The article examines the effect of the personal characteristics of ministers on their party and coalition partners' pledge fulfilment. Partisanship and additional party-related experience is expected to help party pledge fulfilment. Previous field-related experience should additionally open up the space for alternative principals. However, partisan motivation should be the leading mechanism for the behaviour of the minister – and field-related experience can help partisan ministers to follow party mandates better. The joint dataset of objectively testable pledges in the Czech Republic (2007–2015) supplemented by information on government ministers is used to test hypotheses. The article shows that not only holding the portfolio but also the particular features of ministers, especially those related to party-related experience, influence their ability to fulfil party promised policy.
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