Religious migrant women as builders of the new ummah in the Netherlands: A belonging path for Muslims?

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between Islam and migrant Turkish and Syrian women living in the Netherlands and their patterns of belonging, while also questioning the dynamics of identity. It reveals that religious Muslim migrants tend to exhibit their Islamic identity as a salient identity with self-representation of being Muslims. This is seen through the new ummah concept and their demands for a Sharia Council. This new definition of the ummah is discussed in terms of the sense of belonging it brings, asserting that religion cannot always function as a means of resistance, in that the religiosity of Muslims in the Netherlands is not an attempt to exclude themselves from the system, but rather a means by which they can be part of it. The article reveals that the new definition of the ummah is highly driven by migrant religious women in the Netherlands, who resist both the traditionalist and institutional understanding of Islam, while also rejecting their national ties. They aspire to create an Islamic space (dar’al Islam) for themselves within the ummah and seek to achieve this legally through a Sharia Council.

Can the new European ummah make Muslims part of Europe?

Islam has been an arena of contestation in Europe since the late 1970s when the socio-economic problems of migrant workers, primarily from Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and Pakistan, were largely overlooked, and considered a natural outcome of cultural differences. Scholars have linked this phenomenon to the populist right-wing discourse and the resulting perception in Europe that the cultural integration of Muslim migrants has failed (Khader, 2016: 176; Tekin, 2007). These beliefs are nurtured by populist right-wing claims that the failure of Muslims to integrate must be related to their religion and the incompatibility of Islam with Western culture and values (Khader, 2016: 177), and the prejudiced belief that Muslims have played no part in European history and so will never adapt to the European culture.

There is a wealth of literature investigating Islam as a cultural identity among Muslim migrants, and the radicalism and racism directed toward such groups (Abbas, 2007, 2012; Acim, 2019; Fekete, 2004; Froio, 2018; Gündüz, 2010; Jacobson, 1998; Kaya, 2016, 2021; Kaya and Tecmen, 2019; Murshed and Pavan, 2011). Within this vast body of literature, Kaya and Tecmen (2019), referring to the current anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe as Islamophobia and as a form of cultural racism, claim that it is wielded as an instrument for social control among the far-right conservative political elite who associate the Muslim community with illegal activity, crime, violence, drug abuse, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflict and financial burden, all together – referring to them as global ‘scapegoats’ (p. 51). On the other side, there is a common belief among many Muslims in the West that the West is guilty of applying double standards, with the freedoms that the West allows being restricted as soon as Islam and Muslims enter the picture (Berger, 2018: 266).

Populist thinking and the studies cited above, however, disregard the possibility that one’s adherence to Islam stands in the way of the creation of a sense of belonging to a host country. This study aims to reveal how Turkish and Syrian women in the Netherlands, contrary to popular perceptions, are increasingly embracing an Islamic identity and ceding their national identities as a means of establishing a certain sense of belonging in the Netherlands. It investigates how Islam instills a sense of belonging to the host society and state among its adherents. In this regard, the religiosity of Muslims in Europe does not suggest a disconnection from the European system, being rather a means by which migrants can be part of the system of their country of residence.

This article focuses specifically on Muslim women, given the challenge migrant Muslim women pose to gender relations in their host countries and to the relationships among migrant communities. Previous studies of the status of Muslims in Dutch society suggest that Muslim women are considered by non-Muslims to be victims of an oppressive system and as dependent, subordinate and backward – prevented by their own culture from playing an active role in society, with the veil held up as symbol of their oppression. One distinctive feature of these prejudices is the assumption that Muslim minorities are a threat to such established European values as gender equality (Eijberts and Roggeband, 2016: 133). Taking these arguments in to consideration, in this article, we focus on the issue of gender, and especially the female aspect, as we believe it to be a prime indicator of change in a community. In this sense, with the reference to Spivak’s (1994) critique of the lack of voice among subaltern women, the article considers Muslim women not as objects but as active agents and as subjects of change.

In this frame, this study offers an understanding of the current circumstances and identifies the similarities and differences in the patterns of belonging of religious women of Turkish and Syrian origin living in the Netherlands. Studying the attitudes of these groups toward their places of residence and their ways of life, as well as how they describe their lifestyles and their plans for the future, provides us with insight into their salient identity as Muslims in general, and more specifically, their demands for the new ummah and a Sharia Council.

It should be noted that while the migrants of Turkish and Syrian origin in the Netherlands differ in terms of numbers, ethnic origin, reasons for migration, period, settlement choice and obligations, there are commonalities in their understanding of religion and their religious lifestyles. Among the varied immigrant communities in the Netherlands, those of Turkish and Syrian origin are the most similar. First of all, the devout Muslim immigrants from the two countries belong primarily to the same Islamic congregation, while their shared Ottoman background has resulted in similar interpretations of Islamic references in the Civil Codes of their respective countries. Both Syria and Turkey have secular regimes, although in Syria, Muslims turn to Sharia courts for matters related to civil law, while in Turkey, the secular legal system alone holds sway in civil matters, although 83 percent of the Turkish population approve of unofficial religious marriages in parallel to official marriages (Sarıgil et al., 2020). In other words, Islam is an important point of reference in matters pertaining to civil law, although not at an official level. Finally, the experience of living as a religious person in a secular state and society is similar as both countries are constitutionally secular, and so Muslim women from both countries have acquired the practice of living as Muslim women in a secular state. This practice clearly distinguishes the religious lifestyles of Muslim women from both countries from that of other immigrants.

After Turks, Moroccans are the most populous Muslim immigrant group in the Netherlands, and there have been numerous studies to date comparing Dutch, Moroccan and Turkish Muslims in the country (Curl and Doomernik, 2003; Dotinga et al., 2004; Maliepaard et al., 2009). In this study, we chose not to present a further comparison of Moroccans with Turks due primarily to the congregational difference between the two immigrant groups – Moroccans being primarily of the Maliki congregation, who practice Islam very differently from the primarily Hanafi Turks. Another reason relates to their political differences, as unlike Turkey and Syria, Morocco is still ruled by a monarchy and is not constitutionally secular. In summary, Turks and Syrians share commonalities in terms of religion, politics and culture realms, as the basis of comparison in this article. Moreover, the aim of this study is to understand the sense of belonging experienced by ethnically different migrant Muslim women, and the effect of the early immigration of Turks and the late immigration of Syrians. Moroccans settled in the Netherlands almost simultaneously with Turks, however, this article is about the difference in the development of a sense of belonging to the Netherlands of two immigrant groups – one that settled earlier and one that arrived more recently. In this sense, the Syrians can be considered appropriate for comparison with Turks. It can be understood from the new Muslim profile in Europe that the religious practices of ‘ordinary Muslims’ are no longer directly linked to family traditions in their countries of origin, or the practices passed down from generation to generation. As such, this study investigates the sense of belonging constructed by Turkish and Syrian religious women in their host nation – the Netherlands. The body of previous literature on belonging and the related politics (Antonsich, 2010; Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006; Huizinga and Van Hoven, 2018; Yuval-Davis, 2006) can thus be considered highly relevant to this study in terms of their theorization of how and when migrants feel safe, or under what conditions they hide or reveal their identities.

We also delve into the interplay between gender and religion in the settlement processes of religious women of Turkish and Syrian origin, and in doing so, gain an understanding of the relationship between Islam as a salient identity (Ayvazoğlu et al., 2020; Hogg, 2006; Stets and Burke, 2000) and its effects related to gender among women, who generally regard themselves as ‘religious tutors’ to their children. The respondents considered the teaching of Islamic rules to their children to be of utmost importance in their efforts to raise them as ‘good’ Muslims, in line with the Social Identity Theory. Stets and Burke (2000) highlight the phenomenon of the threat to identity and the effect of this threat on the salient identities of minority groups. Following on from this, this study draws from Social Identity Theory to explain why migrant Muslim groups are so keen to maintain their religious identity, and suggests that the theory may be applied to understand the construction of the new ummah as a ‘safe haven’ for Muslim women living in the Netherlands.

Finally, we explain the motivation behind our study of the Muslim community in the Netherlands, which is related primarily to the country’s immigration policy. In its transformation from multiculturalism to integration, the immigration policy of the Netherlands has always served as an example for Western European countries. Gender occupies an indispensable place in the history of Dutch immigration policy, and so the country presents a unique opportunity for consideration of the relationship between Islam, women and the sense of belonging, and particularly the impact of the murder of Theodoor van Gogh ¹ on the transformation of the Dutch approach to immigration, from multiculturalism to integration, after 2000.

Theoretical base

Stets and Burke’s (2000: 227) analysis of intergroup relationships investigates the in-group functions of groups who identify with each other, who recognize their similarities and who hold similar views that are in contrast with those of out-group members, serving to highlight the process behind the maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem. On this issue, the authors referenced Turner et al. (1987) and their identification of group formation as the holding and reinforcing of the same perceptions within a group, as well as the enhanced self-evaluation associated with the activation of a group identity noted in Social Identity Theory. The self-esteem motive was thus conceived to be at the heart of in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism in many cases, residing alongside hostility toward the out-group (Stets and Burke, 2000: 232). Oakes (1987) described salience from a socio-psychological perspective with emphasis on the psychological significance of group membership, with a group, in this regard, being defined in psychological terms as comprising at least three or more people who perceive and evaluate themselves based on shared attributes that distinguish them collectively from other people (Hogg, 2006: 111).

Hogg (2006) claims that a migrant may have as many social and personal identities as the number of groups to which they belong, but emphasizes, however, that in any given situation only one identity is sufficiently psychologically salient for the governance of self-construal, social perception and social conduct. For Hogg (2006: 115), a person’s salient identity may change as the situation or context changes which is in perfect alignment with the fact that Muslim migrants tend to reveal more of their Islamic identity after their migration as a result of their new conditions, the threats they encounter or their plans within their new surroundings. Connor (2010) comes to a parallel conclusion, pointing out that Muslim populations tend to be more religious in European countries where the anti-immigrant sentiment is high. In the course of our interviews, we found that migrant Muslim women, for many reasons, spend more time in mosques than in the past, being a somewhat new domain to these women considering the fact that mosques are generally a male domain in Muslim countries. Saba Mahmood’s (2005) study of women in Egypt shows how piety can change conditionally, how the active use of mosques by women can lead to changes in Muslim women and in piety itself, and how new interpretations of Islam develop. Similarly, Tubergen’s (2013) study of immigrant groups in the Netherlands also identifies differences in the patterns of religiousness, revealing that members of the ‘old’ immigrant groups, comprising Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans, more frequently attended religious meetings and pray more often than those of the ‘new’ immigrant groups (p. 723). This suggests that a strong institutional structure in the host country facilitates the construction of mosques and the presence of imams, leading to a strengthened religious identity among immigrant groups through their reliance on religious practices or their increased use of the mosque as a social space.

Can the enhancement of a particular identity result in the depersonalization of the members of the group in question? The answer to this, according to Social Identity Theory, is a resounding Yes! Hogg refers to this phenomenon as social categorization, and claims that it depersonalizes both in-group and out-group members. The depersonalized perception of out-group members is called stereotyping, while self-stereotyping is applied to in-group members (Hogg, 2006: 119). Depersonalization, for Hogg (2006: 119), becomes a means by which one views oneself as a category representative, and self-categorization produces conformity and patterns of in-group liking, trust, and solidarity as a result.

For migrant Muslim women in the Netherlands, this goes a long way to explaining their living patterns. The more the women that we interviewed regarded themselves as ‘free’ to maintain an Islamic lifestyle, the more likely they were to prioritize their ummah over their personal preferences. Moreover, we found the self-representation of Muslim women to be quite strong, especially among the Turkish community, many of whom were born in the Netherlands as Muslim women and seemed to be sufficiently equipped to represent Islam. Van Es (2019) refers to this phenomenon as the ambassadorial role of Muslim women, and claims that many Muslim women, including those with a migrant background, have begun to play an ambassadorial role in public debates about Islam that have been growing in the Netherlands since the 1980s (Van Es, 2019: 389). While making this argument, Van Es (2019) points out further that the self-representations of these women should be seen as part of the politics of belonging – a notion that leads us into discussions of belonging and the politics of belonging.

Literature regularly refers to feminist thinker Yuval-Davis (2006) when explaining the difference between belonging and the politics of belonging – with the former being identified as an emotional attachment, invoking the feeling that one is ‘at home’ and ‘safe’, while the latter refers to special political projects aimed at the construction of a sense of belonging in certain groups through specific methods. Belonging has a relational context with social locations, constructions of the self, and collective identities or attachments, and the ways these are valued and judged (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 203). Our intention in this study is to explain the behaviors of migrant groups and their interactions – which are quite important in the formation of a new ummah for Muslim migrants in the Netherlands – and we can thus assume that the concept of belonging has multiple meanings and explanations for the migrant populations that can be regarded as out-groups. Huizinga and Van Hoven (2018), for example, explain the concept of belonging from the perspective of refugee groups who are defined as ‘others’. For them, refugees develop ‘new places’ that are built around the shared memories, stories and foods of their home countries (Huizinga and Van Hoven, 2018: 309), and they feel happier and safer in these newly constructed atmospheres. Antonsich (2010: 647) identifies five aspects of belonging: auto-biographical, relational, cultural, economic and legal, among which the cultural factors of language (Buonfino and Thomson, 2007: 17) and religion (Ameli et al., 2004) are key components in the construction of a sense of belonging in a group.

When discussing the politics of belonging, Crowley’s (1999) famous description ‘the dirty work of boundary maintenance’ (p. 30) is often referenced, with specific mention of the boundaries defined by Yuval-Davis (2006) as the lines that divide the global population into ‘us’ and ‘them’. For Anthias (1998), one’s sense of belonging has boundaries, although hierarchies exist both within and across boundaries. Previous scholars have described an imagined construction of the border concept, as explained above, as a political construct. The ‘new ummah’ concept discussed in this article gains specific importance for its determination of the boundaries between the self and the others. In a classical sense, the ummah comprises all devout Muslims, although there is also a national reference. In other words, it suggests the existence of a homogeneous structure. The new definition of the ummah that we propose in this article, however, recognizes the heterogeneity of the Islamic faith based on the understanding that, as mentioned above, it can be conditionally interpreted differently when determining its boundaries with respect to others. It recognizes the ummah as a whole and emphasizes the differences in membership of the ummah as a European Muslim or as a Muslim in an Islamic country. In this sense, one’s membership of the ummah serves to define one’s supra-identity, though not at the expense of loyalty to one’s country of residence – though balancing the two requires ‘hybrid’ aspirations, as Bhabha puts it. This understanding recognizes that identity is fragmented, but also fragments belonging, and one can have many identities and also many political affiliations.

For Yuval-Davis (2006: 204), the situated imaginations of imagined communities that are separated by different boundaries are influenced by their social locations and experiences, in line with the definitions of self, with the most important situated imagination being their values. For Bhambra (2006: 39) and Yuval-Davis (2006: 204), the politics of belonging are related directly to the locations of others, whether inside or outside the imagined boundary, and whether they are referred to as ‘us’ or ‘them’. In such a constructed milieu, major questions remain, such as who ‘belongs’ and who does not? And what are the minimum common grounds in terms of origin, culture and normative behavior for such a kind of belonging to be felt (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 207)? For Antonsich (2010: 649, 650), these questions conflate politics of belonging with identity politics and claims of belonging on one hand, and the power to ‘grant’ belonging on the other hand.

In this study, we discuss the effect of Islam – as a salient identity – on the patterns of belonging of religious Muslim women in the Netherlands and address the issue of belonging particularly in the context of Muslim women. One of the most important factors defining one’s sense of belonging in a state or country is, of course, the legal rights recognized under citizenship. That said, people are expected to establish a relationship with the state and country on a cultural level rather than in the context of economic and social rights. Chatterjee (1990), known for his work on the relationships between culture, nation and belonging, claims that anticolonial movements ascribe special importance to women in the construction of an authentic cultural identity. Muslims living in predominantly non-Muslim communities redefine the position of Muslim women in the community as representatives of their culture, and it can thus be said that the field of religion has been left to women, especially at a grassroots level (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 131). Chatterjee’s explanation is crucial to our article, as most of the women we spoke to said that they did not feel safe as Muslims, even though they held Dutch citizenship, and complained that they attracted stares for wearing a headscarf, and had access only to low-paid employment, if any. Moreover, ‘religious Muslim’ women are actively engaged in initiatives aimed at reinforcing the sense of belonging of the Muslim community in the Netherlands. This involves rekindling discussions around religiosity and religious institutions, thereby placing them back on the public agenda. The new definition of the ummah and the demands for a Sharia Council should be addressed within this framework. Referring again to Chatterjee (1990), women always occupy a central place in fundamentalist movements, but are usually against fundamentalism.

Methodology

Data for this study was garnered primarily through participatory observations, one-on-one interviews and document analyses, all of which were conducted in the Netherlands in September 2020, July 2021, October 2021 and April 2022, ² and to a large extent determined the basis of our arguments. An ethnographic approach was applied during the participatory observations with a view to recording life in the community from ‘the locals’ point of view’. The researcher was able to share the lives of the targeted community over a relatively long period, and to examine their living patterns, habits and culture close up, thus gaining an understanding of the relationship they developed with the world being the central benefit of such an approach.

Different approaches to participatory observation were employed in the study, including temporary residence in the homes of the respondents, visiting different mosques, participating in women’s meetings and religious festivals held in the mosques, and joining various online chat forums. Throughout the participatory observations, it was noted that the respondents preferred mosques over non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for their social activities, from which it was understood that mosques serve as a form of civil organization for immigrants with strong religious backgrounds. For this reason, study visits were made to mosques rather than NGOs, and were arranged by the Directorate of Religious Affairs and different Islamic communities, or by Moroccans living in Amsterdam and Leiden. As a result, a total of six mosques in Amsterdam, two in Leiden and one in Utrecht were visited on numerous occasions, of which three serving Moroccan communities were selected due to the preference of Syrian migrants for their native Arabic language. The COVID-19 pandemic prevented face-to-face observations for part of the study period, leading the researcher to participate in online activities. The Turkish Religious Foundation in Holland (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı) organizes online classes and conversations for women during the month of Ramadan for catechism, sense tafsir and hadith prayer meetings, and the researcher regularly attended these events as an observer and took notes on the questions asked and the responses given. With the easing of COVID-19 pandemic restrictions after April 2021, the researcher’s fieldwork continued with participant observations, including regular/routine visits to Turkish Mosques, such as for Ramadan and Eid al-Adha celebrations and Quran courses.

The one-on-one interviews were held with 25 Turkish and 25 Syrian respondents living in Leiden, Amsterdam, Amersfoort, Rotterdam, Baarn and Sasseinhaim, the majority of whom were women. A semi-structured in-depth interview approach was adopted for which a total of 32 questions were prepared, and the interviews lasted for 2 hours on average. As many of the study participants, primarily the female respondents, declined to have the interviews recorded, the researcher made written notes throughout the interviews. While some of the interviews were conducted face-to-face, others were carried out online due to the restrictions applied during the COVID-19 pandemic. A female Syrian translator accompanied the researcher during the in-depth interviews with Syrian women, although six of the Syrian respondents spoke English, and so their interviews were conducted online in English. The other interviews were held in the homes of the Syrian women, allowing the observation of the living conditions of Syrian migrants in the Netherlands. The interviews with Turkish women were mostly conducted in Turkish, although some of the third-generation Turkish respondents had difficulties speaking in Turkish and sometimes needed to explain themselves in English. The female Turkish interviewees were Islamic educators and mosque representatives, teachers at Islamic schools and representatives of Islamic NGOs, while the female Syrian interviewees were teachers of Quran courses, representatives of Islamic NGOs providing support to Syrian families and a lawyer.

Finally, for the document analysis, a review was made of reports, theses and dissertations related to Turkish and Syrian immigrants in Turkey and the Netherlands, for which the annual reports, websites and social media accounts of such institutions as the Netherlands Religious Foundation, the National Vision Northern Netherlands Youth Organization (JVF), National Vision Amsterdam Netherlands, the Netherlands Turks Platform, Amsterdam Nizam-ı Alem Suleymaniye Mosque, the Golden Umbrella Foundation and the Amsterdam Al-Aqsa Organization were analyzed. Furthermore, YouTube broadcasts of different community television channels were followed, especially for those dealing with women’s and family issues. Finally, the websites and Facebook pages of such NGOs as ‘Lens of Young Syrians in the Netherlands’, ‘Syrian Guests in the Netherlands’, ‘Syrians in the Netherlands’, ‘Syrian Women’s Foundation in the Netherlands’ and ‘Syrian Volunteers in the Netherlands’ were examined, and a general profile of these organizations was created.

Religiousness as a means of establishing a sense of belonging in the Netherlands for Muslim immigrants

A report penned by the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the government of the Netherlands stated that Dutch Muslims are becoming increasingly religious and isolated from the rest of Dutch society, posing a challenge to the Dutch government’s integrationist immigration policy. ³ Our study was launched based on this understanding, although the data garnered during the fieldwork led us to question the isolationist viewpoint. During our work in the field, we found the relationship with religion among Muslim immigrant groups to be two-dimensional, with some of those living in the Netherlands having completely distanced themselves from Islam, while others have become more religious. It can thus be understood that the relationship of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands with Islam is not uniform. While there have been studies suggesting that religious immigrants threaten social peace and the forming of consensus in the Netherlands, ⁴ the fieldwork of this study points to just the opposite, asserting that the religiosity of Muslim migrants offers them the opportunity to connect with the system of which they are a part.

In this article, we discuss this claim in the light of two important Islamic concepts: ummah and Sharia, arguing that Muslim immigrants have created a new definition of ummah, and a new sense of solidarity in the Netherlands, and that this new definition of ummah includes a criticism of the traditional institutional structures of Islam and the power they have established. It is frequently claimed that the rise of Islamophobia in Europe has brought Muslim immigrants closer together (Abbas, 2019), and although this claim is not wrong, the increase in individualization and the weakening of ties to the homeland have led to religion becoming more important for third-generation migrants ⁵ in the Netherlands. Muslims of different nationalities are thus brought together around the idea of ‘ummah’. As stated during our interview with Ayşe, ⁶ a teacher at one of the Turkish mosques in the Netherlands:

I profess my Muslim identity and oppose Islamophobia and anti-Islam. Maybe this is a more reactive than thought-out situation. I am starting to feel like I no longer belong within the Muslim community, although the Dutch are pushing me toward Islam. As a Muslim, you have to work harder to achieve something. I think I have fallen 1-0 behind because I am Muslim. Aside from that, there is always the question of whether I am Dutch or Turkish. I am not sure if I am Turkish. I am both Dutch and Turkish, but beyond that I am Muslim; that is my primary identity. ⁷

The female Turkish Muslim respondents said that while the national ties of Muslim immigrants may be weakening, their identification with Islam is becoming stronger and more inclusive, although there are differences between the Turks and Syrians in this respect, which is the focus of this study. For example, there is now a third generation of Turks living in the Netherlands, and while the link between the younger Turkish population and their country of origin is weak, the link between Syrians and their homeland is strong, which can be attributed to their traumatic escape from the war conditions. That said, neither group is keen to return: The Syrian immigrants are reluctant to return due to the past trauma and the perceived instability in their home country, while the desire of the Turkish immigrants to stay in the Netherlands has an auto-biographical grounding (Antonsich, 2010), having been born or raised in the Netherlands and started working there, thus developing a material and moral grounding.

In short, the two groups of Muslim immigrants, one new and one old, both want to feel part of the Netherlands, but for different reasons. This phenomenon overlaps with Hogg’s (2006) notion of social categorization, in which different immigrant groups depersonalize the in- and out-group members to be part of the new ummah in the Netherlands, while also emphasizing their cultural differences as Muslims. Against this background, the development of a sense of belonging in the Netherlands goes hand in hand with a new understanding of the ummah that affirms the Muslim identity – being one that allows Muslims to come together as ‘Muslims of the Netherlands’ under a new ummah that is widespread among immigrants in the Netherlands, but differs from the Islam under which Muslims live in their homelands.

Ummatization in the Netherlands is progressing in parallel with the increase in religiosity among Muslims, who are constantly forced to answer questions about Islam and thus turn to their ummah not only to protect their culture and identity, but also to live up to their sense of belonging to the society in which they live. This envisioned ummah, which is disseminated and popularized mostly through social media (such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube), makes it easier for Muslims to feel like they belong in the Netherlands by blurring the differences between them and their hosts. This envisaged ummah is an imaginary unity rather than a coming together in mosques or civil organizations, and is a reflection of the same faith and the same religious culture, and accordingly, a newly constructed identity. This process can thus be referred to as the creation of a sense of belonging, in the words of Yuval-Davis (2006), Huizinga and Van Hoven (2018) and Antonsich (2010).

However, religiosity not only protects the identity of migrants from Western culture, but also serves to ‘properly explain’ Islam to the West over the versions espoused by radical Islamic movements. As a consequence, the number of mosques providing religious education in the Netherlands has seen a marked increase, ⁸ and even formerly non-religious Muslims are beginning to turn to Islam to break down prejudices and answer the questions often asked about Islam. Mosques function as a social setting, especially for women migrants, being somewhere they can learn about and teach others about their faith and meet with other ethnic groups. Making use of the mosque as a social space has the potential to empower their self-esteem motive, as described in Social Identity Theory, answering women’s questions regarding Islam. This process, rather than being planned or constructed, serves to create and enhance the new ummah organically. Two of the interlocutors, a Turk and a Syrian, told how they had been affected by this state of constant questioning and the need to come up with answers:

We are asked many questions here, and we must answer these questions as accurately as possible. As such, we should know our religion well. Here, we live Islam differently than in Turkey. I can even say that we live more Islamic, because this (the Netherlands) is not a Muslim country. The cut of the meat, the content of what we eat – we must follow all that, and for that we have to know Islam well. ⁹

We are asked many questions here, especially about our religion. They ask why we are veiled. Since we came here later, we have to answer these questions, and for this we should know our own religion well. ¹⁰

During the fieldwork of the study, the male respondents generally did not respond to these questions (the production of Islamic knowledge is a male domain, especially within organized Islamic structures), and it was understood that the transmission, dissemination and application of the given responses, that is, responsibility for protecting the Islamic culture when living in a community in which the predominant religion is not Islam, lay mainly with women. As the bearers and transmitters of culture, women play an important role not only in presenting Islam to the public, but also in protecting it within the community/family. This is because, as Göle (2015: 74) notes, the visibility of religion in the public sphere is closely linked to its construction in the private sphere. It is evident that new meanings have been attributed to women through ‘motherhood’ relating to the protection and reconstruction of privacy within Islam among the Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands. Mahmood (2005: 23) claims that the behaviors of pious women are part of the ‘inhabited norms’ they desire, which are based on the patriarchic and religious culture and actually structure the ‘interiority’ of their gendered subjectivity. Under their long-standing immigration experience and institutionalization, Turks educate both their mothers and children in Islam from an early age in mosques, while Syrians, however, mostly teach their children about Islam at home under the supervision of their mothers in the absence of their own mosques. Addressing this issue, two respondents, a Turk and a Syrian, explained their role as mothers in passing on Islamic knowledge to their children:

I studied at the European Islamic University for 4 years, but I didn’t obtain my diploma. The school closed at that time. The truth is that I was motivated to study not for a diploma, but only to be a better mother. Since we live in a non-Muslim place and are aware of the moral depravity here, I undertook religious education to protect my children from this moral depravity. ¹¹

I am not currently employed. I was an English teacher in Syria. Here I teach my own children; I teach them both Arabic and Islam at home. ¹²

The religious tutor role of migrant women would appear to be compatible with Social Identity Theory based on the sense of power they gain. This opportunity increases the self-esteem motive, which may be related to the visibility of Muslim women in the Dutch public sphere (headscarf, halal food, mosque), and this phenomenon may also result in solidarity, trust and in-group liking among migrant Muslim women, as raised by Hogg (2006: 119) in Social Identity Theory.

However, Muslims today aspire to become ‘subjects’ of the administrative and legal structures in the Netherlands, beyond discussions of ‘representation of culture’ or ‘visibility’. Of course, this demand to be accepted as a ‘subject’ of Dutch society goes hand-in-hand with the idea of existing without abandoning one’s diversity. Within this process, the concepts of ‘homeland’, ‘national belonging’ and Islam, as the components of the Muslim identity that make up their ‘otherness’, become even more prominent. During the fieldwork for the study, we found that women who had become more religious played a greater role than men in the fading of national references, in those national attachments, which are often considered alongside Islam by individualized Muslim women, are managed based on one’s identification with the traditional norms and male authority. This opens traditional Islamic understanding to frequent criticism by women, as can be understood from the comment of one Turkish female respondent:

Islam is Islam, there is only one Islam. What is the definition of Islam in relation to a particular nation? For example, they say that under Islam, women are not allowed to do this, they are not allowed to do that . . . but I know that has nothing to do with true Islam, it is their culture or tradition. ¹³

Here, the respondent attempts to provide a pure definition of Islam, one that is free of all traditions. Young women in particular, and to some extent, men, prefer to belong to an ummah with no specific authority rather than to define themselves as part of an Islamic national community with strict rules. This ummah not only preserves a certain identity for Muslims, but also strengthens their sense of belonging to the host society by homogenizing those of different nationalities. Ultimately, two things are strengthened in this vision of the ummah: Islam, and the sense of attachment they have with their host country, where the style of Islam practiced has no equivalent in their home country.

Is the new ummah inclusivist or exclusionist?

There are two main obstacles to the new ummah envisioned by Muslims in the Netherlands, one being the congregational differences and the other the language barrier. Since the majority of Turks and Syrians belong to a common congregation, their views on Sharia are similar, although it would seem that the experience of living in Europe makes denominations meaningless after a while. The Islam of immigrants of European origin tend to abide by the basic tenets of Islam and adopt a trans-congregational interpretation, and instead of the congregational view suggested by all Islamic congregations, it is the individuality of belief without leaving the community that is prioritized rather than a specific congregation’s views.

With the new integration policy of the Netherlands and the need to master the language to obtain citizenship, all immigrants are rapidly moving away from their mother tongue. Dutch Turks who opposed this language issue opened the Amsterdam Faculty of Theology, where theology is studied and education is offered in Dutch, unlike in the previous faculties. When we asked the rector of the university why their language preference differed from that of other universities, he replied,

The doctrine of Islam is one reason. Other than that, it doesn’t matter in which language you teach. We live in the Netherlands today, and our children learn Dutch and speak Dutch better. We see no problem, therefore, in giving lessons in Dutch. ¹⁴

The fact that everyone must learn the language of the host country weakens the bond with both the mother tongue and the motherland, and leads to a reduction in the differences between Muslims through their gained ability to unite under a common language. This unity is also beneficial for the host country in terms of the governance of the Muslim immigrants and their dealings with different forms of Islam.

This new ummah, however, is not defined by its isolation from the Netherlands, but by its inclusion within the Dutch system. In this context, the demand for the establishment of Sharia Councils as advisory bodies within the Dutch legal system, especially by Muslim women, stands out as a demand of Muslims seeking to define themselves in terms of their position within the Dutch system. Antonsich (2010) explains his phenomenon as the notion of belonging over legal matters, as mentioned in the literature review in this study. Young Muslims who define themselves as part of the system want the system to recognize them as Muslims and to serve them accordingly, and the comment of Zübeyde among the respondents was particularly noteworthy in this sense:

Third-generation Dutch-Turks say today: ‘The Netherlands is my homeland’. They say: ‘It’s also our state. I also serve this state and expect service from this state’.. . . Of course, their demands are different from those of the previous generation, and that’s why they can demand such things as a Sharia Council. Since the third generation considers this their home, they no longer feel they belong only to the Turkish community, but also to the Islamic community. Their demands are also formulated within this community, and according to them, they make institutional or legal demands on the Dutch government. ¹⁵

Syrians, however, focus on satisfying their basic needs, being new to the Netherlands. Having fled the war and sought refuge in the Netherlands, their ‘primary psychological need is for a sense of predictability and continuity’ (Waite et al., 2014: 314). This study reveals that the longer the duration of residence, the greater the demands of immigrants from the Dutch state. Most Syrians deal with the Islamic aspect of marriage and divorce either by contacting a Sikh or Hodja in Syria online, or by obtaining the permission of a Syrian migrant Sikh/Hodja who is said to live in Rotterdam. Unregistered marriages are common in Syria (Van Eijk, 2016: 168), and the practice is common also among Syrian migrants in the Netherlands.

Nonetheless, Syrian immigrants who see permanent residence in the Netherlands as inevitable, though not as emphatically as the Turkish immigrants, concur that Sharia Councils may serve as facilitating mechanisms especially in matters related to marriage and divorce. As explained by one Syrian respondent,

A Sharia Council should be established mainly to facilitate the divorce process, because we want to be in accordance with our religion. Although Dutch law protects women, we also need the approval of Islam. ¹⁶

Indeed, the need for a Sharia Council, which is a common subject of discussion among Muslims in the Netherlands, is a concrete demand of this ummah concept in that, as Berger (2010: 253) points out, Muslim believers need religious certainty. The greatest chasm between the Dutch legal system and the legal demands of Muslim women can be found in civil and family law, and in matters related to marriage and divorce in particular, and Muslim women seek to comply with both. For Muslims in the Netherlands, there are no significant legal problems related to marriage, and so it is Islamic solutions to problems that arise when couples divorce that are more in demand among Muslims. When it comes to divorce, the question of whether a divorced woman is religiously divorced under Dutch law, the payment of the mahr, the duration of compensation for the wife and, to a lesser extent, custody are the main issues to be addressed. For the resolution of problems related especially to family law, Muslim groups including both Turks and Syrians, seek the establishment of a Sharia Council that works in parallel with the Dutch legal system. ¹⁷

The establishment of a Sharia Council in the Netherlands, however, is not without controversy. First, Muslims in the Netherlands want ‘legal pluralism’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 57), however, Sharia law is still a gray area, and there is a lack of consensus among Muslims on the meaning of Sharia. The term Sharia refers to religious law, but religious law can take many forms depending on the prevalent culture, ecology and hermeneutics. As such, the Sharia established by legal scholars is far from uniform, and Sharia law is applied differently in each Muslim country, making it difficult to apply in a standard form in the Netherlands where there are Muslims from different countries of origin. Second, the Enlightenment thinking of the 19th century and the rise of nationalist movements led the ulema to lose influence in education and law, and the influence of Islamic scholars was similarly weakened, creating an environment in which new types of Islamic schools emerged that went against the traditional understanding of Islam (Peters, 2002: 93). There are also fears today that the reintroduction of Sharia Councils will strengthen the influence of traditional Islamic scholars. Third, concerns have been raised that the establishment of the Sharia Council will lead to violations of women’s rights, while others claim the opposite – that the rights of women will be protected. It has been suggested that the establishment of a Sharia Council will be beneficial especially for women who have no family or community support network, serving as an official body that represents their best interests in the event of a divorce or other disputes (Van Eijk, 2019: 48). There have also been suggestions on how sectarian differences should be interpreted in the Council and what solutions can be found. Finally, the efficacy of such councils is also a subject of debate, as if they are only able to make recommendations, they will have no influence in decision-making.

In summary, institutional structures such as Sharia Councils may strengthen the allegiance of Muslims to their host countries. Since there has long been a presence of devout Dutch Turks in the Netherlands, they seem to have found a way of integrating into the system through Turkish mosques, without giving up their Islamic identity. That said, and in line with Jaraba’s (2019: 94) comment about the imams of the Turkish mosques in Germany, such religious leaders in the Netherlands are reluctant to take such initiatives as they do not want to fall foul of the Dutch government, especially in matters of marriage and divorce. For this reason, it has been suggested that an unofficial but highly systematic Sharia Council (Bano, 2008: 295), such as the one established in Britain, may reduce such pressures on the imams, as it is well understood that the building of mosques, rather than affirming the belonging of Muslims to the Netherlands, has served rather to highlight their marginalized character in the Netherlands.

Conclusion

Islam is gaining importance as a ‘salient identity’ among immigrant Muslims in the Netherlands, and with the increasing Muslim population in Europe the legal claims of Muslims from European states are also increasing. While mosques and minarets, as well as the burqa, are a common topic of discussion in Europe, demands for the establishment of Sharia Councils raised mainly by third-generation immigrants are proving to be the most concrete of the demands made by Muslims from their host nations. In recognition of this situation, for this study, we worked with self-professed ‘religious Muslim’ women, who explained their religiousness as a lifestyle formed around Islamic principles. Throughout our observations, we found that Islam had been transformed from a minor aspect of their identity to a major part of their lives as a result of an organic process that has led to a sense of belonging and demands for a Sharia Council. Our field studies revealed that new-generation Muslims in particular would seem to have chosen their own path as active residents of the Netherlands within the framework of the new ummah. The demands for a Sharia Council are driven by the desire of Dutch Muslim immigrants to gain more visibility and find a common voice, rather than a yearning for new boundaries.

Our field studies also revealed that the longer Muslims stay in the Netherlands as immigrants, the greater their cultural demands. The female respondents generally believed it was their duty to embrace Islam in the Netherlands, which we linked to the increased self-esteem motive with reference to Social Identity Theory. Religious Muslim women spend more time in mosques in the Netherlands for their socialization needs, thus increasing the sense of solidarity through in-group activities. In this sense, a comparison of the newly arriving Syrians with the longer established Turks in the Netherlands can be considered an informative topic for study. Although the two groups have different characteristics and needs, the efforts of Turks and Syrians who consider themselves part of the common European ummah to exist as Muslims within the European identity were quite remarkable.

Also addressed in this study is the new definition of the ummah that has emerged in Europe and that seeks to bridge different Islamic sects and national patterns. It can be understood that the dissemination of this new definition of the ummah is in the hands of women and third-generation immigrants. As it is generally women and young people who resist traditionalism, the institutional understanding of Islam and national interpretations, it can be said that it is also this group that is adopting and developing the new definition of the ummah that rejects all such national and institutional ties.