The Effect of Retirement On Political Shirking: Evidence From Congressional Voting

Abstract

The theory of rational utility-maximizing agents suggests that politicians should alter their voting patterns when the reelection constraint is removed. However, the previous empirical work on this issue has not shown such a relationship. This article tests the hypothesis that the decision to retire results in systematic changes in political voting behavior (or "political shirking "). The author uses a multiyearpanel data set with more observations than many prior studies, a more precise measure of political shirking, and a different measure of retirement than previous work Least squares estimation yields significant coefficient estimates and substantial evidence that the retirement decision results in political shirking.

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