Under what conditions will political parties emphasise trade policy during national elections? While research shows the importance of domestic politics in driving trade policy, little attention has been directed towards its electoral salience. This study posits that electoral rules affect politicians’ incentives to politicise foreign trade. In single-member district systems, where the seats-votes elasticity is high, political parties have strong incentives to cater to voters. In contrast, proportional representation systems generate stronger incentives for parties to accommodate to industry interests. The winner-take-all nature of plurality rules thus generates stronger pressures for parties to politicise trade policy. The argument is empirically supported through an analysis of party election platforms in 32 countries from 1961 to 2016. These results indicate that electoral regimes affect not only trade policy, but also its elite-driven attention in national elections.
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