Abstract
It is rare that a political science book on personality and partisanship includes fitting quotes from literary fiction authors like Virginia Wolf and Karl Ove Knausgård. Yet, Matt Luttig, Associate Professor at Colgate University, has managed to do exactly that in his book “The Closed Partisan Mind - A New Psychology of American Polarization” published in April 2023 by Cornell University Press.
Despite its slender volume, the book comprehensively revisits two old but competing classics: First, the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis which states that people on the right of the ideological spectrum are more closed-minded than their moderate or left-wing counterparts. Second, the “rigidity of the extremes” hypothesis which - in sharp contrast to its contender - argues that extreme ideologues on either side of the spectrum tend to be more rigid in their worldview, including their political attitudes. Luttig’s work is known for challenging common assumptions about personality in politics (see, e.g., Luttig (2021) for his work on authoritarianism). From this perspective, this book neatly aligns with his research expertise - both substantively and methodologically. Despite its academic focus, Luttig utilises eloquent language and illustrative anecdotes to make his research accessible to readers outside the academy.
So, what is “new” about Luttig’s proposed “psychology of American polarization”? First, the author examines whether people who are psychologically closed-minded are more intensely partisan than people who are psychologically open. In this context, closed-mindedness - or Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) as it is known to (political) psychologists - describes a person who is uncomfortable with uncertainty and thus tries to diminish this discomfort by “seizing” on readily available information. Need for Cognitive Closure can express itself in various ways, including a preference for group conformity, consistent routines, and familiar environments. Luttig argues that people with high levels of NFCC also tend to be stronger partisans since their party identification simplifies the complex political world and provides clear guidance on how to evaluate political parties, their leaders, as well as their policies, ideologies, and values. From this vantage point, strong party attachments provide exactly the type of closure that people high in NFCC crave.
This aspect of Luttig’s theory borrows directly from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel et al., 1979) and its theoretical offshoot Uncertainty-Identity Theory (Hogg, 2007). In combination, these theories predict that people with a high need for cognitive closure should be drawn to social and political groups with distinct group boundaries, coherent group norms, and high levels of group conformity. Importantly, as Luttig argues, it does not matter whether that party is liberal or conservative. In the end, any political party - just like any other social group - can potentially satisfy an epistemic need for certainty and order, regardless of its ideological orientation. While Luttig readily acknowledges that Republicans are more likely to score high on the NFCC scale, he convincingly shows that NFCC is positively linked to stronger partisan attachments as well as higher levels of affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats.
Admittedly, there are some caveats: The relationship between NFCC and partisan strength as well as many other outcome variables is moderated by political interest. In other words, closed-minded people who are also interested in politics tend to display stronger partisan attachments. In many of Luttig’s analyses, NFCC does not emerge as a significant predictor on its own. Thus, political interest crucially qualifies Luttig’s argument: People who score high on the NFCC scale do not automatically look for guidance from their political parties unless they already have an interest in politics. This pattern has become more pronounced as Democrats and Republicans in the US have become more polarized. As Luttig demonstrates, with the help of a smart experimental design, polarisation has left the parties with more distinctive brands that are particularly appealing to closed partisans since they provide a clear contrast between the parties as well as more conformity within the parties. Thus, polarisation has intensified the relationship between NFCC and partisan strength among the politically interested segment of the electorate. This is a valuable insight, especially for personality researchers who oftentimes struggle to use their relatively stagnant personality variable as an explanation for a dynamic phenomenon such as polarisation over time.
Critics might nevertheless raise questions about the share of Democrats and Republicans who satisfy both crucial conditions laid out in Luttig’s theory, namely being closed-minded and interested in politics. Does it cover a substantial segment of the electorate or only a small minority of partisans? Is that share significantly smaller among Democrats compared to Republicans, and if so, does that imply considerable differences in political behaviour between them? Answers to these questions could illustrate the applicability of Luttig’s undoubtedly significant contribution.
Luttig closes the book with a thoughtful discussion of his results’ implications for future research on partisanship, political attention, and polarisation as well as a brief elaboration on how to open the closed partisan mind, or really, any closed mind. Readers who are weary of being told to accept the inevitability of partisan acrimony will appreciate Luttig’s optimistic conclusion that there are indeed helpful and even pragmatic tools that can help us engage with the other side in a more receptive way. While political scientists should not lose sight of much-needed institutional reforms to address polarisation and partisan disdain in US politics, psychological approaches to promote open-mindedness and tolerance for the chaotic and murky world can turn us not just into better partisans but also better people - as Luttig aptly notes: “[…] those of us who study political psychology and those who cherish the values of liberty and democracy […] should avail ourselves of all the tools at our disposal to create a more perfect union” (p. 100). This book might be a good place to start.
