Migration theory as social theory: From transnational migration to mobile social ontologies

Abstract

With the paradigm shift toward transnationalism in the 1990s, perspectives on the phenomenon of migration changed fundamentally. Up to that point, the societies of origin and settlement had defined the analytical framework for sociology in general and migration research in particular. With the transnational migration model, this perspective made a U-turn: the transnational social networks of migrants became the starting point of migration research and social analysis. First, that meant that migrants and migrating people came to occupy a social–theoretical subject position. Second, migrant lives and the transnational social worlds that they sustain provided a social and socio-theoretical research perspective: migration itself became a perspective of social analysis in general. What does this imply for social theory? I suggest thinking about a social theory that is a migration theory at the same time—and vice versa. Therefore, I investigate Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's nomadology as a specific kind of theory of social mobilities ( Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Within that framework, it is possible to describe social mobilities beyond the “physical” dichotomy between “sedentary” on the one hand and “mobile” or “migrant” on the other.

Migration theory and social theory

Social theory tends to encompass describing and understanding social processes, relationships, and actions, whereas migration theory is supposed to provide concepts and explanations for migration processes. The theoretical separation already epistemically establishes that “migration” is a special social case and is different from what is understood as “society.” However, various researchers in migration research have questioned and criticized the classification of migration as a special social case in recent decades (Bojadžijev & Römhild, 2014; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Following these new approaches, this article suggests that migration theory could operate as a general social theory and vice versa.

I suggest taking transnational migration theory as a starting point for a general mobile social theory. In migration research, the transnational turn marked the “birth” of migrant socio-theoretical subjectivity. This in turn offers the opportunity to bring together migration and social theory: migration theory and social theory are no longer distinct on the socio-ontological level. Following the implications of this transnational paradigm shift, several crucial arguments arose in migration research that have all led to the question of the socio-theoretical status of migration:

Crucially, migrating people and migrants keep social, cultural, and economic ties to people and places that they consider important (Basch et al., 2008). These ties create networks and these networks constitute transnational social worlds. This raises the question of how these transnational worlds are constituted socio-theoretically. These social worlds are constituted by migrants, mobile people, former migrants, or people with migration backgrounds and demonstrate that “migrants” are capable of providing a socio-theoretical subject position. And this raises a further question of whether social worlds in general can be described in migratory and mobile parameters.

The concept of the “autonomy of migration” made it clear that the “mobility of labor” does not simply follow economic laws; instead, that migration consists of a certain ontological independence of economic processes (Moulier Boutang, 2007, p. 169f; Mezzadra, 2007)—although this does not mean that migrants are economically independent (Moulier Boutang, 2007, p. 170). Still, the ontological independence of migration has raised socio-theoretical and political questions about migrant subjects (Bojadžijev & Karakayalı, 2007, p. 207; Karakayalı & Tsianos, 2005, p. 60) and the limits of control of migration processes (Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007). The ontological independence of migration implies questions about the socio-theoretical formation and structure of this mobile social ontologies.

The historical insight that human beings have always been moving, that human history is a history of mobility, and that “transnational” ties may be older than the nation-states that define them is broadly accepted in migration research (Faist, 2023; Oltmer, 2017). This historical understanding strengthens the socio-ontological priority of human mobility as well.

To strengthen the argument not only for an ontological but also theoretical independence of migration, I propose developing a mobile social theory out of migration research. As other authors conceptualize Gilles Deleuze's and Félix Guattari's nomadology in the context of migration and migration theory as well (Braidotti, 1994; Holland, 2011; Moll, 2023; Nail, 2015; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007), the transnational migration model implies a mobile social theory inspired by the two French philosophers (Ehrenfeld, 2022). Following Deleuze and Guattari, who claimed that it is not enough to say, “Long live the multiple” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 6), but rather the multiple must be made by “subtract[ing] the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 6), I try to subtract—or “isolate”—Deleuze's and Guattari's definitions of the “migrant,” the “nomad,” and the “sedentary.” These three figures may represent a fruitful contribution for a mobile socio-ontology. However, it is first necessary to outline the transnational turn and what it means for migration theory. Following this, the implications for a migration theory that might be a general social theory at the same time can be examined.

The meaning of the transnational turn in migration theory

The basic assumption of migration sociology before the transnational turn was that moving from one place to another meant, sociologically, moving from one social group to another (Oswald, 2007, p. 13ff). That meant that in sociology, social formations had been assumed to be geographically bound. An example of this from 2018 is how the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had defined “international migrants” as people who lived in a country other than the one in which they were born (IOM, 2018). This definition was based on the assumptions that the world is divided into countries, and that sedentariness of social formations represents the “normal” socio-theoretical case. So, although human beings have always been moving, the categorization of “migration” is connected to the givenness of the nation-state, which allowed migration movements across borders to become even more apparent. In empirical migration research, this concept of migration that refers to “nation/state/societ[ies]” (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 301) has been increasingly problematized in recent decades. First, scholars in migration studies have observed that many of the social configurations analyzed under the concept of “migration” are highly complex structures. The theoretical models of migration have become increasingly differentiated, with scholars distinguishing among various forms of migration (e.g., temporary, targeted, or circular migration; re-, trans-, or chain migration, among others). Secondly, qualitative research methods have helped to do justice to the complexity of migration phenomena in the analysis. For instance, these methods have called the distinction between labor and refugee migration into question and recategorized these as “mixed migration flows” (Angenendt et al., 2017). Furthermore, it has become apparent that the causes, forms, and effects of individual as well as collective migration processes can only be understood to a limited extent within the parameters of the host society, and even the difference between “migration” and “mobility” is called into question. As Regina Römhild noted, “While the mobility of some is controlled and regulated as migration, the mobility of others is seen as proof of flexible self-entrepreneurship, which is invoked and promoted as cosmopolitan capital throughout Europe…. There are clearly double standards here [my translation]” (Römhild et al., 2013, p. 190ff.). For example, when people commute from Eastern to Western Europe in the agricultural sector, it is referred to as “labor migration”; In contrast, the temporary stays of young academics across Europe are referred to as “mobility.” “Migration research [has tended] to look for and find its clientele primarily in the lower social fringe zones. By doing so, it thus complemented and reinforced the popular view that migration has become virtually synonymous with society's outstanding problems [my translation]” (Römhild et al., 2013, p. 189).

By 2024, only six years later, the IOM's definition of “migration” now sounds quite different: “Migration” is considered to be

an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.… No universally accepted definition for “migrant” exists. (IOM, 2024)

This fundamental epistemic change has been brought about by migration research. One crucial paradigm shift in the study of migration was marked by the transnational migration model, which emerged in the 1990s. The transnational migration model constituted a turning point in migration studies and paved the way for migration theories of the 21st century: The analysis of migration processes was no longer based on societies of origin and settlement, but on transnational networks of migrant actors. Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc stated that “immigrants… develop and maintain multiple relationships—familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political—that span borders” (Basch et al., 2008, p. 263). Therefore, the authors defined transnationalism as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch et al., 2008, p. 263). These migrant social fields “cross geographic, cultural, and political borders” (Basch et al., 2008, p. 263). Migrants thus create their own transnational patterns of life that extend beyond the contexts of national societies. Although the authors still use the term “immigrants,” their idea of “transmigrants” actually rejects the notion of emigration and immigration. Basch, Glick, Schiller, and Szanton Blanc's concept was an attempt to offer a new analytical framework that would go beyond societies of origin and societies of settlement to understand and describe migration processes more comprehensively and more accurately. The basic assumption of the transnational migration model consists of transnational ties that are supported and maintained by migrant actors. Migrants themselves bear their social worlds, that is, migrants fulfill a social–theoretical subject position. This repositioning marked a paradigm shift in migration research: the migrants themselves provided the socio-analytical framework for observing, describing, and evaluating migration processes and other social dynamics. As Immanuel Kant explained in his critique of epistemology in the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, this is “just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest” (Kant, 1998 [1787], p. 110). Similarly, the transnational shift of perspective considers whether one would not get further with the explanation of migration processes if one left the migrants at rest and made the “societies” revolve. Migrants went from being the “object” of sociological migration research to being the “subject” of social formations. The approach thus created a new socio-analytical starting point for migration research—and for social research in general. Shifting the perspective of migration research changes the socio-theoretical, epistemological, and political possibilities of migrant subjectivity.

During the past three decades, the transnational model has been critically examined, refined, and applied in countless research projects (Faist, 2000; Dahinden, 2009; Khagram & Levitt, 2008; Kivisto, 2001; Pries, 2008; Vertovec, 2003; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). As mentioned above, the transnational idea thus paved the way for the migration theories of the 21st century, in which migrants have been ascribed a constitutive socio-theoretical role and/or socio-theoretical and political subjectivity. For instance, as the concepts of the “autonomy of migration” (Bojadžijev & Karakayalı, 2007; Karakayalı & Tsianos, 2005; Mezzadra, 2007; Moulier Boutang, 2007; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007) and the “postmigrant society” (Foroutan et al., 2018; Hill & Yıldız, 2018) show, migrants and their descendants do not occupy a deficient social role, as had been conceptualized in assimilation and integration theories before, but a socio-theoretical positivity and subjectivity. “Migration” is no longer understood as something different from “society” that might need to be “integrated” (Bojadžijev & Römhild, 2014; Espahangizi, 2022; Espahangizi et al., 2016; Faist, 2000; Holert & Terkessidis, 2006; Karakayalı, 2008; Mecheril et al., 2013; Pries, 2008) and migrants are able to emerge as political subjects (Schwiertz, 2019; Oberprantacher, 2016).

Following the criticism of methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002), Mimi Sheller and John Urry recognized a social–theoretical sedentarism in the social sciences. “Sedentarism treats as normal stability, meaning, and place, and treats as abnormal distance, change, and placelessness” (Sheller & Urry, 2006, p. 208). According to Sheller and Urry, the “social” and even more so “society” are conceived sedentaristically—the social–theoretical marginalization of movement is thus sedentarism. In sedentarism, sedentariness is the social norm: it is the standard and the general condition of sociability or society. This has consequences for the academic study of the causes, forms, and consequences of personal mobility: In terms of social theory, all migration should initially be seen as a special social phenomenon. In other words, according to sedentarism, mobile social existence appears as inauthentic social existence. Tim Cresswell has pointed out that from a sedentaristic point of view “mobility… appears as a [socio-theoretical] dysfunction” (Cresswell, 2006, p. 32). That means that mobility is not justified on a socio-theoretical level, while sedentary lifestyles do not need to be justified as they represent the “normal social case.” As long as social theory operates according to sedetaristic structures, movement, migration, mobility, and nomadism are marginalized socio-theoretically. Sheller and Urry saw this as an unjustified social–theoretical pathologization of the mobile: “Social science has largely ignored or trivialized the importance of the systematic movements of people for work and family life, for leisure and pleasure, and for politics and protest.… Much social science research has been ‘a-mobile’” (Sheller & Urry, 2006, p. 208). They considered this to be a structural neglect of social mobility and mobile lifestyles, which goes hand in hand with social–theoretical marginalization (see also Sheller, 2018).

In empirical migration research, the problematic assumption of sedentarism has been confirmed in several studies. For instance, Tom Holert and Mark Terkessidis preferred to conceptualize a “society on the move” (Holert & Terkessidis, 2006). “For many reasons, more and more people are forced to be mobile, to travel, to commute between work and home…. So many people are actually constantly on the move…. In the meantime, the search for jobs… automatically includes the search for new places to live [my translation]” (Holert & Terkessidis, 2006, p. 11). The distinction between voluntary and involuntary mobility, or between forced labor migration and the mobile migration of skilled workers, or between escape and tourism has become increasingly blurred (Lenz, 2010). Even “sedentary” people can practice transnational lifestyles, as many “locally arrived former migrants” or “highly qualified mobiles” do (Dahinden, 2009), and migrants can adopt very locally oriented, “sedentary” lifestyles. Further, transnational social spaces can become so entrenched that their participants “rest” in them very stably (“sedentarily”) between countries. For their part, displaced persons may on the one hand be considered “settled,” because they have the citizenship of the country of refuge and may speak the local language, but on the other hand considered “migrant” because they have lost their former life, home, income, and social network. The distinction between sedentary or migrant can no longer be made. As a result, it is a valid question to what extent a sedentaristic social theory can scientifically do justice to the wide variety of more or less mobile social configurations; second, the dichotomy between sedentary and migrant/mobile no longer seems to be essential to describe and understand migration processes. Indeed, the socio-theoretical dichotomy between sedentary or mobile has actually obscured complex mobilities and mobility patterns across and within state borders.

In sum, the transnational turn of perspective on migration processes led to new research perspectives not only on “migration,” but on social formations in general. This insight prompted Manuela Bojadžijev and Regina Römhild to wonder what would come after the transnational turn (Bojadžijev & Römhild, 2014, p. 10): What comes after the transnational turn, and what follows from the transnational change of perspective? What does this turn imply for migration and social theory? Ultimately, they suggested the project of “demigrantizing migration research and migrantizing social research [my translation” (Bojadžijev & Römhild, 2014, p. 11; Dahinden, 2016). The idea of post-migrant society emerged with the core assumption that “migration” plays a constitutive role in the concept of society itself; “society” cannot be conceived without “migration” (Foroutan et al., 2018; Hill & Yıldız, 2018; Holert & Terkessidis, 2006). As Römhild explained, just as gender research is not “women's studies,” post-migrant research is explicitly not limited to researching migrants (Römhild et al., 2013, p. 193), but rather about illuminating and questioning social, political, and cultural conditions from a migrant perspective (Römhild et al., 2013). According to Marc Hill and Erol Yıldız, the post-migrant perspective produces “a resistant practice of knowledge production… a critical and at the same time optimistic attitude…. In the radical rejection of the usual separation between migration and sedentariness, migrant and non-migrant, an epistemological turn is heralded [my translation]” (Hill & Yıldız, 2018, p. 2). The post-migrant concept thus raises both social–theoretical and epistemic questions that originate in migrant subjectivity. The dichotomy between migration and sedentariness is questioned.

The “autonomy of migration” concerns the epistemological-political nexus of migrant subjectivity as well (Bojadžijev & Karakayalı, 2007, p. 207; Karakayalı & Tsianos, 2005, p. 60; Tsianos & Karakayalı, 2010). The “autonomy of migration” is a thesis and a method (Mezzadra, 2007; Bojadžijev & Karakayalı, 2007): As mentioned above an important thesis is that “migration” is ontologically independent, although it may not imply economic independence (Moulier Boutang, 2007, p. 170). However, the autonomy of migration has primarily been conceptually negotiated within criticism of capitalism, due to the concept's provenance (Mezzadra, 2007; Moulier Boutang, 2007). As a result, the socio-theoretical implications of the ontological independence of migration have not yet been fully outlined; one reason for this research gap might be the theoretical background of the “autonomy of migration” in criticism of capitalism and its political theories instead of social theory. To strengthen the idea of an “autonomy” that is not only theoretically claimed but also performed in research design, it might be helpful to develop this theory of an independence of “migration” from migration research. The socio-theoretical migrant subjectivity brought about by the transnational turn in migration research can represent such a starting point for socio-ontological reflections on mobile social theories, which enable to bring migration theory and social theory closer together. In sum, a socio-theoretical migrant subjectivity brings along the critique of socio-theoretical sedentarism; an epistemological migrant subjectivity offers new perspectives on mobile and immobile social formations; and a political migrant subjectivation can be conceptualized in multiple ways, besides the discursive figurations of “the migrant” as, for instance, the “guest worker” or the “refugee” (Celikates, 2015; Karakayalı & Tsianos, 2005, p. 37ff; Oberprantacher, 2016; cf. Schwiertz, 2019).

The socio-theoretical subject position of migrants as assumed in the transnational framework can then be transferred to general social theory; there is no reason why mobility should not be assumed to be a “normal” social case. Since the dichotomy between sedentary or mobile in migration research is not essential to understanding and describing mobility patterns and migration movements, it can be dissolved. Indeed, it should be dissolved, first, to release mobile ways of life from their sedentaristic duty to justify themselves, and second, to prevent a “mobilism” in place of the formerly criticized sedentarism.

Mobile social ontologies

In addition to recent migration theories, there are various considerations and theoretical approaches in political theory and philosophy that deal with mobile social ontologies. Rosi Braidotti develops a feminist-ecological ontology and epistemology of the nomadic (Braidotti, 1994 and 2011), which demands “nomadic consciousness” (Braidotti, 1994, p. 23). Thomas Nail reads migrants as a political paradigm of the excluded. By tracing this thesis historically by examining nomads, barbarians, vagabonds, and the proletariat, he develops a kinesiological political theory (Nail, 2015). Other theorists understand migrants as representatives of practices of resistance (Hardt & Negri, 2001; Papadopoulos et al., 2008: par. 12) or analyze their political potential of alternatives to the structures of capitalism (Holland, 2011; Moll, 2023). As with the transnational approach, the assumption of migrant subjectivity is central in all these theories. At the same time, however, the ontological independence of migration implies questions about the structure of mobile social ontologies, which can be investigated in more detail, as Nail outlines (Nail, 2015). In the following, theoretical aspects of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's nomadology are extracted and proposed for a theory of mobile social ontologies. The aim is to offer a social theory toolkit to describe mobile social ontologies and (im-)mobile behavior. Following up to Braidotti's ontological interpretation of the nomadology (Braidotti, 2011, p. 2, 267f), however, in contrast, I try to offer an analytical framework on mobility processes in which different mobility patterns are to be differentiated rather than summarized under a nomadic paradigm. The objective is to better understand mobile social ontologies, their conditions, and mutual mobile interactions within them. In doing so, a migration theory can be sketched as a general social theory.

Following the implications of the transnational paradigm shift, as explained above, one aim is to dissolve the dichotomy between sedentary and mobile. This requires taking the relationship between space, time, and movement into account. The Treatise on Nomadology by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari is a plateau in the book A Thousand Plateaus, which was published in 1980 as the second book in the Capitalism and Schizophrenia series. A Thousand Plateaus is an attempt not only to describe philosophical ideas but to carry them out according to the book's form and logic. As a result, the nomadology is not intended to be a “theory of migration” as such, but was introduced in the context of a political and aesthetic theory, which itself is embedded in an ontology of “assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 4). Despite its comprehensive philosophical origin, this text explicitly transfers the nomadology to a migration theory context and examines it for a mobile social theory. Roughly speaking, the attempt to develop a kind of mobile social theory based on Deleuze's and Guattari's ideas is essentially about the idea of socio-physically remeasuring the axes running between migration/mobility and sedentariness, and the different relations these have to space. Deleuze and Guattari offered two figures (The “migrant” and the “nomad”) and two spatial concepts (the “smooth” and the “striated” space). The two figures of the migrant and the nomad are clearly defined but are intended to be understood as analytical archetypes and not as empirically based categories of real travelers. “Nomads and migrants can mix in many ways or form a common aggregate; their causes and conditions are no less distinct for that” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380). In other words, it is not a question of finding specific mobility groups empirically (Moll, 2023, p. 593), but more about thinking about the characteristics and criteria by which different forms of mobility can be distinguished from one another. Three categorical distinctions in the nomadology are of crucial importance for a mobile social theory: the distinction between (a) nomadism and migration, the distinction between (b) smooth and striated spaces, and the distinction between (c) movement and speed.

Migration and nomadism

According to Deleuze and Guattari, migrant and nomadic forms of movement are fundamentally different from one another—which, as already indicated, does not mean that they cannot occur together in practice. Migration is a teleological form of movement that strives for a destination, while nomadism is an unfinished, cyclical pattern of movement.

The nomad has a territory; he follows customary paths; he goes from one point to another; he is not ignorant of points (water points, dwelling points, assembly points, etc.). But… although the points determine paths, they are strictly subordinated to the paths they determine…. The water point is reached only in order to be left behind; every point is a relay and exists only as a relay. A path is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all the consistency. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380)

In the nomadic form of movement, the points are strictly subordinate to the path. Nomads do not walk from one point to another to arrive at these points, but to leave them again (and repeat them if necessary). Therefore, in nomadic movement sequences, the points are connecting points; they link the paths together to form one long path. The “in-between” that has “taken on all the consistency” is not mere transit in nomadic logic: it has “autonomy” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380), a kind of independence and its own rules. Nomadic paths follow their own law and have their own meaning for the nomads. Thus, “even the elements of his [the nomad's] dwelling are conceived in terms of the trajectory that is forever mobilizing them” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380). Tents can be taken down and put up again at any time.

The migrant manner of movement is different from nomadism. “The migrant goes principally from one point to another, even if the second point is uncertain, unforeseen, or not well localized” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380). In the migrant movement, the paths are clearly subordinate to the points. Migrants move from Point A to Point B to arrive at Point B. Point B may be unknown or unforeseen, but it is still the destination. Migration is therefore a teleological form of movement, a destination is sought. No importance is attached to the path alone; it is the points that are important for the migrants. The paths are nothing more than a transition between the points.

We are therefore dealing with two fundamentally different patterns of movement: nomadic movement subordinates the points to the paths, while migrant movement subordinates the paths to the points. “Migration” can thus be understood as a decidedly teleological form of movement, while “nomadism” cannot. To reiterate, these are abstract types of figures that empirically occur in mixed forms. For example, initially (relatively!) teleological forms of migration from one country A to another country B gradually give rise to nomadic cycles in transnational social spaces. These can, however, also give rise to individual teleological forms of migration again through chain migration, for instance. Even at the individual level, both patterns of movement can presumably be found in the vast majority of cases.

b. The smooth and the striated space

In addition to migrancy and nomadism, Deleuze and Guattari distinguished between two different spaces: the smooth and the striated space. What they primarily outlined as an aesthetic concept in the plateau The Smooth and the Striated is made fruitful for the various forms of movement in the context of the nomadology. In particular, the functional role of sedentariness in a mobile social theory can be worked out with the smooth and the striated space.

Drawing on Pierre Boulez's music theory, Deleuze and Guattari distinguished the two forms of space by stating that the smooth space “is occupied without being counted” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 362), while the striated or metric space is “counted in order to be occupied” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 362). The smooth space is associated with nomadism and the striated space with the sedentary (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 381). “The nomad distributes himself in a smooth space; he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is his territorial principle” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 381). The figurative nomad “distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite…. It is a… distribution… without division into shares, in a space without borders or enclosure [italics in original]” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380). Sedentary people and nomads thus have two fundamentally different relationships to spatiality. The smooth space of nomads is “occupied without being counted,” which is rephrased as “distribution without division into shares.” Nomads distribute themselves in a smooth space that is open. The smooth space is plain and has no boundaries that define it. In fact, the smooth space is only defined by the nomadic occupation itself: Smooth space is always as large as it is occupied, there is no smooth space until someone has spread out on it. Nomads therefore create and carry their spaces, they live their spaces, and smooth spaces are created by occupation. There are no shares and there is no division of the smooth space, it is “one,” nomads do not “count.” The space is “smooth” insofar as there is nothing in it or on it to divide or structure it. It is plain, open, and boundaryless.

By contrast, in striated spaces, people count to occupy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “the function of the sedentary road… is to parcel out a closed space to people, assigning each person a share and regulating the communication between shares [my italics]” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380). The striated or metric space is counted and divided up. Shares are allocated and connections are regulated. In this way, a certain structure is established to bring things under control: it is counted to be occupied. Like the teleological migrant form of movement, there is also a telos in the counting of the sedentary: the purpose is to establish a certain control over the conditions encountered. For instance, the distribution of harvests can be regulated by allocating arable land. “Sedentary space is striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380). And there is a purpose about these walls and enclosures: regulation. The counting of space serves the purpose of gaining control over conditions of life. For example, the invention of agriculture was based on the idea of enclosing space to better control access to food. A territorial state is also such a sedentary enclosure of space: by drawing borders, parts of space are postulated, regulating where which sovereigns govern and where which laws are valid.

The smooth and the striated space thus shapes two different spatial relationships among people. The nomadic figure occupies the smooth space without counting. Nomads create their spatiality through occupation and by living. There are no “empty” smooth spaces waiting to be occupied, smooth spaces come into existence by being occupied. They are created by the nomadic paths in (or on) them, and they disappear when these paths disappear. Nomads thus have a direct relationship to their space: they create their spaces and live them. The smooth space is so close to the nomads lives that it is “a tactile space, or rather ‘haptic’” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 382). In contrast, the figure of the sedentary has an interfered relationship to its spaces. It is not “haptic”; it is a functional relation. The sedentary divide space to pursue a purpose: to (better) control the conditions of life qua spatiality (walls, gates, borders). “The sedentary's relation with the earth is mediatized by something else, [for instance] a property regime, [or] a state apparatus” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 381). The sedentary space is counted to be occupied; it is counted to gain control. To practice this control, however, sedentary people do not have to be immobile! In other words, “being sedentary” is not characterized by immobility as opposed to mobility, but rather sedentariness is defined by a certain kind of spatial control practice.

When looking at the two distinctions between nomadic and migrant forms of movement as well as the smooth and the striated space, it becomes obvious that the migrant form of movement must take place in a striated space. The migrant movement from Point A to Point B, in which the paths are subordinate to the points, requires a logically and ontologically a priori space in which it can occur. Migrant movement does not create its own spatiality, as is the case with nomadism, but must presuppose it. In reality, the migrant's tragedy is that migration usually takes place in spaces that have already been divided and counted out by others. However, this does not mean that migrants, understood in the narrow sense of this theory of movement following Deleuze and Guattari, are fundamentally incapable of gaining control over their lives: for instance, migrants can establish smooth spaces in transnational networks. Smooth spaces are not occupied to gain control, but they can still offer a certain control to their nomadic travelers, as the nomadic territory is familiar and the cycles follow customary paths.

c. Movement and speed

Finally, the distinction between “movement” and “speed” is relevant to the social theory of movement. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “it is… necessary to make a distinction between speed and movement: a movement may be very fast, but that does not give it speed; a speed may be very slow, or even immobile, yet it is still speed [italics in original]” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 381). For instance, a migrant movement from A to B can be very fast, it can have speed, but it is not speed. Indeed, as spatiality is an element of speed, speed involves a direct relation to spatiality. This is different from a migratory movement that presupposes spatiality; space is logically and ontologically before migrant movement. And this migrant movement from A to B can be very slow. It can be so slow that it is barely perceptible. Equally, a speed can be very low; it can be so low, that it appears like immobility, but it remains a certain speed. Briefly: “immobility” does not actually exist. There may be very slow movements from A to B, or cycling patterns at a very low speed. These may seem immobile, but they are not. Deleuze and Guattari therefore argued that

movement [in the narrow sense of migrant movement] is extensive; speed is intensive. Movement designates the relative character of a body… which goes from point to point; speed, on the contrary, constitutes the absolute character of a body whose irreducible [or uncounted, uncountable] parts… occupy or fill a smooth space in the manner of a vortex. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 381)

The migrant form of movement from A to B is an extensive and relative movement. It takes place in a space that precedes it. The nomadic form of mobility is not a “movement” in this narrow sense. Following Arnold J. Toynbee, Deleuze and Guattari pointed out that

It is… false to define the nomad by movement.… The nomad is on the contrary he who does not move. Whereas the migrant leaves behind a milieu that has become amorphous or hostile, the nomad is one who does not depart…. Of course, the nomad moves, but while seated, and he is only seated while moving…. Immobility and speed [are the traits] of the nomad [italics in original]. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 381)

Migrant movement is extensive, it can be measured in a spatiality. Nomadic mobility, on the other hand, is intensive; it is the speed of a vortex and the intensity of a cycle; it can hardly be measured.

So, how can these considerations be fruitful for migration theory? First, Deleuze and Guattari's analysis allows researchers to overcome the categorial distinction between “mobile” and “immobile.” The question is not “mobile” or “immobile,” but which kind of mobility? There is no “immobility”: everybody is moving and/or mobile in certain patterns, at certain speeds, and on certain scales. The dichotomy between sedentary and mobile or migrant can be transferred into a spectrum of mobility patterns, speeds, and space relations. To repeat: these figures of the “nomad,” the “migrant,” and the “sedentary” are not meant to be categories for groups of travelers, but analytical figures and modes of behavior that we are all capable of. That means, for instance, a migrating person can apply sedentary practices of using space to control his or her life conditions by pitching his or her tent in an—at least temporarily—safe place. Even people who have never left their village of origin might carry out a movement from A to B, even if in their own biography by reaching personal goals. Of course, these are very abstract and functional definitions of different kinds of mobility practices, and they definitely cannot be applied in any case to understanding specific migration processes. However, the crucial advantage of this kind of mobile social theory is that mobile and immobile individuals are equal from a socio-ontological perspective. And that in turn means that mobile entities are in principle socio-theoretically justified.

In migration theory, transnational social networks can be understood as smooth, nomadic spaces. They only come into being through their “occupation”; they are as large as they are “occupied”; and without their occupants, they would not exist at all. Transnational migrants can inhabit their networks. For instance, harvest workers are established in their own seasonal mobility, they live in their cycles, and they are at home in their mobility pattern. Or, as has been shown about guest workers of the first generation in retirement who commute between their country of origin and country of residence (Krumme, 2004), they find their personal balance and calm in this cycling mobility. In contrast, highly qualified mobile groups, such as expatriates, are “immobile” despite their high geographical mobility, as they never leave their social and cultural milieu, regardless of which city on the globe they are in. Their privilege consists of a tranquility worldwide: although they perform mobility, it is others who really exert movements from A to B. The migrant's mobility is the type of movement with the greatest personal and existential risk: it takes place in spaces that have been striated by others beforehand. And property structures on real estate markets can be understood as strongly striated spaces that strengthen sedentaristic policies: tenants live in spaces that are striated by others, which means they are “potential migrants.” Still, however precarious their routes may be, migrants remain socio-theoretical subjectivities according to the mobile social theory—and therefore political subjectivity or subjectivation is always possible.

Finally, the social—ontological equality of all mobile forms allows us to abolish the socio-theoretical privileges of “non-migrants.” Sedentariness turns out not to be immobility, but a kind of political practice: sedentariness is about the purpose of control (Scott, 2017). This practice of control can be exercised by anyone, regardless of whether they are highly mobile, whether they have migratory movements from A to B behind them, or whether they live at such low speeds that they seem almost immobile. From this, it becomes clear that socio-theoretical sedentarism supports, sustains, and legitimates political practices of control like territorial states, property structures, or agriculture. Briefly, a precise isolation of the notions of “migration,” “nomadism,” and “sedentariness” out of the nomadology as presented here, can offer profound vertices for a theory of mobile social ontologies that build upon the current state of research in migration studies. The categorical distinction between sedentary and migrant is dissolved and transformed into a spectrum of mobilities. It is no longer a question of whether someone is mobile or not, but how. “Immobility” doesn’t exist. The different types of movements, speeds, mobilities, and spatial relationships can be combined in practice. “Sedentariness” is a spatial control practice and therefore not a question of “immobility” and certainly not of “origin” or even “belonging,” but of concrete (political) action.

Migration theory as social theory

To put it in a nutshell, the transnational turn in migration theory led to new perspectives on migration processes that shifted the perspective on social theory as well: the transnational turn led to the question of why the “normal” social case should be the immobile one. I want to emphasize that the transnational paradigm shift implies the dissolving of the dichotomy between sedentary and migrant/mobile. The shift of perspective that happened in migration theory has a socio-theoretical meaning beyond migration theory, as I have tried to sketch here. It was realized that migrants and other mobile persons constitute social formations and that “modern society” is not as “natural” as methodological nationalism had assumed. Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari's considerations, it is possible to sketch a mobile social theory that dissolves the “physical” dichotomy between sedentary and mobile/migrant. This dissolution is inherent in the transnational migration theory: transnational networks are characterized by various mobility patterns and different kinds of movements and speeds that cannot be simply summarized as “migration.” The “physical” distinction between immobile and mobile is transformed into a spectrum of different kinds of movements, speeds, mobilities, and space relations. This mobile social theory distinguishes fundamentally between teleological, linear movements (migrant movements) on the one hand, and mobility patterns without destinations in vortexes (nomadism) on the other hand. In reality, these two categories occur in various mixed forms: individuals are able to switch between these different kinds of mobility to find their individual path and balance.

Beyond that, the transnational paradigm shift shows that people keep their ties to what and especially who is important to them, even across political borders and oceans, or over several thousand kilometers. Many mobility patterns actually result from close relationships. Nomadic smooth spaces help to keep close relations close, as the smooth space is direct and always present. The three modes of migration, nomadism, and sedentariness complement each other.

Overall, a mobile social theory has the advantage that it establishes a fundamental, that is, socio-ontological, equality of all participants. It allows migration to be implemented as a “normal” case in terms of social theory, which is important for contemporary migration theories. But is it wise, one could counter, to equate migrants with privileged positions in terms of social ontology? For instance, it makes a big difference whether you were born in northern Denmark and tried to travel through Hungary or if you were born in northern Syria and tried to travel through Hungary. By equating the two, there is a danger of making serious marginalization and life-threatening disadvantages invisible. Here, it is certainly important not to overestimate the perspective of a general mobile socio-ontology, and to accept it for what it is: a socio-ontological basis that has certain political implications, namely the equal subjectivity of all participants. This does not absolve privileged positions of their responsibility, nor is it intended to minimize factual inequalities. Nevertheless, the danger of categorical unequal social theories is that they also reinforce marginalization. This is where a mobile socio-ontology can offer a critical contribution. Another problem is the potential of socio-theoretically justifying any type of mobility. For example, could someone justify colonialism in this way? This problem shows one more limit of analytical categories, which may be fruitful for changing perspectives, but are not intended as a normative setting. Even if a movement might be socio-theoretically legitimized, it still never justifies violence, exploitation, or slavery. On the contrary: if everybody is recognized as an equal(ly) mobile subject, no exploitation or violence or slavery can be justified at all.

Finally, following Deleuze and Guattari, it is not enough to simply proclaim: Long live mobile social ontologies!. As I tried to sketch here, it is more profound to develop them from migration research and its theories, because this framework supports the autonomy of both migration theory and mobile social ontologies. I propose speaking of a “migrant social theory” instead of a “mobile” or “nomadic” theory for three reasons: First, it is important not to forget that we can all become migrants. Second, we all behave in “migrant,” that is, teleological, patterns: it is part of human behavior to want to achieve things, and goals; “migrant behavior” is something that we all share. Third: general mobility serves as the ontological basis, but it is “migration” that unveils the striated spaces and their policies (while striated spaces conceal social relationships and practices across and underneath borders). That is why the migrant's condition is the starting point to comprehend. I conclude that the three modes of migration, nomadism, and sedentariness always belong together and can be performed by all of us, no matter how “mobile” or “immobile” we are.