Anti-corruption has garnered increasing attention, especially in China, where President Xi launched an influential and far-reaching anti-corruption campaign in late 2012. A better understanding of the effects of anti-corruption efforts on the hotel sector can reveal insights into the development of the Chinese hotel industry. Based on the quarterly data on China’s hotel industry in 49 cities from quarter 2 of 2010 to quarter 4 of 2015, this study investigates how the anti-corruption campaign (measured by anti-corruption inspections and the number of corruption lawsuits) has influenced hotel industry demand in China. Hypotheses are developed from China’s unique cultural environment of guanxi combined with rent-seeking theory and the crowding-out principle. Empirical results confirm a significant and negative effect of the anti-corruption campaign on hotel lodging and food and beverage demand. Several factors, including a city’s administrative position as a provincial capital, hotel class, level of tourism dependence, and local residents’ entertainment expenditure, are found to moderate the effect of the anti-corruption campaign on hotels’ lodging demand significantly. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in light of these findings.
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