Organization and organizing in revolutionary times: The case of Tunisian General Labor Union

Abstract

Adopting Barker’s (2011) Marxist approach of a social movement “as a whole”, this article addresses the question of whether and how mass-membership movement organizations can break out of oligarchic authority and support a radical political protest movement. Using an ethnographic approach, this article explores how the UGTT (the Tunisian General Labor Union) responded to organizational challenges during the Tunisian popular uprising in 2010 by examining its intra-organizational processes as well as its interactions with other parts of the protest movement and how their struggles mutually aided the fall of Ben Ali’s regime. The findings highlight that two correlated aspects were critical to a radical transformation of UGTT’s conservative goal. First, unionists with activism experience outside the labor organization played a key role as “mediators,” deriving meaning from the organizational culture of the union to interpret the course of the event, supporting the popular uprising, and forcing the union leadership to join the revolutionary process. Second, the unpredictable and unprecedented regime repression radicalized the protest movement and its claims, and ruptured the union’s traditional bureaucracy. The article concludes by elaborating on the potential of organizational studies to help us understand the role of trade unions in protest movement organizing and, more broadly, the role of formal mass-membership organizations in social movements.

Introduction

At 11:30 a.m. on December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire protesting harassment by police and local authorities at Sidi Bouzid in central Tunisia. His last words as he burned to death outside the governor’s office were: “How do you expect me to make a living?” Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation was widely seen as the catalyst for the “Arab spring” triggering large scale civil uprisings and major protests in many Arab countries. On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali was forced to flee Tunisia and the “Tunisian Revolution” was portrayed as a “mythical” event in which “moderate” and “harmless” Tunisians miraculously managed to drive their dictator out of power. Thereafter, perpetuating old orientalist representations, the same analysts showed fear of possible chaos and focused their analyzes on the danger of the rise of religious dictatorship. Thus, the historical causes and consequences of the revolt were blurred and abandoned in favor of a depoliticized narrative of a spontaneous movement of young bloggers rescuing their country from a dictator. This narrative essentially denied the importance of the history of activism and the different social struggles that the West-supported dictatorship, at best marginalized, and at worst, criminalized. This rendered invisible the diverse forces of change, activists’ networks, and pre-existing organizations that were responsible for organizing the protest movement.

Various networks and organizations—such as the Tunisian League for Human Rights, the lawyers’ association, and the union of unemployed graduates—conducted collective mobilizations. The labor movement, as embodied by the UGTT (Tunisian General Labor Union), was a key player and contributed greatly to the revolutionary process. Historically, this organization has been a site of convergence for militant trade unionism and the struggle against autocratic regimes in Tunisia. Moreover, it has played a vital role in various popular revolts in Tunisia and has been crucial to the unfolding of what is now termed the “Revolution of dignity.” It has been involved in this revolution since the initial uprisings in Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, organized rallies, marches, and general strikes in various regions, and is currently playing a central role in the country’s democratic transition process.

Similarly, enthusiasm in the academic literature in the last two decades for the rise in social movement led protests has been accompanied by an equal dismissal of the role of organized labor in political transformation (Abdelrahman, 2015). Some scholars confidently declared the role of the class politics of organized labor in post-industrial societies to be diminishing. Castells (1996: 354), for example, pronounced collective labor organizations as passé “political agents integrated into the realm of public institutions” lacking relevance in the information age. The decline in labor union membership because of global capitalism and the changing nature of production (due to flexibilization, relocation, outsourcing, etc.) was used as evidence of the end of class-based politics (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990).

This northern-centric analysis, however, ignores the role of labor in global networks of activism, such as the global justice movement and in political struggles in the industrialized nations of the Global South, such as South Africa, Brazil, and South Korea (Moody, 2005). Similarly, the decade that saw the downfall of autocrats such as Mubarak or Ben Ali witnessed the most sustained wave of labor protests in the Arab world’s recent history (Yousfi, 2017; Beinin, 2015). Both traditional unions and more horizontal networks led the national and social struggles in these countries—a testimony to the persistent presence of class and labor politics in the movements.

However, while the Occupy movement, Los Indignados, and Arab revolutions took novel organizational approaches and pushed to think differently about protest movements’ organizational challenges (Den Hond et al., 2015; Reinecke and Ansari, 2020), a tension exists between “movement verticals” such as the hierarchically organized “old left” or labor organizations, and “movement horizontals” based on decentralized ideals in organizing movements (Fantasia and Stephan-Norris, 2007 [2004]; Maeckelbergh, 2009). Despite growing consensus on the necessity to move away from the dichotomy that has dominated the debate on social movement organizing in favor of a more dialectical approach to thinking about the co-presence of hierarchically structured organizations and horizontal networks (Maeckelbergh, 2009), two dimensions lack a complete understanding: First, the functioning of the inter-relationships between different dimensions of “organizing” within and between different parts of protest movement (De Bakker et al., 2017; Den Hond et al., 2015; Misoczky et al., 2017). Second, there is also scarce empirical or theoretical work on the intra-organizational processes of change when formal organizations such as labor organizations adopt the causes of social movements (Yu, 2012).

This article seeks to unpack these questions by first revisiting the current debate on the question of “organization” in protest movements at the crossroads of social movement studies and organization theory. Then, by showing how Barker’s (2011) marxist approach of a social movement “as a whole” could help us to move away from the dichotomy that have dominated the debate, this paper aims at addressing the question of whether and how mass-membership movement organizations can break out of an oligarchical authority and support a radical political protest movement. Using an ethnographic approach, it details how the UGTT responded to protest movement’s organizational challenges during the Tunisian uprising in 2010. By examining UGTT’s intra-organizational dynamics, its interactions with other parts of the protest movement, and how their struggles mutually aided in the successful regime change, this article intends to capture the way oligarchic authority and members’ agency can coexist successfully within some models of social movement organizations, and the factors that could lead them to a radical transformation. The contributions to the literature are outlined in the conclusion.

Trade unions in protest movements: Can we move away from the “Iron Law of oligarchy”?

Formal organization: A resource for social movement led protests?

One of the reasons that could explain why the organized labor has been understudied by social movement scholars is the long-standing debate at the crossroad of organization theory and social movement theory around the question whether “formal organization” is beneficial or detrimental to movements’ goal accomplishment and to producing radical change (De Bakker et al., 2017; Gamson and Schmeidler, 1984; Rucht, 1999; Staggenborg, 1988). On one hand, historical studies based on Michel’s (1965) analysis of the Social-Democrat Party in Germany, summarized as the “iron law of oligarchy” argue that, because of formal organizations’ tendency to develop oligarchical leadership and conservative goals, the capacity for disruption that threaten elites is suppressed. The most influential work was Piven and Cloward’s (1979) study of poor people’s movements cementing the association between organizations and conservative tactics in the minds of many analysts.

In this regard, trade unions as representatives of organized labor and ideal types of bureaucracies in Weberian terms represented the congealed power of a social group, its interests realized, codified, and institutionalized in formal rules, procedural order, and organizational segmentation (Barbash, 1984). They are perceived as exemplars of iron law. As official leaders gain power, a growing distance from members by virtue of formal procedures and social hierarchy allows them to mold the organization in their interests. Their priority becomes organizational maintenance and their power “conservation rather than disruption or the interests of the union members. Trade unionism is thus sealed out from wider questions about movement organizing” (Barker, 2011).

However, proponents of the resource mobilization approach built at the crossroads of social movement studies and organizational theory has fueled important literature during the last two decades (Soule, 2012; Zald and McCarthy, 1980). Based on an empirical focus on movements pursuing political participation or rights, notably the labor and civil rights movements in the USA, they argue that formal organizations play a central role in social movements. They conceived organization as a resource for social movement activists; the more organization, the better the prospects for mobilization and success (Buechler, 2000; Cress and Snow, 2000; McAdam et al., 1996; McAdam and Scott, 2005) . Other studies, built on Freeman’s (1972) seminal contribution “The Tyranny of Structurelessness”, have tried to go beyond a choice between the thin and homogenized sense of organization within resource mobilization research and the distrust of organization that stemmed from an emphasis on disruption and spontaneity (Clemens and Minkoff, 2004; Leach et al., 2005; Polletta, 2002). Using arguments from organizational theory—such as those expressed in neo-institutional and population ecology—they have explored the varieties and consequences of diverse organizational forms (Buechler, 2000; Clemens, 1993, 1997; Ganz, 2000; Haydu, 1999; Polletta, 2002; Schneiberg, 2002).

Likewise, the decline of trade unions in the last century in the Global North led to the academic stream of trade union revitalization strategies, first in the Anglo-Saxon context (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998; Fairbrother, 2000; Milkman and Voss, 2004) and then spread to other European countries (Dörre, 2011; Hoffmann, 2006). These studies aimed to demonstrate how oligarchy or its consequences could be avoided. They suggest that formal organization may be associated with more radical actions (Rucht, 1999) or even the reinvigoration of organizations that had succumbed to quiescent oligarchy (Voss and Sherman, 2000). Within formal organizations, movement-like mobilization may generate significant changes (Katzenstein, 1998; Scully and Creed, 1999). In the place of a monolithic model of hierarchical organization, varied and malleable organizational forms are studied (De Bakker et al., 2017) .

While the return to a more complex and detailed organizational analysis is a welcome step, the persistence of social movement studies’ predominant analytical categories—such as political opportunities, mobilization of resources, framing, and emphasis on structural and environmental aspects—are noticeable. Critical perspectives have considered that this predominant analytical framework in social movement studies has led to the imposition of structure over agency and the impossibility of these conceptual models to address different dimensions of organizing movements (De Bakker et al., 2017; Den Hond et al., 2015; Spicer and Böhm, 2007; Sullivan et al., 2011; Sutherland et al., 2014).

They argue that the persistence of the “structuralist objectivism” along with the adoption of analytical criteria such as success, performance, has led to underappreciation of mutually constituting relations that exist between mobilization and counter mobilization, between a social movement and its converse, the exercise of institutionalized power (Barker, 2011; Fantasia and Stephan-Norris, 2007 [2004]; Misoczky et al., 2017). Similarly, the recent emphasis on agency in emerging organizations as sources of disruptive tactics fails to explain the appearance of such tactics in formal organizations characterized by highly institutionalized and relatively stable decision-making processes (Voss and Sherman, 2000). In the organizational literature, the factors underlying radical change in existing formal organizations have received less focus than the reasons for conservative transformation, inertia, and the standardization of organizational forms (Weber and King, 2014). Thus, the mainstream perspectives occlude the organizational power dynamics emerging around and within the formal organizations and fail to adequately analyze the contingent and contested organizational practices comprising both confrontation and collaboration in movement activity leading to a radical transformation (De Bakker et al., 2017).

Trade unions as a part of “movement as a whole”?

The debate over the “iron law of oligarchy” in social movement studies has downplayed the role of formal organizations as a resource or obstacle for radical change. Yet, contemporary research is challenged to provide a more precise understanding of the “interpenetration” of different dimensions of “organizing” within and between different parts of protest movement to capture the organizational challenges of new protests that are not so much against specific business companies or economic activities but more generalized expressions of dissatisfaction with the prevailing neo-liberal order (De Bakker et al., 2017). This understanding is critical to highlight whether and how mass-membership movement organizations can break out of oligarchic authority and support a radical political protest movement. By protest movement, I refer to the different forms of struggles, skills and knowledges used by diverse groups of people, from different social spaces who decide under specific circumstances to rally and act together in open confrontation with a dominant group in a particular place at a particular time, in a particular conflict over a particular issue (Nilsen and Cox, 2013).

Barker (2011) has a proposition to move away from the dichotomies that have dominated the debate and to analyze in greater detail the role played by UGTT within the popular uprising in Tunisia. He criticizes the assumption that “movements are discrete and bounded entities that can be examined on their own, with little attention to the inter-relations with other movements” and proposes the approach of “the social movement of a whole.” Using the Marxist framework, he considers that “all the different forms of popular struggle were taken to be part of something greater, a movement of resistance to capitalism that might, sooner or later, manage to challenge capitalism as a whole.” Far from division and fragmentation being a “natural” condition of movements, this standpoint invites us to inquire what separates and unifies movements.

It allows us to avoid the common tendency of “specialization”—for example, in studies of “trade unions”—and to explore the ongoing relationships between trade unions and other aspects of movement activity such as unemployed movements or anti-wars campaigns. It helps place trade unions in a wider context of movement activities and opposition. By offering a more “dialectical” approach to thinking and acting within movements, this proposition could help us to explore the interplay between “wholes and parts,” the relationships between a hierarchically organized trade union “UGTT” and more informal/horizontal networks, between mobilizations and counter mobilizations, continuity and change, and the possibilities of eventual radical transformations.

Coupled with a detailed organizational analysis of internal dynamics of the UGTT during the protest movement against the ruling regime, this approach will allow me to highlight the way oligarchic authority and formal structures on one hand and members’ agency and innovation on the other can coexist successfully, leading to a radical transformation. Rather than being understood unproblematically as a resource for mobilization, trade unions represented by formal organizations can be viewed as having a variable association with protest movements depending on political, institutional, and organizational contexts (Osa, 2003). By focusing on “organizing” as decision-making to affect the prevailing social order, as an intervention in the then-present mixture of emergent and decided social order, instead of organization as an entity (De Bakker et al., 2017), this article explores the organizational power dynamics emerging around and within the formal organizations in a protest movement leading to a popular uprising and to a regime change in the Tunisian case.

This could help investigate how mass-membership organizations are shaped by movements and protest challenges, which in turn shape the organizational responses to external and internal demands of radical change. This could offer a better understanding of how and under what circumstances mass-membership movement organizations can break out of an oligarchic authority and support a radical political protest movement.

Data collection and methodology

Research context

With 750,000 members, the UGTT is the first national organization in the country and was the only one for several years. Centered on the public sector, it includes 24 regional unions, 19 sector-based unions, and 21 grassroots unions. It brings together a wide range of political persuasions with members in every part of the country and different social groups, including factory workers, civil servants, doctors, etc. The UGTT has a centralized hierarchical structure with four levels—local, regional, federal, and national—forming a network that spans the entire country. The union’s highest body, the National Congress, elects the national executive committee, and the secretary general; the base unions and local union bodies comprise the lowest level. Two parallel bodies lie in between at an intermediate level: the regional unions, whose executive committees are elected by base-union representatives on a regional basis (by governorate), and the federations and general unions, which are organized by sector (Cf. www.ugtt.org.tn). This centralized, hierarchical structure concentrates hegemonic power in the hands of the Executive Board and secretary general, who is able to further consolidate power by granting privileges and forming alliances with various levels of the union representation.

More than a trade union, the UGTT is a political organization where social, political, and national claims have been linked historically. Founded in 1946 by Farhat Hached, following a break from the France-based Confederation Génerale du Travail (CGT), it was a cornerstone of the Tunisian anti-colonial struggle and has played the central role in Tunisian political life (Ben Hamida, 2003). Once in power, Bourguiba and Ben Ali attempted to use the UGTT’s prestige to establish their domination.

This led to a complex relationship between the UGTT and the Tunisian State. However, unlike other Arab unions that are totally integrated with the State machinery, UGTT remains an exception because of a peculiar combination of two positions it has maintained: submission of the bureaucracy to the ruling power on the one hand; and a tendency to resist the ruling power, on the other hand, especially in times of crisis (Gobe, 2008). The latter tendency controls a few sectors, such as those of education or postal services and telecommunications as well as some regional and local unions and had become bastions for leftist and Arab nationalist political trends that had no freedom of political expression. The union was at the heart of social unrest by resisting liberal reforms and privatization projects as in 1978 ¹ or 1984. ² During other periods, labor bureaucracies tend to dominate the surface while generating various expressions of internal union dissent and insurgency. Despite the “union bureaucracy” taking an ambivalent stance with the single party, the various Tunisian social movements have always been structurally and politically supported by UGTT.

This forged a unique organizational identity of UGTT as a “counterbalance power” that entailed an often shaky balance between autonomy and dependence from both the union’s base and the ruling power. The union’s leaders were highly aware of their ability to counter the ruling power by drawing on the deep roots of the union machine and its local and regional sections across the country, albeit discreetly in order to avoid risking government reprisal. Then again, they could not obey the single state party completely and risk facing opposition from their base and betraying their principles and the “national duties” they have always claimed.

The events that led to the downfall of the Ben Ali regime originated in the offices of the UGTT. Guided by militants of the workers’ movement, educated unemployed youth and some of the urban poor, the initially unorganized/spontaneous protest movement gradually evolved from localized socio-economic demands into a national movement encompassing the workers, the urban poor as well as the middle classes—mostly comprising civil servants, professional associations (lawyers, engineers, etc.) as well as sections of the economic elite. The UGTT as one of the few spaces of organized resistance against the hegemony exerted by the single party played a decisive role in the protests that eventually led to regime change and the subsequent election of the National Constituent Assembly on October 23, 2011.

This paper aims to highlight the UGTT’s responses to the organizational challenges of the Tunisian revolutionary episode of 2010:

First, I will try to situate the role of unionists from grass-roots level in the organizational dynamics that have shaped the evolution of the protest as well as the UGTT’ position as counterbalance power—as many trade unionists love to remind—negotiating power relationships between different parts of the protest movement. Second, I will analyze the way the popular uprising impacted the UGTT’s intra-organizational processes and how they subsequently shaped the organizational responses to external and internal demands of radical change. The goal is to highlight how a mass-membership movement organization managed to withdraw from oligarchic authority and support a radical protest movement.

It is worth noting that instead of approaching the revolution as “an event” that overthrew the political order and established another in its place, I chose to make sense of the revolution as a process. It is thus less a matter of identifying the causes of the popular uprising or its outcome than focusing on the protest movement dynamics and its contribution to rebuilding Tunisian politics as well as its interactions with emergent organizational configurations and coalitions with varying degrees of structure an agency, all without predicting the end or the result of the revolution (Dobry, 2009).

Data collection

This paper adopted the tools of a critical ethnography, defined as “conventional ethnography with a political purpose” (Thomas, 1993: 4) and whose ethical responsibility is to address social injustice in a particular area (Madison, 2011). This consists of traveling regularly and extensively in the field to conduct interviews to accurately capture as close as possible the mobilized local representatives giving meaning to the role of the UGTT and the strategies pursued by the actors during different phases of the mobilization. The events observed included meetings, protests, social events, and informal gatherings. Innumerable hours were spent with unionists and other activists traveling to and from meetings and protests.

Sixty semi-structured interviews were conducted in Tunisian Arabic with trade unionists in diverse positions within the organization, allowing revisitation to key moments in the mobilization of the UGTT over a period of 3 years (January 2011–January 2014) (Yousfi, 2017). This paper focuses only on the comments of the interlocutors on the first important temporal rhythm called “the first revolutionary situation.” This incorporates the 28 days between December 17, 2010, when a series of local and national protests spread from Sidi Bouzid and its environs, and January 14, 2011, when the Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, fled to Saudi Arabia. The trade unionists interviewed belonged to different regions of Tunisia, particularly those that were at the heart of the popular uprising like Sidi Bouzid, Sfax, Gafsa, and Tunis. They are affiliated with different sectors, especially education, post and telecommunications, health, and textiles. Having different political backgrounds, ranging from the extreme left to the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), the former ruling party. Additional interviews were also conducted with actors of civil society such as members of other organizations such as the Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC ³ ), the Tunisian League of Human Rights (LTDH), and activists from political parties like the Islamist party, Ennahdha.

I used a flexible interview guide that, while tailored to the interviewee and the situation, was typically centered on four main themes: How did Bouazizi’s immolation snowball into a large protest movement that led to the fall of Ben Ali? How did unionists react to this turn of events? How do unionists view their contributions to protest movements? Did they act as individuals or UGTT members? How do they explain the discrepancy between the initial conciliatory official statements by union leadership and the daily protests in the streets? Interviews were recorded and transcribed. All quotations below are the respondents’ comments. Extracts from their interviews were selected according to the themes that were prevalent and recurrent in interviewees’ comments.

This ethnographic approach offers the advantage of addressing both what is happening and how it is experienced by the interlocutors, allowing an appreciation of the unfolding of resistance and mobilization dynamics spatially and temporally (Courpasson, 2017; Kellogg, 2009). This helps to understand how trade unionists interpret the unanticipated changes, think of the political and social situation in Tunisia, get hold of the issues, and finally deduce the organizational strategies for mobilization. By linking specific organizational practices, their political intent, and subsequent effects, the relationship among the “where,” “who,” “when,” “how,” and “with what effects?” may be conceptualized, allowing to better examine the “anatomy” of organizing in revolutionary times.

The ethnographic observation of the UGTT over time and during different crises ensures the avoidance of the teleological pitfalls, restores the fluidity and contradictions of a context characterized by uncertainty, and an ongoing reassessment of strategies facing an order of constraints as well as rapidly changing power relations (Yousfi and Abdallah, 2020). In this process, the study tried to assimilate the fact that at the beginning of the popular uprising’s outbreak, the outcome, as known today, was both unpredictable and unexpected. The intent is to make sense of the internal dynamics of a trade union organization—as a space for collective action—the nature of its contribution to the transformation of the Tunisian political field, and its interaction with different organizations and more or less structured networks.

To sum up, the purpose of the ethnographic approach adopted is to account for the dialectical relationship between the structural social and political structures that weigh on individuals and the autonomy they have to resist or even emancipate themselves from it (Anderson, 1989).

Discourse analysis

The research goal was to provide a grounded and contextualized account of “how the UGTT operates during the uprising” (Watson, 2011), based on the premise that actors’ own accounts are the starting point, but not the end, of the research process. Building on the critical realism tradition, the objective was not only to describe events but also to explain them by identifying the influence of structural factors on unionists’ agency (Rees and Gatenby, 2014). To this end, critical discourse analysis was used to explore the interplay between action, shared frames of meanings, and formal structures in organizing the protest movement (Heracleous and Hendry, 2000; Langley and Abdallah, 2011). This helps not only to understand how the interviewees interpreted the popular uprising and subsequently responded to it but also to elucidate the specific, contingent manner in which a certain mix of causal powers has been formed and articulated with individual agency and innovation.

The interviews were free-coded, following a three-stage procedure associated with the research goals. First, the focus was on trade unionists’ enthusiasm as well as their discouragements, with a constant concern for elucidating the dynamics of an organization during crisis. The internal conflicts, the doubts, and the attacks they suffered and the public’s misconception of them were all valuable elements to clarify the operation of the UGTT and its place in the political and organizational fields. By listening to grassroot-level unionists and leaders, by identifying the divisions as well as the similarities, the internal decision-making machinery of the organization was accessed.

Second, how unionists used organizational jargon to position themselves and construct their identity in relation to the challenges involved in organizing the protest movement were observed. An organization as large and old as the UGTT, with its strong organizational culture, creates a specific vocabulary that highlights specific formal processes and structures. The challenge was to uncover why certain persistent relations or formal features of the organization have certain effects or observable outcomes in some settings and not others, and what the factors—for example, history, political crisis, unionists’ resistance, the state’s answer—that may explain this, are.

If it appears undeniable that there are indeed variations in the opinions of the interlocutors, it is also true that the shared assumptions characterizing an organizational structure are present in the words of all those who, in order to provide meaning to their experience, resort to the categories of that specific organizational culture. This evidence appears in quite a redundant way in the material collected in spite of divergences at the levels of status, origin, and sector of the interviewees, and they are valuable in describing the influence of the organization’s specificity on the different strategies used by its members.

Third, taking into account that organizational vocabulary can lead to myopia on the real dynamics at stake, unionist discourses were confronted to other external narratives. This allows for an escape from the built and rehearsed unionist discourses and encourages trade unionists to better describe the stakes of their mobilization. This included identifying how metaphors, words, expressions, repetition, and emphasis were used to formulate comments and opinions about the various changes brought about by the protest movement’s challenges. Beyond the organizational culture that unites trade unionists, the diversity of points of view raised by both internal and external divisions over the role of the UGTT helped to understand the complexity of the organization and its operations.

This three-stage procedure allows for a revelation of the complex interplay between formal structure and unionists’ agency over time and place, linking local changes in the decision-making process and control regimes to deeper structural changes within the political and economic landscape. This requires the identification and exploration of the complex interaction between relevant key actors, structural conditions, and situational contingencies (Reed, 2009). The process was used for each interview and was then extended to a much larger scale. The overlapping stories and expressions provided clues as to how the organizational challenges took on meaning in protest movement development.

Lastly, the quotes selected in this paper serve to demonstrate that unionists, whatever their region, sector or position, employ the same classification to describe how the UGTT operates, reflecting the influence of the union’s organizational framework on the strategies adopted and methods for coping with the various crises they encountered. The rank, the region and the sector are specified in each used quote.

Findings: From the outbreak of the revolt to efforts to organize the movement: The role of the unionists

It is mainly the social question and the socio-economic demands that have together questioned the image of the “economic Tunisian miracle” celebrated by international institutions and brought down the regime. Unequal regional developments were reflected in the southern and central western regions of the country. In early 2008, supported by immigrant associations in France, the revolts at the Gafsa mining region mainly Redeyef town, further south, emphasized the gravity of the situation (Chouikha and Geisser, 2010). The UGTT began experiencing early internal divisions; some of its local branches were tempted to join the protest, while national leaders close to the regime, at best, played a mediating role. These protests were strongly repressed by Ben Ali. On December 17, 2010, images of Mohammed Bouazizi’s self- immolation spread across social media, eliciting intense emotions among Tunisians, gradually transforming into a vast protest movement that led to Ben Ali’s eventual flight. Beset by the same anger and indignation, unionists joined the movement, then called the “Intifada” ⁴ and played an active role as organizers. One unionist from Sidi Bouzid explained that the self-immolation was not the sole factor behind the revolt, but it was the “straw that broke the camel’s back”

On December 17, 2011, the revolution began in Sidi Bouzid; Bouazizi’s self-immolation was the straw that broke the camel’s back, but that incident alone could not be viewed as the main factor that sparked the revolution. The residents of Sidi Bouzid have long suffered from economic hardship—people experienced injustice and humiliation. Bouazizi was the sixth person to commit suicide in 2010, but he was the straw that broke the camel’s back.

(Mohammed, union activist, Secondary Education, Sidi Bouzid)

When commenting on the events, interviewees alternated between two different narratives. The first narrative, recounted by all unionists, depicts Ben Ali’s fall as the expected, foreseen outcome of an “accumulation of social struggles” over the past two decades. However, when called upon to describe their actions in concrete terms, they introduced a second narrative: their extraordinary missteps, improvisations, and adjustments during this rapid chain of events, many of which were unforeseen. What follows is an attempt to shed light on how the interviewed unionists attributed meaning to their actions and those of the organization. In the first section, a detailed description of the events that occurred between December 17, 2010, and January 14, 2011 is used to gain perspective on their view of their roles in the uprising. Then, I will focus on the organizational dynamics within the UGTT, to home in on the various contradictions and tensions that the union faced as an intermediary between the popular uprising and the state apparatus. How the organization, as a formal authority and communication system governed by a well-defined hierarchical structure and precise assignment of roles, reacted to often-unforeseen events is described, while also covering the process by which unionists adjusted to the circumstances and the organizational resources mustered to support the protest movement.

The UGTT serves as a refuge (Maljaâ) for the popular uprisings

As soon as the protests broke out, several organizational challenges emerged, requiring protesters to devise concrete solutions beyond speeches and slogans. How did unionists react to the intifada that erupted in Sidi Bouzid? How do they explain the spread of the movement? All the interviewed unionists agree that the protest movement materialized in a completely spontaneous manner without concrete leadership:

The incident with Bouazizi, who was humiliated, sparked the revolution. The events unfolded completely spontaneously in the beginning, but the anger in the streets, the ferment, and the rallies held by Sidi Bouzid residents, who were outraged and shocked by the incident, created a popular protest movement. There were no political parties, plans, or clear goals.

(Foued, Union Official, Primary Education, Sidi Bouzid)

However, most of the unionists interviewed also maintained that the UGTT welcomed and supported the protest movement. When asked how exactly the UGTT welcomed the protest movement, the interlocutors stated that this primarily involved serving as a physical refuge. The UGTT has offices across Tunisia, which also served as planning and coordination sites for the movement. Others add that the UGTT not only served as a physical refuge providing shelter to various social movements, it was also the only space where opponents of different political inclinations can exercise political expression. The UGTT is a rare space that is able to avoid total domination by the regime:

The UGTT is a shelter for all political opposition groups and human rights activists. The opposition—legally recognized and otherwise—was persecuted and often sought refuge at the union to make their voices heard and exercise their right to free movement. The UGTT’s open-mindedness and positions in support of dissidents enabled the union to develop an “immunity of the people” which helped it to withstand multiple crises in which it was pitted against the conformism promoted by the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes.

(Mongi Amami, former director of the UGTT Research and Documentation Department)

The UGTT offices are perceived as a physical, symbolic, and political refuge, and which later become protest sites. The UGTT offices are the “base location” to or of organizing the protest movements. They become sites not only of struggle but of organization in ways that involve protection of activists as well as coordination between different networks (Davis et al., 2008). This ushers in the question of how, then, did the unionists assist with this coordination.

Unionists help guide the movement

One of the recurring descriptions in the unionists’ accounts of their role in the popular uprising was “guidance.” While emphasizing the spontaneous nature of the movement, the interviewees stated that they joined early on to provide guidance. As Farid, a teacher and unionist in Sidi Bouzid explained:

It has become a mass protest movement, but unionists in primary and secondary education unions, lawyers, and a few political activists quickly stepped in to guide the movement.

The interviewees used the term “guidance” to describe three types of actions: the politicization of the movement, coordination between different networks of activists—especially the lawyers, and the unemployed young people—and mediation with the various union leaders and political authorities. Most of the unionists interviewed had both political affiliation and union duties, they greatly emphasized their roles in politicizing the uprising by pairing the social and economic demands with political aims. Early on, protesters chanted slogans about the right to employment and equality in regional development. Gradually, political slogans emerged against corruption and calling for the ouster of Ben Ali. Larbi, a teacher and union activist in Sidi Bouzid, offers his perspective:

Early on, the slogans mainly had a social protest message. The slogan that was most chanted during the first few days was, “Employment is a right, pack of thieves!” and later “No to the Trabelsis, who stole the budget!” was chanted in early January. On January 11, the police violently responded to the first time when “O great people, reject another term for the president!” was chanted.

The social and political demands expanded the movement, as people from different regions identified with the sentiment. The politicization of the movement, as described by the unionists, confirmed the impossibility of meaningfully separating economic from political demands, as extensively commented by Luxemburg (1906). In an authoritarian state such as Tunisia, where different waves of economic liberalization were systematically associated with the repression of collective worker mobilizations, increasing economic demands turned into a political challenge for authoritarian rule. The combined demands of democracy and social justice in the Tunisian revolution involving human rights activists as well as unionists or the unemployed represented a unity between class and civil-democratic struggle and helped transform the protest movement into a revolutionary process (Author, 2017).

The second aspect of the union’s guidance was coordinating demonstrations. The interviewed unionists stressed that the UGTT served as the hub for communication between different groups of actors, especially human rights activists, lawyers, and young unemployed people. Networks of activists established during previous movements were quickly reactivated during the Sidi Bouzid uprising. For instance, one unionist from Redeyef described how the revolt in his city provided an opportunity for lawyers and unionists to forge ties that would be renewed in 2011:

We coordinated our actions with lawyers. The lawyers who stepped forward in 2011 were the same ones who defended us in 2008—they led a major offensive against the Ben Ali regime. The videos of lawyers that were circulated on Facebook—lawyers who were on the front lines of the demonstrations—energized the movement.

(Adel, union official, secondary education, Redeyef)

Lawyers were among the main opponents of the Ben Ali regime in the 2000s. They provided invaluable support to the popular protest movement, organizing sit-ins in front of the courthouse, and coordinating their actions with unionist protesters. For his part, Maher, an unemployed graduate, noted that numerous activists from the Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC), who are generally former students and activists from the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET), participated in the popular uprising from the very beginning. Accustomed to working clandestinely, they had experienced partnering with unionists.

Do not forget that the first slogan of the revolution— “Work is a right, you pack of thieves” —had first been used by unemployed graduates. It was a slogan that became popular and radicalized the protest movement initiated on December 17, 2010. The 2010 movement was not the first one for us. We campaigned for work, dignity, and justice in secrecy since the end of the 1990s. We know all about prison and torture, but we never gave up on our wholly legitimate rights. Unionists have always supported us and even lent us their offices for our activities. Coordination with unionists in 2010 was almost immediate.

Various actors established efficient methods and a meticulous division of tasks. During the day, unionists organized demonstrations and rallies for all social groups and ages. In the evening, young people (unemployed, university students, and high school students) would clash with the police in what could be called guerrilla warfare. Meanwhile, lawyers worked to defend political prisoners.

The third aspect of unionists’ guidance is mediation with political authorities and UGTT leadership. The unionists acted as “mediators” between the young unemployed, who were particularly active and determined to continue with the protests and confront the police crackdown, and the regime authorities, who were resolute in suppressing the movement:

As unionists, we wanted to prevent young people from engaging in direct conflict with RCD members. We had to prevent young people from being jailed. That’s what “guidance” meant to me—we served as an intermediary between the [unemployed] young people and the government.

(Adel, union official, Secondary Education, Redeyef)

The unionists combined their prior experience in activism with the young people’s intricate knowledge of their urban environment. The unionists found themselves at the center of an unprecedented alliance between traditional activist networks and young people from disadvantaged neighborhoods, who were normally excluded from such events. This cooperation was a key factor in the transition from riots into an organized movement and the supply of resources required to expand and sustain protest efforts (Fominaya, 2015; Hmed, 2012).

When the state repression fuels the spread of the protest movement and its radicalization

One of the key elements in the Sidi Bouzid’ intifada, as described by the interviewees, is the speed at which the protest movement grew, reaching most of the neighboring central cities in Sidi Bouzid Governorate in 3 days. Demonstrations quickly became regional in scale and appeared throughout the country. Unionists reached out to contacts across the neighboring towns to “tone down the pressure” on those in Sidi Bouzid. The UGTT offices across Tunisia and the unionists’ backing proved decisive. The spread of protests to new locales was a new development compared to previous movements, which remained restricted to a specific region. The government adopted a systematic strategy of surrounding protesters to wear them down and extinguish the movement, as it had done in Redeyef in 2008. Sidi Bouzid was able to break free from the blockade because of the swift support from other regions, as noted by a young unemployed from the city:

The difference with the events in the mining area is that the government was able to block off Redeyef [for six months], restricting the intifada to a well-defined geographic area until the movement was aborted. However, Sidi Bouzid was able to break free from its isolation very quickly. How so? . . . Other delegations joined the movement—Meknassi, Jelma, and Regueb—and broke the cordon around Sidi Bouzid. This is what upsets the police.

Police repression intensified along with the movement, which helped radicalize those loyal to the cause. However, all the interviewees regard the violent crackdown on the protest movement in Thala and Kasserine on January 8 and 9, 2011, as the point of no return that radicalized the protesters and hastened the fall of Ben Ali:

When Thala and Kasserine joined the movement on January 6, 2011, the government felt that it was in danger, so it decided to change tactics and react very violently, with massacres in Thala and Kasserine. They had organized in the same way there—the demonstrations would depart from the local union in Thala and the regional union in Kasserine . . . The government intervened very violently; police practices changed at that point, even in Sidi Bouzid, and live ammunition were used against protestors.

(Farid, Union official, Primary Education, Sidi Bouzid)

Although direct police repression of the movements and a high level of criminalization of dissent and protests were common during Ben Ali’s regime, the events in Thala and Kasserine garnered an unprecedented wave of support that reached most cities in Tunisia. Rallies were held throughout the country in a show of solidarity and rejection of the situation imposed by the government. Ben Ali gave a speech that was later dubbed “bikouli hazm” (with all due severity) in which he threatened to press charges against the protesters and punish them severely. These two unpredictable events: the savage repression and Ben Ali’s menacing speech galvanized the protest movement. The Sidi Bouzid intifada, which began spontaneously, reached the point of no return. The protesters were more determined than ever to fight the ruling power and achieve their aims. Violent clashes between the police and young people from disadvantaged neighborhoods like Hay Atadhamoun (City of Solidarity) in Tunis erupted across the country on January 11, 2011, during which police stations were burned down. That was when the uprising reached the capital.

To summarize, the economic claims, intrinsically related to the country’s uneven development voiced by the excluded and marginalized were gradually politicized because of the attitude of the authoritarian regime and the unwillingness of the Union’s regional and national leadership to fully back the protesters. The inertial tendencies of the union’ leadership require unionists to operate incrementally and opportunistically, taking advantage of grievances as they arise and capitalize on organizational realignments when they occur. The networks of activists embedded in a specific political context and built in advance of such upheavals were critically important. As the social movement grew in power, it also grew in its composition, and the initially unorganized protest movement gradually evolved from localized socio-economic demands into a popular national movement. Finally, the Revolution of dignity was supported by a very broad alliance of Tunisia’s different social classes.

The question remains of how this revolutionary situation, in which unionists played a key role in mobilizing and organizing the movement, in turn impacted the UGTT and its internal dynamics as well as its relationship with the protest movement.

The internal organizational dynamics of an organization in crisis

The UGTT fit the description of an oligarchy, because for many years, its hierarchical structure concentrated power in the hands of the union bureaucracy and allowed the political regime to interfere with its affairs (Leach, 2005; Michel, 1965). The relative power of the Secretary General rivaled that of Tunisia’s president. The UGTT’s centralized decision-making processes and certain internal regulations enabled the Secretary General and the Executive Board to master how the union operated via its control over knowledge, resources, and communication.

The UGTT’s role as an organization in the revolutionary process remains controversial. While some believe that the union played a central role in the revolutionary process, others dispute that assertion. Those most critical of the UGTT point to the executive board’s late show of support and the official positions of the Secretary General. Others theorized that unionists acted independently and that the UGTT as an organization did not deserve credit for the regime’s fall. These critical viewpoints raise questions about the internal dynamics of the union during this period. Is there evidence that unionists acted individually outside the organization? How were decisions made within the union during the uprising? What explains the disparity between unionists’ actions on the streets and the Executive Board’s official statements? In the following section, the focus is on the chain of events and actors involved using an intra-organizational approach to shed light on how the UGTT reacted to internal pressure from unionist demonstrators and external pressure from the regime and the protest movement.

Regional and national decision-making bodies hesitate between mediation and confrontation

Although several unionists joined the popular uprising, the regional boards, and the national executive board adopted a wait-and-see approach that bordered on hostility. This prudent attitude enabled the decision-making bodies to distance themselves from the slogans critical of the government. This may lead one to believe that grass-roots unionists adopted strategies for action that were separate from the organization. However, upon closer inspection, the unionists’ remarks revealed that their actions were closely connected to how the union functioned. Unionists were able to pressurize the decision-making bodies to allocate carefully chosen roles to its members, regional executive committees, and the national executive committee. At the local and regional levels, the unionists obtained material resources from the UGTT, which they used to hold demonstrations and maintain ties with different groups of activists in the protest movement. Conversely, top regional union officials immediately began working as intermediaries with the political authorities to free prisoners and protect demonstrators:

Obviously, the UGTT regional executive committee in Sidi Bouzid played a secondary role, but it did not attempt to block the demonstrations, paid for the protest signs, and played a central role in freeing the prisoners. You know, in Sidi Bouzid, there were about 300 prisoners from Bouzayane, Meknassi, Regueb, Jelma, etc. It was the regional committee’s job to free the prisoners, calm the situation, and support the families. We held rallies in front of the UGTT to intensify pressure, and the regional committee negotiated with the governor for the prisoners.

(Farid, Union official, Primary Education, Sidi Bouzid)

While the members of all unions in every region joined the movement; the regional executive committees held back, limiting themselves throughout December to release statements of support demanding that prisoners be freed and regional inequality addressed. The statements mirrored the official position of the national executive committee, demonstrating the discipline of the regional committees and the coordination among them. Other interviewees explained that the wait-and-see attitude stemmed from the executive board’s role as a mediator between social movements and the government. This mediating role prevented the UGTT from clashing directly with the regime. From this perspective, the Executive Board’s apparent hesitation reflected the constraints it faced as the UGTT’s highest authority. A member of the Gafsa Regional Committee explained:

I believe that there is a tactical division of roles. . . The union bureaucracy cannot clash with the regime directly. It did not have a clearly stated position, but its views were reflected in its tacit support for the regional unions and its statements. . . Certain members of the Executive Board announced on Place Mohamed Ali Hammi that they were with the people and could not let them down. There is a division of roles. The Executive Board needed pressure from the streets to be able to openly make decisions that opposed the regime.

(Belgacem, a member of the Regional Committee, Gafsa)

At the behest of the intermediate and base branches, the UGTT Administrative Commission compelled the National Executive Committee to change course and release its first statement explicitly backing the protest movement. The UGTT Executive Board’s initial press releases had attempted to position the leadership in its usual role as a mediator, calling for the government to “free those who were arrested” and “take urgent measures to implement decisions regarding youth employment.” The statement was designed to appease the intermediary unions’ structures and win as many concessions as possible from the declining regime.

Pressure from union members leads to a breakdown in the hierarchical decision-making process

Unionists from the base and intermediate branches adapted their strategy against rising violence from the regime, and the uprising swelled. They put all their efforts into changing the prudent, wait-and-see attitude of the union’s bureaucracy, which had only expressed tepid support for the Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and Thala movements. This pressure sparked a crisis within UGTT, leading to an immediate breakdown in the conventional decision-making process at the union and a disregard for the central hierarchy. The quick succession of events and the resurgence in violence pushed the regional unions to act independently. The regional bodies ignored the regulatory provisions in the Tunisian labor code that required prior approval from the UGTT’s executive board and a ten days’ notice to strike legally. In this way, the intermediate union bodies shifted from a mediation approach to confrontation with both the government and the UGTT leadership.

There was a bit of coordination between the regional unions, but not enough, and each region was attempting to keep up with the onrush of events. . . The general strike in Sfax was planned long in advance, and they did not wait for approval from the Administrative Commission, which only recognized the legitimacy of the strike after the fact.

(Cherif, union activist, Primary Education, Sfax).

The crisis incited the unionists to set aside the “sanctity” of the hierarchy to make necessary decisions as per the requirement of the protest movement. At that point, the UGTT Executive Board and Secretary General had no choice but to back the protest movements; otherwise, they would have lost all legitimacy in the eyes of their base and cut themselves off from the Tunisian people, who were deeply moved by the self-immolation and suicide of several struggling young people and the killing of 100s of civilians. After welcoming and backing the popular uprising, the unionists succeeded in pushing the Executive Board via the Administrative Commission to take a more offensive stance in support of the protesters and their demands. The negotiations ended with the decision to let the regions choose the date of their general strike. On January 11, 2011, members of the UGTT Administrative Commission issued a statement which gave local unions across the country the freedom to call regional and sectoral strikes. Three regional unions—Sfax, Tozeur, and Kairouan—called a general strike on January 12, 2011. This compromise represented a success for the intermediate bodies, which were able to push through their decisions, but it also reflected the central leadership’s continual focus on leaving room for maneuver by avoiding a “national general strike” that would cut all dialog channels with the government. At the time, it was unpredictable that the events that would follow or the fall of the Ben Ali’s regime—the UGTT was not in any position to call for the government’s demise.

Thus, the violently suppressed popular uprising became a revolutionary process when the UGTT’ local and regional branches took up the cause. Ben Ali addressed the nation on January 13, 2011, nearly a month after the riots began. In the speech, famous for the phrase “fhemtkoum” (I understand you), Ben Ali promised more freedom for Tunisians, lower prices for staple goods, and to refrain from seeking another term in the 2014 presidential elections. Many Tunisians reacted quickly to these promises, which were delivered too late. The regional union in Tunis called a two-hour regional general strike in the greater Tunis region on January 14, 2011. The Tunis demonstration departed from Place Mohamed Ali Hammi, from the UGTT’s longstanding headquarters, and continued toward Avenue Bourguiba, across from the interior ministry, a reviled symbol of the dictatorship. Several hundred thousand people—far more than just union members and activists—demonstrated with the slogans “Ben Ali out!” and “Work, freedom, national dignity.” The same evening, Ben Ali flew to Saudi Arabia.

A noteworthy point is that, according to the interviewees, no one expected Ben Ali to flee. They all acted according to the sequence of events and adapted to new developments each day. They did not remotely suspect that their actions, combined with those of other actors, would completely change the fate of the country. Later on, certain unionists reinterpreted the fall of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011 as a consequence of the Administrative Commission meeting on January 11, 2011, a historic event: the culmination of a series of social movements spanning two decades.

The organizational culture of UGTT as a “counterbalance” inspired unionists’ actions

The interviewees’ detailed description of the organizational dynamics of UGTT during the uprising suggested that there was no disconnect between the unionists’ actions and the organizational framework in which they acted. The political crisis led to unexpected events, such as violent police repression and the rapid spread of the movement, yet the codified system of roles and well-oiled procedures remained a source of inspiration for the unionists, who were charged with establishing coordination mechanisms and assigning roles to the various hierarchical bodies as well as devising methods for pressuring the Executive Board to change its stance. This formal structure, which drew from the union’s unique historical trajectory, provided a framework, for the various participants to interact, communicate, coordinate their actions, and create a shared understanding that guided them in the strategies they pursued (Scully and Segal, 2002).

Thus, the paradox often cited by the public—the divide between the official position of the Executive Board and that of the base and intermediate unions in terms of support for the uprising—can only be understood by accounting for the unique organizational culture of the UGTT. The interplay between pressure and negotiation at the UGTT, which had a profound impact on the outcome of the Redeyef and Sidi Bouzid movements in 2008 and 2010, respectively, appears to be rooted in the UGTT’s unique organizational culture. The history of state formation and the evolution of worker movement in Tunisia shaped a specific organizational culture that allowed the coexistence of different political factions within the UGTT enabling the union to alternate between autonomy and dependence in both its internal organization and relations with the single-party state. The union’s self-proclaimed identity as a “counterbalance”—a stakeholder that exerts pressure and initiates negotiations—meant that it was not resigned to the purely defensive stance of a counterweight but did not have to take sole leadership of the political transformation, either.

As an illustration, the unionists predicted that the Executive Board would avoid a showdown with the government. They also knew that the Executive Board would only join the movement if they were able to exert enough pressure to tip the scales toward the people:

The executive board has a classic strategy: it always studies the balance of power. If the base unions do not exert any pressure, they play the hands of the government—the hands of the most powerful. The base unions play a key role in changing the direction of the union bureaucracy.

(Najet, union activist, Health Care, Tunis).

This organizational culture—a product of the union’s specific history—enabled unionists to pursue strategies involving pressure and negotiation to shift the position of the executive board, achieve their aims, and allay crises that could have caused a rift within the organization. As former UGTT Deputy Secretary General, Mohamed Trabelsi put it, “There has always been unity in the conflict, and a conflict in the unity.” The conflict between radical sections within UGTT and the bureaucracy never led to a clear rupture showing a strong sense of belonging to the organization. Moreover, this organizational culture enabled the UGTT to maintain close ties with the working class without cutting the cord with the single-party state, giving the union what Tunis-based journalist and unionist Tarek termed an “intuitive political sense.” According to him, this sense was the reason why the Executive Board was able to correct its stance in the last minute to conserve the UGTT’s unity in the changing political landscape.

Under this light, it was awaited that all the unionists interviewed had reconstructed the events in a way that emphasizes an “accumulation of struggles.” While the idea ignored the unique circumstances of the December 17 uprising, it revealed the extent to which unionists upheld the identity of the UGTT. This social and political legacy, transmitted through generations and archived by the organization’s formal bodies, both provided unionists significant resources for the movement and fostered a strong sense of identity that later enabled the UGTT to maintain its place in the political landscape in the face of various political crises.

The UGTT played the central role in the success of the revolution and provided guidance rooted in its historical legacy as a stakeholder in Tunisian society. The UGTT had human and structural mechanisms that enabled it to adapt to each period in history, from independence to the crises at the union in 1978 and 1985, up to the December 17 revolution. . . It is true that the December 17 revolution against the oppressive regime did not have any leadership, but no one can deny that this accumulation of struggles, this legacy, was the catalyst that enabled several different generations to manage social crises and political differences. Thus, it may be said, then, that the UGTT played a vital role in guiding the revolution.

(Omar, Union activist, Education, Bizerte).

Discussion

This paper aims at addressing the question of whether and how mass-membership movement organizations can break out of an oligarchical authority and support a radical political protest movement. Adopting Barker’s (2001) approach of a “social movement as a whole” it examined the interactions between the formal organization represented by UGTT and the popular uprising in Tunisia. It has also explored how the intra-organizational dynamics of the UGTT affected the transformation of the UGTT’s goal as well as the evolution of the protest movement and its outcomes. The analysis of the way unionists have overcome oligarchy within their organization and supported the protest movement highlights two factors.

First, the key role of unionists with activism experience outside the labor organization, who derive meaning from the organizational culture of the union to interpret the course of the event, to support the popular uprising, and to force the union leadership to support the revolutionary process. While there was no formal hierarchy in organizing the protests, there were unionists (some with decades of political experience), who consciously and deliberately introduced broad visions, knowledge of organizational practices, and disruptive tactics critical to joint campaigns, and organizing the protest movements in revolutionary times. They interpreted the Sidi Bouzid’s intifada as a mandate to change, and they had the know-how and vision to develop strategies to help support the unemployed youth at the beginning of the uprising (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Voss and Sherman, 2000).

Because of their past experience and background within and outside the labor organization, unionists became the “mediators” and, as such, influenced the shape and character of “the movement as a whole.” Their accounts revealed that in their “spontaneous action,” there were traces of years of “underground activity” led by trade-union resistance factions as well as a long organizational experience of coordination between groups and engaging regularly in protests against an authoritarian regime that helped set the stage and shape these eruptions. They were able to “break the silence” together, to proceed toward radical political expression and set the stage for greater organizing while facing unanticipated repression by a state that had hitherto been considered unshakable (Hmed, 2012). The history of worker movement and their experience with different political organizations and protest movements significantly molded their ability to assume the task of a revolutionary spearhead (Osa, 2003; Petras, 1978). This case confirmed the requirement for a historically grounded analysis that could be helpful in highlighting the ongoing social movement activity during periods of latency or abeyance to better understand the rapid mobilization of networks in new visible episodes of protest cycles (Fominaya, 2015).

More precisely, unionists’ roles required planning, coordination, and communication. It echoed Cloward and Piven’s (1984) use of “cadres.” “Cadres” are individuals dedicated to the cause, who seek to mobilize “the poor” through institutions and networks (e.g. churches, colleges) where they [i.e. “the poor”] were already “organized.” Yet, in the case of UGTT, the grass-roots level unionists were “the cadres,” who helped support the movement not only by “organizing” in the sense of a coordination of collective action but also by breaking the iron law of oligarchy and operating a radical transformation within UGTT that was critical to the success of the protest movement. Differently put, the Tunisian case confirms that there is no such thing as a leaderless movement (Sutherland et al., 2014). This is true whether the “leaders” acknowledge their role or not.

Second, the occurrence of unpredictable and unprecedented regime repression helped radicalize the protest movement and its claims, leading to a growing pressure on the union’s bureaucracy (Dobry, 2009). Indeed, unionists’ challenges, goals, and expectations were regularly thrown into disorder due to the unpredictable reactions of the regime and the shifting dynamics of the protest movement. This showed that the protest movement’s trajectory in an organic crisis was shaped not simply by movements from below but also by offensive movements from above, led by the ruling economic and political elite (Gramsci, 1994; Nilsen and Cox, 2013). The use of direct repression that sought to disaggregate the protest movement led to the suspension of “truce lines” handed down from past movement struggles and opened up new terrains of struggle. The importance of crisis or counter mobilization created the requirement for and seed for radical transformation. From this awareness of the point of “no return,” the unionists as well as different activist networks began to move beyond classic support campaign toward a form of movement activity and organization that saw the social whole as the object of challenge or transformation (Nilsen and Cox, 2013). At the heart of this radical change, laid new radical requirements and organizational challenges to oppose counter mobilization, which resulted in overcoming the oligarchic authority within the UGTT and in the development of a revolutionary situation.

These two factors in conjunction helped the unionists to “break the iron law” by pushing the union bureaucracy to shift from a “wait and see” attitude to a clear radical support of the protest movement. The originality of this case laid in the fact that apart from confrontational tactics, the unionists alternated between confrontation, mediation, and collaboration (De Bakker et al., 2017; Voos, 2000). Additionally, the rupture in the decision-making process was an intentional break, opening, crack, or, according to Holloway (2003), a fissure. The space of creation and autonomy to support the protest movement was desired, and they knew that a rupture might help to facilitate this radical change, so they used the various tactics necessary to keep the political horizons open, such as specific forms of collaboration, conscious grounding of collective memory in the present, and a profound and rich analysis of power dynamics to prevent the opening to become coopted (Sitrin, 2011).

Thus, the unionists’ agency and their collective resistance appeared to have resulted from both the foresight gained from their intricate knowledge of the organization and the unpredictability of the effect their actions would have on the course of events and the other actors in the movement. In fact, attempts that may fail in one instance can be wildly successful in another because of factors beyond the control of the organized forces or individuals involved. The Executive Board, which had successfully controlled and refocused past social movements, was taken by surprise and, for the first time, was compelled to cede to pressure from the base and attacked the regime head-on. The revolutionary process, which pushed certain regional unions and federations to distance themselves from the Executive Board and make decisions independently, set a precedent that paved the way for new relations between the intermediate sections and the central leadership. This created an opportunity for a more equal balance of power and an end to the hegemonic excesses of the executive board.

Differently put, it is doubtless that the UGTT’s centralized hierarchical structure—several local, regional, federal, and national levels with more than half a million people from all walks of life—helped sustain the power in the hands of the union bureaucracy and allowed the political regime to interfere with union affairs but gave the union political sway and an ability to unite Tunisians on an unparalleled scale during the protest movement. These finding extend Morris (1981)’s work by demonstrating that political and organizational features of UGTT were critical for nurturing and sustaining the spontaneous popular uprisings. Intra-organizational processes manifested in the relationships between the national leadership and the base and intermediate structures on the one hand and the inter-organizational level where networks of activists where established largely shaped the trajectories of movement mobilization (Clemens and Minkoff, 2004; Curtis and Zurcher, 1973; Gerhards and Rucht, 1992). The unionists showed that it was possible to work outside the official co-opted bureaucracy while simultaneously resisting their ineffective tactics, and still operate by using the available resources provided by the organization and coordinating with other groups of activists in the process of mobilization.

More broadly, and following Luxemburg (1906), the Tunisian case of UGTT showed that revolutionary events cannot be comprehended without an understanding of their discrete histories and specifically the history of the forms of resistance, organization, and repression, which underlie the current events. Backed by a long history of activism and a unique organizational culture of a “counterbalance power” that combined strategies for pressure and negotiation, the UGTT was able to both maintain cohesion despite internal tensions caused by the uprising and serve as the driving force behind a coordination network comprising several groups of actors that focused on protest movement and hastened the fall of Ben Ali.

Conclusion

The connection between social movements and unions remains unexplored in social movement studies. This study adds to the literature on trade unions in social movements, which has, up to this point, largely emphasized the contingencies that might prevent the iron law from emerging rather than the perspective developed in that paper; under some conditions and in specific political and organizational contexts, oligarchy is compatible with agency and radical transformation. The UGTT case study has several implications for the study of trade unions in protest movements and, more broadly, the role of formal mass-membership organizations in social movements.

First, it suggests that dichotomies that dominated the debate on social movement organizing between “movement verticals” such as the hierarchically organized labor organizations, and “movement horizontals” could be overcome by focusing on the “interpenetration” between different dimensions of “organizing” within and between different parts of protest movement. Understanding the interrelations between movements and organizations as well as their respective internal organizational dynamics is critical to highlight how and under which circumstances mass-membership movement organizations can break out of an oligarchic authority and support a radical political protest movement. This could help inquire how mass-membership organizations are shaped by protest movement challenges and how these, in turn, shape organizational responses to external and internal demands of radical change.

Second, political crisis or counter mobilization in social movement studies is often seen as creating the requirement for organizational transformation, but few studies discuss the ways in which organizational inertia and resistance that underpin bureaucracies are overcome. The Tunisian case of UGTT offered a significant empirical and theoretical contribution to this debate by demonstrating that a detailed analysis of intra-organizational dynamics during the protest movement, was critical to highlight the circumstances and the way oligarchic authority and formal structures, on one hand, and membership agency and innovation, on the other, can coexist successfully, leading to a radical transformation of UGTT goals as well as to a successful regime change. While acknowledging that the distribution of authority as well as the organizational culture have clear effects on the allocation of resources for organizing, this case showed that innovation does not arise only from informally organized, emergent social movements but also from bureaucratic mass-membership organizations. The crisis propelled organizational change within the UGTT and paved the way for adoption of a new set of organizational practices comprising both confrontation and collaboration critical to the support of protest movement.

By exploring the organizational power dynamics emerging around and within the formal organizations as well as the key role of unionists in the protest movement, this study provided a useful way to consider the impact of a formal organization in protest movement. The UGTT created an environment in which activists learned key mobilization and organizing skills. The organizational and cultural processes through which activists learn the skills of mobilizing and organizing are frequently overlooked in the study of social movements, and arguably, this can be one of the benefits of the professionalization of movement organizations. This could be an area of potential for organizational studies to help understand the impact of crisis for provoking changes in existing organizations, and more generally to grasp in a dialectical way the co-existence of agency and structure within the protest movement. It would be fruitful to explore this further in the future, and to analyze, compare, and contrast how “organizing” and “organization” in social movements is performed and constructed across Northern and Southern contexts.