This article examines the role of information acquisition and the interaction between
learning and individual choices in a model of voluntary public good provision. It
shows that if agents form conjectural variations via a simple econometric learning
process, final equilibira are dependent upon initial conditions. There is a significant
set of possible equilibria that arise as limit points of this process and they may be
given a simple geometric interpretation.
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