The present research examined the assumption that the higher the probability that decision-makers perceive their contribution to be critical to the group outcome the higher the chance that they will contribute. Contrary to the widely accepted view that highly critical people contribute more because it is in their self-interest to do so, the authors argue that this criticality effect may also be explained, at least partly, in terms of decision-makers’ focus on the consequences of own behavior on other’s outcomes. In line with this, it was hypothesized that high perceived criticality activates feelings of social responsibility (which includes an other-oriented approach) and in turn influences contributions. Across three studies, using a linear public good dilemma, a step-level dilemma with different monetary endowments, and a sequential step-level dilemma, supportive evidence for this hypothesis was found. These results suggest that the self-interest explanation is too limited to fully account for the criticality effect.
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