It is well known that joint cost allocations should not be used in making output
decisions, but they might be required for budgeting or accounting purposes. This
article develops approaches to joint cost allocation that minimize the chance of
disturbing a correctly determined output set when cost information is not known
with certainty. The approaches developed are shown in a case example to have the
potential to substantially decrease the chance of cost allocations motivating output
distortions, relative to extant methods.
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