Putin’s puppets in the West? The far right’s reaction to the 2022 Russian (re)invasion of Ukraine

Abstract

While an argument that the far right supports Putin is popular, comparative analysis of far-right parties’ stances on Russia is generally lacking. In the wake of the 2022 Russian (re)invasion of Ukraine, this becomes increasingly problematic. This study aims to fill this gap and provide an initial answer(s) to an increasingly important question of who supports Putin's Russia within the Western world. First, I examine the immediate reactions to the 2022 (re)invasion of far-right parties across the European Union. Based on the findings, new sub-categories within the far-right in terms of stances on Putin’s Russia are proposed. Second, I provide a comparative analysis of the roll-call votes in the European Parliament on resolutions condemning Russia’s actions and test the proposed sub-categories.

Keywords

far right foreign policy Putin Russia European Parliament

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