Interpreting Sperber: A Response

Abstract

In ‘Naturalistic Study of Culture’ (2003), I criticized the account of the explanation of culture that Dan Sperber offers in Explaining Culture(1996). I argued that Sperber unduly overemphasized the explicit propositional, or propositionally expressible, beliefs of native members of cultures to be explained. The result was a neglect of the importance of skills and overt activities in the constitution of a culture, and of the tacitly represented know-how that is an important part of the cognitive underpinning of such skills and activity. In his response, Sperber (2003) argues that I have badly misrepresented his position. He claims that he does not represent culture as inert. Moreover, he claims to give a very important role to tacit representations in the explanation of culture. Further, he objects to my characterization of his position as reductive. He cites portions of Explaining Culture in response to my criticisms. My present purpose is to examine Explaining Cultureclosely to show that I did not misrepresent Sperber’s position, and that therefore my original arguments stand.