Why do autocratic ruling parties adopt certain candidate selection processes, and what effects do they have on political outcomes? This article argues that many contemporary autocracies democratize candidate selection to address the demands of multiparty elections, but that this creates unforeseen hazards. Autocrats centralize candidate selection to reassert control over the composition of legislatures, but not necessarily to recruit more effective representatives. These ideas are explored in Cameroon, a longstanding authoritarian regime that has altered its candidate selection twice. Using an original biographical dataset and elite survey that measures legislative role orientations, the article shows how changes to candidate selection allowed the Cameroonian regime to retain more partisan legislators and to recruit new candidates who were more oriented to the party than the constituency. The article expands the comparative study of candidate selection to new settings and provides insights into how candidate selection helps shape and sustain authoritarian regimes.
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