Politicization after the ‘end of nature’: The prospect of ecomodernism

Abstract

A growing body of literature has argued that environmental discourses in general, and climate change in particular, have a tendency to become depoliticized. In this article, I discuss how the mechanisms of depoliticization can be traced back to the commonly deployed nature–society dualism. By analysing ecomodernism, one of the most prominent articulations of politics in the Anthropocene, I assess the recent suggestion that the ‘end of nature’-thesis could provide a way out of this dualism and the related problem of depoliticization. I argue that while early ecomodernism showed great prospect in overcoming the depoliticization of environmental discourses by effectively challenging the externalization of nature from society, and critically questioning technocratic solutions, later ecomodernism displays a more depoliticized vision of environmental politics, one which once again separates nature from society, and places it in the realm of necessity, rather than contingency.

An emerging argument within the scholarly community holds that environmental discourses are particularly sensitive to processes of depoliticization (Bettini, 2013; Goeminne, 2012; Kenis, 2019; Kenis & Lievens, 2014, 2016; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014, 2017; MacGregor, 2014; Machin, 2020; Maeseele et al., 2015; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2014, 2016; Swyngedouw, 2011a, 2013). Both more catastrophic and optimistic environmental narratives seem liable to these problems. Catastrophic visions of the current trajectory as one of no return with mass-extinction, famine and radically changed living conditions, effectively restrict the possibility of choice, deliberation and contingency (Hay, 2007, p. 87; MacGregor, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Optimistic visions, focusing on nature’s resilience or the promise of scientific progress and technology, also downplay the need for human agency and action (Eckersley, 2017; Hamilton, 2015; Hay, 2007, p. 87). Depoliticization is both a democratic problem, as a well-functioning democracy requires the acknowledgement of conflict and power, and a practical problem, as it may hamper effective political transformation by leaving us blind to structural and political problems (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Kenis, 2019; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2016). This raises the question, how can depoliticization be overcome in environmental discourses?

In this article, I trace the causes of depoliticization of environmental discourses to the separation of the ‘realm of contingency’ and the ‘realm of necessity’. While the first realm is commonly understood as related to politics and the political, environmental issues have a tendency to be placed in the second, apolitical realm, and seen as guided by fate rather than agency. It has been suggested that the introduction of the Anthropocene concept, which has been described as ‘spelling the end of nature’ (Arias-Maldonado, 2015), might offer an escape from the traditional society–nature dualism and facilitate the politicization of environmental discourses. Dobson (2022, p. 8), for example, has argued that ‘(t)he apparently settles ontological understanding of the relationship between humanity and nature (…) is being unraveled by the Anthropocene’ (see also Arias-Maldonado, 2022; Hamilton, 2017; Latour & Lenton, 2019; Swyngedouw, 2011a). The ‘end of nature’ opens up for politicization of environmental discourses, as it calls for the re-conceptualization of the relationship between society and nature.

Scholars have discussed the implications of the ‘end of nature’ when it comes to emancipation (Arias-Maldonado, 2022; Dobson, 2022), freedom (Latour & Lenton, 2019), agency (Latour, 2014; Hamilton, 2017) and to underline the presence of a post-political consensus (Swyngedouw, 2010, 2011a). However, research is still lacking on the relationship between the ‘end of nature’ and processes of (re-)politicization. This gap will be addressed in this article. What happens when the traditional nature–society dualism is questioned? How is politics reconfigured at the ‘end of nature’? In order to answer these questions, I will do two things in this article. First, I theoretically investigate how the ‘end of nature’ might facilitate the politicization of environmental discourses by discussing the importance of contingency. Second, I look for politicization in environmental politics by analysing the politicizing potential of ecomodernism, a theory which has been labelled the ‘leading narrative of the Anthropocene’ (Fremaux, 2019, p. 72).

Ecomodernists offer one of the most elaborated and widespread visions of how the ‘end of nature’ might transform the political sphere. Having recently been promoted as representing ‘an alternative to those political discourses that insist on the impossibility and/or undesirability of human emancipation in a climatically disturbed planet’ (Arias-Maldonado, 2022, p. 15), ecomodernism shows potential when it comes to politicization. Ecomodernists present the view that we could be facing a ‘Good Anthropocene’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015), welcoming it as ‘the beginning of a new geological era ripe with human-directed opportunity’ (Ellis, 2011, p. 43). The emphasis put on human agency and capacity, as well as the optimistic view of the future, could create ideal conditions for a more politicized vision of environmental politics. As such, ecomodernism provide a good starting-point for investigating if the Anthropocene ultimately makes ‘nature a political question’ (Purdy, 2016). Scholars have deconstructed and critiqued ecomodernism in general (e.g. Buck, 2013; Isenhour, 2016; Wilson, 2016) and An Ecomodernist Manifesto in particular (e.g. Collard et al., 2016; Hamilton, 2015). Although some scholars have pointed out managerial and depoliticizing elements of the overarching ‘good Anthropocene’-narrative (Eckersley, 2017; Fremaux & Barry, 2019; Swyngedouw & Ernstson, 2018), no systematic analysis of the (re-)politicizing potential of ecomodernism exists. Furthermore, the critique of ecomodernism has focused primarily on early ecomodernists’ reliance on the market, rather than taking seriously the more recent turn to state-lead innovation (i.e. Symons, 2019; Symons & Karlsson, 2018). In this article, I make a distinction between what I call ‘early’ ecomodernism and ‘late’ ecomodernism to highlight this difference. ¹ Although the difference between the two periods is not clear-cut and can be disputed, it corresponds to an important shift in ecomodernists view on the interpretation of the ‘end of nature’-thesis, from a constructivist to a realist one, which I will show has important consequences for politicization.

The article proceeds as follows. First, politicization is discussed in relation to what has been labelled the ‘realm of contingency’ and the ‘realm of necessity’ (Hay, 2007). Second, I examine how the introduction of the Anthropocene concept and its reliance on the ‘end of nature’-thesis might offer a way to overcome the traditional nature–society dualism and facilitate processes of politicization. Finally, the politicizing potential of ecomodernism is evaluated. The analysis shows that early ecomodernism has the potential to overcome depoliticization, by consciously engaging in formulating a new, more political relationship between society and nature and insisting that environmentalists need to engage in value-driven political debates. Later ecomodernism, however, shows a more depoliticized vision, one which once again separates nature from society and places it in the ‘realm of necessity’.

Politicization and depoliticization

Scholars studying politicization commonly make a distinction between the political sphere (the ‘realm of contingency’) and politics. While the latter commonly refers to political institutions, such as parliaments or political parties, the former describes to an order of discourse which recognizes the presence of power, dissensus and decision (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Rancière, 1999; Zizek, 1999). As explained by Laclau and Mouffe (2014) and Mouffe (2005), the social is always hegemonically constituted, which involves a certain exclusion and hence the potential for conflict. Politicization is the process or moment by which the previously concealed or denied exercise of hegemonic power and the resulting dissensus is finally reviled or confronted. It occurs when the discourses through which the social is interpreted succeeds in accounting for the antagonism, division and exercise of power inherent therein.

Central to politicization is the presence of choice and contingency. The idea that we can collectively change our lives and surroundings reveals a non-deterministic view of history and politics. For example, a political act, according to Rancière (1995, 1999), always happen under the assumption of equality of everyone. By acting as if everyone was already equal, the normal, hierarchical order is disturbed and appears as fundamentally contingent. Contingency is also central to understanding what Marchart (2007) has called ‘society’s foundation’. As explained by Kenis (2019, p. 835), what ultimately happens in a depoliticized discourse is that ‘society’s contingency is rendered invisible by representing society as if it had an ultimate foundation’. Efforts to introduce an ultimate foundation is an attempt to introduce necessity into the ‘realm of contingency’, taking away the conditions for conflict and contestation.

Viewing politicization as a process anchored in contingency has several important consequences. First, contingency enables agency, and more importantly freedom, as this can only occur in situations where it would be possible to act differently. As argued by Chandler:

Freedom of choice stems from the meaningful contingency of the world – the structured gap between our actions and their final end – which provides room for experimentation and learning. We are capable of exercising our freedom only when we can conceive ourselves as acting meaningfully in the world – i.e. in relations to temporal and spatial structures – as subjects, capable of adopting our actions and decisions towards chosen goals. (Chandler, 2013, p. 6)

This is the reason why scholars as different from each other as Arendt, Marx, Hamilton (2017), and Latour and Lenton (2019) have chosen to refer to the political sphere as ‘the realm of freedom’. Second, contingency enables accountability and by extension morality. It is only insofar as those exercising power have a genuine choice and could have acted differently that they can be held accountable. It is the contingency of the world that allows us to think of ourselves as moral beings, since it enables us to learn from our mistakes.

Much of the early literature on politicization focused on the role of the state as the concept was interpreted in relation to decision-making and statecraft (Wood, 2015). However, the state is also part of the regulatory and hegemonic order, what Rancière (1999) calls ‘the police order’, which effectively eliminate contingency, plurality and conflict by acting as if all parts of society are already equal and accounted for. For Mouffe (2018, p. 24), in order for politicization to occur, a confrontation between the hegemonic order and the people is needed, which can create a new hegemony, where the people, rather than the market or the government, is at centre. At the same time, the state can function as a venue for citizens to maintain pluralism, agonism and contingency in instances where citizens themselves are unable to do so. The state can act as an appropriate threshold for maintaining a political conversation and safeguard from forces wishing to derail democracy into violence or radicalism.

Depoliticization of environmental issues

The idea that it is possible to separate the ‘realm of necessity’ from the ‘realm of contingency’ has a long history, as has the inclination to place nature in the former. Since Aristotle, biological life (zoe) has been separated from the political, good life (bios). Only political life can have agency, interests, political capacity and be included in the political realm. Similarly. Kant separated what he called the ‘realm of autonomy’, which he saw as inferior from its counterpart, the ‘realm of heteronomy’. Emancipation of autonomous subjects is limited to the former, while denizens of the later are subject to external domination. Thus, western thinking has traditionally depicted humans as political because they possess agency, interests and political capacity, while nature is conceptualized as the opposite of this: a passive object to be controlled, governed or abused. As explained by Delanty and Mota (2017, p. 18):

Modernity gave rise to the notion of the autonomy of the human being and heralded a view of history as the emancipation of humanity from nature, a condition that was equated with domination. Modern subjectivity is thus constructed through the domination of nature.

It has been argued that environmental politics in general, and climate change politics in particular, is a key component of spreading a wider post-political condition (e.g. Goeminne, 2012; Kenis, 2019; Kenis & Lievens, 2014; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; MacGregor, 2014; Machin, 2020; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2011a, 2013). The argument holds that in order to generate legitimacy, environmental policy making is limited to scientific rationality claims. As appealing to scientific expertise becomes the foundation and guarantee for policymaking, the space for dissent and conflict is effectively eliminated. Furthermore, by portraying environmental concerns as a universal and socially homogenous threat towards humanity, structural inequalities within this humanity are ignored (Swyngedouw, 2010).

Politicization after the ‘end of nature’

Politicization of environmental concerns involves coming to terms with the fact that the representation of nature can no longer be seen as outside the realm of public dispute, contestation and disagreement, but is to be subject to processes of contingency and deliberation. Politicization is not a static condition, but rather depoliticization and politicization are ongoing processes which sometimes can occur simultaneously within the same narrative or movement (cf. Anshelm et al., 2018; Hausknost, 2020). This shows the importance of studying the social construction of the natural world as it is put under negotiation by changing cultural practices, traditions and technological innovations.

The Anthropocene concept, understood as the consolidation of the idea that nature has ended (Arias-Maldonado, 2015), can be seen as an opportunity to move environmental issues from the ‘realm of necessity’ and re-articulate them in political terms. When McKibben first introduced the ‘end of nature’-thesis in 1989, he argued that we had entered a stage where nothing on Earth can be considered natural. Humans have interrupted natural processes to such an extent that everything has become an artefact:

We have changed the atmosphere, and thus we are changing the weather. By changing the weather, we make every spot on earth man-made and artificial. We have deprived nature of its independence, and that is fatal to its meaning. Nature’s independence is its meaning; without it there is nothing but us. (McKibben, 1990, p. 58)

McKibben’s thesis struck a chord with the scholarly community, resulting in an intense discussion (e.g. Cronon, 1996; Merchant, 1980; Vogel, 1996). Two main positions can be found in the debate: a realist and a constructivist. The realist position is close to McKibben’s original formulation, seeing the ‘end of nature’ as brought about by humans changing the literal, physical composition of nature. It is the end of an understanding of nature as untainted by human hands, and this end cannot be limited to the end of an idea, but rather includes the changing of an ontological reality separate from human perception. This nature can be observed through science, and normative implications can be deduced from such observations (Certomà, 2016, p. 25). What has ended is not only our conception of nature, but nature itself, and can be understood as the ‘humanization of nature’ (Dobson, 2022).

In contrast, the constructivist position sees the dualism between nature and society as unfounded to begin with. For constructivists, environmental issues should be viewed as social constructs, and facing the challenges ahead involves questioning our understanding of nature and its social representation (Eder, 1996). The ‘end of nature’ involves the realization that we need a new understanding of how different domains of the world relate to each other, as well as how conceptualizations of nature are involved in the production of knowledge, worldviews and science (e.g. Cronon, 1996; Merchant, 1980). Some scholars have taken this one step further, challenging even the separation of the human and the more-than-human. The world is understood as a place of complex entanglements where everything is viewed as hybrids, generated from and located in networks of relations (e.g. Bennett, 2010; Haraway, 2015; Latour & Lenton, 2019).

Common to both interpretations of the ‘end of nature’-thesis is that they call for the dissolution of the society–nature dualism, enabling the moving of environmental issues from the ‘realm of necessity’ to the ‘realm of contingency’. As nature cannot be understood as fully ‘natural’ anymore, or is seen as a social construct to begin with, it is less obvious why environmental issues should be treated as belonging to a separate realm. By questioning the idea that there is anything outside the world of the human, the thesis invites us to rethink the understanding of politics as something which can be neatly separated from other aspects of the world. The ‘end of nature’ thesis has seen further revival with the proclamation of the new geological epoch Anthropocene, and it has been described as the consolidation of the idea that nature has ended (Arias-Maldonado, 2015). As explained by for example Latour and Lenton (2019: 687), the Anthropocene ‘reopens the connection between what philosophers used to call the domain of necessity – that is, nature – and the domain of freedom – namely, politics and morality’ (see also Arias-Maldonado, 2022; Dobson, 2022; Hamilton, 2017; Swyngedouw, 2011a).

However, it is possible that it is not the politicization of nature that will follow from the ‘end of nature’, but rather the naturalization of politics. Toussaint (2020), for example, has explored how the framing of bush fires as natural has depoliticizing effects. Thus, the ‘end of nature’ might entail both more necessity in the realm of contingency in and more contingency in the realm of necessity (cf. Latour & Lenton, 2019). In order to assess which one is true, we in the next section turn to ecomodernism, one of the most prominent articulations of politics after the ‘end of nature’.

Ecomodernism

Ecomodernism is commonly linked to the American think-tank The Breakthrough Institute (Kallis & Bliss, 2019). Its founders, Michel Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, made a name for themselves with their essays The Death of Environmentalism (2004) and An Ecomodernist Manifesto (2015), the later written together with a group of influential scholars, thinkers and environmentalists. Developed as a critique of traditional environmentalism, ecomodernists do not favour ideas of scaling back human influence over nature, limiting resource use or harmonizing with nature. Rather, they promote new technologies like nuclear power, industrial agriculture and urbanization as ways to ‘decouple’ humans from nature. Its utopian features, together with its emphasis on human capacity for action and rejection of external boundaries, could facilitate politicization of environmental discourses. Consequently, it is a good place to start an investigation of politicization after the ‘end of nature’.

Early ecomodernism: The breakdown of nature and increased human agency

Shellenberger and Nordhaus first important writing, The Death of Environmentalism, begins with a call for environmentalists to rethink ‘everything’, starting with how the environment is understood. They argue that traditional environmentalists have mistakenly assumed that ‘a) the environment is a separate “thing” and b) human beings are separate from and superior to the “natural world”‘. They call for the re-framing of the environment so that it is no longer understood as a separate ‘thing’ which has little effect on society, arguing that: ‘(t)he environmental problem is not external to us, it’s us. It’s a human problem having to do with how we organize our society’ (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004, p. 12). This reveals two important things about early ecomodernists view of environmental politics.

First, the interpretation of the social/nature dualism positions early ecomodernists on the constructivist side in the ‘end of nature’-debate. It is not the transformation by humans which has rendered nature obsolete as an analytical category, but ecomodernists question the productivity of such a categorization to begin with. Humans are seen as part of the natural world, and no strict division can be drawn between humans and the environment. This encourages us to think of society as part of the environment and the environment as part of society. Starting from this position, it becomes arbitrary which problems are understood as environmental. As Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 12) ask: why is a ‘human-made phenomenon like global warming – which may kill hundreds of millions of human beings over the next century – considered “environmental”? Why are poverty and war not considered environmental problems while global warming is?’ Accordingly, no problems are automatically delegated to the ‘realm of necessity’. Instead, the environmental movement is repeatedly compared to other political movements, such as the labour and civil rights movement (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004), indicating that environmental issues can and should be treated in the same way as other political issues, that is, within the ‘realm of contingency’.

Second, ecomodernists view the ‘end of nature’ as a time of increased human agency, where nature will become what we make of it, both in terms of our physical ability to reshape it, and in our understanding of it. Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 135) argue that the ‘issue is not whether humans should control nature, for that is inevitable, but rather how humans should control natures – nonhuman and human’. They continue:

(o)nce we abandon the belief that there exists a nature or market separate from humans, we can start to think about creating natures or markets to serve the kind of world we want and the kind of species we want to become. (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 235)

This wish to re-articulate environmental issues in terms which recognize human power and agency further consolidated their placement in the ‘realm of contingency’, opening up for a debate on what relationship we wish to have with nature. Environmental discourses are politicized as human agency over nature increases, making deliberation possible.

The rejection of essentialism and the turn to values

In the book Break Though, Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007) strongly reject essentialism, or the idea that reality can be reduced to a single essence which can be expressed objectively. This rejection has several important consequences when it comes to politicization. It cements the idea that no authority exists as to how we should understand nature, nor any single answer to how we ought to address environmental problems. Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 141) challenge traditional environmentalists: ‘(l)ike the fundamentalist who believes his religion only speak for God, environmentalists believe that only Science, in a singular and objective way, can speak for Nature’. Instead, they argue that the separation of nature and society adhered to by most leading environmentalists threatens to ‘short-circuit democratic values by establishing Nature as it is understood and interpreted by scientists as the ultimate authority that human society must obey’ (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 132), resulting in dystopic visions of the future where global warming is placed above politics (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 237 f.).

This rejection of a single authority questions the role of experts as a ground for environmental politics and strengthens the idea that environmental issues should not be placed in a realm of their own, but rather be addressed politically. Science should be understood not as telling the ‘truth’ about the world, but as the contingent empirical and theoretical claims of a particular community of experts. Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 231) state: ‘Science has never been a reflection of nature, much less the only vehicle for the expression of the truth. There have always been multiple, contradictory, and overlapping sciences, truths and natures’. Consequently, environmental politics cannot be reduced to ‘speaking truth to power’, and climate politics cannot be reduced to climate science.

The traditional separation of society from nature has according to ecomodernists resulted in narrow, technological solutions, reducing environmentalism to a special interest (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004, p. 26). Instead, they ask for a shift away from technological solutions and broad political consensus building, to reflections on what values we wish to govern our society and our relationship with nature. The Death of Environmentalism ends by stating:

We [Environmentalists] are so certain about what the problem is, and so committed to their legislative solutions, that we behave as though all we need is to tell the literal truth in order to pass their policies. Environmentalists need to tap into the creative worlds of myth-making, even religion, not to better sell narrow and technical policy proposals but rather to figure out who we are and who we need to be. (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004, p. 34)

By understanding environmental politics not as efficient technological solutions, but as a matter of conflicting values, they acknowledge the presence of a deeper and more political disagreement.

The questioning of authority and the turn to values paves the way for a more politicized environmental discourse. Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2011) argue that ‘more, better, or louder climate science will not drive the transformation of the global energy economy’, and that what is needed is not ‘more climate science but rather a different set of remedies’ referring to technological progress guided by strong values. This can encourage political deliberation and citizen participation, thus enabling politicization. The possibility of debate and political contestation is further enhanced as the multitude of interests in the public sphere is recognized. Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 238) argue: ‘The truth of the collective is that it is multiple, contradictory, divisive. There is no single public interest’.

From market logic to private–public partnerships

While the state could have a large role to play in the sharpening of values, early ecomodernists are largely silent on the matter. They largely seem haunted by their ecological modernization legacy, viewing the market as the main provider of many public goods. As explained by Fremaux (2019, p. 69), ecomodernists ‘support those capital intensive technologies and market-based solutions as the best solutions humanity has on hand’. The problem with this, Fremaux (2019, pp. 68, 70) explains, is that it ensures the continuation of ‘capitalist, growth-oriented consumer economic systems’, when what is needed is rather the ‘drastic changes in voters’ lifestyles or values’ and the ‘retirement of a value system almost exclusively focused on monetary and material dimensions of existence’.

However, it is not necessary to call for a new economic system to acknowledge the depoliticizing effect the delegation of power from the government to the market can have. It makes possible for politicians to appeal to the market as yet another process beyond their control, placing it in the ‘realm of necessity’ and cementing the hegemony of the capitalist society. It can be seen as not only a way to deny responsibility for policies, but to reject the need for policy and public deliberation in the first place. This paves the way for more technocratic solutions, consolidating consensus between scientific elites, cooperations and governments, and limit citizen influence.

One of the few mentions by early ecomodernists of the role of the state is as provider of financial support for long-term investments in technology. Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 124) argue that the role of governments is to make sure that: ‘procurement of new technologies should be dramatically increased, public-private partnerships pursued, training programs created, prizes offered for technological breakthroughs, and international research collaborations encouraged’. In the 2010 rapport Where good technologies come from, they elaborate on how many of the most influential technological developments have occurred when the government and the market collaborate. The role of the state is seen as supplying funding for key applied research and to act as a demanding customer for innovation (Jenkins et al., 2010). The reduction of the role of the government to an economic supporter of technological innovation limits policymaking capacity of governments, decreases responsibility and cements the notion of a liberal state-market hegemony. Rather than facilitating a space for pluralism and contestation, governmental agency is restricted to the withdrawal of funding.

Late ecomodernism: The separation of nature from society

Taken together, early ecomodernists show potential in overcoming the depoliticization of environmental discourses, consciously engaging in formulating a new, more political approach towards the relationship between society and nature. However, since the publication of An Ecomodernist Manifesto, something seems to have changed in ecomodernist thinking. The Breakthrough Institute’s early explorations with the inherent hybridizations of nature and culture (Latour, 2011) have largely been sidestepped in favour of the idea of further separation of society from nature. Contemporary ecomodernists argue that it is possible to affirm the ‘long-standing environmental ideal, that humanity must shrink its impact on the environment to make more room for nature’, while rejecting that ‘human societies must harmonize with nature to avoid economic and ecological collapse’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 6). Technical innovations are envisioned to result in the ‘decoupling of humanity from nature’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015; Blomqvist et al., 2013, p. 686; Symons & Karlsson, 2018).

At a first glance, it seems that the aim to ‘decouple’ from nature is primarily a practical advice about elevating nature from the burden of human activity by separating economic growth from environmental harm. On a more fundamental level, however, the idea that humans can and should decouple from nature relies on a realist understanding of the ‘end of nature’-thesis where humans and nature are seen as ontologically separate. If ecomodernists would have stuck with their initial constructive interpretation of nature as inherently intertwined with society, the argument of decoupling would make little sense. Rather than recognizing the multiple ways in which society is connected to nature, ecomodernists try to draw boundaries between the realms, viewing nature as external to human affairs. Ecomodernists argue that some parts of nature should be turned into a ‘rambunctious garden’ for the sake of human recreation (Marris, 2013) and other parts should be left to ‘rewilding’ (Symons & Karlsson, 2018, p. 688). As such, ecomodernism is not another form of modernism, but one which springs from a care for nature, and it is argued that the best way for humans to protect nature is to depend less on it: ‘nature unused is nature spared’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 19).

As we will see, the view that nature is something which we can separate from, and eventually do without, makes it possible for late ecomodernists to more readily commit to the technocratic solutions and environmental expertise deemed necessary, rather than to debate the values underlying these commitments. Furthermore, while early ecomodernists showed interests in deconstructing and problematizing concepts related to the environment, later ecomodernists seems reluctant to engage in this debate, uncritically seeing ‘nature saved’ as a positive thing.

Ecomodernists describe humans as always having changed their surroundings, a narrative which tone down the importance of agency and specific practices in the process of transforming nature into humanized nature. One examples of this can be found in An Ecomodernist Manifesto, where deforestation is used as an example of the long transformation of nature by human hands. It is proclaimed that ‘(e)xtensive human transformation of the environment continued throughout the Holocene period: as much as three-quarters of all deforestation globally occurred before the industrial revolution’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 16). This framing is used to downplay the importance of processes such as capitalism and modernization, specific to contemporary, Western societies. By not differentiating between different societies, neither spatially or temporally, socio-economic struggles can be ignored, limiting the space for deliberation and debate, resulting in depoliticization (cf. Baskin, 2015; Berkhout, 2014; Malm & Hornborg, 2014).

The inevitability of the humanization of nature is further displayed in ecomodernists’ depiction of processes such as capitalism and urbanization. Themselves making the reference to Marxism, ecomodernists see capitalism as ‘a necessary stage in a historical process that at a first makes everything into a commodity but eventually leads to the decommodification of what is intrinsically valuable’ (Sagoff, 2015, p. n.p.). Likewise, the related process of urbanization is described as ‘a seemingly inevitable force’ (Lorimer, 2017, p. n.p.).

The view that a certain economic, technological and political system is necessary in order to reach an inevitable state of ‘decoupling’ leaves little room for human agency, action and deliberation. Similarly, as pointed out by Karlsson (2018, p. 79), the ecomodernist assumption that all people desire a high-energy future contains a problematic element of teleology. As explained by McNay (2015, p. 70), teleology tends to ‘depoliticize the process of emancipatory social change by construing it in terms of impersonal mechanisms and developmental tendencies rather than as open-ended, often polemical and deeply contested forms of political struggle’. This is true here as well, and the depiction of history as running its course no matter how humans act places it in the ‘realm of necessity’ rather than that of contingency.

The uncritical turn to technology

While ecomodernists critiqued environmentalists in The Death of Environmentalism for promoting narrow and technocratic solutions, later ecomodernism has focused a lot on technological progress. The role of technology in processes of de/politicization has been discussed for a long time. Already back in 1929, Carl Schmitt (1993) argued that since technology is always a means to another end, it could offer a new form of strict neutrality upon which the rest of society could be grounded. However, as pointed out by Reynolds and Szerszynski (2014, p. 49), the nearly 100 years since Schmitt’s original argument has provided the scene for politicizing struggles regarding the role of technology and science. Any attempt to reach a neutral domain inevitably fails as the technology loses its neutrality and become contested.

Thus, technology cannot be separated from political processes and can be subject to processes of both politicization and depoliticization. Technology can help to expand the realm of human agency, as it enables deliberation on matters previously seen as guided by fate or beyond human control (Hay, 2013, p. 110). This is especially true when it comes to some of the technologies favoured by ecomodernists, such as geoengineering, GMO and nuclear power, as they can provide the space for debating human intervention into nature (e.g. Johnstone, 2013; Wynne, 2013). Technology can also function in a depoliticizing way, as it can be appealed to as yet another process beyond human control. Swyngedouw (2011b, p. 225 f.) argues that it part of the overarching post-political condition, as relying on techno-organizational ‘forecloses (or at least attempts to do so) politicisation and evacuate dissent’. Similarly, Bailey and Wilson (2009, p. 2338) have pointed out that technicalization can function to ‘narrowing and hardening the “boundaries of the possible”‘.

Given the centrality of technology to late ecomodernism, the picture presented of the relationships between technology and politics is surprisingly fragmented. At a first glance, ecomodernists seem to invite a discussion on the proper role of technology, insisting that ‘technological progress is not inevitable’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 28). They appeal to the need for strong political leadership which takes the social, economic and political context into account and turn against the notion that technological choice should be determined by remote international bodies which can be seen as difficult to steer (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 28).

However, a more thorough analysis reveals that the reliance on technology functions as a new form of necessity. In an attempt to downplay the contested nature of technological progress, ecomodernists took issue with traditional environmentalists’ view on technology as an ‘affront to the sacredness of nature’ already in year 2011, arguing that technology has always been ‘perfectly natural’ (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2011), and that effective climate mitigation is ‘fundamentally a technological challenge’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 21).

The depoliticization of technology is even presented as something desirable. To quote Karlsson (2018, p. 3), ecomodernists believe that breakthrough innovation can offer a way to ‘partially depoliticizing the issue of climate change’. Similarly, Merkley and Stecula (2021, p. n.p.) write, in relation to problems of polarization and climate denial, that ‘(t)he first lesson is that we should avoid the politicization of science-based issues if at all possible’. Their suggestion is that while some issues, such as climate change, should attract elite and public attention in a way which makes them salient and political, other technological implementations, such as GMO, does not need to.

Ecomodernists are correct that polarization and the problem of climate denial needs to be addressed. However, in doing so, they conflate polarization with politicization. The idea that depoliticization is something desirable rests, as noted by Castree et al. (2021, p. 74), on a specific notion of politicization as making ‘“political” something that is somehow before, above or beyond politics’. The transferring of issues to the ‘realm of contingency’ offers the possibility of subjecting it to human purposes and intentions, making it possible to take responsibility for our collective choices. It is to expose something which has always been there. Is not about the questioning of scientific expertise or empirical evidence, but rather a way of understanding the context within which this knowledge has been produced, as well as making it possible to collectively deliberate on the proper use of this knowledge. Understood in this way, it is clear that depoliticization of technological progress will not result in less climate denial, rather the alienation of citizen from climate politics.

The lack of citizen participation

One of the main claims of late ecomodernism is that all people should have a material standard high enough to critically reflect on their own preferences, as well as develop their own plan of life (Arias-Maldonado, 2022, p. 4). While other environmental theories (i.e. degrowth) rely on a reformulation of the ‘good life’ so that it pairs with planetary boundaries, ecomodernism claims to be compatible with any way of life, enabling a more pluralist understanding of how a sustainable life can be lived. The future they envision is one where people are free to be ‘punk rockers and others stockbrokers’ (Karlsson, 2020). The pursuit of a pluralist society can be important for politicization as it introduces contingency and different views on what is considered a sustainable life.

However, it is a quite specific form of life that is envisioned by ecomodernists. Symons (2019, p. 8) explains:

The idea here is that a global modernity can only spare place for nature if most people live in high-density cities, utilize high-density energy sources and draw on all available technologies to minimize the footprint and maximize the efficiency of agricultural production.

While in The Death of Environmentalism, ecomodernists focused on how preferences can change, ascribing particular importance to the framing of political issues, they now treat certain preferences as given. The job of the environmentalists is to come up with policies which adhere to these preferences, not try to limit or change them. This results in a vision which includes a distribution of citizen rights which make ‘dense urban living and intensification of production universally appealing and emancipatory’ (Symons & Karlsson, 2018, p. 694).

This view creates problems for public deliberations and citizen debates. Symons and Karlsson (2018, p. 696) deem participation in intensification and innovation as the primary citizen value and require citizens to actively participate in debating the trajectory of change. But, by requiring that citizens ‘maintain support for state-directed innovation even through periods of failure’, it is a bit unclear what citizens are supposed to debate. Given that the overarching trajectory of society is already decided, the possibility for the public to question the current political course becomes limited. The public is not allowed to change their minds, limiting agency and resulting in depoliticization. The choices that people are left with are those traditionally viewed as private, as we are free to choose occupation and personal attributes (punk rockers or stockbrokers), but not the overarching trejectory of society.

State-directed innovation

One of the principal features of contemporary ecomodernism is the strong reliance on the state in facilitating the political momentum necessary to promote modernization. According to Symons and Karlsson (2018, p. 692), the state is the only actor with both the political legitimacy and institutional capacity to achieve the necessary acceleration of science and technology. They argue that our ecological footprint should be reduced ‘via societal action rather than individual change and sacrifice’ and by the promotion of ‘state-directed public-good-focused innovation’ (Symons & Karlsson, 2018, p. 695). Similarly, the Breakthrough Institute has continued promoting state-funding for innovation technologies and the development of collaborative public–private partnerships when it comes to for example research and development in alternative protein sources, infrastructure for electrical vehicles, power sources and agricultural innovation.

Some have even argued that ecomodernism points towards a form of global social democracy as it emphasizes ‘the primacy of politics, the acceptance of democratic interventions to maximize social investments in human development and other collective goods, and the recognition of national community as an effective source of identity and solidarity’ (Symons, 2019, p. 171). In such a vision, the role of the state is not limited to providing funding to private companies or public–private partnerships. Instead, the state is seen as a potential main driver of innovation. Striving to make the trajectory of technological innovation an issue for political institutions, rather than the market, could open up for deliberation on the future of society, and enables politicization. However, it is unlikely that this shift towards state-lead innovation would actively challenge the contemporary presence of a liberal market-state hegemony, as it neither mobilizes citizens, nor presents a viable counter to the current order.

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to investigate how the ‘end of nature’ can facilitate politicization of environmental discourses, as well as analyse the politicizing potential of ecomodernism, one of the most prominent articulation of politics in the Anthropocene. My findings show that early ecomodernism questions mainstream environmentalists for promoting narrow, technocratic solutions. Instead it encourages debates on the values behind policy suggestions. It rejects the idea that climate politics can be reduced to climate science, thus increasing agency and accountability. Although it reduces the government’s role to the contribution/withdrawal of funding for technological progress, the overall picture is that early ecomodernism manages to overcome the depoliticization common to environmental discourses. Late modernism, on the other hand, aims at further separating humans from nature, making it possible to frame environmental issues in terms of necessity rather contingency. Ecomodernists present technology as a neutral and necessary mean for combating environmental degradation, in an active attempt to depoliticize it. While the increased reliance on state-lead innovation could potentially offer a venue for politicization, a closer inspection reveals that it does not manage to engage citizens in debating the trajectory of technological development.

The discrepancy between early and late ecomodernism indicates that in order to politicize environmental discourses, we need an understanding of the ‘end of nature’-thesis that allows for agency, accountability and non-determination. This is more likely if the thesis is understood in a constructivist, rather than realist, way. The realist appeal to a physical end of a nature which is ontologically separated from society invites us to think that humans possess some specific quality which can legitimate a view of nature as best governed by technocratic and technological solutions. In contrast, a constructivist interpretation makes it possible to rethink the relationship between nature and society without legitimizing any specific treatment of the former. Thus, it is not true that any understanding of the Anthropocene ultimately makes ‘nature a political question’ (Purdy, 2016), rather, the ‘end of nature’ holds the potential for both politicization and depoliticization.

The conclusion that the ‘end of nature’-thesis, in general, and the ecomodernist interpretation of it in particular, can result in processes of both politicization and depoliticization contributes both to a more detailed understanding of how processes of de/politicization operates within contemporary environmental narratives, and can be the basis of evaluating the desirability of ecomodernism. In order to do so, one does not have to agree with the normative starting point that politicization of environmental issues is desirable. Some scholars approaching the issue from a consensus-building perspective have argued that politicization may lead to a lack of consensus to stop climate change and environmental degradation (for an overview of the debate, see Pepermans & Maeseele, 2016). However, the point of departure for this article is that opening a space for debate between different alternative socio-environmental futures is crucial for a democratic response to environmental concerns.

At the same time, politicization is not to be equated with democracy, although the former can both be seen as a precondition for and as a characteristic of the later. Without making politics a public matter, one cannot speak of democracy. Depoliticization offsets the politically legitimate opposition that is so important for democracy and reduces politics to consensus reached through rational argumentation of experts. Politicization, by contrast, offers the opportunity to address issues democratically, in both private, social and more formal institutional governmental settings. Consequently, politicization of environmental discourses makes it possible for the people to have the final say in the desirability of policy proposals emerging from environmental theories such as ecomodernism.