Competitive representative negotiations worsen intergroup relations

Abstract

Representative negotiation affords a unique opportunity to regulate intergroup competition and conflict. Although past research has identified factors that shape representative negotiations, little is known about how such interpersonal representative negotiations influence broader intergroup relations. Here we investigate how the representative negotiation process can affect intergroup relations, irrespective of negotiation outcomes. In Experiment 1, competitive (as opposed to cooperative or neutral) communication by the outgroup representative decreased satisfaction with the outcome and increased outgroup derogation. In Experiment 2, the timing of the competitive behavior of the outgroup representative was shown to affect ensuing intergroup relations, such that early rather than late competition led to higher outcome satisfaction because of reduced outcome expectations, but also decreased trust in and perceived closeness of the outgroup. Together, these findings show that competitive behavior, especially early rather than late in the representative negotiation process increases outcome satisfaction, but hurts intergroup relations, regardless of the actual negotiation outcome.