Culturalist and neo-propagandist politics at Eurovision: A triptych analysis of cultural diplomacy approaches of the European Broadcasting Union vis-à-vis Belarus,Russia and Israel

Abstract

The Eurovision Song Contest is a self-proclaimed non-political musical competition that is nonetheless the site of politics and diplomacy. This article presents a three-part case study – or a triptych picture – of the controversies surrounding the participation and song entries of Belarus, Russia and Israel in recent contests of the early 2020s. It discusses the political nature of Eurovision, despite protestations to the contrary, and unpacks the cultural diplomacy of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and these three states towards Eurovision during periods of geopolitical tensions and wars. Specifically, it applies the concepts (and practices) of culturalist and neo-propagandist diplomacy to the approaches adopted by the EBU and Belarus, Russia and Israel towards Eurovision.

Introduction: politics at a non-political event

The Eurovision Song Contest is a self-proclaimed non-political musical competition that is a prominent site of politics and diplomacy. The contest is frequently subject to political circumstances and controversies engulfing its participants and song entrants. But the contest itself is not just a site of/for politics and cultural diplomacy. It also engages in cultural diplomacy with implications for its participants, song entries and the wider international cultural community.

Intervening in the interdisciplinary scholarship on Eurovision, this article contributes to considerations of cultural diplomacy exercised at Eurovision to help broaden conceptions of how culture and politics intersect beyond conventional political channels. It therefore adds to the literature on these intersections at/with the contest (Dubin et al., 2022; Fricker and Gluhovic, 2013; Ginsburgh and Noury, 2008; Jordan, 2009, 2014; Kalman et al., 2019; Raykoff and Tobin, 2007; Tragaki, 2013; Vuletic, 2018; Yair, 1995; Yair and Maman, 1996; Zahavi and Ariely, 2024). An aim is to further deepen reflections on the important roles Eurovision itself plays in such intersections. The contest, after all, is often a cultural and political ‘seismograph for exposing national traumas and cultural conflicts’ (Yair, 2019: 1023) illuminating ‘debates surrounding national identity, polity and protest’ (Jordan, 2009: 40). Conversations about the cultural diplomacy exercised at Eurovision, particularly during periods of heightened geopolitical tensions and turbulence, are further extended by this article’s intervention.

Adopting a qualitative approach, this article conducts a case study of Eurovision during the first half of the 2020s. Framed by Mariano Martin Zamorano’s (2016) cultural diplomacy framework of culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches to diplomacy, it interrogates the cultural diplomacy enacted by Belarus, Russia, Israel and the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) at Eurovision in the early 2020s, specifically from 2021 to 2024, since these represent key years in which debates about the EBU’s criteria for, and decisions regarding, expulsion surfaced. According to Zamorano (2016), the culturalist approach is based upon intercultural dialogue, emphasizing art, heritage, music, scholarship and other forms of culture. The neo-propagandist approach, meanwhile, is usually used by governments or other organizations to instrumentalize culture for political, institutional or ideological agendas. Zamorano’s culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches have been used to investigate the instrumentalization of Eurovision by states, particularly Russia and Ukraine, over the course of the 2010s and early 2020s (Welslau and Selck, 2024). Extending such analyses, this article considers how different states, and the EBU itself, engaged in culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches at Eurovision for their particular agendas during conflicts confronting them during this time period. Presenting a descriptive triptych of these three countries helps compare and contrast these approaches and their consequences on/for the contest specifically, and culture and cultural diplomacy generally.

Cultural diplomacy and Eurovision

Culture plays an important role in diplomacy. It can serve twin goals of serving as a ‘contact zone’ for state and non-state actors and shaping foreign and diplomatic policies (Lähdesmäki and Čeginskas, 2024). For instance, culture is often used to project the soft power of such actors. Soft power happens when ‘a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others’ in order to ‘encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow’ (Nye, 1990: 182). It represents a state’s ‘ability to establish preferences . . . associated with intangible power resources such as culture’ (Nye, 1990: 181). Culture is central to exercising soft power. Connected to larger processes of cultural diplomacy involving ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art, language and other aspects of culture among nations and their people to foster mutual understanding’ (Cummings, 2023: 1), culture is wielded in schemes to strengthen, improve, justify and/or otherwise manipulate narratives, images or perspectives about states or institutions, as well as their actions, policies and positions.

As a tool of soft power, cultural diplomacy engages, or exploits, culture to craft or present preferred perspectives about a state or institution. Specifically, cultural diplomacy is ‘the systematic intervention of governments in the arts, sciences, and other cultural expressions’ that, in turn, ‘shape and promote a group of artistic and cultural goods and activities that identify with official cultural policy and national identity’ (Zamorano, 2016: 169). Hence, it ‘promotes emblems and cultural representations that seek to synthesize a specific way of “being in the world” [regarding the state or institution]’ (Zamorano, 2016: 180). The intention is to make a state’s power seem legitimate or palatable, either to domestic and/or international publics, by employing or exploiting culture to increase support or sympathy for, while reducing resistance to, its goals, interests or needs.

Instrumentalizing culture for soft power strategies, however, can backfire. Soft power can transform into ‘soft disempowerment’ (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2018; Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016). It can be (mis)interpreted as an attempt to ‘whitewash’ the narrative, image or perception about the state or institution in question; or instead of being seen as positive, it can be interpreted as manipulative, problematic or offensive. Political tensions can arise between the state or institution implementing cultural diplomacy and its targeted audiences and/or with other states, institutions or groups themselves. For countries in crisis, in particular, identifying ‘cultural actors as symbols of the state opens a new front in the ongoing conflict’ (Kiel, 2020: 974). When governments connect their country’s image with culture, they simultaneously ‘make it legitimate for critics of the government to target cultural events and actors’ (Kiel, 2020: 983). The controversies or problems confronting the state can be magnified by such connections; indeed, the state’s image can become further blighted instead of boosted. Cultural mega-events, like Eurovision, provide promises of soft power opportunities and soft disempowerment perils for states using them for cultural diplomacy.

More than a meeting between artists, Eurovision is a place where culture and politics intersect and various state and non-state actors interact. All EBU members in good standing are eligible to participate in Eurovision. Notwithstanding eligibility, not all members participate for various reasons ranging from the financial to the political. Members who are ejected, suspended and/or withdraw from the EBU lose this eligibility. They no longer have an option to participate, or not, in Eurovision. Yet, at Eurovision, ‘politics compete for and on the main stage’ (Bohlman, 2007: 66), making it a ‘seismograph for exposing national traumas and cultural conflicts’ (Yair, 2019: 1023). A platform is provided ‘for the conduct of everyday politics among European nations and as a form of state identity-branding and status-signalling’ and, by extension, furnishes a cultural reference point for all participating states of being part of Europe (Press-Barnathan and Lutz, 2020: 734). Despite the EBU’s official policy of Eurovision being a non-political event, politics and political engagement never seem far from the glitzy stage.

While Eurovision is officially a competition between broadcasters, it remains organized along state lines and symbols. It is, as a result, often embroiled in national identity politics. Even though it is national broadcasters that are EBU members, the competition remains structured around states. Participants may not be official state representatives yet ‘they are often understood as such’ and, in turn, are considered ‘as being synonymous with the state they represent, each performance being broadcast with the name and flag of the state and points usually being awarded to the country as well’ (Welslau and Selck, 2024: 9). Entries, themselves, are often considered ‘symbolic representatives of the nation, whose bodies and embodied practices can be said to “perform” national identity’ (Baker, 2019: 96). Entries are even presented as representatives of their states instead of their broadcasters; for instance, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), as an EBU member, selects a Eurovision entry on behalf of the United Kingdom and, thereafter, that entry becomes representative not of the BBC but of the country. Eurovision is therefore ‘implicitly nationalistic and any participant will know that they are associated with their country in both success and failure’ (Kiel, 2020: 978).

Eurovision is therefore political in two main ways. First, by expressing a cultural collectivity comprised of states, Eurovision advances an idealized image of a culturally and politically unified Europe. Situated at the nexus of culture and politics, Eurovision ‘helps create an ideational form of solidarity, transmitting European narratives through a [transnational] format that reinforces the nation-state as the basic unit of European unity’ (Kalman et al., 2019: 14). Second, Eurovision helps validate states through culture. Since culture helps legitimize political structures, Eurovision matters to Europe by providing ‘a form of legitimacy for the social and political structures that exist to frame, govern, and give expression to collective communities’ (Carniel, 2024, 17). All entries are national, and all forms of public participation address or revolve around these entries, consequently politicizing the contest and ensuring that ‘all interactions must be framed in terms of diplomatic relations’ (Carniel, 2019: 166). Organized and centred around states, Eurovision eligibility and representation, as well as voting, are arranged according to the states involved.

Cultural diplomacy opportunities are consequently opened up by Eurovision. Culture is often ‘instrumentalized politically by a variety of state, non-state, and industry actors. . .The fact that it is a non-governmental event fails to obscure the fact that [Eurovision] is nevertheless political’ (Carniel, 2019: 156). States, for instance, can use Eurovision as part of soft power strategies of cultural diplomacy. They can attempt ‘to use this cultural event to promote their [political] goals’ (Press-Barnathan and Lutz, 2020: 730). Participating in Eurovision can help ‘songwash’ (Kosciejew, 2025) their images by creating or maintaining positive international perceptions, improving reputations and/or deflecting from controversies and other problems. Their country’s image can be connected with the contest, particularly through membership and performers/performances, thereby providing them with a veneer of respectability as accepted members of the wider international cultural community. Performers themselves can ‘directly raise the profile of strategic narratives from their state’ (Baker et al., 2024: 46) through pronouncements and performances.

Leveraging the contest in these ways reveals ‘how the event itself has inevitably become a political arena, even for those claiming its apolitical nature’ (Press-Barnathan and Lutz, 2020: 730). Yet, critique and soft disempowerment can result for states engaged in such leveraging. Exploiting Eurovision ‘also offers a platform for naming and shaming states, mostly about dubious human rights records and violations of international law’ (Press-Barnathan and Lutz, 2020: 733). Negative attention directed at the state can occur alongside its attempts to use its Eurovision membership and/or entry to improve its image. Due to intense international media coverage of the event, this naming and shaming by its critics and opponents ‘can take place in the period leading up to the event (a year in the case of (Eurovision) or during the event itself’ (Press-Barnathan and Lutz, 2020: 733). Politics, it appears, is part of the show.

Culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches at Eurovision

Engagement with Eurovision ultimately means engagement with culture and politics. Since politics are, in many ways, ‘central to key aspects of the contest, from the choice of songs, artists and host venues’ (Shepherd, 2021: 3), cultural diplomacy is often exercised by various actors, both state and non-state, involved or otherwise associated with it. There are two major types of cultural diplomacy that are often exerted at Eurovision, namely culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches.

The culturalist approach ‘emphasizes the cultural value of heritage, arts, and identities’ (Zamorano, 2016: 179). Cosmopolitan in orientation, the cultural approach is ‘based on the multilateral promotions of [cultural] pluralism and intercultural dialogue in the international system’ (Zamorano, 2016: 179). It centres on horizontal reciprocity between people and cultures in which they share the beneficial effects of cultural exchange and, in turn, buttress mutual recognition and respect for each other and their cultural contributions. Concentrating on art, heritage, music, scholarship and other areas and forms of culture, the culturalist approach is enacted by and within diverse international organizational settings, including cultural centres, exchange programmes, exhibitions and events. Within such settings, ‘the construction of collective power through culture’ (Zamorano, 2016: 179) is carried out, in which local actors contribute to help bring about cultural development in their particular territory or context and transfer and share it beyond their locale. While democratic contributions of governments, in terms of cooperation, support and endorsement, can occur or be incorporated, this approach assumes ‘the relative absence of governmental control over the creative process linked to artistic diffusion’ (Zamorano, 2016: 179) and its exchange, consumption and use.

The neo-propagandist approach to cultural diplomacy, meanwhile, instrumentalizes culture for political, institutional and/or ideological agendas. It is used as ‘a way of legitimizing various methods of constructing . . . political power’ (Zamorano, 2016: 181–182). Governments or other organizations put culture to use in a broad spectrum of political strategies aimed at advancing and/or promoting their objectives. Unlike the culturalist approach’s horizontal reciprocity of cultural construction and exchange, this approach, employed by governments or other kinds of organizations, focuses on the ‘unilateral dissemination of cultural content that shows a positive view of the political territory in question’ (Zamorano, 2016: 179). Processes that enact or facilitate neo-propagandist approaches include creating or intervening in major international cultural events, working with cultural industries at home and abroad and actions or policies controlling, or at least slanting, mass media attention and coverage. It is often adopted within challenging contexts like ‘war and geopolitical tensions [which] often result in cultural diplomacy serving as neo-propaganda’ (Zamorano, 2016: 181). Put differently, neo-propagandist approaches tend to be exerted to transform a situational image, manage difficult problems and/or manipulate international geopolitical scenarios.

Distinguishing between culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches can be determined by various variables, including ‘communication patterns’, ‘projection terms’ and ‘character of the audience’ (Welslau and Selck, 2024: 18–19). Communication patterns are culturalist when there exists reciprocity; that is there are either bi- or multi-way channels through which to communicate, share and exchange. Neo-propagandist communication patterns, however, are unidirectional in which the government or institution in question creates and channels its messages without reciprocity with its intended targets. Projection terms for both approaches are typically intended for long-term effects of raising the culture’s visibility and familiarity, in addition to either enhancing its image or countering problematic aspects or interpretations of it. The character of the audience is culturalist when the audience or intended targets are actively engaged in the culture as well as its creation and exchange, whereas in neo-propagandist approaches, the audience remains passive, functioning or serving as mere consumers or receivers of the culture emanating from a vertical one-way channel from the government or institution creating or managing the culture. Culturalist approaches are therefore reciprocal, long-term and actively engage the audience. Neo-propagandist approaches are similarly long-term, but they are nonreciprocal and keep audiences’ tractable.

Beyond states, non-state actors also engage in forms of cultural diplomacy. Ranging from the GLAM sector (galleries, libraries, archives and museums) to educational institutions, from civil society organizations to the private sector, from artistic collectives to individual creators (authors, actors, artists, musicians, etc.), there are a plethora of parties and participants, external to official foreign ministries, that create or are concerned with diverse aspects of culture, and deploy their creations or concerns for diplomatic endeavours (Gilboa, 2008; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 1999; Lee and Ayhan, 2015; Sylvester, 2001, 2009). Each type of non-state actor does not necessarily engage in cultural diplomacy in similar ways. After all, they possess different objectives, capacities, resources and reach, not to mention focus on different kinds of audiences, publics, patrons, clients, customers and/or other groups or individuals.

Unlike states, which officially deploy cultural diplomacy in support of foreign policy and/or other state-centric diplomatic goals, non-state actors use this kind of diplomacy, either formally and/or informally, to reach out to, communicate with and otherwise convey their messages outside of official state channels or involvement. It is part of a ‘diplomacy of the public’ (Castells, 2008: 91) in which globally-networked actors beyond governmental channels and confines, ‘forge coalitions across borders’ (Kelley, 2010: 302) for various ‘polylateral’ (Wiseman, 2010: 24–39) initiatives. Official cultural diplomacy remains the remit of states. Culture is imbued with official status when it is employed or exploited under state auspices. When non-state actors engage in/with culture, their efforts may be unofficial vis-à-vis governments, yet no less impactful. Non-state cultural diplomacy can raise awareness, expand exposure, increase scrutiny and/or promote or otherwise advocate for causes or issues for assorted purposes such as showing support or solidarity, bestowing recognition or respect or building/enhancing (or diminishing) reputations and profiles. Further, some non-state actors do not collaborate with states, or refuse or resist doing so, whereas others join forces with states, for sundry reasons and to varying degrees, to advance their shared cultural diplomacy goals and initiatives.

At Eurovision, for example, state and non-state actors are engaged in cultural diplomacy, albeit for different, and sometimes competing, purposes. The extravaganza is owned and organized by an influential supranational non-state actor, the EBU. The members of the EBU, additionally, are also non-state actors, specifically public service media broadcasters based in countries associated with the European Broadcasting Area and/or the Council of Europe. These non-state actors are established by their home country’s national laws but are independent and nonpartisan from the respective state. Entries to Eurovision are selected by these broadcasters rather than their associated states. States, though, are not members of the EBU, nor are they directly involved in the Eurovision entries chosen by their national broadcasters. They can, however, still influence the contest with various kinds of machinations (discussed below).

Nonetheless, Eurovision’s format often obfuscates this distinction between state and non-state participation. National identity and broadcaster involvement are commonly conflated by the contest’s organization and presentation, in which entries are presented as/under the names and flags of their respective states, thereby providing the (mis)perception that entries are emanating from the countries themselves. Even the contest’s public voting can align into bi/multilateral (country-to-country) bloc votes for countries in particular regions (Charron, 2013; Gatherer, 2007; Yair, 1995; Yair and Maman, 1996); furthermore, this bloc voting is often determined by cultural and linguistic distance between/from, and traits shared by, the voting publics in these countries (Ginsburgh, 2005; Ginsburgh and Noury, 2008; Spierdijk and Vellekoop, 2009; Stockemer et al., 2018).

On a transnational level, meanwhile, Eurovision can also often be conflated with the European Union (EU) itself. Although a product of the EBU and ‘not institutionally related to the EU, the ESC [Eurovision] can be seen as an example of a key event that symbolizes the notion of a united Europe . . . due to its general European message’ (Zahavi and Ariely, 2024: 1). Eurovision is not a cultural diplomacy tool controlled by the EU, but it nevertheless offers the EU ‘an unintended opportunity for [cultural and] public diplomacy’ that, in turn, can influence ‘external views of the EU’ (Zahavi and Ariely, 2024: 2). Thus, what transpires at/with Eurovision can be (mis)construed as a reflection on/of the EU itself, and additionally, it can be common to (mis)interpret a country as making a creative decision, or being censured or expelled. In both instances, though, it is neither the EU nor the state but instead the EBU and/or the national broadcaster that is the relevant actor involved in such verdicts.

Regardless of formal conditions or technicalities, the material effects of such common conflations are often what count most. Reputations and profiles of national broadcasters and countries alike can be affected, especially when there is contention concerning the contest. In such disputed diversions, opprobrium can be directed at both actors. The broadcaster will be formally reprimanded or removed from competition by the EBU, and, within the milieu of international information/media organizations, its reputation will be tainted since it would be seen as the party at fault; meanwhile, further public obloquy will be (mis)directed at the state itself as there is often conflation between broadcasters and states in terms of perceptions. The inclusion of a song or participation of an entry from a country confronting troubles, or alternatively the exclusion of a song or an entry from such a situation, will be associated, in most public perceptions, more with the country than the national broadcaster or the EBU. In such instances, Eurovision becomes a ‘platform for naming and shaming states, mostly about dubious human rights records and violations of international law’ (Press-Barnathan and Lutz, 2020: 733). Put plainly, it is typically not the national broadcaster – which is the main actor involved in EBU rules and decisions and Eurovision proceedings – but the country that bears the brunt of negative attention, media coverage and outcomes within the wider public sphere whenever controversy erupts at Eurovision since the public is usually less aware that the contest’s competing parties are put forward by broadcasters and not countries per se.

Despite no formal connections to Eurovision, states themselves can still affect the contest through their own cultural diplomacy efforts. They can engage in ‘songwashing’ to achieve or extend official cultural diplomacy objectives, whether aimed to conceal or downplay negative perceptions of an issue, or alternatively, create or amplify positive images of the state, for internal and/or external publics (Baker, 2024; Biasioli, 2023; Kosciejew, 2025; Yamarik et al., 2025). Again, it may not be directly involved in EBU membership or deliberations, or in the Eurovision selection processes and decisions of the national broadcaster, a state can nonetheless, unofficially yet influentially, shape what happens at/with Eurovision.

Both culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches of cultural diplomacy are often deployed at Eurovision. The EBU, for instance, often adopts both approaches when dealing with Eurovision membership, participation and entries of songs/performers. While ‘designed for non-political cultural exchange . . . [it] also leaves room for instrumentalization within each single entry’ (Welslau and Selck, 2024: 19). This dual adoption can be seen through the three variables of communication patterns, projection terms and audience characteristics. To begin, Eurovision’s communication patterns are both culturalist in terms of reciprocity and neo-propagandist in terms of nonreciprocity. It is reciprocal since the same time to perform songs is granted each country, ‘and thus, their nation and message, and then [each] watches and listens as other nations present their entry in a form of cultural exchange’; however, it is simultaneously nonreciprocal because ‘this cultural exchange consists of multiple one-way messages . . . [that are] limited by the [Eurovision’s] rules banning explicit political messages’ (Welslau and Selck, 2024: 18). Eurovision enables reciprocity of cultural exchange while also restricting it by adjudging suitability through the EBU’s unilateral decisions about participation as well as membership.

Cultural diplomacy is increasingly being deployed by diverse actors beyond states, including supranational organizations like the EBU and, by extension, its Eurovision. Members of the EBU, as aforementioned, have adopted culturalist and/or neo-propagandist approaches to their participation in the extravaganza. Importantly, it is possible that these approaches can align or conflict when advanced by a national broadcaster and its respective state. A national broadcaster could adopt a culturalist approach to the contest while its state could push for a neo-propagandist approach or vice versa. For instance, the Russian state and its broadcasters, as well as the Ukrainian state and its broadcaster, used these approaches in recent Eurovision entries posits that even though Eurovision’s state-centric structure is ‘designed for culturalist approaches based on the reciprocal communication pattern inherent to the event, it leaves some room for instrumentalization’ (Welslau and Selck, 2024: 6). Russia displayed neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy through its close control of messaging and attempts at power demonstration and persuasion, while Ukraine took a mixed approach incorporating both representations of Ukrainian cultural heritage and cultural exchange with counterarguments against Putin’s claims about the country (Welslau and Selck, 2024). Similarly, the EBU and Eurovision, as well as other national broadcasters and states, have also exercised these approaches to membership, participation and contest entries, confronting contestation.

Throughout the early 2020s – from 2021 until 2024 – the EBU, national broadcasters and associated states embroiled in conflict adopted culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches to Eurovision for divergent, and parallel, purposes. Let us now turn to a descriptive triptych of culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches adopted by Belarus, Russia and Israel at Eurovision contests during this turbulent time period.

A Eurovision triptych of Belarus, Russia and Israel

The following triptych supplies descriptive overviews of the controversies concerning the Eurovision participation of Belarus, Russia and Israel during their respective geopolitical tensions and wars emerging in the early 2020s. The images supply snapshots of Eurovision contests at which Belarus, Russia, and Israel were involved. The first two images illustrate Belarussian involvement in Eurovision: Image 1 is a picture of Rotterdam Ahoy, the host venue of Eurovision 2021, at which Belarus was suspended; Image 2 is a picture of Belarussian pop singer Zena performing at Eurovision 2019 (the last Belarussian entry to Eurovision). The next two images exhibit Russian involvement in Eurovision: Image 3 is a picture of the semi-finals of Eurovision 2022 at which Russia was banned; Image 4 is a picture of Russian folk singer Manizha performing at Eurovision 2021 (the last Russian entry to Eurovision). The final two images display Israeli involvement in Eurovision: Image 5 presents Israeli President Isaac Herzog hosting Eden Golan at his official residence before her departure for Eurovision 2024; Image 6 shows Eden Golan performing at a dress rehearsal at Eurovision 2024.

Image 1.

Rotterdam Ahoy arena in the Netherlands, the host venue of Eurovision 2021, at which Belarus was suspended.

Image 2.

The last Belarusian entry to a Eurovision contest, the Belarusian pop singer Zena, performing at a dress rehearsal for Eurovision 2019 in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Image 3.

Eurovision 2022 semi-final 2 show, at which Russia was banned, in Turin, Italy.

Image 4.

The last Russian entry to a Eurovision contest, the Russian folk singer Manizha, performing at the Eurovision 2021 semi-final 1 show in Rotterdam, Netherlands.

Image 5.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog hosting Eden Golan at the official presidential residence, Beit HaNassi, in Jerusalem, Israel, before her departure for Eurovision 2024.

Image 6.

Eden Golan performing at Eurovision 2024 dress rehearsal in Malmö, Sweden.

Eurovision 2021: disqualifying Belarus

In the months preceding Eurovision 2021, Belarus was convulsed by mass political protests disputing the 2020 presidential election of Alexander Lukashenko (Auseyushkin and Roth, 2020). Although scheduled to perform in the contest, Belarus’s song entry was disqualified because of its apparent political sympathy for Lukashenko. It was composed and written by the folk-rock group Galasy ZMesta (‘The Voices of the Town/of Reason’) that formed in 2020 in response to the contentious election and subsequent unrest (Eurovoix News, 2021; Goncharenko, 2021). With its logo consisting of red and green lettering reminiscent of the state flag, the band became known for its ‘firmly pro-Lukashenko’ outlook and criticisms of pro-democracy protestors; in fact, many of their ‘other songs also mock the opposition’ (Goncharenko, 2021). Its original Eurovision entry, entitled ‘I Will Teach You’, featured lyrics such as ‘I will teach you to toe the line’ (BBC, 2021) that were interpreted as ridiculing the demonstrators and possessing a political subtext supporting Lukashenko (DW, 2021; Reuters, 2021).

Belarussian opposition figures and protestors contended that keeping the song in Eurovision legitimized Lukashenko’s contested electoral victory and violent political suppression, while various artists, including a former Eurovision entrant, denounced the song choice (BBC, 2021; DW, 2021). Beyond Belarus, some European parliamentary members called for the country’s expulsion from Eurovision (Al Jazeera, 2021). Deeming the lyrics inappropriate, the EBU disqualified the song and contacted the Belarusian Television and Radio Company (BTRC), requesting revisions and/or a new song to ensure compliance ‘with the rules of the competition’ (Eurovision, 2021). The band’s lead singer, Dmitry Batukov, believed the song was ‘compliant’ but that these accusations from the opposition and European allies were ‘expected’ (Goncharenko, 2021). Lukashenko interjected himself into the controversy by claiming Belarus would consider the request. Stating that ‘we’ll make another song’ (BBC, 2021), he presented the request ‘as another example of Belarus being besieged by outside forces’ (Reuters, 2021). He averred, ‘they [Western states] are starting to press us on all fronts. Even at Eurovision, I see . . . this is all politicized’ (Reuters, 2021).

Complying with the EBU’s request and Lukashenko’s endorsement, the BTRC resubmitted a new song, again by Galasy ZMesta. Entitled ‘Song About Hares’, the new song told a fable of a hare getting eaten by a fox that critics construed as political references to the anti-Lukashenko opposition (Adams, 2021). This new song, too, was rejected for its seemingly political subtext. The EBU ‘concluded that the new submission was also in breach of the rules of the competition that ensure the contest is not instrumentalized or brought into disrepute’ and, thus, ‘regrettably’, removed Belarus from competition (EBU, 2022).

Shortly after the contest, the EBU suspended BTRC from membership for three years due to perceived political interference that, in turn, rendered future participation in Eurovision impossible (Garcia, 2021; Rainford, 2021). Responding, the BTRC joked about Belarus’s Eurovision suspension as ‘fulfill[ing] the dream of most Belarusians. No more Eurovision!’ (Belteleradiocompany, 2021). In 2024, Belarus’s suspension became indefinite, in part because of Belarus’s military involvement with Russia in the Ukrainian war (Argyropoulos, 2024).

At Eurovision 2021, the EBU engaged in a culturalist approach to Belarus; however, after the contest, it veered towards neo-propagandist dealings with the country. Belarus, in turn, applied a neo-propagandist approach to its entries to Eurovision and its relationship to the EBU.

Eurovision 2022: expelling Russia

Scheduled to occur from 10 to 14 May 2022 in Turin, Italy, Eurovision 2022 was divided into two semi-final shows before the grand finale. Both Russia and Ukraine were expected to participate and were listed in the performance lineup for the first semi-final on 10 May. But in the months leading up to the contest, the Russia–Ukraine war upended these plans (BBC, 2022).

As hostilities unfurled, the Ukrainian state broadcaster, Suspilne Ukraine, requested the EBU expel Russian broadcasters, and by extension contestants, from Eurovision as well as membership in the union. Accusing Russian broadcasters – namely, Russian Television and Radio (RTR), Channel One and Radio Dom Ostankino – of being Kremlin mouthpieces and propagandists (Суспільне Мовлення, 2022), it contended that Russia should be banned because, ‘as an aggressor country and a violator of international law’, its participation would undermine ‘the very idea of the contest’ uniting Europe (Суспільне Мовлення, 2022). It noted that, if permitted, Russia’s entry would be provided by the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), emphasizing the broadcaster’s role as ‘an instrument of the Kremlin’s power in the information war against Ukraine’ (Суспільне Мовлення, 2022).

Initially, the EBU remained neutral. It asserted that although ‘concerned about current events in Ukraine’ and ‘closely monitor[ing] the situation’ (Fielder, 2022), Eurovision was a ‘non-political cultural event’ that was ‘currently planning’ on hosting both countries (Savage, 2022). It further noted that the contest should be free from politics since it ‘unites nations and celebrates diversity through music’ (Savage, 2022). Condemnation of the EBU’s position was swift. The EBU was ‘hit with a number of requests to ban Russia from competing’ (Fielder, 2022). Public broadcasters in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Poland, for instance, called for Russia to be interdicted while the Estonian and Finnish public broadcasters threatened to withdraw entirely if Russia took part (BBC, 2022).

On the invasion’s second day, the EBU prohibited Russia from Eurovision participation. It marked ‘the first time [Russia would] not participate since its debut in 1994’ (Muir, 2022). Announcing that ‘no Russian act will participate in this year’s Eurovision Song Contest’, the EBU explained that ‘in light of the unprecedented crisis in Ukraine, the inclusion of a Russian entry . . . would bring the competition into disrepute’ (Eurovision, 2022). It reiterated the contest’s ‘apolitical status’ and its dedication ‘to protecting the values of a cultural competition which promotes international exchange and understanding, brings audiences together, celebrates diversity through music and unites Europe on one stage’ (Eurovision, 2022). Asked if the decision had been difficult, Eurovision’s executive supervisor, Martin Österdahl, answered affirmatively, accompanied by an acknowledgement that Eurovision was invariably impacted by public sentiments and the wider social context in any given year (Grierson, 2022).

Approbation of Russia’s ban was demanded by most public broadcasters and acts participating in Eurovision (BBC, 2022). Opprobrium, meanwhile, was conveyed by Russian broadcasters. They publicized intentions to suspend their EBU involvement over Russia’s Eurovision expulsion (EBU, 2022). After Eurovision ended, the EBU suspended its Russian members ‘indefinitely’ resulting in the concomitant loss of participating and broadcasting rights to, and indefinite banishment from, Eurovision (Granger, 2022). The EBU later claimed that the primary impetus for Russia’s suspension resulted from ‘the Russian public service broadcasters . . . consistent breaches of membership obligations and the violation of public service media values’ (EBU, n.d.). Descriptions of these breaches and violations were not supplied. The Russian broadcasters, in turn, announced their concurrent withdrawal from the EBU (Granger, 2022).

At Eurovision 2022, the EBU adopted a mixed culturalist and neo-propagandist approach to the Russian broadcasters. No option or objection in the matter was extended to Russia. It was consequently forced into a neo-propagandist position as a result of its expulsion.

Eurovision 2024: allowing Israel

Eurovision 2024’s premiere on 7 May 2024 marked the Israel–Hamas war’s seventh month. By the time Israel’s entrant, Israeli pop star Eden Golan, performed, thousands of Palestinians were evacuating Rafah from an imminent Israeli military ground offensive and Hamas contingents around Gaza City were being attacked by Israeli forces (Druker, 2024). Golan herself would have been ‘serving in the army . . . had her national service call-up not been delayed to let her compete’ (Hinsliff, 2024).

Calls to ban Israel from competition because of its wartime actions were made by pro-Palestinian groups. The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), part of the wider Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement, spearheaded the campaign for a ban. Encouraging ‘all who reject genocide and apartheid to stand together and pressure the EBU to ban Israel from Eurovision’ (PACBI, 2024b), it warned that if the ban failed, it would ‘campaign for a boycott of the contest’ (PACBI, 2024b). Responding, the EBU lamented the ‘profound suffering of all those caught up in this terrible war’ but repeated that Eurovision was ‘a non-political music event’ and ‘not a contest between governments’ (EBU, 2024b).

Comparisons with Russia’s Eurovision prohibition surfaced. Acknowledging the ‘concerns and deeply held views around the current conflict’ and awareness ‘of the many voices calling to exclude Israel form this year’s competition in the same way as we excluded the Russian broadcaster in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine’, the EBU claimed that ‘comparisons between wars and conflicts are complex and difficult and, as a non-political media organization, not ours to make’ (EBU 2024b). Unlike the Russian broadcasters, the EBU claimed, the Israeli broadcaster was a member in good standing that met competition rules, and, further, was not a propaganda arm of its state and, in fact, often had fractious relationships with the Israeli government (EBU, 2024b). It allowed Israel to remain in the contest.

Labelling the contest the ‘festival of hypocrisy’ because of the EBU’s doubling ‘down on its shameful, hypocritical complicity in Israel’s genocide’ (PACBI, 2024a), PACBI called for a boycott. Beseeching ‘all participating broadcasters, national competitors, finalists, production crews, and viewers to boycott the contest’, it further encouraged supporters to pressure broadcasters’ withdrawals, cancel screening parties and hold alternative concerts and events (PACBI, 2024a). Various European artists, music associations and politicians supported the boycott (Abad-Santos, 2024; Marshall, 2024b; Wünsch, 2024). Various Eurovision entrants, such as the Netherland’s Joost Klein, Ireland’s Bambie Thug and the UK’s Olly Alexander, publicly expressed sympathies with both Palestine and the boycott calls (O’Connor, 2024b; Savage, 2024a, 2024b). Israeli Europe-based embassies, simultaneously, condemned these developments (Bryant, 2024; Wünsch, 2024). Addressing the boycott, the EBU argued that Eurovision’s ‘values of universality, inclusivity and celebrating diversity through music have never been more important’ (EBU, 2024c). Israel was to remain.

During Eurovision’s grand finale, PACBI proclaimed it ‘the most controversial edition of the competition ever’ and inculpated the EBU of advancing a ‘colonial double standard’ of banning Russia but not Israel (PACBI, 2024c). PACBI accused the EBU of exposing audiences ‘to Israel’s genocide and underlying regime of settler-colonial apartheid’ (PACBI, 2024c). The statement ingeminated PACBI’s longtime ‘call to boycott all future editions of Eurovision until Israel is banned’ (PACBI, 2024c). If the EBU kept Israel in competition, then they urged a more sustained boycott of the event itself.

Compounding consternation was Israel’s song entry. Entitled ‘October Rain’, the title and lyrics of the pop ballad referenced the war’s start on 7 October and Hamas’s attacks on and abductions of Israeli hostages with lines like ‘I’m still wet from this October rain’, ‘take me home’ and ‘never again’. One of the song’s composers described how she composed the song ‘just hours after visiting a friend’s burned-out home in Kibbutz Be’eri [a major Hamas target]’ (Marshall, 2024a). The war, it seemed, was the song’s focus. The EBU disqualified the song as political since the title signalled the Hamas attacks and the lyrics referenced Israeli wartime experiences (Armstrong, 2024; Marshall, 2024b; Spiro, 2024a). Declaring the decision as ‘scandalous’ (Marshall, 2024b), Israel’s culture minister insisted the song was not political but emotional by reflecting ‘the current public sentiment in Israel’ and castigated the EBU to ‘not to let politics affect art’ (Leonard and Jehring, 2024).

Initially refusing to revise or resubmit an alternative, KAN was prepared for barring (Armstrong, 2024; Marshall, 2024a, 2024b). Intervening, Israel’s President Isaac Herzog pressed the broadcaster to revise the song, stressing that Israel’s Eurovision participation was essential ‘precisely at a time when those who hate [Israel] are trying to shun and exclude the state of Israel from every platform’ and therefore Israel must ‘proudly . . . make its voice heard and to fly its flag at every international forum, especially this year’ (Noat, 2024). Compromising, KAN commissioned the song’s writers to revise the song. ‘October Rain’ was changed to ‘Hurricane’, including revisions to its lyrics. According to KAN, the revised song ‘is about a young woman going through a “personal crisis” (Spiro, 2024a). Golan, meanwhile, suggested that while the song is ‘open to interpretation’, for Israelis, it connects ‘on a very different, deeper emotional level because of the tragedy we’ve been through’ (Mouriquand, 2024a). Like the original, the song’s main composer admitted that ‘the Hamas attacks [remained] on her mind when she wrote “Hurricane” . . . but [this time tried] not to be specific, or pornographic, about it’ (Marshall, 2024a). The EBU permitted the revised song into the competition.

Before departing for the contest, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wished Golan ‘good luck and said she had “already won” after “successfully confronting” what he described as a “horrible wave of antisemitism” in Sweden [and beyond]’ (Armstrong, 2024). Golan was also formally hosted by President Herzog at the presidential residence ‘to receive the blessing of the President’ (Yalon, 2024), where she expressed ‘huge honor to have this privilege, to stand there on stage with my voice, and show everyone who we are and our beautiful nation’ (Yalon, 2024). Herzog reemphasized ‘that Israel should be present in every arena in the world [including Eurovision, since there] are terrible forces that are trying to exclude us from everywhere, especially in the worlds of sport and culture’ and that when Golan performs ‘we will all be with you, the whole nation will be with you’ (Yalon, 2024). Golan was further featured in a public campaign operated by Israel’s foreign affairs ministry, encouraging contest voting for Israel (Ynet News, 2024).

Protests engulfed the host city of Malmö. Thousands of protestors marched throughout the city and outside the venue, accompanied by heavy police contingents with hovering helicopters, rooftop snipers and metal detectors (Armstrong, 2024; Brady, 2024; Lawless, 2024; Savage, 2024a; Sohne, 2024). Golan also received death threats, prompting the EBU to condemn ‘abuse and harassment of artists over Israel’s participation’ (Mouriquand, 2024c) and compelling the chief of the Israeli internal security service, Shin Bet, ‘to [personally] inspect security arrangements for the country’s delegation’ (Brady, 2024). Security threats and worries, for the audience, performers, fans and the wider city, were real and present throughout the festivities.

During her performances, Golan received ‘loud jeers and boos’ from the audience (McLaughlin, 2024). This heckling, however, was ‘muted by anti-boo technology deployed by the EBU’ (Spiro, 2024b). Golan responded she was proud ‘to show the voice of an entire nation’ and her ‘entire country behind me and with me and I’m going to represent us’ (Marshall, 2024a; Spiro 2024b). Further, as finale results were tallied, booing ensued whenever Israel received points and while Israel’s presenter, Maya Alkulumbre, announced Israel’s national jury votes (Brown, 2024). Israel placed fifth in the results and garnered the second-highest tally in the public vote (Brown, 2024). In an official press release, Prime Minister Netanyahu celebrated Golan for bringing ‘honour’ and ‘immense pride to the state of Israel’ and that while the audience ‘booed you . . . we [Israel] shouted “douze points”’ (O’Connor, 2024a). Posting on Instagram after the contest, Golan averred the aim had ‘always been to share the strong voice of Israel’, dedicating her performance to ‘the hostages’ (Golan, 2024).

At Eurovision 2024, the EBU and Israel deployed culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches towards Israel’s involvement and song entry. The EBU engaged in culturalist diplomacy by providing Israel the opportunity to participate, in the first place in spite of the growing international opprobrium confronting the country due to its wartime actions in Gaza, and to revise its original song entry for being politicized. Yet, the EBU was simultaneously neo-propagandist with these decisions vis-à-vis Israel since it not only permitted Israel’s participation in the midst of the war (and denied Russia the same opportunity despite parallel circumstances) but also accepted a revised song that was still instrumentalized by the Israeli state and lyrics that remained seemingly open to interpretation or susceptible to perceptions of remaining politicized. Israel, meanwhile, adopted a culturalist posture by desiring to, and taking part in, Eurovision; however, much of its involvement was neo-propagandist in terms of its original, and arguably revised, song, the statements by and positions of the song’s writers and the performer and the direct intervention of the country’s top political establishment and other state ministries and officials. In other words, both the EBU and Israel engaged in joint culturalist and neo-propagandist endeavours related to the contest.

As geopolitical tensions and wars erupted throughout the first half of the 2020s, Eurovision was not untouched. Both the EBU and its member states implicated in conflicts, namely Belarus, Russia and Israel, used the contest for cultural diplomacy initiatives. Taken together, these three cases help illuminate the culturalist and neo-propagandist positions of the EBU and respective states vis-à-vis Eurovision and cultural diplomacy during geopolitical tensions and wars. Let us now examine ways in which culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches of these actors aligned and/or contradicted at Eurovision.

A triptych of culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches at Eurovision

As political turmoil embroiled Belarus and wars engulfed Russia and Israel, Eurovision became a site of cultural contention for these states, as well as for the EBU, in which culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches were adopted as responses to these conflicts. The following section analyses these approaches, separately and collectively, within the EBU and triptych of Belarus, Russia and Israel.

Belarus and the EBU

Belarus and the EBU adopted both approaches at Eurovision 2021. Although disqualifying Belarus’s original song entry, ‘I Will Teach You’, because of its political subtext supporting Lukashenko’s disputed election, and presumably compounded by Galasy ZMesta’s admitted pro-Lukashenko stance, the EBU advanced a culturalist approach towards the country by offering the opportunity to revise the song or submit a new one. Openness was demonstrated to sustain intercultural dialogue with Belarus, within the Eurovision auspices, through the opportunity of amendments. Giving Belarus the chance to share its music with the wider Eurovision and by extension European community, the EBU was facilitating continued cultural exchange.

Despite this culturalist overture, the EBU’s suspension of Belarus can be construed as neo-propagandist. The EBU, in fact, not only suspended Belarus from the 2021 contest but also for an additional 3-year period, thereby preventing its participation and cultural exchange. Eventually suspending Belarus indefinitely from competition can further be considered neo-propagandist because this outcome was not addressing, let alone concerned with, a different or new song entry, but instead, seemingly, about the continuing geopolitical conflict in Ukraine. No options for addressing or appealing the ban were provided to Belarus, consequently closing current and future prospects for intercultural dialogue. While the EBU claims it does not adjudge or comment upon political affairs, positing Eurovision as a non-political musical event celebrating culture, its unrestricted blocking of Belarus indicates a political decision instrumentalizing the event.

A neo-propagandist disposition, meanwhile, was displayed by Belarus in numerous ways. First, by submitting the self-proclaimed pro-government band Galasy ZMesta’s song during a period of political troubles for Lukashenko, it was already instrumentalizing Eurovision for the state’s political ends. Second, the song itself was political in title and lyrics by derisively referring to anti-government/pro-democracy protestors, accompanied by lyrics declaring they will be taught to toe the government line. The band itself acknowledged that they were expecting the song to be criticized as such by anti-Lukashenko forces at home and abroad. Third, President Lukashenko personally interjected himself into the matter, contending the request for revisions represented another front in the external political onslaught facing the country, but, in defiance, the country would confront the charge by submitting another song. Lukashenko thus instrumentalized both the EBU’s request and the new song through his claims and intervention. Fourth, like the original song, the new one, ostensibly a fairy tale about hares, was political, serving as a euphemism for Lukashenko’s opponents being eaten. Finally, when the second song was rejected and Belarus suspended, the BTRC issued a public denouncement of Eurovision by mocking how Belarus is spared from (the expense of) the event. Despite the EBU making culturalist overtures to Belarus, the latter responded with neo-propagandist comebacks.

Russia and the EBU

Likewise, at Eurovision 2022, culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches towards Russia were advanced by the EBU. Russia, however, was apparently forced into taking the latter tactic. At the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EBU took a culturalist position by being prepared to permit Russia’s entrance to the contest. Although controversial, it was culturalist by not deliberating upon the war or Russia’s political reasons for invading and, instead, attempting that intercultural dialogue could subsist between Russia and Europe through Eurovision, as well as continue to pursue cultural exchange with Russia regardless of its geopolitical actions.

Condemnation of the EBU’s decision was swift. Almost immediately thereafter, on the war’s second day, the EBU prohibited Russia’s participation on the grounds that its entry would bring Eurovision into disrepute. This decision mirrored the wave of international boycotts and sanctions cascading against Russia after the war’s commencement, leading it to become the most sanctioned country on Earth (Bella, 2022; Pandey, 2022). Reversing the previous decision’s culturalist position, a neo-propagandist approach was advanced. It did not dispense Russia any opportunity to make a case for its involvement in the contest, let alone submit a song entry for consideration. Russia was pre-emptively excluded without recourse due to political calculations. The EBU, in other words, waded, culturally, into the war to condemn Russia by instrumentalizing Eurovision.

Further neo-propagandist reasoning for Russia’s prohibition was put forward by the EBU by stating its decision resulted from both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and also responded to allegations that Russian broadcasters served as Kremlin mouthpieces. Adjudging and interjecting itself into a tendentious political crisis, while also alleging that its own Russian members promulgated Putin’s political propaganda, meant that the EBU was promoting political positions. Contrary to promoting culture and being non-political, the EBU, in this case, took a neo-propagandist posture.

Yet the EBU’s neo-propagandist posture vis-à-vis Russia did not transpire in a vacuum. Broader geopolitical factors invariably played a role in influencing diverse sectors and industries, including cultural, to not engage with Russia. International sanctions, for instance, presented a strong front opposing Moscow’s invasion and signalled disapproval of collaborating, partnering or working with Russia while the war continued. Many countries, particularly across Europe, led the charge against Russia, including the Eurovision 2022 host country of Italy. It is within this pressurized environment that the EBU suspended Russian broadcasters from Eurovision eligibility.

The EBU’s decision, in other words, was perhaps not exactly ‘unilateral’ but instead mirroring, and arguably in concert with, the sentiments of much of the international community. After all, sanctions at state and interstate/international levels can circumscribe the parameters for action that a non-state organization can operate within. Sanctions against Russia were so sweeping, especially within the European region as many European broadcasters were threatening their own boycott and withdrawal should Russia remain in Eurovision, that the EBU was confronting a thorny problem. In addition, even if Russia were permitted to participate, the sanctions against Russia would have stymied, at least logistically, its involvement in the contest. It may not have been possible for Russia to even send a delegation to Italy; moreover, other broadcasters may have boycotted the event or blacked out the Russian performance if the EBU did not remove it from competition. It therefore did not matter whether the Russian song would have been political or apolitical; there was no opportunity or option to participate in the proceedings anyway. The EBU’s decision to indefinitely suspend Russian broadcasters from membership in the organization automatically disbarred them, and by extension the country, from future Eurovision participation.

Maintaining the apolitical nature of Eurovision would have necessitated the EBU permitting Russia entry. If Russia’s song entry was not political or perceived as instrumentalizing the contest, then, being apolitical, the EBU would have allowed it to stay. If its song entry was then deemed political, and if given an opportunity to fix it but nonetheless remaining political, then the EBU could have ejected Russia and retained a culturalist position vis-à-vis Russia (and the war). But it did not provide Russia with a chance to submit any entry, nor did it offer any opportunity to respond or defend its Eurovision membership, let alone appeal the EBU’s decision, meaning there was no intercultural dialogue or negotiation involved.

Russia was left without the opportunity to deploy cultural diplomacy, whether culturalist or neo-propagandist, at Eurovision 2022 due to the EBU’s unilateral decision to remove it. Although Russia proffered neo-propagandist postures at previous contests, in this edition it was entirely shut out without deliberation or debate, let alone any recourse to appeal.

Israel and the EBU

Comparably, both culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches were employed at Eurovision 2024 by the EBU and Israel. In the first place, KAN selecting the original song, ‘October Rain’, can be construed as neo-propagandist since the title and lyrics referenced aspects of, and promoted general Israeli sentiments regarding, the ongoing war. Once disqualifying ‘October Rain’, the EBU extended a culturalist overture by granting KAN the opportunity to revise or submit a new song, thereby keeping channels open for intercultural dialogue and enabling a continuation of cultural collaboration. Initially, KAN retained its neo-propagandist position by refusing to capitulate to the EBU’s request. Interestingly, it was the Israeli state’s neo-propagandist intervention that convinced KAN to revise the song. Acquiescing to this requirement, Israel’s broadcaster authorized the song’s composers to revise the song. Deeming it appropriate, the revised version was accepted by the EBU. There was, in other words, a complex cultural exchange between the EBU and Israel regarding the song and its overall participation in the contest: on the one hand, there was a kind of (forced) reciprocity between the EBU and Israel permitting the latter to remain in competition on condition of changes; on the other hand, there were neo-propagandist approaches by both KAN and the Israeli state in the need for, and ultimate composition of, the song’s inclusion in the contest.

This neo-propagandism arguably overshadowed the EBU’s culturalist overtures and, in fact, appeared to dominate proceedings. Israel’s position and entry, after all, were neo-propagandist for numerous reasons. First, its original song entry was political in terms of its title and lyrics, referencing the war, Israeli hostages and beseeching the world to side with Israel. The composers described writing the song within the context of the war and after visiting Hamas-attacked areas. The revised version, moreover, retained similar sentiments to the original, leading to some interpretations of it being as political as the original. The composers, again, described how the revisions were shaped by the Hamas attacks. Both song versions, in other words, were politicized to certain degrees.

Second, the direct intervention by Israel’s top political establishment also instrumentalized the song for political purposes. President Herzog himself urged KAN to revise the song, stating that keeping Israel within Eurovision was vital for the country during this war since other forces were trying to isolate it from the international cultural arena. Israel’s participation was treated as a way to help the state manage its image for both domestic audiences, showing Israel as a legitimate member of the international community, and foreign audiences, showing Israel as an accepted cultural player in international settings. Further, the Israeli culture minister, as well as ambassadors/embassies, interpolating by reproving the EBU’s revision request and reprimanding it for not letting politics affect music, compounded this presidential instrumentalization.

Third, the foreign ministry’s video, featuring Golan, for distribution to European audiences/fans to secure votes for Israel, further turned the entry into a political tool to champion the case for Israel’s inclusion. Fourth, Golan herself instrumentalized Israel’s participation by dedicating her performance to the hostages and declaring it to represent the country. Ironically, demands from protestors that Golan be removed from the event, due to her state-connections and politicization of the song and her performances, made her more ‘publicly accountable for the conduct of this war as a singer than she would ever have been as a soldier’ (Hinsliff, 2024). Finally, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s public statements that Golan’s performance brought honour and pride to the state further instrumentalized it for the state’s political agenda of promoting Israel internationally.

Matching these neo-propagandist approaches, the EBU accepted Israel’s song revisions, thereby permitting its participation. While this decision could be construed as culturalist because the reason for acceptance hinged on the title and lyrics no longer explicitly referencing the war, it is arguably neo-propagandist since the original (political) sentiments seemingly remained intact in the revisions; put differently, the revised title and lyrics could still be construed or perceived as being about the war, hostages and Israeli grief. The revised song, in fact, can be seen as a form of ‘songwashing’ since ‘its political referencing of the war could still be surmised’ (Kosciejew, 2025: 16). Peles, one of the song’s co-writers, continued expressing how the war influenced the revisions. Golan herself noted that the revisions were ‘open to interpretation’ but for Israelis, the song still connects on a ‘deeper emotional level because of the tragedy we’ve been through’ (Mouriquand, 2024b). Censure of the song persisted, especially from pro-Palestinian groups, that the revisions were insufficiently changed since their original interpretation was left largely intact (AFP and TOI STAFF, 2024). Accompanying these aspersions was heightening scrutiny over KAN’s associations with the government and its apparent biased coverage of the war (Euronews, 2024; Sokol, 2024). It was also arraigned for sharing a children’s song about the ‘annihilation’ of Palestinians across its digital platforms (Khatsenkova, 2023). Additional scrutiny was cast upon the EBU over its relative silence about the high casualty rate among journalists reporting in Gaza (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024; EBU, 2024a; Reporters Without Borders, 2024). Permitting Israel into competition, despite the politicization of its song and entry, as well as despite the considerable international public sentiment demanding its defenestration, the EBU ultimately made a neo-propagandist choice regarding this crisis.

The triptych vis-à-vis the EBU

Culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches towards Eurovision were adopted, to various degrees and for different reasons, by Belarus, Russia, Israel and the EBU itself. When presented with the opportunity to revise/resubmit their song entries, both Belarus and Israel deployed a combination of culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches towards the contest. Despite cavilling at having to do so, both states acquiesced to the EBU’s requests to revamp their music. Intercultural dialogue remained open and ongoing.

Compliance, however, came at a political cost. Put plainly, the Belarusian and Israeli broadcasters relented only after their respective states intervened in the controversies. In both cases, top political leaders – particularly the heads of states – pressed them to satisfy the EBU’s requests and reappraise their contentious songs. Believing they were confronting external onslaughts against their political legitimacy, both states exploited Eurovision in attempts to advance their interests by demonstrating willingness to not only participate in the contest but also obey the EBU as members in good standing. Both states, in doing so, engaged in neo-propagandism by instrumentalizing their inclusion in, and eventual or threatened exclusion from, Eurovision with their song entries and performers. The Belarusian band and both original and revised songs were pro-government. Comparably, both versions of Israel’s song, and its author’s and performer’s own public pronouncements, were pro-state and advocated for the plight of the hostages.

The EBU, meanwhile, similarly deployed different combinations of culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches towards each country’s involvement. Culturalist outreach was extended to Belarus and Russia, even though they were embroiled in conflicts at the time. They were privileged with a sustained culturalist posture by the EBU since both were permitted opportunities to revise/resubmit their song entries and remain in competition. From a culturalist perspective, the EBU’s communication patterns were reciprocal by offering both countries such opportunities to revise/resubmit. Intercultural dialogue and cultural exchange were, at least initially, at the forefront of the EBU’s positions towards the two.

Neo-propagandism, however, featured prominently in many EBU’s responses, albeit in divergent ways. While Belarus and Israel were bestowed some degree of latitude in their initial entries and song choices, no such culturalist consideration was prescribed to Russia. It was not afforded a chance to submit an initial song entry, nor was it allowed to address or respond to charges against it, before being expelled entirely.

Regarding song revisions, moreover, the EBU appeared contradictory in terms of what was deemed appropriate and hence admissible. Revising songs labelled politicized can be considered as songwashing if/when the revisions are instrumentalized, particularly by governments, and remain questionable or at least open to similar interpretations or perceptions as the original offending music. Songwashing, after all, is a form of neo-propagandism insofar as it attempts to advance advantageous, or address and ameliorate awkward or problematic perceptions of an apparently offending actor such as a song, performer/performance, broadcaster or entire country. While Belarus’s resubmission and Israel’s revisions remained politicized, and both states’ political establishments directly intervened in their amendments, the EBU rejected the former for being/remaining instrumentalized, yet accepted the latter despite parallel circumstances. Both interventions functioned as songwashing in that the governments engaged in neo-propagandist strategies vis-à-vis their broadcasters’ participation in Eurovision to burnish their own political profiles and reputations at times of heightened velitation. Yet with Belarus, the EBU opposed its neo-propagandist approach but remained lenient with Israel’s similar approach; effectively, the EBU instrumentalized the contest by disqualifying the former for songwashing, specifically for politicization, and not the latter, despite similar situations and reasons.

In addition, the wider context of war was handled differently by the EBU. Regarding Russia, its approach was neo-propagandist insofar as the country was completely shut out of the contest without even entering in the first place, let alone resorting to an appeal once it was expelled. Pressure exerted upon the EBU by various broadcasters across Europe to ban Russia from Eurovision – coupled with the then-spreading international sanctions against Russia across diverse sectors – further pushed the EBU’s decision from an initially culturalist to a neo-propagandist position. Even permitting a song entry, in the first place, for culturalist reasons, was deemed unacceptable. Yet, despite parallel geopolitical circumstances, and coupled with song politicization and state interventions, such decisions by the EBU were set aside for Israel.

Conclusion: culturalist and neo-propagandist politics at Eurovision

Culture is often exploited by various state and non-state actors during turbulent times. Whether approached from culturalist or neo-propagandist positions, or both, culture is a target or tool that is used to address or deal with these affairs. Geopolitical tensions and wars often force cultural diplomacy to serve neo-propagandist purposes as culture is subjected to political instrumentalization by antagonistic or opposing parties. Eurovision has been no exception to these machinations. It may be ‘designed for culturalist approaches based on the reciprocal communication pattern inherent to the event. . .[yet] it leaves some room for instrumentalization’ (Welslau and Selck, 2024: 6). Espoused as a non-political event, politics often seep into Eurovision’s proceedings, especially during times of geopolitical tensions and wars.

The preceding triptych of Belarus, Russia and Israel describes their respective Eurovision controversies and reveals the culturalist and neo-propagandist positions adopted by these states and the EBU. While a culturalist ethos of cultural exchange, intercultural dialogue and reciprocity was advanced by each country, they nonetheless largely engaged in neo-propagandism through the instrumentalization of their entries, music and interactions/relationships with the EBU and Eurovision. The EBU’s position, while attempting to maintain a culturalist posture in each case, often ended up morphing into neo-propagandism in approach and result. The divergent combinations of culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches of states and the EBU tended not to unite but divide through music.

Ultimately, a few departure points for further considerations of cultural diplomacy at Eurovision and other international cultural events are provided by this article. Specifically, it offers a foundation for further interrogations of culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches of various state and non-state actors at Eurovision. To this end, it could be used for considerations of the cultural diplomacy challenges confronting the EBU vis-à-vis its members, and their respective countries, that operate on neo-propagandist terms when participating in Eurovision. The article could also serve as a basis for other studies on cultural diplomacy at other kinds of (mass) cultural events, including musical, literary, theatrical and filmic. Extending from the cultural sector, it could further provide an example for other examinations of parallel deployments of soft power and diplomacy at other kinds of (mass) events, such as sports/sporting showcases and ways in which they are/can be instrumentalized for various ends.

Beyond the realm of events, it could suggest some insights, as well as directions, for considerations on how culturalist and neo-propagandist approaches to cultural diplomacy are undertaken by diverse kinds of state actors in formal capacities and/or by non-state actors outside of official channels. It could help analyse how these approaches are/can be advantageous and/or disadvantageous for the state or non-state actors deploying them, especially regarding whether or not they display the intended effects and/or have unintended consequences, for better or worse. Broadly, this article could also inform interdisciplinary investigations of the intersections of culture, cultural diplomacy and politics and ways in which culture is/can be exploited or manipulated to advance assorted agendas. Culture, after all, is not spared the reach or ruptures of politics, not even on the extravagant stage of Eurovision.