Arms transfers are both an economic necessity for the European arms industry and a potential obstacle for the EU’s emerging normative power role. Nevertheless, research on how well EU members’ arms trade mirrors EU normative power rhetoric is scarce. To help fill this void, I use regression analysis to examine the relationship between EU arms exports and human rights, conflict, and democracy in recipient states from 1990 to 2004. A case study of the China embargo debate provides a more in-depth assessment of the politics behind EU arms transfers. Both analyses reveal a questionable relationship between EU norms and arms transfer practices. The findings suggest, first, that domestic-level material and normative concerns remain important to the formation and execution of EU foreign policy and, second, that low levels of EU socialization may hinder the creation of a single European external identity.
AhlinP (2004) EU borde inte sälja några vapen till Kina. Dagens Nyheter8December. Available at: http://www.dn.se (last accessed 23 August 2005).
2.
AhlmarkP (2005) EU-Vapen till Kina Kan Krossa Taiwan. Dagens Nyheter15February. Available at: http://www.dn.se (last accessed 22 September 2006).
3.
Amnesty International (2004) EU–China: Arms embargo — Don’t sabotage human rights activists in China, says Amnesty International to EU. 14April. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org.uk (last accessed 2 August 2005).
4.
Amnesty International (2005a) EU–China: Javier Solana must press the Chinese Foreign Minister over human rights. AI Index: IOR 61/006/2005. Available at: http://web.amnesty.org (last accessed 22 August 2005).
5.
Amnesty International (2005b) People’s Republic of China: Human rights defenders at risk (update). AI Index: ASA 17/002/2005.
6.
AnderliniJSpiegelP (2010) China extends help to tackle Euro crisis. The Financial Times21December. Available at: http://www.ft.com (last accessed 23 December 2010).
7.
AndersH (2009) Controlling arms brokers operating from abroad: Challenges and policy options for EU states. Note d’Analyse du GRIP. Brussels: GRIP.
8.
AnthonyI (2005) Militarily Relevant EU–China Trade and Technology Transfers: Issues and Problems. Solna: SIPRI.
9.
ArchickKGrimmettRFKanS (2005) European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for US Policy. CRS Report. Washington, DC: Library of Congress.
10.
BalmeR (2008) The European Union, China and human rights. In: LaïdiZ (ed.) EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative Power and Social Preferences. New York: Routledge, 143–173.
11.
BauerS (2004) The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports: Enhancing the accountability of arms export policies?European Security12: 129–147.
12.
BjörkdahlA (2007) Swedish norm entrepreneurship in the UN. International Peacekeeping14(4): 538–552.
13.
BlantonSL (1999) Instruments of security or tools of repression? Arms imports and human rights conditions in developing countries. Journal of Peace Research36(2): 233–244.
14.
BlantonSL (2001) The role of arms transfers in the quest for human security. Journal of Political and Military Sociology29(2): 240–258.
15.
BlantonSL (2005) Foreign policy in transition? Human rights, democracy, and US arms exports. International Studies Quarterly49(4): 647–667.
16.
BullH (1982) Civilian power Europe: A contradiction in terms?Journal of Common Market Studies21(2): 149–164.
17.
CasariniN (2006) The evolution of the EU–China relationship: From constructive engagement to strategic partnership. Occasional Paper No. 64. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
18.
CheckelJT (2001) Why comply? Social learning and European identity change. International Organization55(3): 553–588.
19.
ClaphamA (1999) Where is the EU’s human rights common foreign policy, and how is it manifested in multilateral fora?’ In: AlstonP (ed.) The EU and Human Rights. New York: Oxford, 627–683.
20.
CortellAPDavisJW (1996) How do international institutions matter? The domestic impact of international rules and norms. International Studies Quarterly40(4): 451–478.
21.
Council of the European Union (2004) Presidency Conclusions — Brussels, 12/13 December 2003. 5381/04. Brussels.
22.
Council of the European Union (2005) Council Conclusions on an International Treaty on the Arms Trade. 2678th General Affairs Council Meeting (3October). Brussels.
23.
CraftCSmaldoneJP (2002) The arms trade and the incidence of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa, 1967–97. Journal of Peace Research39(6): 693–710.
24.
CuéCE (2010) EE UU ordenó impedir que España levantara el embargo a China. El Pais14December. Available at: http://www.elpais.com (last accessed 2 January 2011).
25.
Dagens Nyheter (2004) Kina Kräver Slopat Vapenembargo. 5December. Available at: http://www.dn.se (last accessed 23 August 2005).
26.
DavisI (2002) The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports. New York: Oxford University Press.
27.
Deutsche Welle (2004) German Parliament rejects arms sales to China. 29October. Available at: http://www.dw-world.de (last accessed 29 December 2010).
28.
DiezT (2005) Constructing the self and changing others: Reconsidering ‘normative power Europe’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies33(3): 613–636.
29.
DombeyD (2005) EU drive to lift China arms ban falls apart. Financial Times14June. LexisNexis Academic (last accessed 26 August 2005).
30.
DuchêneF (1972) Europe’s role in world peace. In: MayneR (ed.) Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead. London: Fontana/Collins, 32–47.
31.
EricksonJL (2010) Who gets sanctioned? Characteristics of arms embargo states. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC.
32.
EU (European Union) (1999) First annual report on the implementation of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Available at: http://www.fas.org (last accessed 14 December 2010).
33.
European Commission (2001) The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries. Communication from the Council to the European Parliament. Brussels: The European Commission.
34.
European Commission (2004) A World Player: The European Union’s External Relations. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission.
35.
FalknerR (2007) The political economy of ‘normative power’ Europe: EU environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation. Journal of European Public Policy14(4): 507–526.
36.
FinnemoreMSikkinkK (1998) International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization52(4): 887–917.
37.
FoxJGodementF (2009) A Power Audit of EU–China Relations. London: ECFR.
38.
GarciaD (2006) Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms. New York: Routledge.
39.
GerringJThackerSCMorenoC (2005) Centripetal democratic governance: A theory and global inquiry. American Political Science Review99(4): 567–581.
40.
GibneyMDaltonM (1996) The Political Terror Scale. Policy Studies and Developing Nations4: 73–84.
41.
GleditschNPWallensteenPErikssonM. (2002) Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset. Journal of Peace Research39(5): 615–37. Version 3-2005. Available at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm
42.
GreenhillB (2010) The company you keep: International socialization and the diffusion of human rights norms. International Studies Quarterly54(1): 127–145.
43.
GropasR (2006) Human Rights and Foreign Policy: The Case of the European Union. Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas.
44.
HarpazG (2007) Normative power Europe and the problem of a legitimacy deficit: An Israeli perspective. European Foreign Affairs Review12: 89–109.
45.
HellströmJ (2010) The EU Arms Embargo on China: A Swedish Perspective. FOI-R-2946-SE. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.
46.
HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2004) China: EU must stand firm on arms ban. 6December. Available at: http://www.hrw.org (last accessed 19 August 2005).
47.
HRW (2005) Torture Worldwide. Available at: http://www.hrw.org (last accessed 22 August 2005).
48.
Human Security Centre (2005) The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press.
49.
IngebritsenC (2002) Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s role in world politics. Cooperation and Conflict37(1): 11–23.
50.
Johansson-NoguésE (2007) The (non-)normative power EU and the European neighbourhood policy: An exceptional policy for an exceptional actor?European Political Economy Review7: 181–194.
51.
JohnstonAI (2001) Treating international institutions as social environments. International Studies Perspectives45: 487–515.
52.
KatzensteinPJSilR (2010) Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics. New York: Palgrave.
53.
KatzensteinPJKeohaneROKrasnerSD (1998) International Organization and the study of world politics. International Organization52(4): 645–685.
54.
KingT (1999) Human rights in European foreign policy: Success or failure for post-modern diplomacy?European Journal of International Law10(2): 313–337.
55.
KoganE (2005) The European Union Defence Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market. Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik 1/2005. Vienna: Schriftenreihe der Landsverteidigungsakademie.
56.
KolodziejEA (1987) Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and its Implications for the International System. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
57.
LeedsBA (2005) Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP), version 3.0. Available at: http://atop.rice.edu.
58.
LewisJA (1997) France ready to resume arms trade with China. Jane’s Defence Weekly3, 16April.
59.
LiebermanES (2005) Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research. American Political Science Review99(3): 435–452.
60.
LindseyD (2005) A trans-atlantic crisis foretold. Spiegel Online18March. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de (last accessed 2 August 2005).
61.
LorenzA (2004) Gerhard’s comrade. Spiegel Online8December. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de (last accessed 23 August 2005).
62.
MannersI (2002) Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?Journal of Common Market Studies40(2): 235–258.
63.
MarshallMGJaggersK (2005) Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2003. College Park: University of Maryland. Available at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity
64.
MeernikJKruegerELPoeSC (1998) Testing models of US foreign policy: Foreign aid during and after the Cold War. Journal of Politics60(1): 63–85.
65.
MevelJ-J (2010) L’UE fait miroiter à Pékin la fin de l’embargo sur les armes. Le Figaro29December. Available at: http://www.lefigaro.fr (last accessed 2 January 2011).
66.
MFAPRC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China) (2003) China’s EU Policy Paper. Beijing. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm (last accessed 20 December 2010).
67.
MoravcsikA (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
68.
MulhollandD (2005) Dropping EU embargo may jeopardise JSF. Jane’s Defence Weekly2March: 20–21.
69.
PaceM (2009) Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the mediterranean: The limits of EU normative power. Democratization16(1): 39–58.
70.
PeelQ (2005) Where trade comes before politics. Financial Times3February. LexisNexis Academic (last accessed 1 June 2006).
71.
ScheipersSSicurelliD (2007) Normative power Europe: A credible utopia?Journal of Common Market Studies45(2): 435–457.
72.
SchimmelfennigF (2001) The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the European Union. International Organization55(1): 47–80.
73.
SchimmelfennigF (2005) Strategic calculation and international socialization: Membership incentives, party constellations, and sustained compliance in Central and Eastern Europe. International Organization59(4): 827–860.
74.
SchimmelfennigFSedelmeierU (2002) Theorizing EU enlargement: Research, focus, hypotheses, and the state of research. Journal of European Public Policy9(4): 500–528.
75.
SchonfieldA (1974) Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination. White Plains, International Arts and Sciences Press.
76.
SchröderG (2005) Schröder on China: Integration instead of isolation. Bundesregierung15April. Available at: http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de (last accessed 22 September 2006).
77.
ShannonVP (2000) Norms are what states make of them: The political psychology of norm violation. International Studies Quarterly44(2): 293–316.
78.
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) (2006) SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. New York: Oxford University Press.
79.
SIPRI (2007) SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. New York: Oxford University Press.
SjursenH (2006) The EU as a ‘normative’ power: How can this be?Journal of European Public Policy13(2): 235–251.
82.
SmithKE (2000) The end of civilian power EU: A welcome demise or a cause for concern?International Spectator35(2): 11–28.
83.
SmithME (2004) Institutionalization, policy adaptation and European foreign policy cooperation. European Journal of International Relations10(1): 95–136.
84.
SmithRPTasiranA (2005) The demand for arms imports. Journal of Peace Research42(2): 167–181.
85.
StivachtisYA (2007) The EU as an international actor: ‘Civilian’, ‘normative’ or ‘military’ power? In: StivachtisYA (ed.) The State of European Integration. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 41–58.
86.
The Economist (2004) Too soft a touch — The EU, China and the world 11 December. Factiva (last accessed 23 August 2005).
87.
The Economist (2005) Merci, Y’all — Merci, Y’all — George Bush and Europe. 26February. Factiva (last accessed 23 August 2005).
88.
TisdallS (2004) Trade persuades Europe to review China arms ban. The Guardian8December. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk (last accessed 29 December 2010).
89.
TsangS (2005) Why the EU arms embargo should stay. Far Eastern Economic Review168(3): 43–46.
90.
UN (United Nations) (1997) Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. A/52/298.
91.
USDOS (US Department of State) (2005a) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004: China. Washington, DC: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Available at: http://www.state.gov (last accessed 22 August 2005).
92.
USDOS (2005b) Ambassador’s parting thoughts on taking the Dutch to the next level. EO 12958: DECL: 08/18/2025 (22August). Reprinted in The Guardian (15 December 2010). Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk (last accessed 29 December 2010).
93.
USDOS (2010) Supporting the EU arms embargo on China. EO 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 (17 February). Reprinted in El Pais (14 December 2010). Available at: http://www.elpais.com (last accessed 2 January 2011).
94.
Van der PuttenFP (2009) The EU arms embargo against China: Should Europe play a role in East Asian security?Social and Cultural Research. Occasional Paper No. 7. New York and Hong Kong: Pace University and Hong Kong Shue Yan University.
95.
WattN (2005a) EU could lift arms embargo on China. The Guardian15January. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk (last accessed 29 December 2010).
96.
WattN (2005b) US nod for arms sales to China. The Guardian10February. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk (last accessed 29 December 2010).
97.
YoungAR (2007) Trade politics ain’t what it used to be: The European Union in the Doha Round. Journal of Common Market Studies45(4): 789–811.
98.
YoungARPetersonJ (2006) The EU and the new trade politics. Journal of European Public Policy13(6): 795–814.
99.
YoungsR (2004) Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU’s external identity. Journal of Common Market Studies42(2): 415–435.
100.
ZürnMCheckelJT (2005) Getting socialized to build bridges: Constructivism and rationalism, Europe and the nation-state. International Organization59(4): 1045–1079.
