of individuals. Unofficial diplomats are private citizens who interact with official and unofficial representatives from another country and with their own government (with or without the latter’s blessing) and try to influence the policy of one or more of these countries (Berman and Johnson, 1977: 5). From the government’s perspective, such private citizens can facilitate communications in situations where there are limited official relations, like the United States and Cuba (Hovey and Weinberg, 2009: 45; Tyler and Beyerinck, 2016: 523). Governments can utilise private individuals in topics that require specific expertise or knowledge (Tyler and Beyerinck, 2016: 523). Unofficial diplomats are also useful for sending messages or testing initiatives without official state involvement – they can perform unregulated actions with greater ease and less attention (Sharp, 2001).

Indeed, the significance of individual agency has been highlighted by existing research on diaspora mobilisation. For instance, Brinkerhoff (2016) and Koinova (2021) examine diaspora entrepreneurs and focus on the agency of diasporans embedded in transnational contexts. As residents in the relevant foreign country, they have a unique ‘in-between advantage’ (Brinkerhoff, 2016: 7), possessing knowledge of and familiarity with both their homeland and country of residence. This enables them to send messages and pass on information in a way that resonates well with political elites on both sides (see Marinova, 2017). Their embeddedness in the residence country can also result in high levels of access to government officials, which increases their attractiveness to homeland governments. That was the case, for example, with some Haitian diasporans in the United States, who performed unofficial diplomatic roles on Port-au-Prince’s behalf (Laguerre, 1998: 164).

Individual diasporic actors also carry other advantages for states. Governments can tap major diaspora philanthropists to complement (or even substitute) the state in providing certain services (Morvaridi, 2013; Tribune, 2023). They can also benefit from specific expertise, skills, or abilities that individual diasporic actors have (see Hawkins et al., 2006: 13–14). Moreover, states seeking to disguise some aspects of their foreign policy or to allow themselves plausible deniability may operate through diasporic actors (individuals as well as organisations), keeping the state’s involvement covert (Daniel and Silverman, 2023; Hägel and Peretz, 2005; Tsourapas, 2021: 633–634).

The tailored mobilisation of diasporans

How do governments decide which individual diasporas to mobilise? A key concept in explaining the rationale behind state-diaspora engagement is socio-spatial positionality, defined as ‘the power which diaspora political agents are perceived to amass from their sociospatial position in a specific context and linkages to other global contexts’ (Koinova, 2018: 194). In other words, governments engage diasporas based on the perceived strength that diasporic agents gain from their spatial location. As Koinova (2018: 196) writes, ‘Agents positioned in Brussels, with numerous EU institutions, would be empowered differently from those in refugee camps’. Diasporas thus possess ‘the potential to influence various international actors depending on the diaspora’s embeddedness or significance concerning other global actors’ (Carment et al., 2022: 258).

For example, individual diasporans may be connected to specific business, political, organised labour, popular culture, sports, or intellectual circles (Brinkerhoff, 2019: 57; Grossman, 2022; Wheeler, 2016). This resonates with the concept of brokers in social network theory, indicating actors whose position as vital nodes within a social network enables them to connect previously unconnected networks (Adamson, 2013: 68–69; Goddard, 2009; Koinova, 2021). A common example involves reaching out to diasporans who are well-positioned within a knowledge network, such as scientists or experts. For instance, in 2004, the mayor of the City of Puerto Princesa in the Philippines contacted Larry Asera, a Filipino-American engineer, to build the first solar power plant in the country (Wescott and Brinkerhoff, 2006: 83). Before the establishment of the State of Israel, Chaim Weizmann, a prominent scientist and Zionist leader, contacted Jewish-American scientists and professionals involved in the US atom project to facilitate the transfer of nuclear knowledge into the pre-state Jewish Yishuv (Rabinowitz and Abramson, 2022).

The diasporan’s positionality – their linkages to specific contexts and the strength of those linkages – is indeed an important consideration in states’ logic regarding who to mobilise (Koinova, 2018: 201). For example, diaspora returnees often maintain strong linkages to diasporic centres abroad, making them likely candidates to serve as brokers connecting homeland and diasporic elites (Koinova, 2018: 201). Furthermore, the country where the diasporan resides is another important factor. When inter-state relations are friendly and the interests of the two states converge (DeWind and Segura, 2014: 24–26), governments might perceive it easier to harness diasporic actors. When political leaders in the country of residence rely on electoral support from a particular minority group, the government of this group’s homeland may see such leaders as susceptible to diasporic influence (Godwin, 2018: 1332).

However, interpersonal relations between state elites and diasporic individuals are also a crucial underlying element that shapes decisions regarding who to mobilise and for what goals. In addition to the relational position of diasporans within a spatial context, we emphasise relations between individuals. We suggest that governments’ efforts to mobilise and harness individual diasporans are tailored and personalised. They depend on two primary considerations: the government’s perception regarding what the diasporan can do as well as what they are willing to do. These two considerations are anchored in the interpersonal relationship and previous experience state elites have with a specific diasporan and the degree of trust developed by these relations. Our argument suggests that brokers’ power is not only a matter of their position within a spatial context but also a matter of their interpersonal ties. In the following, we elaborate on the logic of tailored mobilisation, focusing on these two dimensions.

What the diasporan can do

Given a specific objective – one that the government cannot or does not want to pursue by itself – the government first identifies the relevant diasporans who can help with such an objective. For instance, government agents can reach out to diasporans possessing specific scientific or professional knowledge when looking for particular expertise. In the context of security and foreign policy, governments might search for those with ties to political elites in the relevant country or with a unique political standing that can be leveraged. In other words, a key component in governments’ perception regarding what diasporans can do is access.

First, state elites need to have access to the diasporan. The ability to request a favour from or harness the designated individual for a specific task requires some communication channel between the homeland’s government and the diasporan. Second, to accomplish the task at hand, the diasporan needs access to ‘networks of resources, opportunities, and social actors’ (Brinkerhoff, 2016: 19); that is, access to knowledge, technology, or relevant elites in the country of residence. State elites will be interested in diasporans who have personal connections to relevant, powerful people, including political, social, and economic elites and entrepreneurs (Koinova, 2021: 50). Indeed, a key element in the power of brokers is their control over access to political actors, information, or resources (Stovel and Shaw, 2012). However, diasporic individuals do not necessarily play the traditional broker role in interstate diplomacy. After all, governments can use their official diplomatic connections to pursue a certain objective. From the government’s perspective, the diasporans’ advantage lies in their ability to engage in diplomacy at arm’s length – quietly and informally.

Interpersonal relations and previous experience play an essential role here. On the one hand, personal ties and mutual respect between homeland officials and the diasporan make it easier for the government to approach that particular individual and convince them to accept the task. Knowledge about the diasporan, derived from past interactions, informs the government regarding the latter’s networks and capabilities – who does the diasporan know? How well does the diasporan know them? And what can the diasporan ask them to do? On the other hand, interpersonal ties between the diasporan and political elites in the country of residence give this diasporan access to the halls of power. Such interpersonal ties foster trust and friendship between the diasporan and the relevant elite. For example, the decision of US President Harry S. Truman to recognise Israel’s independence in 1948 was facilitated by his close friendship with Edward Jacobson – Truman’s Jewish business partner (Bickerton, 1968: 206). Preparing for the 1948 elections, some of Truman’s advisors encouraged him to support the Zionist cause to cater to Jewish voters. Others, such as his foreign policy advisers, strongly counselled to the contrary (Snetsinger, 1974: 11). The historical record suggests that Truman’s motives for supporting Israel were mixed but point to the crucial role played by Jacobson in persuading Truman (Cohen, 1990; Snetsinger, 1974: 77–78).

What the diasporan is willing to do

Even if the access and capabilities conditions are met, it does not necessarily mean that a diasporan would agree to perform the task at hand. Their willingness is related to their motivation, ideological inclinations, and web of commitments (cf. Abramson et al., 2022). When asking a favour from a diasporan, state elites are gauging whether the individual would be sufficiently motivated to pursue the task and agree with its content and the potential risks involved.

For instance, governments might be interested in reaching out to diasporans who hold institutional positions of relative importance (e.g. politicians, public officials, or senior advisors). Such a request might put the diasporan in an uncomfortable position vis-à-vis their country of residence – especially when the task involves national security matters – and might even require the diasporan to break the law. These requests would probably be rejected and, therefore, are unlikely to be made in the first place. Requests going against the diasporan’s ideological position are also likely to be declined. Conversely, requests that align with the diasporan’s inclinations are more likely to be accepted. For example, when trying to harness Albert Einstein for the goals of the Zionist movement, Zionist leaders only asked Einstein to speak on the issue of Jewish refugees and not on Jewish statehood, knowing that he was not in favour of an independent Jewish state (Rabinowitz and Abramson, 2022). Moreover, when the task is likely to benefit the diasporan personally, the chances of them accepting it may grow.

Also important here are interpersonal relationships and previous exchanges between homeland officials and the diasporan, as they affect what the former know about the latter’s preferences and motivations. They are also crucial in instilling some degree of trust between the government agent (who requests the favour) and the diasporan. To continue with the example of Larry Asera, the Filipino-American engineer who helped the Philippines develop a solar power plant, the request came ten years after Asera had begun working on projects across the country (Wescott and Brinkerhoff, 2006). Thus, the mayor who requested the assistance already knew that Asera would likely assist.

All of these attributes – the diasporan’s institutional position, personal connections, and ideological desire to promote specific homeland-oriented goals – derive from the state elites’ interpersonal relations and previous experience with the diasporan. Importantly, tailored and personalised mobilisation is not unidirectional. Diasporans themselves can sometimes approach government agents and offer their assistance on a specific issue, regardless of whether the government is interested in this assistance. They can do so out of a sense of duty or obligation to the homeland and for reasons of personal status and fulfilment (Grossman and Shafer Raviv, 2023; Nielsen and Riddle, 2009).

Methodology

Our empirical evidence focuses on Israel’s efforts to harness three diasporans in the United States. As mentioned above, the Israeli–US context is particularly fitting for charting new theoretical terrains regarding diaspora diplomacy. The Jewish diaspora is often considered the ‘ideal type’ (Safran, 1991) or ‘archetypical’ diaspora (Armstrong, 1976: 197; Dieckhoff, 2017: 275), while various states view Israel as a model for managing state-diaspora ties (Gamlen, 2019: 229). The extensive history of Israel and Jewish communities abroad offers a wealth of empirical evidence useful for identifying processes and patterns.

The United States is home to the largest Jewish community outside Israel. Moreover, its political environment – with democratic and permeable institutions – provides easier conditions for diaspora individuals to pursue homeland-oriented objectives (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999), rendering it useful for studying the access of diaspora lobbying to positions of power in the government (Paul and Paul, 2009) and transnational activism (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Lewis, 2010). Examining state-led mobilisation of diasporans in the Israeli–US context also allows us to keep constant inter-state relations and the country of residence.

The Israeli–Jewish case might be considered unique in the broader discussion about diaspora politics. After all, unlike contemporary cases of diaspora engagement, our three protagonists never emigrated from Israel (or Mandatory Palestine). Furthermore, as Brubaker (2005) cautions, claiming that certain populations are a diaspora is by itself a speech act. Thus, treating Jews abroad as ‘Israel’s diaspora’ grounds them within the particular realm of diaspora nationalism, which is only one possible form of diaspora politics (Dufoix, 2008a: 1367). Still, we suggest that this does not render the case necessarily unique in terms of state-diaspora relations. First, the Israeli state considers Jews abroad (and especially those who support Zionist ideology) to be tied to Israel both as a political institution and as a spiritual and physical space. Similar dynamics appear in the claims made by other states vis-à-vis their expatriates (Gamlen, 2019; Yakobson, 2008). Second, the dynamics of diaspora politics – maintaining collective identity, narratives of migration, and attachments to a ‘referent origin’ across generations – manifest themselves within communities of expats as well as communities of co-ethnics who were never citizens of the real or mythical homeland (Dufoix, 2008b; Mahieu, 2015). This similarity is especially relevant when referring to second- or third-generation diasporans who never emigrated themselves and are not necessarily citizens of their parents’ country of origin.

Temporally, we focus on the period from the 1960s to the early 1980s because of its centrality for Israel-diaspora ties (Lasensky, 2018: 70–78). After World War II, relations between Israel and the US Jewry entered a new phase, which included unprecedented financial and political diasporic support for Israel’s establishment and development. These years witnessed a growing influence of Israel on US Jews, who for the first time had a sovereign homeland state to which they could relate, as other diasporas in their country had. Israel’s victory in the 1967 War further strengthened Zionist and pro-Israeli sentiments in this community. Only in the 1980s did this support begin to wane. More prosaically, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s are a period for which the relevant secret archival records in Israel and the United States have been largely declassified, making it suitable for a historically informed analysis.

Our analytical strategy follows a descriptive approach that helps answer the fundamental ‘what’ questions of ‘when, whom, out of what, in what manner’ (Gerring, 2012: 722) regarding the phenomenon of tailored and personalised mobilisation of diasporans and thereby constitutes a critical step towards theory building (Shapiro, 2002). Moreover, this approach serves as a crucial prelude to the process of causal analysis since ‘it is hard to develop [causal] explanations before we know something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis of what characteristics’ (King et al., 1994: 34). Thus, to decide which individuals to analyse, our main criteria were access to well-documented archival evidence regarding their actions, the duration of their assistance to Israel, and its significance – the relative importance of the issues to which they contributed their assistance.

We started by reviewing a preliminary sample of archival records at the Israel State Archives – especially correspondence between Jerusalem and the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC – and identified diasporans who carried out important tasks for Israel until the 1980s. We also consulted relevant secondary literature (e.g. Aridan, 2017; Ben-Zvi, 2011; Segev, 2005). Having compiled a list of candidates, we eventually selected three individuals – Abraham Feinberg, Jacob Javits, and Julius Klein. While all three resided in the United States, they had different socio-spatial positions: Feinberg was close to several Democratic US administrations but never held an official government role. Javits was a Republican who served in the House of Representatives and Senate. Klein had close personal relationships with senior members of the Republican Party, but was also mobilised due to his influence among West German elites.

The primary data for these cases were gathered from the Israel State Archives, the American Jewish Historical Society Records, and the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. These archival sources include secret diplomatic correspondence, official memoranda, government meeting records, and letters. Among them are Feinberg’s and Klein’s personal archives. Additional sources include press sources, secondary literature, Javits’s autobiography, and oral interview transcripts accessed through the LBJ Library website.

Israel’s engagement of diaspora individuals in the United States

Harnessing the power of Jewish diasporans who had strong personal connections with US policymakers has been an important Zionist diplomatic instrument since before the Jewish State’s inception, as well as during Israel’s first years (Hixson, 2019). Israel actively and regularly sought out political assistance from diasporans. In the 1950s, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) created a ‘card index of American personalities and organizations’ with information on Jewish community leaders, key figures, and students – their occupation, organisational and political affiliations, home address, opinion on Israel, and experience or relationship with the Israeli embassy. On occasion, the index also noted whether a specific diasporan would be useful in the future. The main purpose of this project was to get a ‘picture as clear as possible of the network of existing contacts of ours’. ³

In the 1960s, the political influence of US Jewish diaspora individuals markedly grew, making them more useful than ever for Israel. This resulted from the strengthening of US–Israeli strategic ties and the increasing importance that Democratic presidents attributed to the political and electoral power of Israel’s Jewish supporters (Aridan, 2017: 7–8; Ben-Zvi, 2011: 5–6). In particular, Israel relied on a relatively small number of diasporans who had formal or informal access to the government’s highest echelons. Among them were Feinberg, Javits, and Klein. Our analysis shows that the necessary conditions for mobilisation – the state’s access to the diasporan, the diasporan’s access to relevant decision-making actors in the country of residence, and their commitment to helping the homeland regarding the issue at hand – were strongly present in all cases.

Abraham Feinberg

Among Israel’s diasporic allies, the contribution of New-York born businessman, banker, and fundraiser Abraham ‘Abe’ Feinberg was remarkable (Aridan, 2017: 300). Even though he did not hold any official position in the US government, Feinberg provided Israel with essential assistance vis-à-vis the John F. Kennedy (1960–1963) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–1969) administrations. As will be shown, it was Feinberg’s informal role that allowed him to have closer ties to the Israeli government than other diasporans, making him particularly valuable for certain undertakings.

A few examples of Feinberg’s Israel-related activities illustrate his importance. Under Kennedy, he arranged an informal meeting between the president and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, which the latter deemed crucial (Aridan, 2017: 195–196), and he relayed information to the Israeli embassy about the views of different US government offices regarding the provision of arms to Israel. During Johnson’s presidency, Israel used Feinberg to send messages to the administration and pressure it on issues related to US military and economic aid to Israel and its enemies (Tal, 2022: 113, 128, 135). In December 1966, for instance, Feinberg met with National Security Advisor Walt Whitman Rostow and explained to him that if the administration supplied arms to Jordan as it planned, Johnson ‘may have real political trouble with the Jewish community in the US’. ⁴ During the 1967 geopolitical crisis in the Middle East, Feinberg, at the behest of the Israeli embassy, promised to promote Israel’s position when meeting Rostow. ⁵ On 19 May 1967, when tensions were building up, Israel instructed its representatives in the United States to ‘activate’ Feinberg to persuade Johnson to issue a pro-Israeli statement. ⁶

Access to the diasporan

Feinberg had been a Zionist activist long before he collaborated with Israeli officials (Hazkani, 2021: 48). After Israel’s independence, he became a central figure in the Development Corporation for Israel (the Israel Bonds), the organisation tasked with selling Israeli state bonds to the Jewish diaspora. ⁷ In the 1950s, he played a key role in garnering financial support for Israel’s nuclear project, reporting directly to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion (Mualem, 2019: 93). Ben-Gurion’s successor, Moshe Sharett, and President Itzhak Ben-Zvi also corresponded with Feinberg, instructing him on issues related to the Bonds. ⁸ Thus, by the 1960s, the Israeli government could easily access Feinberg, who had maintained a long relationship with Zionist and Israeli leaders for decades.

The diasporan’s access to decision-making actors abroad

Feinberg’s access to US decision-making circles was consequential for his mobilisation by Israel. Feinberg made his first steps into the halls of power in the 1940s as part of his endeavour to help the persecuted Jews of Europe. In 1944, he used his connections to get an invitation to a cocktail party where he met and befriended Vice President Harry S. Truman. Soon thereafter, Truman became president, and Feinberg gained direct access to the White House. ⁹

Two related factors made Feinberg highly regarded by Truman and his Democratic successors: Feinberg’s financial resources and his ability to secure Jewish community members’ donations and votes. In the 1948 election, Truman asked Feinberg to help finance his campaign. Feinberg delivered, successfully raising a substantial sum from Jewish donors. ¹⁰ Over subsequent years, Feinberg’s ties with the administration further solidified. As he recounted in an interview, he had become ‘a persona grata in the power area, in the structure that had the power to do things’, and he used this influence to help the Zionist movement and, later, the State of Israel. ¹¹

Although Feinberg temporarily lost his access to power after Dwight D. Eisenhower’s victory in the 1952 election (Rotenberg, 2021: 23), he recovered his political ground before long. Feinberg mobilised Jewish donors and voters to the John F. Kennedy presidential campaign, which turned out to be central to Kennedy’s 1960 victory. The president rewarded Feinberg by issuing pro-Israeli declarations and, according to some accounts, by helping Feinberg’s brother get a court appointment (Rotenberg, 2021: 43–52).

However, it was under President Lyndon B. Johnson that Feinberg became most prominent and, therefore, most valuable to Israel. Feinberg had cultivated his relationship with Johnson since Truman’s presidency. Over the years, it developed into a close friendship (Segev, 2005: 127), which, as with Johnson’s Democratic predecessors, was mutually beneficial. Feinberg provided Johnson with donations, political lobbying, advice on Israeli matters, and an informal channel to Israel. Johnson reciprocated with pro-Israeli acts and statements, as well as other favours. ¹² There was no apparent conflict between this relationship’s genuine and utilitarian aspects. As Johnson’s National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy said, ‘The President takes the call from Abe Feinberg, because it might mean another million dollars. Anyway, he likes Abe Feinberg’. ¹³ Feinberg’s commitment to Johnson persisted even after the latter’s political career ended. In 1972, he helped organise the trip of Johnson’s daughter to Israel. The ailing Johnson warmly thanked him in a letter. ¹⁴

Feinberg’s relationship with Johnson was characterised by mutual trust, which proved important for Israel in mobilising him. Israeli officials asked Feinberg to meet with Johnson whenever Feinberg was going to visit Israel. ¹⁵ Even though Feinberg did not conceal his support for Israel, Johnson and many of his aides did not think that he would prefer Israel’s interests to those of his own country. This elevated Feinberg’s standing compared to other Israel supporters, of whom the administration was more suspicious. As a result, Johnson often conveyed informal messages to the Israelis via Feinberg, and sometimes even used him to pressure Israel (Aridan, 2017: 234; Rotenberg, 2021: 58: 61). In November 1966, for example, the administration informed Feinberg that the president would like him ‘as a special friend’ to tell Prime Minister Levi Eshkol that the United States was dissatisfied with Israel’s retaliatory attacks in Jordan. ¹⁶ After the 1967 War, Feinberg served as an informal intermediary between Johnson and the Israeli government. ¹⁷ In late 1968, Johnson finally agreed to allow the sale of F-4 warplanes to Israel, an authorisation that Israel had attempted to attain for a long time. According to journalist Seymour M. Hersh (1991: 191–192), the president’s agreement might have been ‘his farewell gift to the Israeli people and his way of repaying the loyalty of Abe Feinberg’.

As this analysis suggests, Feinberg’s positionality was strongest in the 1960s, and especially during Johnson’s administration, when he had both close personal ties to the president and the reputation of a prominent donor and fundraiser for the Democratic Party.

The diasporan’s inclination

Feinberg’s assistance to the Zionist movement and Israel since the 1930s demonstrates his commitment to the Jewish State. In his 1972 interview, he expressed his belief that helping Israel was the obligation of every Jewish person. ¹⁸ Accordingly, he kept raising funds for the country, serving for many years as president of the Israel Bonds and chair of the Weizmann Institute of Science US committee. ¹⁹

The historical records reveal that the Israelis did not perceive Feinberg as representing US interests. Rather, they treated him as an ally who could be used to sway the administration’s attitudes. As such, he was different from other Jewish diasporans who were also close to the US government but supposedly not committed enough to Israel. This distinction was most evident in 1961 when Feinberg accompanied President Kennedy’s envoy, White House Counsel Mike Feldman, who visited Israel in order to persuade the Israelis to allow US inspection of the Dimona nuclear facility.

Feldman was a Jewish diasporan who served as the president’s unofficial liaison to both Israel and the US Jewish community (Aridan, 2017: 191). Accordingly, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion treated him as a US official representing the administration’s position. Contrarily, he regarded Feinberg as ‘one of us’ because of his past assistance to Jewish arms procurement in the pre-state period and his more recent fundraising for Israel’s nuclear project – the very same project that Kennedy was worried about (Karpin, 2006: 186). The Israeli ambassador in Washington, Avraham Harman, similarly emphasised that Feldman’s Jewishness notwithstanding, he was first and foremost the president’s personal envoy. ²⁰ In contrast, Feinberg was more than merely a go-between for the two governments. In 1962, for example, Feinberg briefed the Israelis on how to deal with both Feldman and Kennedy. ²¹ A few months later, Ambassador Harman expressed his opinion that Israeli officials talking with Feldman should do it formally, treating him as Kennedy’s representative, and that Feinberg should not be present in these meetings. However, Harman suggested that the content of these meetings could be later passed on to Feinberg, ²² revealing his confidence in him. Thus, even though Israel regarded Feldman as a potential ally, up to a point – in one dispatch both Feldman and Feinberg were described as ‘friends’ capable of pressuring US decision-makers ²³ – it clearly trusted Feinberg more. In hindsight, Foreign Minister Golda Meir praised Feinberg’s independence from the ‘establishment’, which allowed him to speak with the president ‘as an independent Jewish American, and as a friend of Israel’. ²⁴

Notably, the Israelis did not try to persuade Feinberg to undermine his country’s interests. Instead, they sought to confirm his beliefs that helping Israel would serve US interests in the Middle East. For example, as part of the attempts to prevent Washington from supporting a Palestinian refugee repatriation plan that Israel opposed, Israeli diplomats were instructed to emphasise to Feinberg that if he valued Israeli–US relations, he must do everything in his power to foil the plan. ²⁵

Israel also generously rewarded Feinberg for his loyalty. Feinberg was given the Coca-Cola franchise in Israel. ²⁶ According to a press report, he once approached Israel’s finance minister and asked for preferential conditions for his investments in Israel, mentioning his political assistance vis-à-vis the Johnson administration and claiming that such benefits had been promised to him by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in exchange for his help. His request was granted. ²⁷ Another report claims that Feinberg’s status as an ally of Israel helped him secure higher-than-usual loans from the Israeli government for constructing a hotel in Jerusalem, as well as a management position at an Israeli bank in New York. ²⁸ Such incentives might have helped Israel to sustain its diasporic allies’ commitment.

Considering our theoretical framework, we can see how Feinberg emerged as an ideal target for Israel’s tailored mobilisation. Following decades of interpersonal ties between Feinberg and Zionist elites, the Israeli government had easy access to him, while Feinberg’s access to US decision-making circles was guaranteed during the Democratic administrations of Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. Israel’s repeated interactions with Feinberg also provided them with knowledge about Feinberg’s own commitment to Israel and trust in his activities, manifested by his long involvement in fundraising and other Zionist enterprises, as well as his willingness to assist Israel vis-à-vis Washington. Because of these traits – and not having a formal position in the US government, which allowed him more leeway – Feinberg was usually among the first names to come up when Israel needed to mobilise diasporans for US-related issues during the 1960s.

Jacob Javits

Jacob Koppel Javits was the son of poor Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe – by way of Palestine, in the case of his mother (Javits and Steinberg, 1981: 2–4). A lawyer by profession, he served as a commissioned officer in Europe and the Pacific during World War II. In 1946, he was elected to the US House of Representatives as a Republican. In 1954, he was appointed the Attorney General of New York. Two years later, he became a US Senator, holding on to his seat until 1981 (Maisel et al., 2001: 358).

An undated report by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs extensively surveys Javits’s assistance to Israel. Like Feinberg, Javits’s Zionist activities predated Israel’s independence. For example, he appealed to Congress to support the state’s establishment and called on the British to open Palestine to Jewish immigration and release Jewish illegal immigrants imprisoned in Cyprus. He also promoted US military and financial aid to Israel. In 1951, Javits and New York Democratic Rep. Emanuel Celler led the first struggle for a 65-million-dollar grant for Israel. In 1970, he headed the move to win the support of 79 senators in an appeal to President Richard M. Nixon to resume the shipment of Phantom jets to Israel. Aside from these initiatives, the Israeli report praises Javits for supporting every major piece of legislation calling for diplomatic, military, and economic aid for Israel, as well as measures to help ameliorate the plight of Jews in Russia and Arab countries. ²⁹

Access to the diasporan

Javits’s diasporic activism predated Israel’s independence. In 1946 he visited Palestine a few weeks after being elected to Congress (Javits and Steinberg, 1981: 272). This trip was followed by numerous visits as a public official, as well as many years of advocacy for Israel within Washington’s corridors of power. His pro-Israel activity spanned decades and included relaying messages from Washington to Jerusalem and vice versa, which enabled Javits to establish a personal relationship with Israel’s leadership. Following the 1956 Suez Crisis, he visited Israel, delivering President Eisenhower’s personal message to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and subsequently conveying Ben-Gurion’s concerns regarding US policy vis-à-vis Egypt back to Washington. Recalling this exchange, Javits wrote that he had ‘left Tel Aviv feeling utterly convinced that the United States had to listen to their [Israel’s] case’ (Javits and Steinberg, 1981: 274). Apparently, it was Ben-Gurion, Israel’s most prominent leader, who harnessed Javits in that early period.

Javits regularly met with other senior Israeli officials besides Ben-Gurion and held a close relationship with many of them, including Foreign Minister Meir (Javits and Steinberg, 1981: 278). According to Javits, the Israelis had taken it for granted that they could discuss confidential matters in his presence. In some instances, he actually had to remind them that, being a US official, some secrets could not be shared with him. During one meeting, Walter Eytan, the MFA’s potent secretary-general, spoke openly with his aides about delicate matters of national security. Javits interrupted, telling Eytan that despite his devotion to Israel’s security, in any event of a conflict between the United States and Israel, it would be his duty to reveal anything he knew to his US superiors (Javits and Steinberg, 1981: 278).

Israeli records provide further evidence that high levels of mutual confidence characterised Javits’s relations with Israeli officials. For example, Ester Herlitz, a senior diplomat and Israel’s first woman ambassador, described him as ‘a person that we trust’ (Grossman and Shafer Raviv, 2023: 11). Prime Minister Golda Meir defined him as ‘a loyal Jew and a loyal Zionist’. ³⁰ Evidently, the Israeli government was interested in Javits’s 1974 Senate race, which he won by a small margin. Shortly after Javits’s victory, Reuven Dafni, Head of the MFA’s North American Department, commented that although he did not belong to those ‘who are in love with this senator’, he was nevertheless happy that Javits was able to win the race against the Democratic candidate, Ramsey Clark. Dafni explained that

‘first and foremost, it is good that we will have another Jewish senator – and even better, someone who has done a lot for us in the past – than a goy [gentile], a liberal, and a leftist who, to the best of my understanding, would abandon us at the first opportunity’. ³¹

As the historical evidence shows, the Israelis perceived Javits not only as loyal to their cause but also as someone who could be approached in times of need.

The diasporan’s access to decision-making actors

Javits was himself a decision-maker, completing numerous terms in both the House and the Senate and serving as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Clearly, these roles rendered him of particular importance for Israel, which often wanted to harness him as a friendly lawmaker. At times, Israel also tried to utilise his easy access to other influential political elites in the United States and elsewhere.

Three examples from 1976 illustrate how Israel sought Javits’s help in important foreign policy and national security matters. In April of that year, Javits briefed the MFA’s secretary-general about his recent tour in the Middle East. Following the political updates, the Israeli diplomat requested Javits to speak with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and with African leaders during his upcoming trip to Africa and persuade them not to participate in anti-Israel movements in the United Nations. According to a top-secret Israeli report, Javits promised that he would do so. ³²

In August 1976, militants belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Japanese Red Army perpetrated a terrorist attack against Israeli passengers at Istanbul’s airport. The MFA was concerned that Turkey did not denounce the attack due to geopolitical considerations vis-à-vis the Arab world and because the targets were not Turkish. Its North American Department stated that in order to prevent Turkey’s capitulation, it was best that Javits, whose foreign policy assistant, Hal Rosenthal, had been murdered in the attack, would reach out to the Turkish prime minister and express his hope and wish that Istanbul joined the global struggle against terrorism and brought the perpetrators to justice. ³³

In September 1976, Israeli Ambassador to Washington Simcha Dinitz and Israeli diplomat Zvi Rafiah met Javits before a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on military aid. Dinitz expressed Israel’s concerns regarding the supply of 650 Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia and requested Javits to do whatever he could to cancel or at least minimise the shipment. ³⁴ In his autobiography, Javits writes that when the Gerald R. Ford Administration changed its policy, leading to the sale of such weapons to Arab countries, he helped moderate this course of action. In 1976, he worked with Ford and Kissinger to reduce the number of missiles eventually supplied to Riyadh by more than half (Javits and Steinberg, 1981: 475). Thus, his position as a US legislator, as well as his subsequent access to other high-ranking officials, made him an invaluable asset for Israel’s tailored mobilisation.

The diasporan’s inclination

Javits was an ardent supporter of Israel and Zionism since the pre-state period. In hindsight, he boasted about his contribution to Israel’s security and US–Israel relations. In his autobiography, he reminisces that in Israel’s early years, he used to promote what was seen as a ‘radical proposition’ at the time: ‘that Israel was the anchor and bastion of democracy in the Middle East and was vital to US security’ (Javits and Steinberg, 1981: 271). It was this assumption that would lead to his activism on behalf of Israel throughout his political career.

According to Javits, ‘To represent my constituents and to make my voice heard among the congressmen competing for attention, I did not let pass any opportunity to speak out for the cause of security, development, and justice for Israel’ (Javits and Steinberg, 1981: 277). As noted above, the Israeli MFA was well aware of this fact and cited years of Zionist and pro-Israel activity that Javits led throughout his political career. In December 1973, for example, Javits helped ensure the passage of the 2.2-billion-dollar emergency assistance for Israel by testifying in person before the Foreign Operations Sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. According to the MFA report, Javits ‘impressed upon the committee the direct relationship between assistance for Israel and the cause of freedom’. ³⁵

Even when Javits’s views and obligations to the United States clashed with Israel’s interests regarding a specific issue, he made sure to voice his general support for Israel’s cause and his consistent willingness to use his power to come to its aid. In 1976, for example, Rafiah met with Javits’s aide, Albert Lakeland, to express his concern about Javits’s criticism of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Lakeland explained that since Javits had to ensure that his image was credible in the Senate and that he was not merely ‘Israel’s Senator’, he had to preserve some kind of balance. In addition, Javits’s criticism of the settlements reflected his actual position on this issue. Lakeland argued that taking such a position would enable Javits to help Israel more effectively. ³⁶

Evidently, Javits was an important asset for Israel’s tailored mobilisation. He was a senior and influential legislator and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which discussed foreign policies that pertained directly to Israel’s interests. Thanks to his official positions, he was in close relational proximity to the most powerful individuals in the US government, including the president, his staff, and the secretary of state. Moreover, Javits established a lengthy record of engaging in Zionist and pro-Israeli efforts across many foreign policy issues. His support for Israel probably benefitted his political career as well, enabling him to cater to the preferences of New York’s large and important Jewish electorate.

Julius Klein

Julius Klein was born in Chicago in 1901 to Austrian parents and grew up in Germany. During World War I, he enlisted in the US Army and spied for the United States in Berlin. Between 1922 and 1923, he worked as a reporter in Berlin and eventually returned to the United States, settling in Chicago (Ross, 2017: 201). In the mid-1930s, as an officer in the National Guard, he conducted the first army investigation of subversion in the United States by surveilling Nazi organisations in the country (Ross, 2017). After World War II, Klein, a retired US Army general, headed the Jewish War Veterans of America organisation. In the 1960s, he was a public relations executive representing West German corporate and political interests in the United States (Wiesen, 2006).

During his career, Klein was also highly active in central US political circles. He was a lobbyist in the Republican Party but also maintained amicable relations with the Democratic Party (Wiesen, 2006). According to his account, he was a consultant to Senator Robert A. Taft at the Armed Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and to John Foster Dulles at the 1948 and 1952 GOP Conventions and during his tenure as Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration. ³⁷ In addition, Klein engaged in Zionist activism. While serving as the head of the Jewish War Veterans of America, he claimed to have collaborated with Zionist leader Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver on US recognition of the State of Israel following the latter’s 1948 declaration of independence. ³⁸

Klein’s Zionist, United States, and German background and the close contacts he maintained with the West German government, with Israeli leaders such as Ben-Gurion (Wiesen, 2006), and with senior US government officials, placed him in a unique position, simultaneously connected to different elite spheres and moving between three political spaces. This made him highly relevant to achieving Israel’s goals.

Access to the diasporan

Because of Klein’s rich history of aiding Israel, he built personal relations with key political elites in Israel, who could access him when needed. According to Klein, he was among those responsible for the signing of the 1952 Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany and the facilitation of Ben-Gurion’s historic 1960 meeting with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in New York. ³⁹ Klein describes a secret meeting in his New York apartment between Adenauer’s majority leader, Rainer Barzel, and Israeli Ambassador Abraham Harman. According to Klein, this meeting resulted in Bonn dispatching Dr. Rolf Pauls (who would later become West Germany’s first Ambassador to Israel) of the German Foreign Office and Member of Parliament Dr Kurt Birrenbach to Israel for negotiations. ⁴⁰ After instituting diplomatic relations, Ben-Gurion sent Klein a handwritten personal message from his home in Sde Boker, stating ‘You may be proud of your important contribution to normalising relations between Israel and Western Germany’. ⁴¹ Klein received a similar letter of recognition from Felix Shinnar, an Israeli diplomat who was instrumental in bringing about the Reparations Agreement. ⁴² Thus, Klein’s years of Zionist and pro-Israeli activism resulted in the establishment of personal relationships with Israeli elites, who, in turn, could mobilise Klein.

The diasporan’s access to decision-making actors

Klein, on his own behalf, maintained close ties with and influence within the political elite of both the United States and West Germany. Israeli officials explicitly stated the need to cultivate a positive relationship with him because of his influence within the Republican Party. As one of them wrote, ‘In a number of important cases, he was our person of contact to senior members of the Republican Party’. ⁴³ In an Israeli government meeting, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion described Klein as ‘close to both Adenauer and the Republican Party’. ⁴⁴ When Klein and his wife were visiting Israel, its consul general in Chicago urged the MFA to pay him special attention and be available to him throughout his entire stay, attesting to the importance Israeli officials attached to him. ⁴⁵ Thus, Israeli diplomats relied on their past experience of working with Klein, which convinced them that he was capable of connecting them with US and West German elites and justified giving him preferential treatment.

Curiously, Israeli diplomats also noted that Klein had an unfavourable standing within significant segments of the Chicago Jewish community. His public relations firm represented German clients for such purposes as repairing the public image of German companies who wanted to operate in the United States or returning to the West German government assets frozen during World War II. This remained a sensitive topic because many industrialists interested in improving their image were accused of taking part in Germany’s war crimes during the Holocaust.

Klein’s supposedly negative image in his local Jewish community did not deter the Israelis from mobilising him. On the contrary, what apparently caused Jewish Chicagoans to view Klein unfavourably – his close interpersonal ties with decision-makers in an important third-party country such as West Germany – was exactly what facilitated his access to Israel’s foreign policy establishment. Raised in Germany, he was a native German speaker who understood the local culture very well. After the war, he cultivated significant relations with individuals in the West German government and parliament, both through his public relations firm and as an international lobbyist. Israel’s consul general in Chicago reported in 1960 that ‘Klein’s connections to the Germans appear to be of the utmost seriousness. I have already met at his home German industrial leaders, princes, and statesmen’. ⁴⁶ As this evidence demonstrates, Klein’s close contacts with key US and West German officials showed the Israelis that he was relevant and valuable.

The diasporan’s inclination

An additional quality mentioned by the MFA was Klein’s devotion to promoting Israel’s affairs. Israel’s consul general emphasised his loyalty and emotional attachment to Israel, explaining that Klein ‘can be very useful for us in certain situations. Throughout the last two years, I was asked by the previous ambassador to give him special treatment and to make sure that the attacks on him from the Jewish community would not ruin his efficiency for us’. ⁴⁷ The Israelis perceived Klein’s attachment to Israel as steadfast, which rendered him a preferred candidate for mobilisation. According to them, ‘despite the fact that he is a special “bird”, there is no doubt regarding his sincere feelings and loyalty to Israel. Even his detractors acknowledge this’. ⁴⁸

Conclusions

Against the large backdrop of literature that focuses on state-led mobilisation of and engagement with diasporas, this article examines the tailored and personalised mobilisation of individual diasporans. States, for various reasons, do not always seek to publicly harness diasporic masses but rather may operate through influential and networked individuals. The empirical analysis demonstrates how political elites in one state leverage the contacts or clout of diasporic individuals overseas for foreign policy purposes.

Based on their previous knowledge regarding specific diasporans – who is in these diasporans’ network and what these diasporans are willing to do – government agents task them with a favour. In the cases of Feinberg and Javits, Israeli elites asked them to convince US elites regarding specific policy issues and to transfer messages on Israel’s behalf. In Klein’s case, Israel used the diasporan’s ties to improve relations not only with elites in the country of residence but also with a third country – West Germany. These examples show how the Israeli government preferred utilising individual diasporans to eschew the involvement of official representatives of Israel in such delicate tasks. Israel’s ability to do so relied on two primary dimensions: access (the government’s access to the diasporan and the diasporan’s access to government officials abroad) and inclination (the diasporan’s motivation and ideology). Both dimensions are informed by personal relations, acquaintance, and experience that, in turn, inform the government about the diasporan’s capabilities and willingness.

The article’s focus on tailored and personalised mobilisation deepens our understanding of the transnational and networked character of state action beyond ‘statist paradigms’ (Koinova, 2017a). While diaspora scholars have examined the agency of diaspora entrepreneurs (Brinkerhoff, 2016; Koinova, 2021) and politicians (Karabegović, 2025), this article highlights the homeland state’s perspective and its strategic use of this agency. Particularly, it underscores the importance of interpersonal relations – connections, exchanges, impressions, and reciprocity – to diaspora-diplomacy endeavours. Interpersonal relations are an underlying infrastructure that facilitates considerations of socio-spatial positions and instils trust.

Our findings also blur the distinction (Brinkerhoff, 2019; Ho and McConnell, 2019) between instrumental diaspora diplomacy (done through the diaspora) and agency-based diaspora diplomacy (done by the diaspora). The analysis shows that diasporans can be instrumental to state governments while simultaneously maintaining a degree of autonomous agency regarding their advocacy, and sometimes even suggest themselves to act on behalf of state elites.

Following the recent turn to personal relations in diplomatic studies, our analysis opens up fruitful research avenues to study the personal element in diaspora diplomacy and transnational repression. In addition to harnessing individual diaspora scientists or diasporans with connections to foreign policy circles, homeland governments often target celebrity diasporans – Mila Kunis in the case of Ukraine, Kim Kardashian in the case of Armenia, Gal Gadot in the case of Israel, or Mesut Özil in the case of Turkey. Investigating the attempts of governments to mobilise these celebrities will contribute to our understanding of homelands’ diaspora diplomacy initiatives. Regarding transnational repression, our findings might contribute, with some modifications, to explaining why states choose to repress certain individuals and not others. Future research would be keen to continue this line of research by not only examining the conditions for selecting diasporic individuals but also exploring how they are harnessed and the process of doing so.

In addition, with certain changes, our theoretical insights can shed light on the tailored and personalised mobilisation of non-diasporic individuals. For example, access to policymakers, ideological commitment to the task, and non-affiliation with the government – which provides the latter with deniability and discretion – are crucial for additional types of citizen diplomacy. Among them are the endeavours of private citizens who unofficially mediate between their country’s intelligence services and non-state actors (Lehrs, 2019) and back-channel diplomacy by citizens who are officially sanctioned by states to informally negotiate with foreign governments (Wanis-St. John, 2006). While such individuals sometimes initiate citizen diplomacy on their own accord, in other cases it is the state that approaches and mobilises them (Tyler and Beyerinck, 2016).

Likewise, access to specific key policymakers is crucial for states’ recruitment of foreign lobbyists (You, 2023). Lobbying, however, is a formal institution that is expected to be transparent. In the United States, lobbyists and foreign agents must register with the government and are paid by the government that hired them (Straus, 2024). Contrarily, diaspora unofficial diplomats generally work behind the scenes, and their services to the homeland are not always (or not exclusively) of a transactional nature – in our study, we found no evidence of Israel officially employing or directly paying any of the three individuals.

A final interesting comparison would be with the recruitment and handling of intelligence assets, which is also informal and discreet in nature. However, such assets are often motivated by ‘material rewards, moral and political commitments, resentment and anger at their regime, a need for recognition, [or] vulnerability to coercion’ (Fabre, 2022: 143). For diasporans, as we have shown, ideological inclination plays the most important role, even though material incentives may also be involved (and, of course, some diasporans may become intelligence assets). As these brief comparisons suggest, empirically exploring such similarities and differences, or developing typologies of government-led mobilisations, would advance our theoretical understanding of how states engage with individuals beyond their borders.