This article argues that there is a need to question whether parliamentary involvement actually leads to the intended effects of increased democratic deliberation and responsiveness. We compare the unintended consequences of parliamentary votes on the use of force in two ‘most-different cases’: Canada and Germany. Despite substantive differences in the formal war powers of their parliaments, we find that military deployment votes on Afghanistan led to less democratic deliberation and responsiveness. Applying rationalist institutionalism, we argue that the deployment votes incentivised major parties to collude together to lessen debate on the Afghan mission, despite increasing public opposition and media attention. Rather than enhancing deliberation and responsiveness, as assumed by proponents of greater parliamentary involvement in military decisions, these parliamentary votes effectively diminished the willingness of parties to debate the mission.
AuerswaldDPSaidemanSM (2014) NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2.
BerinskyAJ (2007) Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict. Journal of Politics4: 975–997.
3.
BlandDLRempelR (2004) A vigilant parliament: Building competence for effective parliamentary oversight of national defence and the Canadian Armed forces. IRPP Policy Matters1: 1–60.
4.
BoltA (2015) The ‘convention’ to consult parliament on decisions to deploy the military: A political mirage? In: BédardMLagasséP (eds) The Crown and Parliament. Montréal, QC, Canada: Yvon Blais, pp. 72–145.
5.
BornHHänggiH (2005) The Use of Force Under International Auspices: Strengthening Parliamentary Accountability. Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces.
6.
BrummerK (2014) Die begrenzten ‘war powers’ des Bundestags. Zeitschrift Für Parlamentsfragen3: 596–614.
7.
BrummerKFröhlichS (ed.) (2011) Zehn Jahre Deutschland in Afghanistan. Wiesbaden: Spinger VS.
CarrA (2017) Is bipartisanship on national security beneficial? Australia’s politics of defence and security. Australian Journal of Politics & History2: 254–269.
13.
CPC (2006) Stand Up for Canada: Federal Election Platform. Ottawa, ON: Conservative Party of Canada.
14.
DamroschLF (2003) The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: Changing trends in executive and legislative powers. In: CharlotteKuJacobsonHK (eds) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–60.
15.
DewatripontMJewittITiroleJ (1999) The economics of career concerns, part I: Comparing information structures. Review of Economic Studies66: 183–198.
16.
DieterichSHummelHMarschallS (2010) Parliamentary War Powers: A Survey of 25 European Parliaments. Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
17.
DieterichSHummelHMarschallS (2015) Bringing democracy back in: The democratic peace, parliamentary war powers and European participation in the 2003 Iraq war. Cooperation and Conflict1: 87–106.
18.
DunnC (2007) Democracy in the 21st century: Canada needs a war powers act. Canadian Parliamentary Review3: 2–3.
19.
FennoRF (1978) Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
20.
FiorinaMP (1987) Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, 2nd edn.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
21.
FischerJ (2011) ‘I Am Not Convinced’: Der Irak-krieg und die rot-grünen Jahre. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.
22.
FrankRH (1987) Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behaviour and the Quest for Status. New York: Oxford University Press.
23.
GerringJ (2008) Case selection for case-study analysis: Qualitative and quantitative techniques. In: Box-SteffensmeierJMBradyHECollierD (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 645–684.
HaesebrouckT (2016) Democratic participation in the air strikes against Islamic state: A qualitative comparative analysis. Foreign Policy Analysis (Early View). Epub ahead of print 8October. DOI: 10.1093/fpa/orw035.
26.
HillmerNLagasséP (2016) Parliament will decide: An interplay of politics and principle. International Journal2: 328–337.
JockelJT (2014) Canada and the Netherlands in Afghanistan. Kingston, ON: Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University.
30.
JosephR (2013) The War Prerogative: History, Reform, and Constitutional Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31.
KesginBKaarboJ (2010) When and how parliaments influence foreign policy: The case of turkey’s Iraq decision. International Studies Perspectives1: 19–36.
32.
KrepsSE (2010) Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: Why public opinion hardly matters for Nato-led operations in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy Analysis3: 191–215.
33.
KuCJacobsonHK (eds) (2003) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34.
LagasséP (2010) Accountability for national defence: Ministerial responsibility, military command and parliamentary oversight. IRPP Study4: 1–60.
35.
LagasséP (2017) Parliament and the war prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining variations in institutional change and legislative control. Parliamentary Affairs2: 280–300.
36.
LagasséPSaidemanSM (2017) Public critic or secretive monitor: Party objectives and legislative oversight of the military in Canada. West European Politics1: 119–138.
37.
LeblangDChanS (2003) Explaining wars fought by established democracies: Do institutional constraints matter?Political Research Quarterly4: 385–400.
38.
LordC (2011) The political theory and practice of parliamentary participation in the common security and defence policy. Journal of European Public Policy8: 1133–1150.
39.
MaderM (2017) Öffentliche Meinung zu Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
40.
MartinSSaalfeldTStrømK (2014) Introduction: In: MartinSSaalfeldTStrømK (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–25.
41.
MassieJ (2016) Public contestation and policy resistance: Canada’s oversized military commitment to Afghanistan. Foreign Policy Analysis1: 47–65.
42.
MeiersF-J (2011) Der wehrverfassungsrechtliche Parlamentsvorbehalt und die Verteidigung der Sicherheit Deutschlands am Hindukusch, 2001–2011. Zeitschrift Für Außen- Und Sicherheitspolitik1: 87–113.
43.
MelloPA (2014) Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict: Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
44.
MelloPA (2017) Curbing the royal prerogative to use military force: The British house of commons and the conflicts in Libya and Syria. West European Politics1: 80–100.
45.
MelloPAPetersD (2018) Parliaments in security policy: Involvement, politicisation, and influence. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1): 3–18.
46.
MüllerHWolffJ (2011) Demokratischer Krieg am Hindukusch? Eine kritische Analyse der Bundestagsdebatten zur deutschen Afghanistanpolitik 2001–2011. Zeitschrift Für Außen- Und Sicherheitspolitik1: 197–221.
47.
MüllerWCStrømK (eds) (2008) Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
48.
PetersBG (2012) Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism, 3rd edn.New York: Continuum.
49.
PetersDWagnerW (2011) Between military efficiency and democratic legitimacy: Mapping parliamentary war powers in contemporary democracies, 1989–2004. Parliamentary Affairs1: 175–192.
50.
PiersonP (1996) The path to European integration: A historical institutionalist analysis. Comparative Political Studies2: 123–163.
51.
RaunioTWagnerW (2017) Towards parliamentarisation of Foreign and security policy?West European Politics1: 1–19.
52.
ReiterDTillmanER (2002) Public, legislative, and executive constraints on the democratic initiation of conflict. The Journal of Politics3: 810–826.
53.
RidTZapfeM (2013) Mission command without a mission: German military adaptation in Afghanistan. In: FarrellTOsingaFRussellJA (eds) Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 192–218.
54.
RikerWH (1986) The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
55.
SaidemanSM (2016) Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada’s War in Afghanistan. Toronto, ON, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
56.
SchlesingerJA (1966) Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
57.
SchoenH (2010) Ein Bericht von der Heimatfront.: Bürger, Politiker und der Afghanistaneinsatz der Bundeswehr. Politische Vierteljahresschrift3: 395–408.
58.
ShepsleKA (2008) Rational choice institutionalism. In: RhodesRAWBinderSARockmanBA (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23–38.
59.
ShepsleKA (2010) Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behaviour, and Institutions, 2nd edn.New York: W. W. Norton.
StrømK (1990) A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Journal of Political Science2: 565–598.
62.
StrongJ (2018) The war powers of the British parliament: What has been established, and what remains unclear?The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1): 19–34.
63.
StrongJ (2015) Why parliament now decides on war: Tracing the growth of the parliamentary prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq. British Journal of Politics and International Relations4: 604–622.
WagnerW (2018) Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1): 121–134.
66.
WagnerW (2017) The Bundestag as a champion of parliamentary control of military missions. Sicherheit + Frieden2: 60–65.
67.
WagnerWPetersDGlahnC (2010) Parliamentary War Powers around the World, 1989–2004. A New Dataset. Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
ZallerJ (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.
70.
ZMSBw (2014) Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
