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Abstract

Some decades on after the MacBride Many Voices, One World report (1980) and the Maitland Missing Link report (1985), global telecommunications have only gained in importance, yet are still fissured by global inequalities. This situation is evident in one of the major developments underway in recent years: 5G mobile technologies. 5G is highly significant for present and future communication—and well advanced in its deployment and adoption. However, the dominant ways in which 5G has been imagined, planned, and deployed have been significantly shaped by interests and geopolitical forces that exclude many countries, and many of the putative beneficiaries of the emergent technology. To shed light on this impasse, in this paper, we offer a comparative analysis of policy and technology realities in two distinct countries that have been relatively overlooked in 5G: Peru and Indonesia. What we find is that national policies are premised on a shared interest and shared benefits, however, at this crucial point in deployment the outcomes are remote for the majority of citizens, especially in ways that matter for daily lives. In both these countries, 5G provides benefits for the small groups who can access and afford it, with others groups in position to be able to come online in the near future—as it provides opportunities for investments, fees, and penalties. However, for large segments of the populations, 5G, the prospects of connectivity, and the emerging digital economy are a long way off.

Keywords

5G mobile media smartphones digital inequalities telecommunications policy global media policy Peru Indonesia

Introduction

More than 50 years on from the MacBride Many Voices, One World report (Independent Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 1980) and the Maitland Missing Link report (1985), global telecommunications have only gained in importance. Telecommunications have moved to the center stage of discussions of communication and society—and yet remain still fissured by global inequalities. This is despite milestone international interventions such as the World Summit on the Information Society and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

This situation is evident in one of the major developments underway in recent years: 5G mobile technologies. 5G is highly significant for present and future communication—and well advanced in its deployment and adoption. However, the dominant ways in which 5G has been imagined, planned, deployed, and governed have been significantly shaped by interests and geopolitical forces that exclude many countries, and many of the putative beneficiaries of the emergent technology. This is something brought to our attention by Mansell and Plantin (2022) in their study of the complex 5G imaginaries in UK, US, and Europe. They see 5G characterized by tension between, on the one hand, promises of bringing digital innovation and, on the other hand, its materialization resulting in intensified harvesting of user data and extended surveillance of consumers and citizens. Mansell and Plantin look forward to the identification of “potential opportunities for a reordering of values, thereby giving higher prominence to those associated with an alternative digital innovation social imaginary with stronger emphasis on public accountability and the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights” (Mansell and Plantin, 2022: 4838; see also Campbell et al., 2021).

To understand why the horizon for values and alternative scenarios of 5G requires us to grapple with the complex nature of telecommunications technology, infrastructure, markets, and policy (Garcia-Swartz and Campbell-Kelly, 2022). The unfolding of the next wave of mobile technology of which 5G is a prime bearer involves, at a minimum, “intense interoperability between billions of mobile devices and through complex telecom networks, crossing every country in the world” (Dallas and Shiu, 2023: 2). How this plays out, and how democratic participation in this process can be secured throughout, especially at the decisive moments, is a conundrum. In this paper, we aim to make a contribution to this puzzle. Mobile communications are used by nearly all the world's population, and underpin internet connectivity for all—but especially those in poor and precarious contexts. Leaving aside the hype regarding 5G, it is vitally important for the next phase of mobile and digital communication infrastructure, devices, products, services, and capabilities. 5G is well established for many consumers in metropolitan, better-off, global north settings: but what is the full international picture?

Our paper builds on the cumulative scholarship and policy from MacBride onwards that, in different registers, theories, and voices, seeks to open up communications and technology to all, while taking seriously the mounting issues of citizens’ rights posed by these highly commercialized, enclosed, data-intensive, and pervasive technologies. In particular, we build on a benchmark international account of communication and social progress by the International Panel on Social Progress (Couldry et al., 2018). In connecting 5G developments with these lodestar goals, we draw on the insights of a pluralistic body of work that critiques and seeks to go beyond dominant economics and public policy that has shaped mobile paradigms since the 1980s. Notably, we take it that policy is still defined by national conditions but subject to global dynamics and forces beyond local control (Flew et al., 2016). Telecommunications involve formidable political and cultural economies (Babe, 1995; Schiller, 2023), especially when it comes to mobile communications (Goggin, 2011, 2021; Wilken, 2019). Telecommunications also turns on power relations in which actors such as consumers (Rhodes, 2012), citizens, progressive social movements, civil society organizations with interest and expertise in digital technology are minor players in the key arenas such as global value chains, governance, and policy (Padovani et al., 2023), standards (Dallas and Shiu, 2023), and what counts as commanding research and policy evidence.

This paper, based mostly on desktop research—and, for Peru's case, in public presentations and some personal communications provided during industry and government events to one of the authors—tries to shed light on other aspects of this impasse, by offering a comparative analysis of 5G in two quite different countries that have been overlooked in research and global policy: Peru; and Indonesia. Each is located in a region—respectively, South America and Southeast Asia—that is regarded as a key emerging market for digital technology. Yet both regions have been relatively minor players in shaping the global 5G “templates”, in terms of the received wisdom: dominant frameworks, ideas, toolkits, and evolutionary paths for what 5G offers and how to configure its environment. The countries we discuss here are to some extent on opposite ends of the spectrum in their capacity to set the terms for and shape their own 5G national markets, when it comes to population, market size, and resources. Policy analysis has been prepared based on current literature for both the 5G and mobile market and telecoms and communication and media policy research.

Peru is a country of over 32 million people, where the Andes mountain range creates significant obstacles to any infrastructure development. Considering the heavily concentrated income distribution that brings over 70% of GDP to the capital city, Lima—where about a third of the population lives—any discussion about 5G starts by taking into account the demand market, while regulatory policy requires a balanced distribution of investment beyond the capital (Yamakawa et al., 2012). There is a long-standing perception that “everyone has a cellphone now” (Aronés et al., 2011), even in rural, poor areas far beyond the capital city, where traders have been using mobile telephony to accelerate their activities and facilitate cross-border exchanges.

Indonesia is a country of over 270 million people. It has been a pioneer in telecommunications (notably satellite) and more recently in mobile, social media, and digital platforms (especially via much-vaunted services such as the Gojek). Indonesian actors have shown considerable interest in 5G, especially associated with technological and social futures to do with smart cities (for instance, the new capital city in the province of Kalimantan being based on 5G networks) (Hutajulu et al., 2020).

In our analysis, we focus on four things as common points of comparison across our two country case studies: the specific characteristics of the country and its environment for 5G; key features of markets and consumption; policy and infrastructure choices; and, critical factors for success or failure. In the penultimate and concluding sections of the paper, we offer reflections for global media policy, as well as national policy and regulation, responding to Bauer and Bohlin's (2022: 2) cautionary note that “prevailing approaches can result in the retention of inappropriate policies,” as well as the lack of direct connection between telecommunications investment and development (Galperin and Viecens, 2016: 38). We also bear in mind the query raised in research, of “why embrace 5G at all?” (Forge and Vu, 2020). Overall, we suggest that global media policy could play an important role in addressing this situation, yet to a significant extent, it is not fit-for-purpose (Padovani et al., 2023).

Peru

Environment for 5G

As proposed by many multilateral organizations, both public and private, 5G has significant potential to enhance quality of life and improve business conditions for Latin America (Leon, 2023). However, there is no clear identification of immediate, actual uses for local 5G-based services. Current patterns of 4G and 3G usage show concentration on commercial services with little innovation beyond digital payments, which have become quite popular in Peru but do not demand significant upgrades on network technology (Castillo et al., 2023). What value beyond the small sliver of globalized actors will 5G bring to Peruvian society is debatable, notwithstanding the fact that it will be deployed, at least by the telcos that are still interested in investing in the country. One factor to take into account is that the region's dominant player, Telefonica Internacional, is moving away from end consumer services, as it intends to search for potential investors and “modulating the exposure to the region, while creating the conditions to maximize its value via growth, consolidation, and possible corporate transactions” (Telefonica, 2019).

However, the expectation for 5G penetration in the region is still low and has some correlation to the levels of inequality that characterize this set of countries. According to the GSM Alliance, by 2025 5G connections would represent 12% of the technology mix, with the leader being Brazil at 20% and Peru at just 7% (GSM Association, 2021: 7), even though the penetration rate of mobile services will reach 73% of the region inhabitants, and 70% of Peru's. Somehow, Ericsson is more optimistic, proposing 43% penetration by the end of 2026 (Ericsson, 2022c). In both cases, there is no breakdown by country.

Market and consumption

Telcom markets in Peru are developing at a rate that is comparatively similar to other emerging economies of the Global South. In terms of mobile and Internet use, ITU figures show that Peru had a total of 42 million post- and active prepaid subscriptions in 2021, or some 120 mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (ITU, 2022b). An estimated 85% of individuals own a mobile phone, with 83% of the female population and 86% of males enjoying ownership. In terms of Internet access: 55% of households have Internet access at home (18% rural households vs. 57% urban) (ITU, 2022b);

75% of individuals are using the Internet (73% female versus 77% male)—with the highest usage of 91% in the 15–24 year cohort (ITU, 2022b);

there are 9.3 fixed broadband subscriptions versus 85 mobile broadband subscriptions, respectively, per 100 inhabitants; and,

81% of the population is covered by a 4G cellular network, and 5.3% by 5G (ITU, 2022b).

In Peru, there are four major mobile operators, with two of them basically having the same market share (around 30%), two others with similar shares (around 20%), and some very minor operators with less than 1% each. The least expensive prepaid plans start at less than 9 USD per month, though only 0.5 GB of data and a few zero-rating apps; these plans allow for topping up as you go. None of the significant players come from Peru: Telefonica International of Spain (Movistar brand) and America Telecomunicaciones of Mexico (Claro brand) are present in most of the region's countries and are the larger operators in Peru; Entel, from Chile, and Viettel (Bitel brand) from Vietnam have the smaller shares and coincide in having Peru as their only foreign market.

As with most Latin American countries, prepaid services (noncontract) predominate, though they are more expensive to the final user than contract ones (although this recently diminished); however, this allows for users to moderate usage according to income. There are no studies explaining this trend (Tude, 2013).

Taking into account Peru's over 70% of labor informality––nonregistered workers, self-employed, and nonspecified work activities are among the causes—the result is an economy that has a very concentrated stratum of users with the income levels necessary to fully utilize services currently requiring 4G connections; thus, the potential for a significant market of 5G subscribers is small, at least till prices fall to current levels.

There are significant issues with supply, as operators concentrate their marketing on affordability and unlimited access to popular apps (such as WhatsApp and Instagram) without mentioning any potential benefits of 5G networks.

Policy and infrastructure choices

While the bands for 5G have been assigned, the auctions have not taken place, amid the chaos brought by the lack of professionalism of the previous presidential administration and the current political turmoil, making Peru's economy not very attractive to investors, even though inflation and currency devaluation have not been particularly high.¹ In 2021, the government, through the Ministry for Transportation and Communications, allowed telcos to offer “5G services” using already existing infrastructure, something that currently only happens in Lima.

But the main issue is the failure of the publicly financed, privately run national fiber trunk network (RDFNO in Spanish), which was designed as a way to promote access outside of Lima and the regional capital cities; the failure of this project has left the network without an operator nor a clear business plan; investment in 5G will come eventually but the distance between the areas of the country served by it and those that cannot attract investment nor quality for the national compensatory fund for telecommunications (Pronatel) will widen (OSIPTEL, 2017).

In March 2023, the final report of a ministerial commission charged with finding alternatives to the current failed management plan for the RDFNO proposed that the infrastructure be offered to any operator willing to use it for any potential business model, including end consumer services like internet access with only regulated service rates while sharing with the REDNACE, or State Network, for government usage. This will present an issue for any potential new operator, as the access to the RDNFO would mean potentially a simplified means to provide full spectrum services all around the country but without the synergies offered by combining mobile/fixed connection rates.

This leads to issues regarding regulatory arrangements carried from the earliest period of privatization, over 30 years ago. Infrastructure sharing is yet not compulsory, though the legal instruments to make it so have just been approved in 2023 (MTC, 2023), while local governments try to enact ordinances setting high rates for setting up antennas at many locations. This makes it even more expensive to bring infrastructure outside of the markets where returns are guaranteed. The responsibility to approve infrastructure lays with local governments. Since 2007, a national law mandates a complex regime of approval where municipalities must follow national guidelines, while, at the same time, maintaining constitutional protection for the autonomy of local governments to decide how and by whom infrastructure of all kinds is deployed under their jurisdictions. Thus, Lima, the capital city, has 49 districts that technically have the right to decide on infrastructure. There is constant low-level conflict between telecom operators, the national government and local ones is being waged on collection of fees for installation of infrastructure—as well as penalty fees for noncompliance of local decisions that become, in many cases, mired in long-winded litigation (Morales Alferrano, 2021).

As well as not sharing infrastructure such as antenna power, another major issue is that operators would prefer not to pay local governments. Local governments like to have as many towers as possible, to obtain more payments for their setting up. Meanwhile, the national government is not able to define the necessary policy changes to promote a rational approach to infrastructure (Mayorga-Bohórquez et al., 2021: 280). These are the kind of policy clashes that, without much public scrutiny, dominate the supply market.

Critical success or failure factors

In the end, the most serious issue in Peru regarding 5G is market segregation. How many people are expected to become users of 5G services is the determining factor in the potential deployment of a technology that relies on high-use, high-bandwidth services. This is important so the operators can recoup their investments. This is especially the case in a world where telecom firms are dealing with an income squeeze, demanding that regulations allow them new business models and potentially better incomes. Added to which is the economic risk of 5G in countries that are not particularly attractive due to low return on investment (ROI). This leads to a situation where operators propose regulatory changes that allow better conditions for them; or, that operators decide that they should wait for better returns by scaling investments.

Also, political turmoil is a factor. Peru has had six presidents since 2016, one of the worst pandemic outcomes, and permanent conflict between the legislative and executive powers (Castilla, 2023). Moreover, the potential for attracting investment, either international or local, for a significant transformation of the telecommunications supply market in Peru is distant and unfulfilled.

Indonesia

Environment for 5G

The fourth most populous country in the world, Indonesia, is a much larger and more prosperous country than Peru. Its role and prominence in its region is growing, and it is of particular interest, globally also, as a testbed and future powerhouse for digital technologies.

As it seeks to develop and capitalize on its digital plans, Indonesia contends with striking levels of inequality, major challenges of geography, and a complex, layered set of cultural and political institutions and arrangements. In the past decade, the role of digital technologies in the everyday lives of Indonesians has deepened with the nation being often hailed as a nation of avid users.

Markets and consumption

In Indonesia, the market can be seen as competitive though “dominated by a small number of very large companies” (Lancaster, 2023: 28). There are five major operators in the mobile market: Telkomsel (dominant player, with approximately 50% of market share); XL Axiata; Indosat; 3 Indonesia; and, Smartfen (Lancaster, 2023).

3G was offered in 2006, with the three major mobile network operators providing 4G commercially by 2014 and becoming well-established (Hutajulu et al., 2020: 2). In terms of mobile and Internet use, ITU figures show that Indonesia had a total of 320 million post- and active prepaid subscriptions in 2021 (ITU, 2022a), or some 114 mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (ITU, 2022a). An estimated 68% of individuals own a mobile phone—63% of the female population and 71% of males (ITU, 2022a). In terms of Internet access:

87% of households have internet access at home (74% rural households vs. 89% urban) (ITU, 2022a);

66% of individuals are using the internet (64% female versus 69% male)—with the highest usage of 92% in the 15- to 24-year cohort (ITU, 2022a);

there are 4.9 fixed broadband subscriptions versus 115 mobile broadband subscriptions respectively per 100 inhabitants; and,

at least 88% of the population is covered by a 4G network (ITU, 2022a).

There is not only high level of reliance upon and consumption of mobile services in Indonesia but also relatively low levels of associated data consumption—thus a complex picture of digital connectivities, infrastructures, and inequalities (Baulch et al., 2018; Dinakrisma et al., 2022; Lim, 2018; Puspitasari and Ishii, 2016).

Policy and infrastructure choices

Indonesia has expended considerable energy on telecommunications and ICTs. It was a pioneer in satellites, a precursor to its national broadband infrastructure program, known as Palapa Ring (completed in 2019). Indonesia has put in place successive policies for internet and broadband infrastructure (such as the Indonesian Broadband Plan 2014–2019), for leadership in digital economy, and more recently the extension of digital services across the archipelago with its strategy articulated in the digital Indonesia roadmaps (2010–2020; then 2021–2024) (Ramli, 2019). Such initiatives have been sheeted home to the village level—for example, with the Village Development Information System providing the right for villages to access information and broadband satellite services (Mazya et al., 2023).

In the COVID-19 pandemic, digitization has received a renewed emphasis in the wider Southeast Region, of which Indonesia is part. Digitalization is seen as a “lifeline” in the pandemic, and digital transformation is believed to be key to the ASEAN's “post-pandemic” recovery (Rillo, 2022). 5G is a prominent element of Southeast Asia regional plans—most recently in the 2025 ASEAN Digital Masterplan (ADM), released in January 2021 (ASEAN, 2021). In its 2022 Mobile Economy Asia Pacific 2022 report, the GMSA gives its stocktake and vision for the region. It places Indonesia in the “leading nations” group, ranging from Pakistan with 3% of customers having 5G by 2025, through Bangladesh (6%), and India (7%), to Indonesia at 13%—the highest predicted in the group (GSMA, 2022: 8). Despite this rosy outlook, there are major issues in the rollout of 5G in the region as the author of a May 2022 UN ESCAP paper on Digital Connectivity notes:

the unequal diffusion of 5G leads to a deepening of the digital divide in the [Southeast Asian] region. In the Asia-Pacific, approximately 20 per cent of the population is still not covered by third generation (3G) network, and only half of the population has access to 4G network. (Son, 2022: 20)

This Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asian regional picture provides an important context for looking at the case of Indonesia.

Despite strong interest in 5G, Indonesia's roll-out remains in its early stages. Initially, the plan was for the 5G network to be available in 2020, but the deployment was delayed for a range of reasons (Hutajulu et al., 2020), as we discuss below. That said, as noted, there has been considerable interest in 5G in Indonesia on the part of industry, elites, and policy actors. Telecommunications and technology industry players, especially equipment vendors and network operators, have made keen efforts to partake in the shaping of 5G in Indonesia. Ericsson claimed the first demonstration of 5G in the country in 2017, showcasing “use cases such as motion-sensing robotic arm and live 4 K video streaming” (Telecom Review, 2017).

Telkomsel was first to launch 5G services, which it did in selected areas in May 2021 (Lancaster, 2023). Ericsson partnered with Indosat Ooredoo to launch commercial 5G services in Jakarta in August 2021, planning subsequent rollout to other major cities in Indonesia (Ericsson, 2021a, 2021b, 2022a). It is optimistically promoting the near-term potential of 5G for applications such as the Metaverse (Ericsson, 2022b). Indosat and 3G Indonesia merged in 2022, becoming Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison (Lancaster, 2023).

Another major European company featuring in Indonesia is Nokia, partnering also with Indosat in the launch of Indonesia's first “5G Experience” center at the Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology in Surabaya. Among the technologies featured at the launch to be supported by 5G networks were autonomous vehicles.

Critical success or failure factors

Indonesia has attracted significant foreign investment interest from elsewhere in the Asian region. Leading the pack are the Chinese technology companies Huawei and ZTE, bolstered by China's “digital silk road” policy push (Priyandita et al., 2022; Rakhmat, 2022). Indonesian industry and policymakers have been keen to take advantage of Chinese expertise in 5G—without the widespread backlash seen in other countries (McBeth, 2022). Huawei signed an MOU with dominant carrier Telkomsel in 2019, building on years of cooperation including on smart cities initiatives in Bandung and elsewhere. Huawei is very well-placed to be a leader in 5G in Southeast Asia (Namingit and Al Haddad, 2020).

One interesting feature of Indonesian policy that affects the development of 5G is its industrial policy. Indonesia has an Import Substitution Policy requiring a 35% Domestic Component Level (TKDN) in relation to cellular phones. The Indonesian government is also encouraging the creation of an “ecosystem for the casing, battery, antenna, and peripheral industries” (Indonesia Government News, 2022). The performance of Chinese handset manufacturer Xiaomi was singled out for praise in late 2022 for exceeding “the TKDN 35% for 4G and 5G-based telecommunication devices” with its Redmi A1 Smartphone (Indonesian Government News, 2022).

These developments and discourses associated with government and industrial promotors and interests, such as Ericsson and Huawei, are typical of the upbeat plans and predictions, and the referencing of 5G in “digital Indonesia” and other “socio-technical” imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015; Mansell, 2012; Mansell and Plantin, 2022; Pesch, 2021). The realities and power relations of 5G on the ground look very different. In the sprawling archipelago that is Indonesia, 5G rollout remains restricted to a few densely populated, relatively wealthy cities and regions. In terms of usage, 5G still remains the realm of better-off, more mobile, more connected, “have-more” users (Donner, 2015; Qiu, 2009). Yet, user demand will be a decisive factor, as noted by authors of a key study of scenarios for 5G in Indonesia: “demand from end-users is also the essential driver for 5G deployment in Indonesia” (Hutajulu et al., 2020: 2). So, this disconnect between 5G rollout and potential users remains, despite Indonesia's reputation for pioneering use of apps and gig economy services—notably the celebrated Gojek “super app,” the e-commerce giant Tokopedia, and flight and travel booking service Traveloka (Jurriëns and Tapsell, 2017; Ramli, 2019), and other digital transactions technologies and platforms (Alam et al., 2022; Handarkho et al., 2021).

Despite the championing of 5G by government and elite actors, there is considerable public skepticism. In a September 2022 editorial, the Jakarta Post critically commented on President Widodo's launch of 5G mining technology for Freeport: “That was not the first time the government boasted about the use of 5G network and its overarching impact on the country. Ironically, nothing much has happened yet” (Jakarta Post, 2022). The editorial continued:

Worse, within the country the yawning gap in access to the high-speed internet, as the COVID-19 pandemic has blatantly shown, will exacerbate the socioeconomic divide we have been fighting against for many decades. (Jakarta Post, 2022)

A major stumbling block remains availability of spectrum, which remains scarce. The Indonesian 5G operators have “little choice … but to refarm legacy IMT spectrum holdings from 3G to 4G and 5G services” (GSMA, 2022). In September 2022, the Indonesia government responded to such concerns with an announcement that it would auction spare segments of the 2.1 GHz spectrum, quickly held in November 2022 and awarded to market leader Telkomsel (Kemkominfo, 2022). While this has been received as encouraging news, there is a widespread sense that 5G rollout will remain a slow process for some years to come.

Discussion

While in appearance these are two quite different cases, facing specific critical factors for whether 5G is on the path to “success”—that is, moving toward a system that has good prospects of meeting SDGs, and other goals—a number of common threads can be proposed as a way to understand challenges that 5G pose for policy makers at many levels in emerging economies.

These two countries have what can be considered significant social and economic divides that may drive the presentation of 5G as a potential boon for development at many levels, but also, and from the experience so far, show that there are very difficult hurdles to make those potentialities into actual better living conditions through technology.

Firstly, in relation to key mainstream factors in making communication markets that can offer extensive, high quality, reliable, and affordable connectivity, and do some with appropriate models of provision (such as effective competition). These include:

Spectrum—the availability of spectrum is a key issue in both places. Geography plays a role, though the barriers for spectrum usage and network deployment are quite different between a large archipelago and a continuous territory with a mountain range constraining population to a narrow band next to the ocean. But also, the distribution of such population is different: Indonesia has 43% of its population in rural areas, while Peru counts just 22% of its population as living in rural locations; costs for network deployment are highest for rural areas and ROI lowest. However, the spectrum is handled according to providers’ demands: if there is a market for services the pressure for spectrum allocation grows.

Market operators—the role of incumbents is a clear factor. The existence of a large installed technological base means that incumbents can press for specific consideration at auctions or similar processes; but the geopolitical conditions also play a role, as countries like Indonesia are contested areas of investment expansion, with China having a presence that is significantly larger than in Latin America for these kinds of businesses. In fact, in Peru, one factor is the participation in a larger area of telecom investments, as shown by the two larger incumbents (Telefonica and America Comunicaciones) who have a strong presence in the region (Martínez, 2008), but a lack of interest in widening services. The future of Telefonica's presence in Spanish-speaking Latin America is an issue not resolved yet, which means that the potential for lower-than-expected investment exists.

National capacity—Indonesia has operators with significant capacity and capital. It also attracts investment from overseas players, from Europe and US as well as in Asia (as well as Chinese interest, there is significant capital from Japan). By contrast, there are no local operators in Peru, and the capabilities for local innovation and investment are minimal, and face a significant challenge as the region as a whole and Peru in particular are not attracting investment, for external and internal reasons.

Secondly, there are a set of issues that go well beyond the orthodox, templates of 5G policy, infrastructure, and markets. The concerns go to the heart of digital inequalities and democratic deficit in contemporary and future communications. In particular, we note:

Political environment—while not the main focus of this paper, the political environment and culture does emerge in both cases as an important and complex part of the feasibility and repertoire available to actors to achieve better, more inclusive outcomes for 5G.

Imaginaries and realities—documentation coming from government, and intergovernmental and business groups tend to present 5G as a new step in bringing all the potential benefits of digital technologies into a reality for economies, especially emerging ones. CEPAL (2021: 41) proposes the potential for smart cities as one reason for investing in 5G, as it is also the case in Indonesia, as mentioned earlier.

It is not difficult to recall the many and varied collections of similar, enthusiastic proposals about what adopting digital technologies will do for all—one of the tropes of the information society discussions as much of the digital transformation arguments currently in vogue. An imaginary around the usefulness of tech as a solution to many problems is recurring and 5G incarnates them easily.

However, as the benefits are not just about 5G but about the combination of many, various investments, the reality tends to be quite different. As much as any technology, human development, human capacity building, and policy stability are the reasons that “tech” changes the world; the absence of nuance in policy proposals is stark in both Peru's and Indonesia's official and commercial documentation.

From our analysis, what emerges starkly as the most salient common element is this: in both cases, the bulk of users are not set to see any benefits for some time. This is quite common in infrastructure rollout, with many lessons to be learnt from the extended evolution of 3G and 4G networks and services. However, especially given the overblown visions of 5G evident in the “imaginaries” (especially in the Indonesia case), the users are looking even more neglected than usual. On the other hand, Peru has very little public discussion of 5G, even as a marketing issue (in part due to the intense concern regarding the need to show improved affordability).

In reflecting on where 5G fits into national and global media policy, it is clear that there are various factors where path dependency is an issue. This is evident in the case of spectrum policy, especially; but it is also evident in the investment and development trajectory, as the presence of transnational enterprises developing region-wide strategies in Latin America implies that the direction is not judged by national developments (Brazil excluded) but mostly by the overall performance of a continent-wide business unit; this is not a factor on Indonesia's case.

Here, we see the recurring issue of the lack of direct connection between telecommunications investment and economic and human development (Galperin and Viecens, 2016: 38). This is something that Indonesia has sought to address over decades with its various nation-building ICT infrastructure policies, and more recently with its extensive efforts to instill digital transformations at the various levels of governance and administration, down to the village level. Similarly, Peru has drafted many plans for Information Society development that amount to many actions with little connection with an actual development strategy (Villanueva-Mansilla, 2016). However, there are significant tensions between such efforts and the design and implementation of market rules and policy (especially when, as in the case of Indonesia, one needs to consider the power of incumbents and key political and industrial figures in political economy, politics, and policy; Citra, 2018; Rahayu, 2016), while in Peru's case, the perception of telecom infrastructure as an opportunity for local governments to tax and charge fees for any investment, combined with weak or nonexistent commercial interest in infrastructure sharing, makes deploying base stations outside of larger cities a significant source of complications for investors.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have sought to respond to the lack of research on 5G in emerging economies, and indeed much of the world. One motivation for this study is a strong sense that 5G, its policy, and research, is proceeding along with fairly predictable lines—shaped by a small number of wealthy and powerful countries and dominant interests, without the purpose, process, and outcomes for populations being seriously questioned or considered. We have brought into juxtaposition and dialogue case studies of two countries that have striking and distinctive features, dynamics, and contexts. Yet, as we hope to have indicated, instructive common elements.

At an overarching level, we feel our analysis suggests that there is something else going on in the global 5G scene: the repertoire of policy frameworks and instruments national leaders and regulators draw from the global toolkit fail to tackle the urgent as well as long-term needs and requirements of users, citizens, and the wider society. The fact that local and national governments clash on policy issues, by having conflicting perspectives of what is relevant for their interests, is also an inheritance of established political cultures and traditions. In the Peruvian case, where there is no unified understanding of what is to be done with mobile telecommunication even if most of the population is using it, there are no agreements on priorities and processes, raising unnecessary barriers to investment and services.

The imaginaries of 5G involve a range of technology for good items, including visions of advancing environmental and social sustainability, that also may hinder rather than help address actually existing as well as future social and digital inequalities. What promoters of 5G, or for that matter of any telecommunications policies, seem to forget is that, not only are national capabilities and resources needed, national policies have to grounded on a shared interest and on shared benefits, not built around supposed outcomes far away from the possibilities of the majority of citizens, but also on actual results that matter for daily lives. In that sense, 5G appears both as a luxury for some and an opportunity for investments, fees, and penalties, and political interest in its deployment will remain far away from the actual needs of the populations that are allegedly the reason for governments to act.

All the more reason, then, to encourage a broadening and enlivening of the conceptual terrain, research agenda, and policy frameworks, tools, and practices toward a much more inclusive, generative, and fit-for-purpose 5G for all its imaginable users.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Gerard Goggin

Notes

References

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5G common threads and challenges in emerging economies: the cases of Indonesia and Peru

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Peru

Environment for 5G

Market and consumption

Policy and infrastructure choices

Critical success or failure factors

Indonesia

Environment for 5G

Markets and consumption

Policy and infrastructure choices

Critical success or failure factors

Discussion

Conclusion

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Notes

References