The desirability of an exogenously induced change in the preferences of individuals
is investigated in the case of the voluntary private provision of a charitable public
good. Because a change in individual preferences implies a change in the means
used to evaluate equilibrium allocations, the welfare criterion of "social supenority," an extension of the conventional Pareto criterion, is used to compare
economic states based on different preferences. This article establishes necessary
and sufficient conditions under which the adoption of nonidentical altruistic (externality internalizing) preferences by heterogenous individuals increases the private
provision of the public good and produces an altruistic state that is socially superior
to the initial state.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Andreoni, J.1988. Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism. Journal of Public Economics35:57-73.
2.
—. 1989. Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. Journal of Political Economy97:1447-58.
3.
—. 1990. Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of “warm glow“ giving. "Economic Journal100.464-77.
4.
Arrow, K.J.1973. Social responsibility and economic efficiency. Public Policy21:303-17.
5.
—. 1975. Gifts and exchanges. In: Altruism, morality, and economic theory, edited by E. Phelps, 13-28. New York: Russell Sage.
6.
Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian.1986. On the private provision of public goodsJournal of Public Economics29:25-50.
7.
Bernheim, B.D.1986. On the voluntary and involuntary provision of public goods . American Economic Review76:789-93.
8.
Bernheim, B.D., and O. Stark.1988. Altruism within the family reconsidered: Do nice guys finish last?American Economic Review78:1034-45.
9.
Bordignon, M.1990. Was Kant right? Voluntary provision of public goods under the principle of unconditional commitment. Economic Notes, no. 3:342-72.
10.
Buchholz, W.1993. A further perspective on neutrality in a public goods economy with conjectural variations. Public Finance Quarterly21:115-18.
11.
Comes, R., and T. Sandler.1984a. Easy riders, joint production, and public goods. Economic Journal94:580-98.
12.
—. 1984b. The theory of public goods: Non-Nash behavior . Journal of Public Economics23:367-79.
13.
—. 1986. The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods . New York: Cambridge University Press.
14.
Frank, R.H.1987. If homo economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience?American Economic Review77:593-604.
15.
Guttman, J.1986. Matching behavior and collective action. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization7:171-98.
16.
—. 1987. A non-Coumot model of voluntary collective action . Economica54:1-19.
17.
Holländer, H.1990. A social exchange approach to voluntary cooperation . American Economic Review58:1157-67.
18.
Kaufman, D.1991. Self-serving philanthropy and Pareto optimality . Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics62:573-90.
19.
Kolm, S.-C.1983. Altruism and efficiency. Ethics94:18-65.
20.
Kuran, T.1990. Private and public preferences. Economics and Philosophy6:1-26.
21.
Laffont, J.-J.1975. Macroeconomic constraints, economic efficiency and ethics: An introduction to Kantian economics. Economica42:430-37.
22.
Margolis, H.1982. Selfishness, altruism and rationality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
23.
Roberts, R.1987. Financing public goods. Journal of Political Economy95:420-37.
24.
Rothenberg, J.1953. Welfare comparisons and changes in tastes. American Economic Review43:885-90.
25.
Sandler, T., and J. Posnett.1991. The private provision of public goods: A perspective on neutrality. Public Finance Quarterly19:22-42.
26.
Schoeffler, S.1952. Note on modem welfare economics. American Economic Review42:880-87.
27.
Stark, O.1989. Altruism and the quality of life. American Economic Review79:86-90.
28.
Steinberg, R.1987. Voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federalist system. American Economic Review77:24-36.
29.
Sugden, R.1984. Reciprocity: The supply of public goods through voluntary contributions. Economic Journal94:772-87.
30.
Weisbrod, B.1977. Comparing utility functions in efficiency terms or, what kind of utility functions do we want?American Economic Review67:991-95.
