Future generations hold the lowest moral standing,even below present-day marginalized human and nonhuman outgroups

Abstract

Climate change, poverty, and inequality pose significant threats to the well-being of future generations, making it essential to advocate for their interests in present-day decisions. Yet little is known about how people morally evaluate future generations relative to other distant groups, such as human outgroups and nature (plants, animals). Moreover, does this perception change among those who exhibit impartial intergenerational beneficence (i.e., concern for all future generations), or when moral concern is framed as zero-sum? Across 15 studies, we find that future generations consistently receive less moral concern than present-day targets already ascribed low levels of concern. This pattern holds whether moral expansiveness is framed as unlimited or zero-sum and persists even among individuals who typically care deeply about future generations, regardless of their temporal distance. These findings suggest that future generations hold a uniquely disadvantaged position in the moral hierarchy—not because of perceived constraints on moral concern but due to factors intrinsic to their exceptional psychological distance from the self here and now.