This article considers the direct provision of merit goods when consumers and the
government hold different sets of beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events. In
a simple model, it is shown that direct provision of the good can outperform tax and
subsidy systems when consumers differ only in their beliefs. However, when agents
differ in other characteristics, it is demonstrated that transfers in-kind need not raise
welfare.
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