Enacting localist health policy in the English NHS: the ‘governing assemblage’ of Clinical Commissioning Groups

Abstract

Objectives

The Health and Social Care Act 2012 introduced Clinical Commissioning Groups to take responsibility for commissioning (i.e. planning and purchasing) the majority of services for local populations in the English NHS. Constituted as ‘membership organizations’, with membership compulsory for all GP practices, Clinical Commissioning Groups are overseen by, and are accountable to, a new arm’s-length body, NHS England. This paper critically engages with the content and policy narrative of the 2012 Act and explores this in relation to the reality of local policy enactment.

Methods

Set against a careful review of the 2012 Act, a case study of a nascent Clinical Commissioning Groups was conducted. The research included observations of Clinical Commissioning Group meetings and events (87 h), and in-depth interviews (16) with clinical commissioners, GPs, and managers.

Results

The 2012 Act was presented as part of a broader government agenda of decentralization and localism. Clinical Commissioning Group membership organizations were framed as a means of better meeting the needs and preferences of local patients and realizing a desirable increase in localism. The policy delineated the ‘governing body’ and ‘the membership’, with the former elected from/by the latter to oversee the organization. ‘The membership’ was duty bound to be ‘good’, engaged members and to represent their patients’ interests. Fieldwork with Notchcroft Clinical Commissioning Group revealed that Clinical Commissioning Groups’ statutory duty to NHS England to ‘ensure the continuous improvement’ of GP practice members involved performance scrutiny of GP practices. These governance processes were carried out by a varied cast of individuals, many of whom did not fit into the binary categorization of membership and governing body constructed in the policy. A concept, the governing assemblage, was developed to describe the dynamic cast of people involved in shaping the work and direction of the Clinical Commissioning Group, many of whom were unelected and of uncertain status. This was of particular significance in Notchcroft Clinical Commissioning Group because the organization explicitly pursued a governance system based on developing positions of consensus. The governing assemblage concept is valuable in articulating the actual practices of Clinical Commissioning Group governance, how these relate to the normative content of the 2012 Act, and the tensions that emerge.

Conclusions

The governing assemblage concept provided clarity in discussion of the dynamics of organizational governance in Notchcroft Clinical Commissioning Group, which did not follow the simple template articulated in the 2012 Act. The concept merits application in the study of other Clinical Commissioning Groups and may prove valuable in illuminating governance processes within a range of other health care organizations in different contexts. The governing assemblage holds promise for the analysis of ongoing changes to NHS organization, as well as international health care organizations such as accountable care organizations in the US.