Extinction threat and reciprocal threat reduction: Collective angst predicts willingness to compromise in intractable intergroup conflicts

Abstract

Two experiments examined the impact of ingroup extinction threat on willingness to compromise with an adversary group. Specifically, Israel’s ability to cope with a nuclear capable Iran was manipulated and Israelis’ willingness to compromise with Hamas (Experiment 1) or the Palestinian Authority (Experiment 2) was assessed. In Experiment 1, extinction threat decreased willingness to compromise with Hamas—an effect mediated by heightened collective angst. Conversely, in Experiment 2, extinction threat increased willingness to compromise with the Palestinian Authority, again via collective angst. The reason for this inverted effect in Experiment 2 was perceived reciprocal threat reduction—the belief that compromise with the Palestinian Authority would reduce the Iranian threat (a belief not relevant to the issue of compromise with Hamas). Implications for the understanding of intergroup conflicts and peace making are discussed within the context of the role played by collective angst.