Perceived normalization of radical ideologies and its effect on political tolerance and support for freedom of speech

Abstract

Two studies tested the idea that perceived normalization of radical political ideologies (right and left) reduces support for freedom of speech of the opponents and political tolerance. In Study 1 (N = 633), Americans were primed with the normalization of the radical right or left. Primed with the normalization of radical outgroup ideologies, both liberals and conservatives were more willing to restrict their opponents’ freedom of speech and were more politically intolerant – effects that were mediated by collective angst. Study 2 (N = 632) replicated the results of Study 1 and extended them by showing that both conservatives and liberals worried about the image of their party not when they were exposed to the normalization of radical ingroup ideologies, but when they were exposed to the normalization of radical outgroup ideologies. These results suggest that perceived normalization of radical ideologies affects people’s attitudes towards freedom of speech and political (in)tolerance.

Keywords

freedom of speech normalization political tolerance radical political ideologies

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Altemeyer

(1996). The authoritarian specter. Harvard University Press.

Beckett

(2017, March 5). How leftwing media focus on far-right groups is helping to normalize hate. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/05/left-wing-media-far-right-normalize-hate-trump

Brewer

M. D.

Stonecash

J. M.

(2015). Polarization and the politics of personal responsibility. Oxford University Press.

Clement

Nakamura

(2017, August 21). Poll shows clear disapproval of how Trump responded to Charlottesville violence. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-shows-strong-disapproval-of-how-trump-responded-to-charlottesville-violence/2017/08/21/4e5c585c-868b-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html

Crawford

(2017). Are conservatives more sensitive to threat than liberals? It depends on how we define threat and conservatism. Social Cognition, 35(4), 354–373. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2017.35.4.354

Davis

D. W.

Silver

B. D.

(2004). Civil liberties vs. security: Public opinion in the context of the terrorist attacks on America. American Journal of Political Science, 48, 28–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00054.x

Davis

Guerra

Jarrett

(2017). Charlottesville: Race and terror [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIrcB1sAN8I&t=528s

Ellinas

A. A.

(2018). Media and the radical right. In Rydgren

(Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the radical right (pp. 269–284). Oxford Handbooks Online. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.14

Everett

J. A. C.

(2013). The 12 Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS). PLoS ONE, 8(12). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0082131

10.

Faul

Erdfelder

Buchner

Lang

A. G.

(2013). G*Power (Version 3.1.9.2) [Computer software]. Universität Kiel. http://www.psycho.uni-duesseldorf.de/abteilungen/aap/gpower3/download-and-register

11.

Feinberg

(1984). Harm to others: The moral limits of the criminal law. Oxford University Press.

12.

Foundation for Individual Rights in Education. (2018). Disinvitation attempts. Fire. https://www.thefire.org/resources/disinvitation-database/

13.

Gaertner

S. L.

Dovidio

J. F.

Anastasio

P. A.

Bachman

B. A.

Rust

M. C.

(1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. European Review of Social Psychology, 4(1), 1–26. 10.1080/14792779343000004

14.

Gaertner

S. L.

Mann

J. A.

Dovidio

J. F.

Murrell

A. J.

Pomare

(1990). How does cooperation reduce intergroup bias? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(4), 629–704. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.692

15.

Gaertner

S. L.

Rust

M. C.

Dovidio

J. F.

Bachman

B. A.

Anastasio

P. A.

(1994). The contact hypothesis: The role of a common ingroup identity on reducing intergroup bias. Small Group Research, 25(2), 224–249. 10.1177/1046496494252005

16.

Haas

I. J.

Cunningham

W. A.

(2014). The uncertainty paradox: Perceived threat moderates the effect of uncertainty on political tolerance. Political Psychology, 35, 291–302. 10.1111/pops.12035

17.

Halperin

Porat

Wohl

M. J. A.

(2013). Extinction threat and reciprocal threat reduction: Collective angst predicts willingness to compromise in intractable intergroup conflicts. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 16, 797–813. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430213485994

18.

Hayes

A. F.

(2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach. Guilford Press.

19.

Herbeck

D. A.

(2018). Freedom of speech and the communication discipline: Defending the value of low-value speech. Communication Education, 67, 245–253. https://doi.org/10.1080/03634523.2018.1428760

20.

Hogg

(2007). Uncertainty–identity theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 69–126. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(06)39002-8

21.

Hogg

(2014). From uncertainty to extremism: Social categorization and identity processes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(5), 338–342. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414540168

22.

Hornik

Satchi

R. S.

Cesareo

Pastore

(2015). Information dissemination via electronic word-of-mouth: Good news travels fast, bad news travels faster. Computers in Human Behavior, 45, 273–280. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.11.008

23.

Hsueh

Yogeeswaran

Malinen

(2015). “Leave your comment below”: Can biased online comments influence our own prejudicial attitudes and behaviors? Human Communication Research, 41, 557–576. https://doi.org/10.1111/hcre.12059http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/23/in-polarized-era-fewer-americanshold-a-mixof-conservative-and-liberal-views/

24.

Huddy

(2013). From group identity to political cohesion and commitment. In Huddy

Sears

D. O.

Levy

J. S.

(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political psychology (pp. 737–773). Oxford University Press. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.013.0023

25.

Jetten

Wohl

M. J. A.

(2012). The past as a determinant of the present: Historical continuity, collective angst, and opposition to immigration. European Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 442–450. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.865

26.

Jost

J. T.

Glaser

Kruglanski

A. W.

Sulloway

F. J.

(2003a). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339–375. 10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339

27.

Jost

J. T.

Glaser

Kruglanski

A. W.

Sulloway

(2003b). Exceptions that prove the rule: Using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological incongruities and political anomalies. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 383–393. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.383

28.

Jost

J. T.

Stern

C. D.

Rule

N. O.

Sterling

R. J.

(2017). The politics of fear: Is there an ideological asymmetry in existential motivation? Social Cognition, 35, 324–353. 10.1521/soco.2017.35.4.324

29.

Kiley

(2017). In polarized era, fewer Americans hold a mix of conservative and liberal views. Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/23/in-polarized-era-fewer-americans-hold-a-mix-of-conservative-and-liberal-views/

30.

Levin

(2017, August 16). The far right is planning 9 rallies nationwide this weekend alone. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/15/us/white-nationalists-protests-tally-trnd/index.html

31.

Lickel

Hamilton

D. L.

Wieczorkowska

Lewis

Sherman

S. J.

Uhles

A. N.

(2000). Varieties of groups and the perception of group entitativity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(2), 223–246. 10.1037//0022-3514.78.2.223

32.

Lindner

N. M.

Nosek

B. A.

(2009). Alienable speech: Ideological variations in the application of free-speech principles. Political Psychology, 30, 67–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00681.x

33.

May

C. R.

Mair

Finch

MacFarlane

Dowrick

Treweek

Rapley

Ballini

Ong

B. N.

Rogers

Murray

Elwyn

Légaré

Gunn

Montori

V. M.

(2009). Development of a theory of implementation and integration: Normalization Process Theory. BMC Medicine, 4, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1186/1748-5908-4-29

34.

Mill

J. S.

(1978). On liberty. Hackett Publishing.

35.

Mosby

C. J.

(2015). Effects of intergroup anxiety, and outgroup tolerance and trust on intergroup contact quality among emerging adults and adults in Bosnia and Herzegovina [Unpublished senior honor thesis]. University of Louisville, Kentucky.

36.

Murphy

P. P.

(2017, January 21). White nationalist Richard Spencer punched during interview. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/white-nationalist-richard-spencer-punched/index.html

37.

Port File Co-cp (2018, March 12). Jordan Peterson interviewed by Leigh Sales, ABC TV 730 program [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7VE0t1FDP4w

38.

Rozin

Royzman

E. B.

(2001). Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 296–320. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0504_2

39.

Sniderman

P. M.

Tetlock

P. E.

Glaser

J. M.

Green

D. P.

Hout

(1989). Principled tolerance and the American mass public. British Journal of Political Science, 19, 25–45. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400005305

40.

Stephan

W. G.

Stephan

C. W.

(2017). Intergroup threat theory. In Kim

Y. Y.

(Ed.), The international encyclopedia of intercultural communication (pp. 1–12). Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118783665.ieicc0162

41.

Tolsma

Lubbers

Coenders

(2008). Ethnic competition and opposition to ethnic intermarriage in The Netherlands: A multi-level approach. European Sociological Review, 24, 215–230. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcm047

42.

Tsfati

Peri

(2006). Mainstream media skepticism and exposure to sectorial and extranational news media: The case of Israel. Mass Communication and Society, 9, 165–187, 10.1207/s15327825mcs0902_3

43.

Van Zomeren

M. V.

Fischer

A. H.

Spears

(2007). Testing the limits of tolerance: How intergroup anxiety amplifies negative and offensive responses to out-group-initiated contact. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1686–1699. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207307485

44.

Waltman

M. S.

(2018). The normalizing of hate speech and how communication educators should respond. Communication Education, 67, 259–265. https://doi.org/10.1080/03634523.2018.1430370

45.

Wilson

(2018, July 1). Riot in Portland as far-right marches class with anti-fascists. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/01/riot-in-portland-as-far-right-marchers-clash-with-anti-facists

46.

Wohl

M. J. A.

Branscombe

N. R.

(2009). Group threat, collective angst and ingroup forgiveness for the war in Iraq. Political Psychology, 30, 193–217. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00688.x

47.

Wohl

M. J. A.

Branscombe

N. R.

Reysen

(2010). Perceiving your group’s future to be in jeopardy: Extinction threat induces collective angst and the desire to strengthen the ingroup. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 898–910. 10.1177/0146167210372505

48.

Wohl

M. J. A.

Giguère

Branscombe

N. R.

McVicar

D. N.

(2011). One day we might be no more: Collective angst and protective action from potential distinctiveness loss. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 289–300. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.773

49.

Wohl

M. J. A.

King

Taylor

D. M.

(2014). Expressions of political practice: Collective angst moderates politicized collective identity to predict support for political protest (peaceful or violent) among diaspora group members. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 43, 114–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.08.020

50.

Wohl

M. J. A.

Squires

E. C.

Caouette

(2012). We were, we are, will we be? The social psychology of collective angst. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6, 379–391. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2012.00437.x