Many challenges to a probabilistic account of evidence fail to distinguish two separate questions. One is the question of whether the evaluation of individual items of evidence is probabilistic or non-probabilistic. And the other is whether the evaluation of multiple items of evidence is sequential (Bayesian) or holistic. This paper seeks to distinguish these issues, to argue that challenges to probabilistic accounts have not yet made their case, and to attempt to clarify just what a theory of evidence and proof is a theory of.
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