In my short contribution to this issue, I focus on Allen and Pardo proposal to redefine key evidentiary concepts in explanatory terms, with special attention to ‘relevancy’ and ‘probative value’. I also join forces with Allen and Pardo in replying to critics to explanatory approaches to evidence law.
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