Allen and Pardo's Relative Plausibility Model provides a mostly valid descriptive model for the reasoning of fact-finders like American jurors. My major reservations on the project concern the incompleteness of the authors’ review of empirical, behavioral research relevant to their proposal. The merits of the project as a normative model are less satisfying and, again, the review of relevant sources seems incomplete.
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