Abstract
Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. ISBN 9780691203836.
Far-right movements are gaining ground, and many researchers have warned that views previously defined as extreme are achieving increasing acceptance among broad sectors of the population (Mondon & Winter, 2017). Cynthia Miller-Idriss’s new book is a good introduction to this process known as ‘mainstreaming’. She describes far-right mobilization in contexts that have been little studied in this connection previously, such as clothing brands, mixed martial arts (MMA) clubs, university campuses, and micro-communities that overlap with elements of the far right, such as groups of doomsday preppers and survivalists. The book focuses on ‘the kinds of places where young people in particular may encounter extremist messages and ideas in their ordinary lives—perhaps long before they have made an ideological commitment to the far right—and the role that these new, mainstream gateways may play in shaping extremist engagement’ (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 4).
By focusing less on far-right social and political movements and individuals and more on contexts where extremism lures people in through the back door, Miller-Idriss explains clearly how young people can stumble across extremist ideas in their everyday lives, perhaps long before any serious involvement in a far-right group. She also explains how far-right ideas are made cool and ‘edgy’ when they are promoted through humorous memes, YouTube cookery shows or more conventional styles of clothing that lack the aggressive connotations of skinhead dress codes or Ku Klux Klan uniforms.
But before Miller-Idriss addresses how the normalization of far-right ideology occurs in each of these contexts, she presents a readable and thorough introduction to the contemporary far right. We learn about anti-democratic tendencies, opposition to elites and governments, and an ideology that advocates the exclusion of certain groups and uses dehumanizing rhetoric. In recent years, we have seen what broad support such an ideology can achieve, for example, in the United States with the dissemination of fake news, interference in electoral processes, attacks on press freedom, and even violent attacks on the political system itself, through the attempt to overturn the result of a democratic election.
Miller-Idriss calls attention to a crucial difference between the United States and Europe: in the United States, the political system does not allow small parties any serious political engagement in politics, and this has caused the far right to target the Republican Party using a strategy known as entryism, whereby far-right individuals have joined the party without initially revealing their extreme views. Once their feet were firmly inside the door, however, they began to mobilize. In recent years, this strategy has been terrifyingly effective. In contrast, far-right parties in Europe can mobilize through ordinary democratic processes by participating in elections, winning parliamentary seats and even becoming partners in coalition governments. Indeed, the fact that these European parties were forced to downplay their radical messages in order to widen their electoral appeal has contributed to making them palatable as coalition partners (Fangen & Vaage, 2018).
The description of the various characteristics of contemporary far-right extremism serves primarily as an excellent summary, particularly for those not previously familiar with this field of research. The truly ground-breaking feature of this book is its description of the various contexts in which mainstreaming of the far right is taking place today. As a sociologist, Miller-Idriss has a human geographer’s awareness of the significance of space and place. She believes that we must be more prepared to ask when and where far-right extremism takes place, instead of asking only why and how. This is important because currently the far right is disseminating its message in a range of everyday contexts where neither governments, teachers, youth workers or parents are keeping track. Accordingly, young people may stumble across far-right messages while listening to music, ordering T-shirts online, attending a lecture on campus or attending MMA tournaments, music festivals or Bible study groups.
Each context is important in itself, but the links between the contexts are also important. As Miller-Idriss points out, a conspiracy theory appears more believable if it is presented during an ordinary election campaign, and a racist message seems more appealing to the younger generation if it is packaged into an entertaining meme or printed on a T-shirt by a well-known brand. Miller-Idriss describes a world where the same messages are promoted in so many different contexts that receptive audiences will ultimately perceive them as true. What is disturbing is that deliberate efforts are being made to make these messages palatable to broad masses of the population and to win their support. One example was the Unite the Right demonstration in Charlottesville on 12 August 2017, where the organizers encouraged participants to wear smart white T-shirts and chinos so that they would appear presentable.
On YouTube, there are cookery shows where discussions of ingredients and preparation methods are combined with a solid dose of far-right ideology. Some of these programmes are rather obscure, such as Balaclava Küche, where balaclava-wearing presenters make vegan dishes while talking about the importance of food and eating as something that enables a ‘healthy body’ and as a ‘moral choice’ that stays true to the National Socialist ideology. Although this appears rather extreme, the show has a large number of followers. Food is generally well suited to the promotion of messages about identity, tradition, the homeland and purity, as Miller-Idriss observes. This has been exploited deliberately by several far-right organizations. ‘Pure’ food marketed as a symbol of patriotism is just one of the examples of the items sold on the InfoWars website, which is run by the radio host and conspiracy theorist Alex Jones. On the website you can find everything you need to live as a white patriot and to survive any kind of catastrophe: emergency radios and lanterns, respirator masks, iodine tablets and advice for surviving a nuclear accident or attack and organic seeds so that you can grow your own food. Miller-Idriss notes that in the United States there is a large market made up of so-called prepper groups—groups of survivalists that have equipped themselves with everything necessary for self-sufficient survival, and there is a large overlap between such groups and the American far right.
Another example of mainstreaming that Miller-Idriss describes in detail involves MMA clubs and tournaments. MMAs have been popularized by films such as The Matrix and Fight Club, as well as online gaming and amateur tournaments. A number of MMA clubs have emerged in recent years, and since the sport tends to be extremely brutal, certain clubs in Germany have appointed moderators to ensure that everything is conducted ethically. The appointment of moderators has also been necessary because MMA milieus have been increasingly infiltrated by the far right. Examples include the Reconquista Club in Ukraine, which was founded by the Azov Battalion, a neo-Nazi Ukrainian militia. The Azov Battalion appears to be anything but mainstream, but even so this is an example of mainstreaming, because the Reconquista Club is run like an ordinary restaurant, MMA competitions catering even for novices are held every Friday, and children and teenagers can attend the Club’s summer camps.
Miller-Idriss also addresses mainstreaming in intellectual spaces. The dissemination of far-right ideology takes place partly through heckling, with lectures being interrupted by claims that the researchers’ findings are unreliable because they are normative, left-leaning or influenced by Cultural Marxism. In addition, a separate body of far-right research is being produced by far-right think tanks, publishers in journals and in specific academic fields such as eugenics. There are also re-interpretations of well-known academic texts, such as Robert D. Putnam’s Bowling Alone. This book is marketed on a far-right website, and Putnam’s discussion of the reasons for Americans’ disengagement from civil society and their local communities becomes, when viewed through a far-right lens, an argument about the destructive effect of increased diversity (due to immigration) on identity and social cohesion.
Hate in the Homeland is the best description I have read so far about how far-reaching the mainstreaming of the far right has become. Much of the available research is primarily concerned with the mainstreaming that takes place online, for example, through social media (Miller-Idriss devotes an entire chapter to this topic), but the book is ground-breaking precisely in its description of so many other examples of mainstreaming, as well as the links between these different examples. Miller-Idriss has an unusually good grasp of this field and manoeuvres confidently in difficult waters. But there is one point where I think she is partly wrong, and that is her claim about the success of deradicalization measures in Germany. It is correct that Germany has been extremely serious in its efforts to tackle far-right ideology, but at the same time this does not mean that these efforts have been successful. Germany continues to be the European country that has experienced the most far-right violence over the past two decades (see Jupskås & Köhler, 2020), and the far-right AfD party appears likely once again to do relatively well at the polls, with 11 per cent support (Wahlrect, 2021).
In her conclusion, Miller-Idriss refers back to the importance of looking at how and when far-right extremism is found, for by doing so, we will also find the answers to how we can prevent radicalization. The answer is that a significant part of these efforts must take place in everyday contexts—in places where we have not generally thought of radicalization occurring. This may sound like a totalitarian project—that we should be on the lookout for radicalization everywhere and at all times. But as the examples in the book show, there are nevertheless certain things one can look for—such as the symbols and coded messages that are turning up everywhere from images on T-shirts to song lyrics and memes shared on social media.
By focusing on where and when, one achieves a better insight into how today’s young people move in and out of extremist groups in a way that is much more fluid than in the past. For example, a young person may wear a T-shirt with a far-right message, but cover it up with a sweater until they feel that it’s the right time to reveal it. Although Miller-Idriss does not disagree with the necessity of studying the extreme aspects of the far right, she argues that it is by studying the far right’s periphery that we will find exactly where young people make their first acquaintance with the ideology. At the same time, one could argue that some of the examples she uses are anything but peripheral—far-right summer camps arranged by a neo-Nazi militia in Ukraine must rather be defined as hardcore extremism. Even so, Miller-Idriss makes a good point in her recommendation of adopting a public health-style approach to far-right radicalization, with the goal of achieving herd immunity.
This approach involves raising awareness at an early age of what radicalization is about. In other words, the topic should be included in the school curriculum, allowing students to build up resistance to such influences. In addition, there is the need to follow up young people who are traumatized, and generally to recognize the important emotional component of far-right radicalization—that it is about the need to feel a sense of belonging and importance, as well as excitement and transgression. These are topics that I have also been concerned with (Fangen 1999), and Miller-Idriss argues well for the importance of empathy in working with young people who have been radicalized, and explaining how the opposite approach, saying that it is okay to knock down a Nazi, only leads to more hatred. But an important additional point, that Miller-Idriss does not address, is that for such an approach to work it must not be too political, or else it loses legitimacy. Training in evaluating information critically, recognizing disinformation (regardless of political nuance), uncovering conspiracy theories (regardless of the politicial flavour), recognizing radical codes and symbols, and learning about the importance of democratic elections and how as large a part as possible of the population should have the opportunity to vote—all this is essential in the present times. And it is this type of information that one learns about by reading Miller-Idriss’s book.
It will never be possible to construct a watertight bulkhead against far-right violence and terrorism, but Miller-Idriss’s book, which according to the foreword is targeted at teachers, decision-makers, parents, sports coaches and everyone who ‘interacts with young people’, makes wise recommendations, which also have relevance in the Norwegian context. Could an encouragement to follow up early signs of radicalization—before a person has joined defined extremist groups—have successfully prevented cases such as Anders Behring Breivik? If concerns raised with the child welfare services had been better followed up (the emotional component), if someone had reacted to the increasing self-isolation, massive participation in violent online gaming and at the same time noticed engagement in extreme online discussions, would 22 July have been avoided? We will never know the answer, but after both the terror attack of 22 July 2011 and the murder and attempted terrorist attack on 10 August 2019, there is certainly no less need to think broadly and well about far-right radicalization.