Narrating Gender (Un)Fairness: Masculinity and Generational Comparisons Among Young South Korean Men

Abstract

This study examines how young South Korean men construct narratives of gender (un)fairness by employing intergenerational comparisons within the broader context of meritocratic neoliberal restructuring and intergenerational inequality. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 31 young men, the analysis reveals that participants interpret contemporary gender conflicts as a zero-sum economic struggle, while simultaneously mobilizing intergenerational comparisons to justify their perceptions of injustice. By contrasting their own precarious trajectories with the relative economic stability and mobility of their fathers’ generation, young men articulate a sense of gender (un)fairness grounded in subjective generational comparisons. The findings extend existing theories of masculinity by highlighting generation—as opposed to class, race or sexuality—as a salient axis of masculine differentiation in the South Korean context. Ultimately, we argue that the perceived crisis in masculinity cannot be fully understood through economic frameworks alone but must also be analysed as a masculinity crisis mediated by generational experiences in response to structural and cultural transformation.

Introduction

Since the mid-2010s, South Korean feminism has seen a visible resurgence (B.-M. Kim, 2018; Sohn, 2017). With the expansion of the #MeToo movement and local feminist protests, young women have increasingly expressed feminist identities through digital and offline spaces (Jung & Moon, 2024, 2025). This visibility coincided with institutional changes, as the state implemented gender equality measures—such as affirmative action and equal employment policies—since the early 2000s, boosting female participation in both public and private sectors (Kim & Kim, 2011). However, these developments provoked backlash, especially among men in their 20s and 30s, who increasingly voiced grievances and perceived marginalization under the banner of reverse discrimination (Choo, 2021; Ma et al., 2017). A core expression of this backlash has been the framing of gender polarization as a ‘gender war’ or ‘gender conflict’, amplified by media and online platforms (Choo, 2021; J. Kim, 2023). This narrative centres on young men’s discontent, with their turn towards political conservatism becoming a defining trend (Cheon & Jeong, 2020). In particular, men in their 20s—often labelled Idaenam—emerged as a visible political bloc during the 2022 presidential election, with both conservative and progressive candidates strategically using gender rhetoric to gain their support (Kim & Lee, 2022). In this context, antifeminist discourse surged, becoming a primary outlet for their anxieties and grievances (J. S. Kim, 2021; J. Kim, 2023; Kim & Yuk, 2022). Gender scholars note that this discourse has shifted from a rhetoric of victimhood to one of (un)fairness, reframing perceived disadvantages as violations of meritocratic justice under neoliberalism (Yum, 2021). This shift reveals not only changing discursive strategies but also deeper transformations in how young men perceive their social positioning and masculinity amid growing gendered and generational competition.

This study examines how young men construct and deploy narratives of gender (un)fairness and the mechanisms through which they justify such claims. We locate our analysis within the literature on masculinity and intergenerational comparison to complicate dominant economic explanations of gender fairness perceptions. Prior research has emphasized how structural shifts—such as neoliberal labour market precarity and resource competition—have fostered young men’s belief in zero-sum logics and meritocratic ideals (Jung, 2021; Magun & Rudnev, 2012; Yum, 2021). Yet economic explanations alone do not account for the gendered dimensions of fairness discourse, particularly how these narratives intersect with subjective masculinity and relational comparisons with other men across generations (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Hong, 2021). While scholars have explored masculinity in response to labour market shifts and gender reforms (Connell, 1998; Kimmel, 2003; Radhakrishnan & Solari, 2015), less attention has been paid to how intergenerational comparison informs young men’s masculine self-perceptions. Past studies have focused on class-, race-, or sexuality-based differentiation within masculinities (Connell, 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) rather than generation as a key axis through which young men express marginalization—relative not only to women but also to older male cohorts who benefited from better socioeconomic conditions (Hong, 2021; H. J. Kim, 2015). By analysing how young men locate themselves within shifting gender and generational hierarchies, this study contributes to the reconceptualization of masculinity as a relational and dynamic process shaped by structural constraints and comparative lived experience.

Recognizing the persistence of gendered hierarchies and meritocratic neoliberal restructuring in South Korea (Hong, 2021; Jung, 2021; H. J. Kim, 2015), this study examines how young men construct narratives of gender (un)fairness. Based on in-depth interviews with 31 young men, our analysis shows that they frame gender (un)fairness not merely as a struggle over resources, but also as a form of generational discontent. Most participants invoked neoliberal meritocracy and zero-sum logics, viewing women’s gains as men’s losses, while also comparing their precarious position in a low-growth economy to their fathers’ experience of stable employment during industrial expansion. Despite referencing dominant masculine ideals, their fairness perceptions were strongly shaped by generational comparisons— challenging previous research that foregrounded race or sexuality in masculine differentiation (Connell, 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). We argue that in rapidly changing East Asian societies like South Korea, generation serves as a crucial analytic lens for understanding young men’s social views and behaviours, diverging from Western masculinity studies that emphasize race or sexuality. By situating these findings in the South Korean context, this study contributes to theories of masculinity under neoliberalism and highlights generational positioning as a key mechanism through which young men negotiate gender (un)fairness and identity within evolving socioeconomic structures.

Explanations of Gender (Un)Fairness Perceptions

Contemporary research has shifted its focus from objective standards to the subjective experience of justice, emphasizing how individual perceptions are shaped by personal and contextual factors (Cropanzano et al., 2001). Scholars have called for greater attention to how people perceive and experience justice, rather than how their subjectivity aligns with external criteria (Guo et al., 2011; Rupp, 2011). Within this framework, the belief in a zero-sum game (BZSG) has emerged as a critical concept in understanding perceived fairness. BZSG refers to a cognitive schema in which social relations are construed as inherently competitive, such that one party’s gain necessarily entails another’s loss (Różycka-Tran et al., 2015). This belief is often intensified in resource-scarce environments, where heightened competition fosters a logic of self-preservation (Magun & Rudnev, 2012), and is particularly salient in collectivist societies, where in-group rivalries and loyalty pressures reinforce zero-sum thinking (Różycka-Tran et al., 2015). In the South Korean context, neoliberal restructuring following the 1997 financial crisis institutionalized economic precarity and job insecurity. These structural transformations have cultivated zero-sum perceptions among younger generations facing high youth unemployment, credential inflation, and protracted transitions to adulthood (H. J. Kim, 2015).

According to meritocratic and neoliberal values that emphasize individual freedom, self-management and efficiency, men and women are seen as equal workers judged solely on individual merit, thus normalizing internal attributions of social outcomes (Lorey, 2015). For instance, men may interpret women’s lower income and professional status as stemming from individual shortcomings rather than systemic inequalities (Choo, 2021). Within this logic, policies such as affirmative action are often viewed by young men as violations of fairness based on merit, undermining the legitimacy of gender equality itself (Jung, 2021). In Korea, women’s labour market advancement through affirmative action policies (AAPs) is perceived by many men as a threat to the gender order (Kim & Shin, 2004; Yoo, 2012), and young men often invoke fairness to rationalize their views on gender relations. Their narratives of (un)fairness are shaped by the myth of meritocracy under neoliberalism, which masks systemic gender disparities (Jung, 2021; Yum, 2021). Deeply embedded in neoliberal frameworks, meritocracy sustains inequality by framing outcomes as the result of fair competition, legitimizing gender discrimination (Yum, 2021). Among young men, belief in equity—rewards based solely on contribution—often casts gender equality efforts as unfair advantages for women (Jung, 2021). This perception fuels derogatory views of women and feminists as entitled or materialistic, widely reflected in male-exclusive online communities (Jung & Moon, 2024; J.-H. Kim, 2023; J. S. Kim, 2018). Scholars argue that this meritocratic rhetoric extends misogyny into daily life and obscures structural disadvantages (Yum, 2021). Ultimately, the language of fairness reflects socioeconomic forces that perpetuate inequality under the guise of merit-based justice (Jung, 2021; Yum, 2021).

Beyond zero-sum economic thinking, the concept of social comparison has been central to understanding how individuals construct their perceptions of fairness and unfairness. Scholars of justice and fairness have suggested that individuals construct judgements on what is (un)fair through social comparison processes (Lewis, 1997; Lewis & Haas, 2005). The concept of ‘sense of entitlement’, defined as a set of beliefs and feelings about rights and entitlements, or legitimate expectations (Bylsma & Major, 1994; Lewis, 1997; Major, 1993), is determined by social comparison processes (Lerner, 1987) and is influenced by social cultural ideology (Lewis, 1997). For example, women’s reporting of relative satisfaction with an unequal division of family labour has been explained by their tendency to compare themselves with other women rather than with their male partners (Hochschild, 1989; Major, 1993; Thompson, 1991). Men’s satisfaction with an unequal domestic division of domestic labour has also been explained by ‘within-gender comparisons’, to other men, rather than with their female partners (Ferree, 1990; LaRossa, 1988). In Korea, young men seem to compare themselves with young women, arguing that they are the victims of the reverse discrimination of the AAPs for women in the public sector (Jung, 2021), but young men also seem to compare themselves with the older generation. Hong (2021) claims that the young generation perceives themselves as the weaker cohort due to their belief that the preceding ‘586 generation’ (those born in the 1960s), characterized by wealth and influence, is exploiting them in various ways.

Recent sociological research underscores a growing perception among South Korean youth that intergenerational inequality—particularly between the 586 generation and the ‘2030 generation’ (individuals in their 20s and 30s)—constitutes a significant source of perceived injustice (Chan, 2023, p. 236). This perception is grounded in the starkly contrasting socioeconomic conditions experienced by the two cohorts. The 586 generation matured during a period of rapid industrialization and middle-class expansion, marked by stable employment, affordable housing and upward social mobility, offering a clear trajectory of institutional ascent (Hong, 2022: H. J. Kim, 2015). In contrast, the 2030 generation faces structural disadvantages under neoliberal capitalism, including labour market polarization, precarious employment, educational debt and exclusion from property ownership, all of which intensify feelings of relative deprivation (Choo, 2020; Hong, 2022; H. J. Kim, 2015). H. J. Kim (2015, p. 179) characterizes this generational orientation as a form of ‘survivalist sentiment’, in which young people, confronted with the erosion of systemic protections, adopt individualized, competitive and pragmatic strategies to secure basic survival rather than upward mobility. This sense of deprivation is further exacerbated by a shift in social benchmarks: success is increasingly measured not against one’s peers, but against the relative stability and material achievements of the older generation. Consequently, young Koreans face growing disillusionment as the promised returns on educational and professional investment appear increasingly unattainable (Choo, 2021; Hong, 2022; H. J. Kim, 2015).

Masculinity in Transition: Generational Comparisons and Neoliberal Precarity

Research on masculinity has traditionally examined how gendered power is produced and maintained through culturally idealized manhood. A key contribution is Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity, introduced in Gender and Power (1987) and elaborated in Masculinities (1995), referring to the dominant form of masculinity that legitimizes men’s dominance over women and other men. Connell (1995) argues that analysing specific masculinities requires attention to relations among masculinities themselves—hegemony, subordination and marginalization—rather than focusing solely on their relationship with women. Subordinate masculinities—often linked to homosexual or effeminate forms—are symbolically devalued through association with femininity. Marginalized masculinities, shaped by factors like class and race, face structural exclusion and institutional oppression that deny them authority (Connell, 1995, p. 79). In patriarchal societies, men’s status is reinforced by the ‘patriarchal dividend’: the collective advantages gained from women’s subordination (Connell, 1995). In South Korea, H. M. Kim (2001) describes hegemonic masculinity as hypermasculinity, where men were state-supported breadwinners and national agents, enjoying material and symbolic privilege while being exempt from domestic roles. Male workers’ demands gained legitimacy through the breadwinner model, while women’s labour rights were framed as disruptive, reinforcing gendered labour divisions and hegemonic masculinity (H. M. Kim, 2001). Amid global political–economic shifts, hegemonic masculinity has also transformed. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) revise the concept to reflect neoliberal globalization, stressing that masculinities are multiple, relationally constructed and context-specific. They vary across race, class and sexuality and manifest differently at local, regional and global levels—calling for empirical attention to their reconfiguration across time and place.

The neoliberal restructuring of the global economy has weakened traditional forms of hegemonic masculinity, leading to rising anxieties among working-class and non-elite men. The decline of traditionally male-dominated industries and women’s entry into previously male jobs have challenged men’s sense of security and identity (Winlow, 2004). This diagnosis has been further developed in subsequent masculinity literature. For example, Michael Kimmel (2003) describes how men in the lower-middle classes—especially those in the United States and Scandinavia—have experienced downward mobility as their traditional economic base eroded and masculine status rooted in economic autonomy collapsed. Kimmel (2003) argues that the economic displacement experienced by certain men, coupled with their adherence to traditional breadwinner expectations, contributes to a sense of emasculation or threatened masculine identity. In a similar vein, Radhakrishnan and Solari (2015) argue that neoliberal globalization has exacerbated ‘a painful dissonance between breadwinning expectations and economic opportunities’ (p. 785), especially among economically marginalized men. These dynamics have contributed to the global circulation of what they term ‘a reverse gender order’ (Radhakrishnan & Solari, 2015, p. 784), in which the expansion of women’s employment opportunities, contrasted with men’s limited labour market prospects, creates the spectre of ‘empowered women attached to failed patriarchs’ and fuels gender anxieties (p. 791). As women’s labour market participation becomes more prominent, poor and working-class men often interpret their diminishing authority not only as material deprivation but also as a crisis of gendered identity.

While neoliberal restructuring provides a crucial framework for understanding the economic and material conditions that shape young men’s experiences, we argue that what demands closer attention is not solely the structural transformation and economic explanations, but the subjective sense of crisis that young men articulate in response to these changes. This perceived crisis is not merely economic but deeply relational, emerging through young men’s comparisons with other men across generational lines. In this regard, we focus on the relational positioning of masculinities—how men situate themselves in relation to other men as a key process through which a sense of marginalization is constructed. Connell’s (1995) theory of hegemonic, marginalized and subordinate masculinities provides an important analytical lens. However, whereas previous research emphasized class, race or sexuality as key axes differentiating masculinities (Connell, 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005), we propose that generation—particularly in the South Korean context—has emerged as a salient axis of masculine differentiation. We suggest that generational positioning functions as a critical social category through which men perceive themselves as disadvantaged relative to other men—specifically, older men who came of age during periods of economic expansion and opportunity. This generational dynamic contributes to the construction of crisis narratives in which younger men portray themselves as victims of intergenerational inequality, not only vis-à-vis women but also vis-à-vis the previous generation of men.

In the South Korean context, the crisis of masculinity among young men cannot be fully understood without considering intergenerational dynamics that distinguish their experiences from those of their fathers. While neoliberal restructuring since the 2000s has transformed labour markets and intensified precarity, it is the subjectively constructed sense of crisis—emerging through intergenerational comparison—that shapes young men’s perception of marginalization. Unlike their fathers, who held stable provider roles during rapid economic growth, today’s young men face unstable employment, delayed adulthood, and rising expectations to be emotionally engaged partners and fathers (Bae, 2015; Hong, 2021; H. J. Kim, 2015). Earlier masculinity crises often took the form of victimhood—particularly around military service or reverse discrimination (Choo, 2020)—but recent studies show a shift to fairness-based narratives reflecting internalized meritocratic values (Jung, 2021; Yum, 2021). Yet, even within this new frame, young men’s imagined futures remain tied to the ideal of hypermasculinity once embodied by their fathers (H. M. Kim, 2001), making intergenerational comparison a key axis through which their frustrations are expressed. Building on Connell’s (1995) theory of hegemonic, marginalized and subordinate masculinities, we argue that generation—rather than class, race or sexuality—has become a salient axis of masculine differentiation in South Korea, shaping how young men perceive themselves not only in relation to women but to older men who benefited from more favourable conditions.

Data and Methods

For this study, we drew on interview data from 31 young men, including preliminary focus group interviews with 8 male students and in-depth individual interviews with 23 men born in the 1990s who are currently attending or have graduated from universities in the Seoul metropolitan area. As Lambert and Loiselle (2008) note, combining focus groups and individual interviews enhances qualitative data by offering complementary insights that improve both conceptual clarity and analytical trustworthiness. Focus groups are effective for generating unexpected ideas and capturing diverse perspectives through group interaction, while individual interviews elicit detailed personal narratives, thoughts and emotions. We began with focus groups to explore general perceptions and identify key themes—such as economic anxiety, resentment towards affirmative action and intergenerational comparison—then conducted individual interviews for deeper insight into internal meaning-making processes less accessible in group contexts. Whereas focus groups revealed collective views, individual interviews enabled participants to speak more openly and in greater depth, providing rich autobiographical accounts rooted in their lived experiences.

We conducted the focus group and individual in-depth interviews from June to October 2020 in Seoul. For the focus groups, a private research firm recruited participants from their existing sample pool. One focus group session was held in a large meeting room provided by the company and lasted two hours. Using a semi-structured interview guide, we covered four main areas: (a) participants’ views on gender issues and feminism; (b) perceptions of gender fairness, affirmative action, dating norms, and women-friendly policies; (c) perceptions of economic inequality, unemployment, job market competition, and peer pressure and (d) perceptions of generational inequality. Participants were informed of their anonymity, confidentiality of responses and the importance of not sharing discussion content afterwards. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed in Korean by the research firm. Each participant received approximately $100 in compensation, and pseudonyms were used to preserve anonymity. These preliminary focus group interviews offered valuable insights into how young men construct subjective views on gender issues, gender conflict and AAPs in South Korea.

Second, the individual in-depth interviews were conducted via Zoom, given the social distancing measures in place during the COVID-19 pandemic. A male research assistant facilitated most of the interviews to help participants feel more comfortable and engaged in the conversation. We recruited young men through online communities by posting and circulating flyers. The interviews lasted approximately two hours. We used a semi-structured interview guide consisting of three parts among others: (a) views on gender issues, feminism, dating and marriage; (b) perceptions of gender fairness, particularly in relation to affirmative action and women-friendly policies and (c) perception of economic inequalities and unemployment, the competitive job market and peer pressure. Participants were informed that their responses would remain anonymous and confidential. All interviews were recorded and transcribed in Korean, and for interviewees, and a gift card ($20) was given as a token of gratitude. Pseudonyms were used to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of the interviewees in this study.

We analysed the data using grounded theory, which aims to generate concepts and linkages through ‘the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 2). This approach is well-suited for uncovering underlying social processes, as it allows researchers to move beyond preconceived categories. We first conducted open coding—defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 61) as ‘the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data’, to identify emerging concepts from the transcripts. This was followed by axial coding, described as ‘a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 96). Through this iterative process, we identified latent social forces shaping young men’s perceptions of gender fairness. Our analysis reveals that the perceived crisis of masculinity is closely tied to broader structural changes, particularly those related to neoliberal economic restructuring. We aimed to identify the key conceptual interests that shaped how young men construct their views on equity and fairness within the context of a shrinking labour market. Third, after identifying the themes related to young men’s perceptions of gender fairness, we applied the conceptual framework focused on the interplay of gender and generation in our analysis. All the participants (i.e., 31 men) were born between 1992 and 1999 and were either attending or had graduated from four-year universities in the Seoul metropolitan area, with the exception of one participant who attended a university in Busan. All participants were unmarried. Twenty-six were preparing for employment upon graduation, while five were already employed.

Analysis

‘I Support Gender Equality, but Not Affirmative Action’: Economic Lens for Understanding Gender (Un)Fairness

Young men engaged in a comprehensive exploration of their understanding of gender and generational fairness. Overall, they perceived gender justice in South Korea as gradually improving. Taehoo Ji (24, fourth-year, liberal arts) mentioned that ‘In the past, I think there were some gender discriminations when it came to things like job opportunities, but isn’t it fair to say that things are moving toward more equality now?’ Similarly, Jongsoo Kim (24 second-year, electrical engineering) reflected on the progress of gender equality, noting that conditions have significantly improved compared to a decade or two ago. He said, ‘I think that gender issues will eventually get better’. Young men have observed that although women’s involvement in the labour market is somewhat restricted, it is gradually expanding, suggesting a positive trend towards gender equality. Bohyung Lee (26, fourth-year, business administration) described this as a ‘slow transformation’, referring to the incremental growth of women’s employment. Seungwoo Yeo (24, fourth-year, electronic engineering) similarly identified female labour market participation as a driving force for transforming gender inequality in the workplace, and even though the limited number of jobs restricts the growth rate, the accumulation of ‘little by little’ quantitative changes will eventually usher in qualitative changes. According to the male respondents, there is a consistent, ongoing and favourable trend in the advancement of gender justice for women in Korea.

Young male students, such as Soobin Min (24, third-year, mechanical engineering), Yeongmin Joo (24, third-year, international trade) and Bohyung Lee (26, fourth-year, business administration), considered economic resources as critical conditions for understanding gender conflict. Soobin Min stated,

I think the current gender conflicts [or gender fairness] are all about the struggle for the pie, about claiming their share of the pie when there are so few of them to eat after all. Anyway, the pie is very small, so they don’t want to compromise or give in to each other, but rather continue to pursue what they want to achieve.

Similarly, Yeongmin Joo commented, ‘In the end, like we said, gender issues just turn into a fight over who gets what—like a battle over the same ‘pie’—or as we say in Korean, a fight over the same ‘rice bowl’. And it makes me wonder, is this really the right way to go about it?’ Bohyung Lee suggested that women’s demands for increased employment opportunities, tax benefits, and greater representation in leadership positions are often strategically linked to issues such as sexual violence in order to legitimize their pursuit of material gains and economic power. In their view, gender equality discourses are fundamentally about economic redistribution, and feminist movements—particularly #MeToo—are interpreted as means of consolidating material interests under the guise of justice claims.

The emphasis on economic rationality is particularly evident in students’ opposition to AAPs, which they often perceived as undermining procedural fairness. Participants such as Soowon Jang (27, third-year, Korean language education) stated,

I don’t really get why private companies have to stick to a certain gender ratio [according to AAPs]. If data shows that hiring a certain gender or keeping a specific ratio helps boost sales, then sure—but otherwise, I don’t know. And if the government tells companies to hire more women even when it doesn’t help their performance, I think that’s unfair.

Similarly, Soobin Min (24, third-year, mechanical engineering) commented, ‘I’m also an engineering major, and in our field, a lot of jobs are physically demanding…. I mean, I get that gender balance is important, but personally, I don’t feel very positive about AAPs either’. Their critiques of AAPs reflected broader neoliberal meritocratic values that emphasize competition, individual effort and measurable performance. In this context, AAPs—particularly gender quotas—are seen as threats to one’s position in an already precarious labour market, reinforcing a sense of zero-sum logic. This logic, as Różycka-Tran et al. (2015) argue, is rooted in the perception that social benefits constitute a fixed pie—a finite resource that must be divided among competing groups. This zero-sum framing reveals how economic rationalities profoundly shape young Korean men’s understanding of gender fairness and legitimacy.

‘Women and Feminists Advocate for Job Opportunities and Men Feel Frustrated’: A Reverse Gender Order and Crisis of Masculinity Under Economic Pressure

As discussed above, young men tend to interpret recent transformations primarily in economic terms, framing them as a loss of male rights resulting from women’s increased participation in the labour market. In their view, women are not seen as striving for structural justice or equitable representation but rather as direct competitors for scarce economic resources and limited professional opportunities. Within this framework, feminism is often simplified as a collective movement focused on securing women’s relative economic and political advantages. For instance, Seonwoo Park (26, fourth-year, public human resources) remarked,

I feel like a lot of the feminism you see online isn’t really about equality or gender balance—it comes across more like trying to put women above men or push men out. If they genuinely want to talk about improving women’s rights and have something to say, then the conversation should be about real solutions. But instead, it often feels like the goal is to sideline men altogether.

Similarly, Joowon Kim (28, Master’s student, computer engineering) commented, ‘I think feminists often say stuff like, “You guys [men] have so many privileges”, and then it turns into this back-and-forth. Like, “You guys benefit more”, and it becomes a fight about splitting things up or sharing rights’.

According to Seonwoo Park and Joowon Kim, feminist claims are perceived less as efforts to achieve mutual equality and more as attempts to displace and undermine men and monopolize institutional benefits, thereby contributing to what they perceive as an emerging conflict between the sexes. Bohyung Lee (26, fourth-year, business administration) echoed this view, suggesting that ‘individuals who engage in demeaning others, driven by egoism, participate in online activities such as feminism… because the concept of feminism has become convoluted and carries numerous negative associations’. From their perspectives, feminist movements are seen as targeting men while advancing women’s material interests, a dynamic that reflects broader anxieties surrounding the emergence of a reverse gender order in South Korea. Within this interpretive frame, job opportunities are understood as finite and highly competitive, and gender-related policies are perceived not as tools to redress structural inequalities but as mechanisms that disrupt the traditional gender hierarchy. Soowon Jang (27, third-year, Korean language education) further raised concerns about female-only opportunities in elite programmes like pharmacy graduate schools, interpreting these as reducing male access to competitive tracks.

Similarly, Bohyung Lee (26, fourth-year, business administration) noted that ‘women [and feminists] are advocating for job opportunities, tax concessions, and greater representation in managerial positions, but these claims lack persuasiveness, so they rely on labels such as sexual violence to argue for equality’. Soowon Jang (27, third-year, Korean language education) expressed concern over perceived unequal access to professional opportunities, specifically pointing out that female students may have an advantage in gaining admission to pharmacy graduate schools at women’s universities, thus limiting opportunities for male students. These narratives highlight a perceived threat as women gain visibility in the labour market, which is seen not as progress but as a challenge to existing male positions. For many male students, gender equality and feminist advocacy are viewed as a reversal of gender roles, reflecting deeper anxieties about their perceived loss of opportunities. This aligns with the concept of a ‘reverse gender order’ (Radhakrishnan & Solari, 2015), in which women’s gains are interpreted as men’s losses. Such sentiments echo broader masculine unease under neoliberal transformations, where the entrance of women into traditionally male-dominated sectors destabilizes men’s sense of security and identity (Kimmel, 2003; Radhakrishnan & Solari, 2015). Consequently, young men’s resistance to feminist initiatives and AAPs can be understood as a reaction to structural shifts in gender dynamics that challenge traditional models of masculinity.

‘It Was Easier for Our Fathers to Find Jobs’: Intergenerational Comparisons and Crisis of Masculinity Beyond Economic Lens

To understand why young men believe that competition over limited resources has intensified, and how they interpret the origins of this perceived threat, they frequently invoked the notion of intergenerational inequality by comparing their own experiences with those of their fathers’ generation. From these men’s perspective, disparities in generational backgrounds play a pivotal role in perpetuating intergenerational inequality and fuelling a broader crisis of masculinity. Bohyung Lee (26 years old, fourth-year, business administration) and Kibeom Yoon (24, second-year, electrical engineering) delineated the contrasting eras experienced by the preceding cohort of young individuals, known as the 586 generation, and the present cohort of youth. Bohyun remarked,

In the past, the older generation of Korean society witnessed a period of rapid economic growth, didn’t they? Therefore, we grew up with one goal, and our growth was guaranteed. Nowadays, we are living in a generation characterized by a low-growth rate, where the economic security of each individual is not guaranteed. So, individuals pursue their own happiness and [survival].

Kibeom Yoon (24, second-year, electrical engineering) also mentioned:

I guess you could say it was the so-called ‘586 generation’—you know, people older than us. Back then, Korea was going through a period of rapid economic development, and honestly, finding a job was a lot easier compared to now. So I feel like there wasn’t much [gender] conflict at the time, or at least not like what we see today.

Yoomin Seo (24, second year, media studies) said:

I think generation is a bigger issue than gender itself. It feels like things have gotten tougher for our generation—like with jobs and stuff, the opportunities just seem narrower [than the past]. And I feel like there are more stereotypes or biases tied to our generation than anything else. That’s kind of how I see it.

For these participants, the traditional gender order was maintained during Korea’s industrialization period, when rapid economic growth and a secure ‘economic pie’ helped sustain relatively harmonious gender relations. In contrast, today’s economic insecurity and limited opportunities are perceived as intensifying competition between men and women, disrupting that earlier balance.

Male participants further emphasized the need to compare their position not only in relation to women but also to the previous generation of men—particularly their fathers. They frequently engaged in within-gender comparison to express their frustration with meeting the evolving demands of hegemonic masculinity, especially in a shrinking labour market where economic power and authority are harder to attain. Sangpil Hyun (27, fourth-year, policy studies) also said, ‘I think it really depends on the generation. For the older generations—like people in their 40s and 50s—it was easier to get a job. But for our generation, the 20s and 30s, I think things are different now’. Other men like Seonwoo Park (26, fourth-year, public human resources) further reflected on changing expectations of masculinity, highlighting how men are now expected to fulfil both breadwinner and caregiving roles. He said:

I have noticed that my acquaintances are getting married, and in such cases, there are still instances where the man takes care of the preparation of an apartment and the woman takes care of the wedding preparations. Although I have not experienced it firsthand, my friend felt a lot of unfairness in such situations. They did not contribute with their own money, but still had to bear the financial burden of their parents.

His remarks highlighted the dual burden placed on young men today: They are still expected to uphold the traditional breadwinner role—such as financing housing—while also increasingly expected to share in caregiving responsibilities. This perceived burden is compounded by their experience of precarious employment and intensified competition with women in what they describe as an emerging ‘reverse gender order’ (Radhakrishnan & Solari, 2015). From their perspective, traditional masculinity is being reconfigured under neoliberal pressures, but without the institutional or economic supports their fathers once had.

Young men’s sense of unfairness arises not only from women’s increasing status in professional jobs but also from comparisons to their fathers’ generation, which held power through traditional breadwinning roles. As Kyungsik (25, third-year, liberal arts) noted, while gender inequality persists, structural barriers were largely created by older men in their 50s and 60s not by younger men like himself. He argued that younger men face greater difficulty securing stable employment, unlike the older generation, which had easier access to career security. Some young men even criticized their fathers’ generation for reinforcing gender inequality in the workplace. Many young men also feel powerless in contemporary Korean society, with real authority remaining in the hands of older elites, particularly the so-called 586 generation. One participant suggested that young people should unite to challenge the cultural and institutional legacies of older generations. Other young men also reflected on how the standards of ‘proper’ masculinity have become increasingly difficult to attain—especially when compared to their fathers’ generation. As Hong (2021) notes, the younger generation perceives themselves as weaker due to the exploitation by the wealthier, more influential older generation. Bae (2015) similarly argues that young men struggle to reconcile hegemonic masculinity with their lived realities. Our participants’ narratives reflect this tension: while they attempt to distinguish themselves from the hypermasculinity embodied by their fathers (H. M. Kim, 2001), they struggle to articulate viable alternatives in a neoliberal labour market defined by precarity and competition.

Discussion

Existing literature on perceptions of gender fairness has largely focused on how neoliberal discourses—emphasizing competition, individual performance and self-responsibility—shape young people’s resistance to affirmative action and other redistributive policies (Jung, 2021; Lorey, 2015; Yum, 2021). Our findings align with this work but extend it by showing that young men’s perceptions of gender (un)fairness are deeply embedded in zero-sum economic frameworks (Różycka-Tran et al., 2015) and shaped by narratives of perceived displacement and threat to their masculinity (Kimmel, 2003; Radhakrishnan & Solari, 2015). Rather than seeing gender equality as a structural issue of inequality, many participants framed it as a challenge to individual merit. This perception is intensified in contexts where social mobility is fragile, resources are seen as scarce, and institutional interventions (such as affirmative action) are perceived as threats to one’s hard-earned position. These dynamics reinforce a zero-sum framework, in which any gain for women is interpreted as a direct loss for men (Radhakrishnan & Solari, 2015).

Building on Connell’s (1995) theory of hegemonic, marginalized and subordinate masculinities, our study introduces a new axis of masculine differentiation—generation. While Connell’s work has traditionally focused on class, race and sexuality as critical factors shaping marginalized or subordinate masculinities (Connell, 1995), our findings suggest that generational positioning has become an equally significant determinant of men’s identities in South Korea. The young men in this study articulated a form of intergenerational inequality, in which their masculine identities are rendered insecure and less legitimate when compared to the previous generation— those who benefited from economic stability, symbolic authority and institutional dominance under a developmentalist regime (Bae, 2015; Hong, 2021). In contrast, today’s young men must navigate a neoliberal order marked by job precarity, credential inflation and delayed transitions to adulthood, all while facing new normative expectations to embody egalitarian and emotionally engaged forms of manhood (Bae, 2015). This generational disjuncture creates a subjective crisis of masculinity that is not only between men and women but also within and across generations of men.

This study contributes to the growing literature on masculinity by theorizing how neoliberal transformations and intergenerational inequality jointly shape the contemporary crisis of masculinity. Our findings suggest that young men’s sense of victimhood is not merely a reactionary backlash against feminism but is mediated by the contradictions between inherited ideals of masculinity and the precarious social realities they now face. Their reliance on zero-sum narratives and economic frames to explain gender fairness reveals not only the internalization of neoliberal ideologies but also the absence of viable models for alternative masculinities. By introducing the concept of generation as a critical analytic axis for understanding marginalized or subordinate masculinities (Connell, 1995), this research extends Connell’s work and provides a more nuanced understanding of the persistence of masculine crisis narratives among young South Korean men. Ultimately, the findings suggest that efforts to transform dominant gender ideologies must attend not only to cross-gender dynamics but also to the intergenerational structures that sustain masculine inequalities. That is, young men understand their masculinity not only in relation to women but also through a sense of disadvantage when compared to older men who previously held greater economic and symbolic power.

Conclusion

This study examined the perceptions of gender fairness among young men in South Korea in the context of neoliberal restructuring. The findings suggest that young men’s sense of gender fairness is shaped not only by economic factors, such as competition for limited resources in the labour market, but also by intergenerational comparisons. These young men view their social position in society through the lens of a ‘reverse gender order’ (Radhakrishnan & Solari, 2015), in which women’s increasing presence in the workforce is perceived as a direct challenge to their own opportunities and masculinities. Narratives of perceived victimhood and reverse discrimination reflect not only backlash against feminism and misogynistic sentiments but also young men’s subjective comparisons with their fathers’ generation—who benefited from greater access to stable employment and economic stability. By incorporating generational dynamics, this analytical lens deepens our understanding of the broader crisis of masculinity, in which young men struggle to reconcile neoliberal meritocratic pressures with inherited expectations of traditional manhood. Moreover, this intergenerational comparison with the father’s generation allows young men to articulate their sense of (un)fairness in a more subtle and indirect manner, effectively bypassing overt claims of reverse discrimination against women. However, this mode of articulation may further intensify their perceptions of injustice and reinforce a sense of victimhood, as it repositions their grievances within a broader narrative of generational decline and lost masculine privilege.

The implications of this research extend beyond the specific context of gender relations in South Korea. The findings contribute to the literature on justice and fairness by highlighting the subjective and relational nature of these concepts, which are often constructed through social comparisons (Lewis, 1997; Lewis & Haas, 2005). This study underscores the importance of understanding justice not just as a set of objective criteria but also as a dynamic process shaped by individual experiences and societal context (Guo et al., 2011; Rupp, 2011). Additionally, this research challenges and expands existing theories of masculinity by introducing the generational axis as a critical dimension of masculinity studies. While prior research has focused on class, race and sexuality as key factors influencing marginalized and subordinate masculinities (Connell, 1995), this study broadens that framework by emphasizing the significance of generational positioning in shaping young men’s perceptions of masculinity. It offers a nuanced understanding of how neoliberal economic transformations and generational discontinuities intersect to produce a contemporary crisis of masculinity.

Despite its contributions, this study has several limitations that suggest directions for future research. First, the focus on college students may limit generalizability, as young men outside academic settings—such as those with only a high school education or in vocational training—may hold different views on gender fairness and masculinity. Second, the study does not fully explore how young men construct alternative masculinities in contrast to hegemonic models. Future research could examine how men of varied political orientations, age groups or socioeconomic statuses engage with or resist hegemonic masculinity. While this study highlights prevalent narratives of marginalization and intergenerational inequality, not all young men may share these views; some may reject zero-sum logics, adopt egalitarian norms or construct alternative masculinities. Although such perspectives were not dominant in our data, further research could explore how these dissenting voices interpret gender (un)fairness and inequality within meritocratic neoliberal contexts. Lastly, this study was conducted in the Seoul metropolitan area, shaped by neoliberal economic policies. Future work should examine whether these findings apply across other regions or are specific to urban, meritocratic settings. Expanding the demographic scope would offer broader insight into how young men’s perceptions of fairness and masculinity vary across South Korea.