Abstract
Some years ago when I was consulting for a construction company, the human resource manager commented how much he enjoyed working with sustainability specialists—‘these sustainability people are different—this is not just a job—they do this work because they care’. A similar observation seems to be the starting point for Hemingway’s exploration of social responsibility in the workplace. After extensive experience in industry and academia observing pro-social behaviour, she asserts the need to look beyond structural features of organisations to explain social responsibility. Rather, the agency associated with individuals’ personal values and moral character also needs consideration.
Hemingway’s research aim is to understand generative mechanisms for the enterprising pursuit of socially responsible behaviour and provide evidence-based practice advice for increasing the inclusion of social value in business decision making. In approaching this review task, I have taken the perspective of a practitioner. My justification is Hemingway’s overarching emancipatory objective of ‘enabling corporations to develop their more socially responsible organisational cultures and provide a platform for the development of a form of capitalism that is a vast improvement over what we have at the present time’ (p. 213). My approach then is to re-compose Hemingway’s agenda by asking my own practitioner question of this book: To influence a culture of socially responsible behaviour within my working environment what sort of people should we employ and what structural support do they need?
Hemingway introduces this book by reminding us that Corporate Social Responsibility is a contested concept. The perspectives of market fundamentalists (who consider social outcome as relevant only if it affects financial outcome) and enlightened self-interest seekers (who promote social outcome if there is business benefit to be gained) are placed in contrast to those who take a perspective of moral responsibility for others in both business and non-business decision making. Market fundamentalism and enlightened self-interest are presented as diminished motivations in contrast to the more enhanced motivation of responsibility to others.
In the first half of this book, Hemingway develops a theoretical model which guides her empirical research. Taking a critical realist approach she relates determinants of people’s socially responsible agency to certain organisational influences which together serve to explain social entrepreneurship in a work context. Distancing herself from the perspective that decision making in business is rational or objective, she highlights how employees’ personal values and moral character combine with their discretion and impression of organisational constraints in the decision making that supports moral action.
The model is developed gradually, drawing deeply from a broad range of psychology, sociology and management literature and includes concepts from moral philosophy. While at times the thread of the argument becomes a little opaque as she delves into diverse literature, her summary signposting at the start of each chapter is most helpful in bringing the reader back to the point she wishes to make. The point being it is possible to classify people into one of four modes of commitment to social responsibility. The modes are presented as a two-by-two typology with a moral character dimension ranging from individualist to collectivist values and a context dimension ranging from a supportive to unsupportive environment for socially responsible behaviour. From Hemingway’s perspective, the answer to my question of who to employ lies in the two quadrants where people’s collectivist values dominate. These are the people Hemingway refers to as corporate social entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are identified as creating new enterprise and having the distinction of being imaginative and socially competent as well as needing autonomy, freedom and independence. They are intuitive decision makers and challenge seekers. Furthermore, social entrepreneurs have a noticeable collectivist sense of duty to society, and it is this moral character that Hemingway uses to differentiate social entrepreneurs from other entrepreneurs.
Hemingway defines values as norms that combine with emotion and guide the selection or evaluation of behaviour. They are manifest in the way people talk and act. Values are not immutable and can be ordered by relative importance. She conceives values as driving behaviour as an expression of self (enhancement of sense of self) and also for the common good of the group (collective welfare of others). Individuals posses a combination of values, and at any time, either individualistic or collectivist values may dominate.
Hemingway also draws on Maslow’s theory of motivation in defining the moral character of social entrepreneurs. She points out that Maslow’s earlier work identifying self-actualisation as the ultimate motivational goal is most frequently cited and embedded in human resource management practice. However, it is his later conceptualisation of self-transcendence (service to others or a cause beyond oneself) as the ultimate motivational goal that she wishes to use to differentiate her corporate social entrepreneurs. The theoretical takeout here is that entrepreneurs who prioritise values and motivations directed towards the collective welfare of others are the people who exercise socially responsible decision making and so take socially responsible action in the work environment.
So how might I recognise corporate social entrepreneurs? Hemingway further develops her theoretical typology with the aid of case study interviews with 28 people from a UK-based multinational healthcare company. The company has a tradition of staff welfare and encouraging intrapreneurship and is reputed to be relatively socially responsible. Occupying the classification, active corporate social entrepreneurs are the interviewees identified as having collectivist personal values and perceiving the organisational context to be supportive of socially responsible behaviour. Significantly, Hemingway found that social entrepreneurship within the corporate context did not require seniority; directives from management were not a prerequisite for corporate social entrepreneurship, sometimes it was self-generated; socially responsible activities that were congruent with the brand and the discretion available seemed to be easier than others; corporate social entrepreneurs were not entirely collectivist as they sometimes also exhibited individualist motivations; many corporate social entrepreneurs experienced a significant event that changed their outlook; and active corporate social entrepreneurs took a long-term view and were reflective in nature.
The interviewees with collectivist personal values who did not perceive the organisational context as supportive are defined as concealed corporate social entrepreneurs. Their moral courage was tempered by perceptions of organisational constraints leading to a certain separation of their pro-social activities between home and work—compartmentalising what they did but not who they were.
Conformists are positioned in the self-enhancement values and supportive context quadrant. They took a pragmatic attitude to corporate social responsibility and happily engaged with pro-social activities if it was appropriate for their career. They were likely to conform to organisational pressure, and their decision making might be described as enlightened self-interest. These respondents emphasised their home life as of primary concern and displayed a noticeable lack of corporate social responsibility knowledge.
Only one of the interviewees was placed into the disassociated classification. This is the quadrant where self-enhancement personal values dominate at work and at home, and the work environment is considered to be unsupportive of corporate social responsibility. Given that the purposive sampling of interviewees was focused on people who ‘do the right thing’, it is actually surprising that any of the interviewees were in this category at all. This person expressed a lack of interest in corporate social responsibility, had little knowledge about it and dismissed its value. He was an example of a market fundamentalist who considered being a ‘nice company’ was a problem.
After this empirical journey through the modes of moral commitment, Hemingway summarises her findings with a refined theoretical model in which socially responsible outcomes are discussed as a consequence of people’s background, values, personality, beliefs about the company and beliefs about corporate social responsibility. These antecedents are seen as being mediated by individual discretion which determines the type of activity undertaken. The model is not proposed as causally deterministic, rather Hemingway highlights that corporate social responsibility outcomes are very much contingent and relational. Importantly, for the first part of my review question, this model provides detailed insight into the characteristics of people who might champion pro-social behaviour in a work environment, although as Hemingway has highlighted, people do not necessarily fit neatly into this typology.
The dynamics of this concluding model also provide insight into the second part of my review question: what support do individuals need to exercise socially responsible behaviour? Significantly, Hemingway highlights the importance of the courage to act autonomously to achieve pro-social outcomes in a business context. This courage to act was not entirely self-generated nor was it immutable. It was not dependent on one’s seniority in the organisation, but it seemed to depend very much on perceiving organisational support. Additionally, social entrepreneurs’ discretion was most effectively exercised where there was congruence between personal and corporate objectives. Here, Hemingway revisits the notion that corporate social responsibility is a contested concept as evidenced by the interviewees. She concludes that to maintain pro-social behaviour as the norm in a work context requires continuing reinforcement in a coordinated rather than ad hoc manner. My practitioner conclusion based on these findings is that an environment of guided autonomy is needed for consistent socially responsible behaviour in the work environment. However, compared with the critical depth found in the discussion of the personal characteristics of individual agency, the practice guidance provided by Hemingway on how to support such an environment is light touch.
As stated at the beginning of this review, my interest has been to understand whether this book assists with the practitioner question of who to employ and what structural support to provide to become a socially responsible business. The short answer is yes to the employment part of the question, but I am left wanting more insight into structural support. Of course, this is not a surprising conclusion and should not be seen as a criticism but as a research opportunity. The primary focus of the study is individual agency with structure playing second fiddle. Hemingway has guided the reader through scholarly concepts of moral character and has provided considerable insight into the personal characteristics of people who take the personal initiative to consistently behave in a socially responsible manner at work. Perhaps, an extension of this study might be provided in a second volume guided by the title—Corporate Social Entrepreneurship: Sustained through Supported Integrity.