Play it Again Pericles:

Abstract

Thucydides' narrative contradicts his assertion that `the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable'. It indicates that Spartans went to war to maintain their honor and way of life. They grossly misjudged Athenian power and erroneously expected to fight a short victorious war. The Spartan `peace party' was equally convinced of the need to defend the internal order, but favored peace because of its more realistic appreciation of Athenian power. It also worried that war would undermine that order. The war, moreover, was not inevitable, but the result of a series of reinforcing miscalculations that allowed civil strife in a remote settlement to escalate into an all-out clash between the two hegemons and their allies. Realists have oversimplified Thucydides — and international relations theory — by accepting the argument of Book I at face value. A more careful reading of Thucydides' narrative reveals a more nuanced and layered explanation for hegemonic war. Such an interpretation is not only more accurate, but has important implications for contemporary theories of international relations. The conclusion elaborates these implications.