Parties that in the past have defended radical positions sometimes decide to moderate, moving towards the median position. Moderation, however, is not the automatic response to electoral defeat. Some parties resist moderation for long periods of time. I suggest that in order to explain moderation (or lack of it), it is necessary to introduce some degree of ideological rigidity into the utility function of parties. Once we have ideological rigidity, several results follow. First, convergence to the median position cannot be an equilibrium even with complete information. Second, moderation is more likely the less the degree of ideological rigidity, the greater the ideological distance between the parties, and the smaller the distance between the moderating party and the median voter. Normally, when moderation is observed, it is due to the fact that the party tempers its ideological rigidity through organizational reforms or leadership renovation.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Adams, James (2001) Party Competition and Responsible Party Government. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press .
2.
Aldrich, John H. (1983) ‘A Spatial Model with Party Activists: Implications for Electoral Dynamics’ , Public Choice41: 63–100 .
3.
Aldrich, John H. (1997) ‘When is it Rational to Vote?’, in Dennis C. Mueller (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice, pp. 371–390. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
4.
Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal (1995) Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Anderson, Paul and Nyta Mann (1997) Safety First. The Making of New Labour. London: Granta Books .
7.
Brennan, Geoffrey and Loren Lomasky (1993) Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
8.
D’Alimonte, Roberto (1999) ‘Party Behavior in a Polarized System: the Italian Communist Party and the Historic Compromise’, in Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strom (eds) Policy, Office, or Votes? pp. 141–171. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
9.
Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row .
10.
Fiorina, Morris P. (1976) ‘The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects’ , Journal of Politics38: 390–412 .
11.
Gillespie, Richard (1988) The Spanish Socialist Party. A History of Factionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press .
12.
Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro (1994) Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press .
13.
Harmel, Robert and Kenneth Janda (1994) ‘An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change’ , Journal of Theoretical Politics6: 259–287 .
14.
Heath, Anthony and Roger Jowell (1994) ‘Labour’s Policy Review’, in Anthnoy Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice (eds) Labour’s Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond, pp. 191–209. Aldershot: Dartmouth .
15.
Ignazi, Piero (1992) Dal PCI al PDS. Bologna: il Mulino.
16.
Iversen, Torben (1994) ‘The Logics of Electoral Politics’ , Comparative Political Studies27: 155–189 .
17.
Juli·, Santos (1997) Los Socialistas en la PolÌtica EspaÒola. 1879–1982. Madrid: Taurus.
18.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (1996) The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press .
19.
L’Unit· (1990) Documenti per il Congresso Straordinario del PCI. Roma: L’Unit‡.
20.
Maravall, JosÈ MarÌa (1991) ‘From Opposition to Government: The Politics and Policies of the PSOE’, in JosÈ MarÌa Maravall et al. (eds) Socialist Parties in Europe, pp. 5–34. Barcelona: Institut de CiËncies PolÌtiques i Socials.
21.
Miller, Susanne and Heinrich Potthoff (1986) A History of German Social Democracy. From 1848 to the Present (translated by J. A. Underwood). Lemington Spa: Berg .
22.
Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strom (eds) (1999) Policy, Office, or Votes? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
23.
Palfrey, Thomas R. (1984) ‘Spatial Equilibrium with Entry’ , Review of Economic Studies51: 139–156 .
24.
Panebianco, Angelo (1988) Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
25.
Parness, Diane L. (1991) The SPD and the Challenge of Mass Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview .
26.
Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague (1986) Paper Stones. A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press .
27.
Richards, Andrew (1997) ‘The Life and Soul of the Party: Causes and Consequences of Organizational Change in the British Labour Party, 1979–1997’. Estudio/Working Paper 1997/95. Madrid: Instituto Juan March.
28.
Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook (1968) ‘A Theory of the Calculus of Voting’ , American Political Science Review62: 25–42, 341-341
29.
Robertson, David (1976) A Theory of Party Competition. London: John Wiley & Sons .
30.
Roemer, John (2001) Political Competition. Theory and Applications. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press .
31.
Santesmases, Antonio G. (1985) ‘EvoluciÛn IdeolÛgica del Socialismo en la EspaÒa Actual’, Sistema68–69: 61–78.
32.
Schlesinger, Joseph A. (1975) ‘The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory’ , American Political Science Review69: 840–849 .
33.
Schuessler, Alexander A. (2000) ‘Expressive Voting’ , Rationality and Society12: 87–119 .
34.
Share, Donald (1999) ‘From Policy-seeking to Office-seeking: The Metamorphosis of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party’, in Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strom (eds) Policy, Office, or Votes? pp. 89–111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
35.
Shaw, Eric (1994) The Labour Party since 1979: Crisis and Transformation. London: Routledge .
36.
Snyder, James M. and Michael M. Ting (2002) ‘An Informational Rationale for Political Parties’ , American Journal of Political Science46: 90–110 .
37.
Stokes, Susan C. (1999) ‘Political Parties and Democracy’ , Annual Review of Political Science2: 243–267 .
38.
Strom, Kaare (1990) ‘A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties’ , American Journal of Political Science34: 565–598 .
39.
Tsebelis, George (1990) Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press .
40.
Tsebelis, George (2002) Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press .
41.
Wittman, Donald (1973) ‘Parties as Utility Maximizers’ , American Political Science Review67: 490–498 .
42.
Wittman, Donald (1983) ‘Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories’ , American Political Science Review77: 142–157 .
