Getting those already within the system to comply has always been one of the loftier hurdles for gender quotas to clear. Some experts have thus maintained enforcement mechanisms (i.e., sanctions) are necessary to compel compliance and are a critical component of a comprehensive and effective gender quota framework. Drawing on more than a half-century of sanction theory and literature, this study discusses the critical differences between deterrence and compellence sanctions, and positive and negative sanctions. Although the most commonly-applied sanction in gender quota frameworks in Africa, this study’s analysis provides evidence that negative compellence sanctions are ineffective at helping quotas reach their minimum target-thresholds while positive compellence sanctions are particularly effective. This study further clarifies the extent to which different types of sanctions help gender quotas meet their target-thresholds over time.
ArendtCM (2018) From critical mass to critical leaders: unpacking the political conditions behind gender quotas in Africa. Politics and Gender14: 295–322.
2.
BaldezL (2004) Elected bodies: the gender quota law for legislative candidates in Mexico. Legislative Studies Quarterly29(2): 231–258.
3.
BaldwinDA (1971) The power of positive sanctions. World Politics24(1): 19–38.
4.
BaldwinDA (1978) Power and social exchange. American Political Science Review72(4): 1229–1242.
5.
BauerG (2004) The hand that stirs the pot can also run the country: electing women to parliament in Namibia. The Journal of Modern African Studies42(4): 479–509.
6.
BauerG (2014) A Lot of headwraps: innovations in a Second Wave of Electoral Gender Quotas in Sub-Saharan Africa. Working Paper. Fiesole, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. European University Institute.
7.
BauerGBurnetJE (2013) Gender quotas, democracy, and women’s representation in Africa: some insights from democratic Botswana and autocratic Rwanda. Women’s Studies International Forum41: 103–112.
8.
BeckwithK (2007) Numbers and newness: the descriptive and substantive representation of women. Canadian Journal of Political Science40(1): 27–49.
9.
BjarnegardE (2013) Gender, informal institutions, and political recruitment. In: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation. New York, NY: Palgrave.
10.
BjarnegardEZetterbergP (2016) Political parties and gender quota implementation: the role of bureaucratized candidate selection processes. Comparative Politics48(3): 393–417.
11.
BrattonKA (2005) Critical Mass Theory Revisted: the Behavior and Success of Token Women in State Legislatures. Politics & Gender1(1): 97–125.
12.
BurnetJE (2011) Women have found respect: gender quotas, symbolic representation, and female empowerment in Rwanda. Politics and Gender7: 303–334.
13.
CarrollSJ (2001) The Impact of Women in Public Office. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
14.
CarterDBSignorinoCS (2010) Back to the future: modeling time dependence in binary data. Political Analysis18(3): 271–292.
15.
CartwrightD (1959) Studies in Social Power. Ann Arbor, MI: The Institute for Social Research. The University of Michigan.
16.
CelisKChildsSKantolaJ, et al. (2008) Rethinking women’s substantive representation. Representation44(2): 99–110.
17.
ChibaDMetternichNWWardMD (2015) Every story has a beginning, middle, and an end (but not always in that order): predicting duration dynamics in a unified framework. Political Science Research and Methods3(3): 515–541.
18.
ChildsSKrookML (2008) Critical mass theory and women’s political representation. Political Studies56(3): 725–736.
19.
ChildsSKrookML (2009) Analysing women's substantive representation: from critical mass to critical actors. Government and Opposition44(2): 125–145.
20.
ClaytonA (2015) Women’s political engagement under quota-mandated female representation evidence from a randomized policy experiment. Comparative Political Studies48(3): 333–369.
21.
CraskeN (1999) Women and Politics in Latin America. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
22.
CrowleyJE (2004) When tokens matter. Legislative Studies Quarterly29(1): 109–136.
23.
CuttsDChildsSFieldhouseE (2008) This is what happens when you don’t listen: all-women shortlists at the 2005 general election. Party Politics14(5): 575–595.
24.
DahlRA (1968) Power International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 12. New York, NY: Free Press.
25.
DahlerupDFreidenvallL (2005) Quotas as a ‘fast track’ to equal representation for women. International Feminist Journal of Politics7(1): 26–48.
26.
DahlerupD (ed) (2006) Women, Quotas, and Politics. New York, NY: Routledge.
27.
DahlerupDFreidenvallL (2009) Gender quotas in Politics – a constitutional challenge. In: WilliamsSH (ed) Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
DownsA (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
30.
FearonJD (1994) Signaling versus the balance of power and interests: an empirical test of a crisis bargaining model. Journal of Conflict Resolution38: 236–269.
31.
FearonJD (1997) Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution41: 68–90.
32.
FranceschetSPiscopoJM (2008) Gender quotas and women’s substantive representation: lessons from Argentina. Politics and Gender4(3): 393–425.
33.
FranceschetSKrookMLJenniferP (2012) The Impact of Gender Quotas. Oxford University Press.
34.
FranceschetSKrookMLPiscopoJM (eds) (2012) The Impact of Gender Quotas. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
35.
FreedmanL (1998) Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
36.
Gender Quota Law (2021) Women in Parliament in 2020: The Year in Review. Inter-Parliamentary Union.
37.
GeorgeA (1991) Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
38.
GeorgeA (1994) The Cuban missile crisis: peaceful resolution through coercive diplomacy. In: GeorgeALSimonsWE (eds) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Boulder, CO: Westview.
39.
GeorgeASimonsWE (1994) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Boulder, CO: Westview.
40.
GeorgeASmokeR (1974) Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
41.
HtunMJonesM (2002) Engendering the right to participate in decision making: electoral quotas and women’s leadership in Latin America. In: CraskeNMolyneuxM (eds) Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America. New York, NY: Palgrave.
42.
HtunMLacalleMMicozziJP (2013) Does women’s presence change legislative behavior? Evidence from Argentina, 1983–2007. Journal of Politics in Latin America5(1): 95–125.
43.
HughesMMPaxtonPClaytonAB, et al. (2019) Global gender quota adoption, implementation, and reform. Comparative Politics51(2): 219–238.
44.
HuthPRussettB (1984) What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. World Politics36: 496–526.
45.
JenkinsLD (1999) Competing inequalities: the struggle over reserved legislative seats for women in India. International Review of Social History44: 53–75.
46.
JervisRLebowRNSteinJG (1986) Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
47.
JonesMP (2004) Quota legislation and the election of women: learning from the Costa Rican experience. The Journal of Politics66: 1203–1223.
48.
JonesMP (2009) Gender quotas, electoral laws, and the election of women. Comparative Political Studies42(1): 56–81.
49.
KangA (2013) The effect of gender quota laws on the election of women: lessons from Niger. Faculty Publications: Political Science41: 94–102.
50.
KerrN (2024) Electoral Commissions and Democratization in Africa: Everyday Production of Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
51.
KrookML (2006) Reforming representation: the diffusion of candidate gender quotas worldwide. Politics and Gender2(3): 303–327.
52.
KrookML (2009) Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
53.
KrookML (2016) Contesting gender quotas: dynamics of resistance. Politics, Groups, and Identities4(2): 268–283.
54.
LangS (2015) Thirty Years of Gender Quotas in Germany: Policy Adoption between Mainstreaming and Minimal Compliance. Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute.
55.
LaserudSTaphornR (2007) Designing for Equality: Best-Fit, Medium-Fit and Non-Favourable Combinations of Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas?Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
56.
LasswellHDAbrahamK (1950) Power and Society. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
57.
LebowRNSteinJG (1987) Beyond deterrence. Journal of Social Issues43: 5–71.
58.
LebowRNSteinJG (1989) Rational deterrence theory: I think, therefore I deter. World Politics41: 208–224.
59.
LeeHShinK-Y (2016) Gender quotas and candidate selection processes in South Korean political parties. Pacific Affairs89(2): 345–368.
60.
LongmanT (2006) Rwanda: achieving equality or serving an authoritarian state. In: BauerGBrittonHE (eds) Women in African Parliaments. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 133–150.
61.
MansbridgeJShamesSL (2008) Toward a theory of backlash: dynamic resistance and the central role of power. Politics and Gender4(4): 623–634.
62.
MeenaR (2004) The Politics of quotas in Tanzania. In: BallingtonJ (ed) The Implementation of Quotas. Stockholm, Sweden: International Idea, 82–86.
63.
MilburnTW (1959) What constitutes effective deterrence?Journal of Conflict Resolution3: 138–145.
64.
MorganP (1983) Deterrence. 2nd edition. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
65.
MurrayR (2004) Why didn’t parity work? A closer examination of the 2002 election results. French Politics2(3): 347–362.
66.
MurrayR (2007) How parties evaluate compulsory quotas: a study of the implementation of the ‘parity’ law in France. Parliamentary Affairs60(4): 568–584.
67.
MurrayRKrookMLOpelloKAR (2012) Why are gender quotas adopted? Parity and party pragmatism in France. Political Research Quarterly65(3): 529–543.
68.
PansardiPPedrazzaniA (2023) Do (strong) gender quotas make a difference? Multiple candidacies as a party gatekeeping strategy in Italy. Party Politics29(4): 711–725.
69.
PaxtonPHughesMM (2015) The increasing effectiveness of national gender quotas, 1990–2010. Legislative Studies Quarterly40(3): 331–362.
70.
PaxtonPHughesMMPainterMA (2010) Growth in women’s political representation: a longitudinal exploration of democracy, electoral system and gender quotas. European Journal of Political Research49(1): 25–52.
71.
PearsonEPowleyE (2008) Demonstrating Legislative Leadership: the Introduction of Rwanda’s Gender-Based Violence Bill. Washington, DC: The Initiative for Inclusive Security.
PetersenWJ (1986) Deterrence and compellence: a critical assessment of conventional wisdom. International Studies Quarterly30: 269–294.
74.
PhillipsA (1995) The Politics of Presence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
75.
PitkinH (1967) The Concept of Representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
76.
SchaubG (2004) Deterrence, compellence, and prospect theory. Political Psychology25(3): 389–411.
77.
SchellingTC (1966) Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
78.
SchwindtB (2009) Making quotas work: the effect of gender quota laws on the election of women. Legislative Studies Quarterly34(1): 5–28.
79.
ShiranM (2024) Backlash after quotas: moral panic as a soft repression tactic against women politicians. Politics and Gender20: 526–552.
80.
SnyderGH (1960) Deterrence and power. Journal of Conflict Resolution4: 163–178.
81.
TajaliM (2023) Women’s substantive representation in the Islamic Republic of Iran: the potential of women critical actors. Politics and Gender19(1): 66–96.
82.
TrippAM (2015) Women and Power in Postconflict Africa. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
83.
TrippAMKangA (2008) The global impact of quotas: on the fast track to increased female legislative representation. Comparative Political Studies41(3): 338–361.
84.
VincentL (2004) Quotas: changing the way things look without changing the way things are. Journal of Legislative Studies10(1): 71–96.
