Partisan distribution of ministerial portfolios in Asian-Pacific democracies

Abstract

How are ministerial portfolios distributed among coalition parties in Asian-Pacific democracies? Studies of power-sharing in Asia tend to focus on democratization processes rather than executive cabinets, although government coalitions occur regularly in the region. Using an original dataset of governments in 27 Asian-Pacific democracies from 1945 to 2018, I examine the bargaining advantage of the formateur party - the party managing the government formation process - over other parties entering government. We know from existing studies, mainly on Europe, that government parties holding larger shares of legislative seats receive larger shares of cabinet posts. I argue that portfolio allocation also depends on institutional context, and use the substantial institutional variation across countries in my dataset to test implications of this argument. I find that formateur parties have a greater advantage over coalition partners in presidential systems than in parliamentary ones, but that this advantage diminishes as political constraints facing the formateur increase.