Critical Realism and the Limits of Philosophy

Abstract

This article critiques the idea that, by establishing a general framework within which research must be conducted, philosophical argument can ‘take the lead’ in relation to research. It develops Holmwood’s work in this area by examining the ontological arguments put forward by critical realists, which attempt to establish the fundamental characteristics of the social realm prior to the production of empirically successful research in that realm. The article draws on a contrast with ontological argument in the natural sciences to demonstrate the illegitimacy of this manoeuvre, showing that ontological claims can be given some justification, but only when they are derived from research that is widely held to be empirically successful. Realist ontological claims in the social sciences do not have this basis, and it is argued that Bhaskar’s alternative mode of justification for these claims is unconvincing. Archer’s view is also criticized that critical realist arguments should be given a strong regulatory role in relation to research, illustrating the problems with this by critiquing Cruickshank’s ontologically driven analysis of unemployment and the underclass. The article concludes that social scientific research should be conducted without philosophical legislation.