Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner. [1969] 1 QB 439 at 444
2.
The case of Fagan (see Ref. 1) is an amusing illustration of both these requirements. The accused drove his car on to the foot of a policeman, accidentally and with no intent to harm the officer. But when the policeman complained, the driver refused to move, stopped the car, and then started it again, abusively asserting his intention not to move. Was the driver guilty of battery? In allowing his car to remain on the official foot was he intending to harm? The Court of Criminal Appeal was divided, one of the three judges holding that the driver's failure to move the car was ‘a mere omission’ and therefore no battery, while the other two judges upheld the conviction
3.
R v. Williams. [1923] 1 KB 340
4.
MitchellJ. A fundamental problem of consent. BMJ1995; 310: 43–46
5.
Only a handful of such cases is recorded, and those are to be found chiefly in the medical press e.g., Hamilton v. Birmingham RHA (a case concerning sterilisation without consent during Caesarean section). BMJ1969; 2: 456
6.
PuxonM. Manslaughter and the doctor. Clinical Risk1995; 1: 129–131
7.
Re S. [1992] All ER 67; [1993] 4 Med LR 28. In declaring the surgery lawful against the wishes of the patient, the court flew in the face of the principle of law, that an adult with ‘no mental incapacity has an absolute right’ to consent to or refuse medical treatment (see Ref. 8)
8.
ReT. [1992] 4 All ER 649
9.
It is said by some that there must be an element of hostility, but others deny this; it is perhaps misleading to use the word, as it has a very restricted meaning in this context, and it is particularly inappropriate when considering assault by a doctor based on lack of consent
10.
Chatterton v. Gerson. [1981] All ER 257
11.
Judge clears gynaecologist of negligence. BMJ1995; 311: 345
